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1978 Georgia gubernatorial election

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Georgia gubernatorial election of 1978

← 1974 November 7, 1978 1982 →
 
George Busbee.jpg
Rodney Mims Cook.jpg
Nominee George Busbee Rodney Mims Cook, Sr.
Party Democratic Republican
Popular vote 534,572 128,139
Percentage 80.7% 19.3%

GACountiesGovernor1978.svg
County Results


Busbee:      50-60%      70-80%      80-90%      90-100%



Governor before election

George Busbee
Democratic

Elected Governor

George Busbee
Democratic

The 1978 Georgia gubernatorial election was held on November 7, 1978. George Busbee was re-elected, the first time a Governor of Georgia was re-elected for a second four-year term under the amendment made to the constitution in 1976 and the first time overall after serving a complete first four-year term.

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Transcription

>> Grant Harris: Well, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen. Good afternoon and welcome to the Library of Congress. I am Grant Harris. I'm Chief of the European Division here. I'm very fortunate to be able to work in this building. You may have seen there are three buildings here on Capitol Hill. We would like to thank the Finlandia Foundation. And specifically the Finlandia-- Finlandia Foundation's National Capital Chapter for working with the Library on this interesting presentation by James Ford Cooper. We would like to thank all of the Finlandia Foundation Board Members who made this event possible. Very briefly, let me say that the Library of Congress is proud of its extensive collections from or about Finland. We have approximately 100,000 volumes concerning Finland. Among other things, we have a first-rate collection of monographs that concern Finnish diplomacy. And we have a few of them on display in the back there. These are featured there. The Library strives constantly to acquire the best scholarship from each country. And from Finland, we receive each year between 400 and 500 volumes. The European Division is responsible for, for providing reference assistance, and for developing the Library's collections. Not only from Finland and Nordic countries. But relating to all of, almost all of continental Europe. And we're fortunate to have Dr. Taru Spiegel whose first language is Finnish, as our curator for collections from Finland. And from all of the other Nordic languages. If you have any interest in using the collections now or in the future, please contact Taru. She'll make it really easy for you to use the materials here in the Library. So we hope you'll come again to explore the Library's collections and, and, and the, our offerings. And that you have a good time here this evening. It is now my pleasure to introduce Turto Turtiainen. Excuse me. Let me say that last name one more time: Turtiainen. First, first syllable accent always in Finnish, just know that. [Laughter] He is President of the Finlandia Foundation, National Capital Chapter. He hails from Varkaus in Eastern Finland. He was a naval officer in the Finnish Navy while studying at the University of Helsinki. And he received a Ph.D. in political science. Dr. Turtiainen worked for the World Bank, living among other places, in Kenya and Nigeria. He focused on agricultural cooperatives and cooperative finance, good Finnish concepts. He wrote many studies for the World Bank. And the Library has one of his works. I remind you now to please turn off your cell-- cell phones. [Laughter] Is that me, or is that somebody in the front row? I remind you now to please turn off your cell phones and recording devices for the duration of the program. [Cell phone ringtone] [ Laughter ] Off, yes. Off is the right, yeah. So after the presentation, we'll have time for questions and answers. So be aware that this event is being recorded for a future webcast. So Dr. Turtiainen, please come up here. [ Applause ] >> Turto Turtiainen: Good afternoon, all. You are respected participants. And Mr. Harris, thank you very much for your kind introduction. I'm very pleased to introduce Mr. Cooper to you, our speaker today. But before that, I would like to make some acknowledgement. It is extremely hard work to get an event like this organized. And it requires hard work from a number of people. From the Capital Chapter side, our coordinator for this event was Hannah Vaughner. Very hard work. [ Applause ] She was cooperating very intensely with Dr. Taru Spiegel, who for her part was helped by Wanda Cartwright. Is that correct? I think they deserve also just as much-- . [ Applause ] On the financial side, it always requires some finances to get an event like this organized. Finlandia Foundation, especially the President of Finlandia Foundation, Ossi Rahkonen very critical position. [ Applause ] Thank you all very much for this effort you have put in. And Mr. Harris, if you would kind, be so kind as to pass our gratitude for using, for allowed to be using this beautiful room or pavilion as it said, to your higher management. If there is any higher management. [ Laughter ] About our speaker today. Many of you are his friends. You know him well. If you do not, or if you have not met him. You might have been taking a look at the, those information notices which we are passing around. Newsletter, Facebook, and website. And you have got the basic, basics about Mr. Cooper's background. He has a long history or career at the U.S., U.S. Foreign Service. Especially interesting for us is that he has been in Finland twice. First as a Political Counselor and then later on another, another period there. When he was there as the Deputy Chief of Mission. As you know Deputy Chief of Mission is really the head of the, head of the Embassy. If we ignore the political appointments. [ Laughter ] But besides that, some of you might have also read this book he has written. [Inaudible] his wonderful [inaudible]. I have actually gone through it during the past few days. And it really is, is wonderful, wonderful book. And good reading. But I have something more personal to share with you also. I have discussed with some of his old colleagues. And they told that when he was in Helsinki, especially in the last position as the Deputy Chief of Mission. He was the very best Deputy Chief of Mission they had ever worked with. And that's something I think -- . [ Applause ] One of his, one of his principles, working principles voiced that he wanted to have a very good [inaudible] with the Embassy staff. That's important. For today's session, it's even more important, the other aspect of his approach to, to the world was he wanted to have very close contact with all the decision-makers. Important decision-makers or opinion leaders in, in Finland. In order to have a good idea and good opinions or clear opinions. About what those people like President Kekkonen or President Koivisto thought about the big neighbor. Our big neighbor who was the other side. That means Soviet Union was on the other side of the Cold War. So that was something very special, special and that I think is very closely related to today. So with these few words, please help me to welcome to the podium the current Lecturer of the Year of the Finlandia Foundation, Mr. James Ford Cooper. [ Applause ] [ Foreign Language ] >> James Ford Cooper: I wanted to use up a few of my last remaining Finnish vocabulary so I thought I'd get that out of the way. It's, it's a great pleasure really to be here. Thank you for those, those kind words and, and whoever your sources were, about my performance as Deputy Chief of Mission. It's, it's to here, we're here to talk about a, a subject very dear to my heart: U.S.-- Finnish relations. I came into the Foreign Service, if you can believe it, 1960, December 1960. The last weeks of the Eisenhower presidency. And yes, I was able and proud and to stand in the snow and watch the inauguration of John F. Kennedy as President of the United States. So that's going back quite a ways. And my, the first part of my Foreign Service career was in Latin America. And it was exciting. I met my wife there in 1961. And that's, that's if you can add, that's 58 years ago or so. And we had, it was a fascinating place to be in the early sixties. But by the mid-1970s, I was in Colombia, South America. And no longer happy with U.S. policies under President Nixon and Secretary Kissinger vis a vis Latin America and our support for right-wing dictatorships. And, and authoritarian governments. And I was very much in accord with U.S. policies in, in Europe. And so I asked the State Department personnel system is I couldn't be transferred to an embassy in, in Europe. And by golly, they came through. And I received word in 1975, early, that we were going to be, that I was going to be appointed as U.S. Political Counselor at the Embassy in Helsinki. But first, ten months of Finnish language training. And my wife also was given an opportunity to take the Finnish language training. So we had a full year at least to prepare for assignment to, to Finland. And then from, from let's say from the language training and the area studies with, with Bob Rhinehart. And Nordic area studies which were invaluable. Bob and I fought a little battle here three years ago to try to keep the area studies alive. But not, we were not successful, unfortunately. Don't understand it. In any case, from 1975 with the language training and already the, the, the officials from the Embassy of Finland in Washington very astutely keeping track of young officers heading off to Finland. Making sure that they were hearing already in Washington the Finnish point of view. And so, and doing independent reading. And so from 1975 to 1978, 1988 I was dealing almost all of my career with Finland. Because I had the assignment as Political Counselor '76 to '79. And then I went on and did other things. And then sent back in 1984 -'86 as the Deputy Chief of Mission. Following which I was immediately assigned to the State Department as Director of the Office of Northern European Affairs. So two more years of dealing with Nordic countries. And importantly with Finland. So you can say that from 1975 through, through 1988, I was dealing almost, most of the time, a good part of that time with, with Finnish affairs and Nordic affairs. And during this long period, I developed a professional and sometimes personal relationship with top-ranking Finns in the Finnish government. Presidential advisors, Foreign Ministry officials, Finnish Security and Defense Ministry experts. General Ari Puheloinen, for example, was a contact of ours. Political party leaders of all, of all political parties including, including the Communist Party, labor leaders. And leading Finnish academics and, and others. And Magda and our children, one of whom is here with us tonight. Developed a, a deep affection for Finland and for Finns. And I believe I was able to gain some important insights into Finnish history, culture, and domestic and foreign policy and politics. And it was also during, towards the end of this period of concentration. That I decided that when I retired, I wanted to write a book about U.S.-- Finnish relations. Now our target subject today is U.S.-- Finnish relations during the Cold War. There are many people, how were two countries with totally different perspectives and circumstances heading into the long Cold War able to develop a basically positive and constructive relationship with each other? The United States entered the Cold War as by far the most powerful country in the world. Both economically and militarily. And as the effective leader of what would become the NATO alliance. And deeply concerned already about Soviet domination of Eastern Europe. And concerned about Soviet goals and ambitions towards a Western Europe. Prostrated by the destruction of World War II. So the U.S. had a unique perspective on, on the, on the world as the Cold War began. Finland's perspective, as it entered the Cold War, could hardly have been more different. Beginning with the fact that Finland had been forced into a harsh peace after its wars with the neighboring Soviet Union. Wars in which Finland was able to maintain its independence, but it had to, had to cede ten percent of its territory to the Soviet Union. The very country, the very country at the heart of our Cold War concerns. And a country with which Finland shared an 800-mile border. Now many, many in this room obviously know a lot about Finland. But I want to review with you the different elements of the Finnish context and history. The parts that I believe was important. And this is the point. The part that was important for U.S. diplomats and policymakers to know about Finland. Which would help us understand Finland's Cold War outlook. And how it was importantly influenced by her long and often arduous history. Moreover, to step back and, and look at, at these factors and historical periods this evening serves as a useful and inspiring reminder to all of us. What this exceptional country and people have endured and overcome during their long history. Few countries have had as, as interesting and as turbulent a history as has Finland. And few if any countries have their histories and their geographical, geopolitical realities had such a direct and lasting impact on their national character and outlook as is the case of Finland. And here's a heads-up. Just as I want to put U.S.-- Finnish relations in historical context. I also realize that we cannot end our discussion this evening with the end of the Cold War. There have been too many important developments since the end, since 1990. Right down to the present, which I think we need to, to refer to and think about. So a key element to start at the beginning. A key element in understanding Finland is to internalize Finland's extreme northern position. And I want to give you two quick perspectives. And that's, that's not happening. Come on. Yeah, there it is, okay. Alright this is starting at the beginning, okay? [Laughter] Starting at the beginning, giving you a break. Twelve thousand years ago just a reminder that all of Finland was covered by a massive glacier ice pack that gradually receded as the Ice Age ended. Gouging out the ravines and the thousands of lakes surrounded by forests. Which characterized ancient and even a part, a good part of even current-day Finland. The glacier pack history reminds us of how far, how far north Finland is. What am I touching wrong here? There we go. And now, and so does this, this interesting map which I came across. It shows Finland in juxtaposition to the Eurasian continent. But Finland just related how far Finland was in and is from, from Central and Western Europe. And, and it, it for thousands of years, it must have been an isolating factor. And then think of that early group of migrants to Finland, bringing with them the [inaudible] predecessor language of today's Finnish language. Which is we know is closely related only to Estonian and to the Karelian languages that was spoken on the Russian side of the Finnish-- Russian border. Now the Finnish language of course is totally unrelated to any Indo-European languages. Including the Slavic languages spoken on Finland's east and the Nordic languages spoken to Finland's west. And I, I'm suggesting that Finland's geographical location, its relative isolation. And then this language which was totally different, totally different grammatic, grammatical structure and vocabulary. I think these have been factors helping to isolate Finland from mainland Europe. And also in maintaining a cohesion among the Finns. And to a certain degree, protecting Finland from unwanted outside influences over, over hundreds if not thousands of years. When nations began forming in the, in the early Middle Ages, around 1150, Finland came under the domination of neighboring Sweden. And for some 650 years, Finland was controlled by Sweden and indeed became considered as a, as the comprising the eastern half of the Swedish realm. Swedes and Swedish Finns dominated the economic, cultural, and governmental and social heights in Finland throughout that long period. Even though Finnish was the mother tongue of well over 80% of the Finnish part of Sweden. This centuries-long period left strong social, organizational, and cultural legacies that are recognized by sociologists. As having endured to the present time. The next extremely important historical period which had an enormous impact on Finland. Including on its outlook during the Cold War was when Czarist Russia took Finland away from Sweden in the early 19th century during Europe's Napoleonic Wars. Finland had of course had been fought over countless times. Between Sweden and Russia with the Finns fighting alongside the Swedes against the Russian incursions. However, this time, Sweden was forced to cede Finland to Russia. Czar Alexander I in March 1809, Czar Alexander I summoned the Finnish Estates or "diet parliament," if you will. To gather formally in the small city of [inaudible], east of Helsinki. And propose that Finland become a quote, "Grand Duchy of Russia." Alexander I understood it would be a great mistake to try to Russify the newly-acquired Finland. Rather, the idea was to try to loosen the centuries-long Swedish influence over Finland. Under the agreement, the Czar consequently granted, granted wide autonomy to Finland. It would have its own parliament. It would select and manage its own government. Pass its own laws, including tax laws. Finland could raise its own military. Russian citizens had no rights in Finland. Now the Czar did keep the authority to appoint a Russian as the Governor General of Finland. Resident in Helsinki. But the Governor General would report directly to the Czar in the latter's capacity as the Grand Duke of Finland. He would not be responsible to any Russian bureaucracies. Importantly the Czar himself affirmed in his closing speech in [inaudible] at that conference. That the Finns had been quote, "Elevated to membership in the family of nations." Unquote. So these constructive policies permitted and encouraged intense resurgence of Finnish nationalism and awareness. Which manifested itself in the flowering of the Finnish culture and language during the Grand Duchy period. Three examples, three quick examples in the arts. Akseli Gallen Kallela, a famous Finnish artist. This is a self-portrait. But he also frequently resorted to themes from the [foreign language] in his paintings. Here you have Finland's first playwright and novelist to write in the Finnish language. Aleksi Kivi, who wrote "Seitsaman Veljesta." And then later in the century, of course the extraordinarily famous then and famous now Jean Sibelius whose works had many references to Finnish nationalism. Just think of his, of his tone poem, Finlandia. The use of the Finnish language was vastly widened during the Grand Duchy period. And in 1863, the Finnish language was finally accorded equal status with the Swedish language. The first high school in the Finnish language was not established until about 1844. Not a single, in other words, not a single high school in the Finnish language throughout the entire 650-year Swedish period. One of the leading proponents and promoters of the expanded use of the Finnish language was and culture was Johan Vilhelm Snellman. His famous aphorism was "Swedes we are no longer. Russians we cannot become. We must be Finns." And language started becoming an important issue. There was resentment among some Swedish Finns over the loss of the unique status of the Swedish language. And many Finns of Finnish-speaking backgrounds expressed resentment against the untoward influence wielded by the Finns of Swedish-speaking backgrounds. Nevertheless, many Finns, including Swedish Finns identified with the concept of emphasizing Finnishness. Many Swedish Finns changed their Swedish names to Finnish names. Reversing the process of a previous era when some Finnish-speaking Finns changed their names to Swedish names in order to fit in better with the, the policy, the, the power structure of the time. But there's no denying that the language issue for decades was important in Finland and divisive. Fortunately, only remnants of these feelings can occasionally be noted in today's Finland. Now, all of these positives associated with being a Grand Duchy were swept away with the accession to the throne of Czar Nicholas II in 1898. Ignoring the benevolent and successful practices of Alexander I and his immediate three successors, Czar Nicholas ordered a brutal program of Russification of Finland. He appointed a Russian army general, Nikolai Bobrikov, as the Governor General of Finland. With orders to carry out a strict Russification program. Here we have General Bobrikov. Actions included the decisions of the Finnish Parliament could be overruled by Russian authorities. The small Finnish army was abolished. Young Finns became subject to conscription into the Russian army. All official government business must be conducted in the Russian language. The Finns were outraged! In a matter of weeks, a petition to the Czar was signed by over half a million Finns, more than half of the adult Finnish population of the time. Czar Nicholas refused even to receive the delegation that brought him that petition. Finnish unrest was dramatized by the assassination of Governor General Bobrikov in Helsinki in 1904. The assassin was a young Swedish-speaking Finnish nationalist Eugen Schauman. Who then turned his weapon on himself and killed himself. He left behind a letter saying his act was in response to Bobrikov's brutal Russification campaign in Finland. Eugen Schauman became an enduring national hero to all Finns of both Swedish and Finnish backgrounds. But it was not just the Russification program of Czar Nicholas II that was the trouble. It was rather a towering incompetence on his part that had introduced a 20-year period, 1898 to 1918, of chaos in Russia. That spilled over into Finland. This became another formative historical period exerting strong influence on the Finnish perspectives during the Cold War. You had the loss in 1904, the Russian loss to the Russo-Japanese War. The St. Petersburg revolutionary uprising in 1905, resulting in the 1905 Bloody Sunday Massacre. You had the overthrow of the czar finally in May of 1917 within the Revolution of the Mensheviks. And the provisional governor, government of Alexander Kerensky. Who in turn was overthrown by the Bolsheviks of Vladimir Lenin in the October 1917 revolution. And the assassination of Czar Nicholas II and his whole family. All of these events in Russia had tremendous consequences for Finland. Creating and exacerbating serious divisions. There were differences between Finnish political and language groups. About how to continue resistance to the Russification program. The language issue itself became more divisive. The Finnish socialist movement gained strength. The Finns were able, however, in 1906 to take advantage of the chaos in St. Petersburg or Petrograd by then I guess. To approve the new 200-member, single chamber parliament. Called the [foreign language]. And then in the 1907 parliamentary elections introduced for the first time in Europe, universal suffrage. Electing several women to the new [foreign language] in the process. Meanwhile, social democrats won a majority in the 1916 parliamentary elections. David pointed out to me last night, that that was the only time a single party in Finland ever had an absolute majority in the Parliament. Back in 1916. And the [inaudible] government overthrew that, overthrew that election. And the Finnish socialists divided among themselves between the moderates and the hardliners. Similar to and influenced by the split between the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks in Russia. And indeed the Finnish moderates sort of had their links back to the Mensheviks. And the Finnish socialist hardliners had their links to the Bolsheviks. In the 1917 parliamentary elections, the Finnish socialists with their now more radical social demands lost their majority by a narrow margin. And a non-socialist government, coalition government, was formed by, by headed by P.E. Svinhufvud, who drafted the Finnish Declaration of Independence. And submitted it to the [foreign language]. It was approved by the [foreign language] on December 6, 1917. And of course, as we all know, we celebrated it for a year. It became accepted as the official date of Finnish independence. Meanwhile, the more radical Finnish socialists organized militia units called Red Guards. And the Finnish conservative movement also formed Civil Guards or White Guards units. Finland was increasingly polarized. On January 3, 1918, the new Russian leader, Vladimir Lenin, formally recognized Finnish independence. Although both he and Stalin expected that Finland would soon become a part of what was to become the Soviet Union. The hardline Finnish social revolutionaries rebelled against the conservative government of Svinhufvud. They declared a general strike and were supported by the Russian Bolsheviks now in power in Petrograd. The officials of the Svinhufvud coalition government had to flee Helsinki and north to Vaasa where the conservative forces were gathering. The Finnish socialists established a government they called quote, "Finnish Socialist Workers Republic," unquote. And signed an agreement with the now-Bolshevik Lenin government of Russia on March 1, 1918. The Russian's promised weapons and supplies to the Red Guards. One example of what was at stake. The Svinhufvud government had sent to Parliament a bill to convert tenant farmers into owners of the land that they worked. The Socialist People's Commission instead declared that tenant farmers would become tenants of the state. So the split was final. And the Civil War was on. Kind of interesting slide here. The disposition of, of the Red and White territories at the outset of the 1918 Civil War. Of course there were, there were exceptions and different groups in different parts. But that reflects the basic reality. There were some 70,000 Russian troops in Finland at the start of the war. But most were pulled back by the Russian government to Karelia. In the north, White Guards disarmed and disbanded numerous Russian troops. The Red Guards were untrained and without experienced leadership. At the officer and non-commissioned officer level. In contrast, many of the White Guards had prior military experience. Moreover, they had the most experienced and brilliant leader of them all, General, soon to become Marshal, Carl Gustaf Mannerheim. Born in Finland of a distinguished Baltic-Swedish family. Mannerheim, who did not speak Finnish, attended the Czar's Military School in St. Petersburg. Later becoming the prestigious, the commander of the prestigious Czar's own regiment. During World War I, he was a Major General in the Czarist Army, fighting against Germans on the Eastern front. At the outbreak of the Bolshevik revolution, Mannerheim had to flee from Russia to Finland. Narrowly escaping execution by his own troops. Mannerheim was given overall command of the White forces. Which also benefited from significant German material, military material support. Young Finns who had secretly been sent to Germany during World War I for training. And some of whom actually fought alongside the Germans, returned to Finland in the Civil War and were turned into the elite Jager battalion. On March 3, 1918, the Soviets and the Germans signed a treaty ending Russian participation in World War I on terms very favorable to Germany. General Mannerheim had stated he did not want the assistance of any foreign troops in the Finnish Civil War. However, in April the Germans landed a full division in southern Finland and rapidly defeated the Finnish Red forces. And then went on to capture the capital city of Helsinki. Meanwhile the White forces of Mannerheim, took what was a major socialist stronghold, the city of [inaudible] also in April. And by early May, the Civil War was over. Brother against brother, veli veljea vastaan. This was a brutal five months short but brutal Civil War with heavy casualties. Some 33,000 Finns lost their lives, one out of every 100 Finns at the time. Even worse, even worse, only one-quarter of the deaths occurred during actual combat. Although it is distasteful, I believe we have to recognize in this presentation with at least this one photo of the numerous war crimes and atrocities that occurred on both sides. Ten thousand of the 33,000 deaths were by summary military executions like the one we see here. Of these executions, some 80% were by the White Guards. And some 20% by the Red Guards. And also, even though the Civil War lasted only five months. Many thousand more Finns died of disease or starvation in prison of war camps. Mostly in the White POW camps. Many of these deaths could have been prevented. The war left a bitter legacy that divided Finns for decades, although the 1939 Soviet invasion of Finland helped draw the two sides of the Civil War closer together against the common enemy. But memories are long. These times are still not forgotten. Here we have a, we see General Marshal, Marshal Mannerheim bringing, leading the White Forces after the Civil War is over. Leading them into Helsinki. I believe that's [inaudible]. It seems probable that had the Red Guards won the Civil War. Finland would have been joined again to the now-communist Soviet Union. As had been anticipated by both Lenin and Stalin. Instead, Finland was very much within the German sphere of influence following the war. The Soviets had been pressuring Finland to move the Finnish-- Soviet border on the Karelian Isthmus westward. Offering Finland some significant land concessions further north along the 880-mile Finnish-- Soviet border. But Karelia had a central place in Finnish history and folklore as the origin, the mystic, mythic origin and actual origin of Finnish history and of the, of the Finnish National Epic poem, the [foreign language] which had been compiled from, from by [foreign language]. It was politically impossible for the Finnish political leaders. To agree to moving the border even though Mannerheim warned them that the border was not defensible. Suddenly, on August 29, 1939, the situation changed drastically. Germany and the Soviet Union signed in Moscow the infamous Molotov-- von Ribbentrop-negotiated Non-Aggression Pact. Here we see, we see Molotov on the right, von Ribbentrop on the left. And Joseph Stalin in the center. This pact gave Hitler a free hand to invade Western Europe. The two sides agreed to divide Poland between them. And unbeknownst to Finland was a secret provision giving the Soviet Union carte blanche to do whatever it wanted in the Baltic and Finland areas without interference from Germany. This led immediately to renewed Soviet pressure on Finland to cede Karelian territories. Joseph Stalin said, "The Finnish-- Soviet border is too close to Leningrad. We cannot move Leningrad, so we're going to have to move the Finnish-- Soviet border." And the Soviet Union attacked. Here was the Soviet Union Red Army plan of attack. You'll notice the arrows penetrating into Finland from all directions. Well as we know, none of these arrows went anywhere. Except modestly but importantly on the Karelian Isthmus. The Soviet Army invaded on November 30, 1939. At the first Karelian town reached by the Red Army, [foreign language], the Soviets established the so-called Finnish Democratic Republic. They recognized it as the official government of Finland. Placing at its head the Finnish communist Arto Kosonen, who had fled to the Soviet Union following the Finnish Civil War. This was a pretty clear signal perhaps of what plans the Soviets had in mind for Finland. The Finns, desperate, pleaded for international support against the Soviet onslaught. The British and French consulted with each other about some kind of joint intervention at some point. But nothing ever materialized. The Finns were on their own against the Soviet Union and the mighty Red Army. A powerful lesson, you think, to be learned? To be kept in mind during the Cold War? To the admiration of the world, Finland fought courageously, inflicting unbelievably high casualties on the Soviet Red Army. Soviet leaders and generals thought that Helsinki, well would be taken in maybe 10 or 12 days. Instead, the war dragged on for months. The spirit of the Finnish resistance can be summarized in a few scenes from the Winter War. And I just simply could not resist including, including a few. Here you have the Finnish ski troops with their iconic white coverings over their uniforms. Here you have a Finnish ski troop column overran a Red Army tank column, a frequent occurrence during the three-month war. Here you have Finnish Winter War machine gun in placements. Set up alongside of strategic places facing fields, open fields covered with snow and frozen lakes. And the recently purged Red Army Officer Corps and experienced officers marched their soldiers in their, in their brown great coats across the open fields. And open and frozen lakes with some tank support, it is true. Considerable tank support. But the Finnish machine guns mowed them down. Yes, Helsinki was bombed during the Winter War. And here finally, Red Army dead in their brown great coats. One Finnish general said, "Poor Finland. We are a small country. Where are we going to bury them all?" [Laughter] The world looked on in admiration as Finland held off the far-superior Soviet forces. But no help came. Finland had to sue for peace in March 1940. The Finnish people were devastated because Finland seemed to have won all of the battled. But Mannerheim and his staff knew that the Russian attacks now. With new generals, better tactics, more weapons and more men. Could not be stopped by a militarily depleted Finnish forces with tremendous loss of, of equipment as a result of the Winter War. The Soviet Union, meanwhile, was getting anxious that the war was dragging on longer than they expected. And so while insisting on their territorial demands which they in fact increased their demands. They forgot about the puppet government in [inaudible]. And negotiated directly with the duly constituted government of Finland. [Inaudible] to, to consider the casualties suffered by both sides in the, in the November 1939-- March 1940 Winter War. Dead or missing in action, Finland about 26,000. The Soviet Union from between 126,000 to 168,000. Wounded: Finland, around 44,000. The Soviet Union: around 167,000. The, the losses of the Finns, the dead and wounded were by no means insignificant, given their small population. It was a serious sacrifice. But the casualty rate was four or five to one. Which is virtually unheard of in modern warfare. And I want to recognize now, as and many others have. That had it not been for the extraordinary heroism, determination, sacrifices, and prowess of the Finnish armed forces, Finland's fighting forces, and their home front support during the Winter War. And the later Continuation War, the Red Army surely would have moved, moved to occupy Finland. If not in 1940, then in 1944 or 1948 or even later. It seems certain that the Soviet and Red Army leadership decided or concluded that any attempt to subjugate Finland would have met endless fighting and resistance. A proud and definitive chapter in Finnish history, the likes of which few, few countries, if any other countries can point to. After the Winter War, as determined in the summer of 1940, the Red Army divided Poland with Germany. They invaded Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia and forcibly incorporated them into the Soviet Union. They stepped up their propaganda attacks on Finland. The Finns began digging new defensive lines and feared the worst. However, that July of 1940, Germany sent a secret military mission to Helsinki. And let it be known that Hitler was planning to invade the Soviet Union the next spring. Were the Finns interested? [Laughter] Well, the Finns adopted one of the oldest and unwritten rules in international warfare, international affairs and in warfare. My enemy's enemy is my friend. And here was Finland's enemy's enemy. Adolf Hitler on the left chatting with Marshal Mannerheim in the center and President Risto Ryti on the right. However, Finland did stipulate to Germany that they would not be allies with Germany in this war against the Soviet Union. But rather a co-belligerent. That is to say fighting the same enemy but for their own goals. In this case to regain their lost territory. They assisted the German forces, some 250,000. The Finns helped them transit Finland to get up to Lapland. Some 250,000, where they would attack the Soviet forces protecting Murmansk. But Finland would not assist Germany in the siege of Leningrad which could easily could have done. It was almost hard not to do. And nor would Finland move to cut the Murmansk-- Moscow railway line which was possible. Which the Allies were using of course to resupply Soviet Union during the war. So when Hitler's forces invaded the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. Finland waited three days and then executed its own planned attack. Finnish forces took back their lost territory and then took over much of Soviet Karelia. And then established defensive lines to see what was going to happen in the greater war. Finland called its renewed fighting with the Soviet Union the Continuation War. Continuation of the Winter War. Here we see Finland occupied Soviet Karelia, that large pinkish area in the center was part of the Soviet Union. It was Karelia, Soviet part of Karelia. The Finns occupied that entire area. And then as I say, sort of established defensive lines and waited to see what would happen. It is quite possible, let's, let's be realistic. Quite possible that had Hitler won the war, there would have been a greater Finland. Including the Soviet Karelia. However, after Stalingrad, when it became clear to the Finns and to many others. That the Soviet Union and the Allies were going to defeat Germany. Finland began secret negotiations with the Soviet Union to get out of the war. Meanwhile, it was talk, talk, fight, fight. Then in June 1944, the Red Army launched a massive military and artillery attack on the Karelian Isthmus. The Finns were overwhelmed and sought the assistance from the Germans to halt the offensive. The Germans initially refused to provide the Finns with the heavy equipment and air support they needed to stop the attack. Because they had become aware that the Finns were secretly negotiating with the, with the Soviet Union for a separate peace. It was only when President Risto Ryti of Finland gave his personal assurances. That he would not approve a separate peace agreement under his presidency, did the Germans relent and provide to Finland the necessary equipment. To blunt the attack and avoid being overwhelmed. As soon as the attack was stopped, President Ryti resigned the presidency. The Parliament named Marshal Mannerheim president. And he promptly signed an armistice agreement in September, ending the conflict with the Soviet Union. A cynical maneuver? Ryti's commitment had been personal. And thus not binding on his successor. But that was what Finland had to do to survive as an independent country. The fighting with the Soviet Union was over. But under the terms of the agreement, the Finns had to drive the German forces out of Lapland. A very annoyed German forces, I might add. Drive them out of Lapland which they did. The war was over, but prospects for Finland were bleak. The Soviets demanded further territorial concessions from the Finns. Remember earlier they had offered to give some additional territories all up north along the Finnish-- Russian border to some territorial concessions to Finland. Instead, they took a big chunk from [inaudible] and then a big chunk from [inaudible] which was Finland's outlet to the Arctic Sea. Very important demands. They also took some islands, Finnish islands from the Gulf of Finland. And then very importantly, way there at the bottom left, the, you see Porkkala. The Soviets, that's a peninsula near Helsinki. The Soviet Union grabbed up that peninsula as a, as a, as a Soviet naval base. And demanded a 50-year lease on that base, only miles from Helsinki. And then one of the bleakest and most feared events in Finland's history. September 22, 1944, the Allied Control Commission arrives in Helsinki, remains from 1944 to 1947. Emblematic of Finland's precarious position. The Allied Control Commission consisted of 200 Soviet and 15 British members. And was headed by the Soviet Colonel General Andrei Zhdanov. A well-known Communist Party ideologue from, ideologue from Leningrad. With always a special, almost perverse interest in Finland. The ACC as it was called set up its headquarters in the Hotel [inaudible] in downtown Helsinki. Zhdanov totally dominated the ACC and deeply meddled in Finnish political affairs. He brokered the creation of a Communist front electoral movement called the SKDL. The Finnish People's Democratic League. Which had a good and strong electoral result in 1944 parliamentary elections in Finland. Zhdanov saw these results as very promising and stated that after the election. That he saw Finland as quote, "Being firmly on the road of democratic development. Alongside Hungary and Romania." Hardly countries I think Finland would like to be paired with. And then you had the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947. It included very harsh terms for Finland. The United States could not participate in the Paris Peace Treaty negotiations about Finland. Why? Because we were the only Allied country that never declared war on Finland. The middle of World War II, we did not consider Finland an enemy. It was just a country doing what it had to do to try to preserve its independence. That we had not been at war with Finland explains in part why the U.S. was not included also in the Allied Control Commission in Helsinki. The Paris Peace Treaty terms essentially reinforced-- I jumped ahead here. Anyway, reinforced the territorial transfers to the Soviet Union that we've always talked about. It formalized the mandatory 50-year lease on the Peninsula Porkkala. And demanded war, war crime trials against Finnish conservative and social democratic party political leaders. It placed strict and permanent limitations on the size of Finland's military forces and types of weaponry that would be permitted. Even in future years. And demanded heavy war reparation from Finland. I've seen estimates ranging from $300 million to $600 US-million dollars. And this is where I meant to get now, to this flag. So here we were. The cold, hard facts that Finland and its leaders had to take, had to face and take into account. The, as the World War II ended and the Cold War began. Finland had been abandoned to its fate in 1939 by the Western countries. It faced brutally harsh terms imposed by the 1944 armistice agreement with the Soviet Union. And by the 1947 Peace Treaty. Moreover, in 1948, the Soviet Union imposed a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance on Finland. Which in effect said that if the Soviet, Soviet Union should unilaterally decide that Finland might be under some kind of possible threat. From a third country, then the Soviet Union would come to Finland's assistance whether or not Finland wanted it to. [Laughter] So that's what the Finns, that's what Finland faced from the east. But it must also be noted that signals from the west, that Finland could not rely on Western support against the Soviet Union during the Cold War. In a memorandum of a NATO meeting. In July of 1947, the U.S. and British representatives at this meeting recorded that an understanding had been reached by them. That quote, "It was not anticipated that in case, in the case of an attack by the Soviet Union on Finland that action would be taken to assist Finland." End quote. And that Finland should not expect any U.S., quote, "guarantees." End quote. And then a 1951 United States government policy paper stated that, "Taking into account the fact that the Soviet Union now possessed atomic weapons, Finland does not constitute a strategically viable cause for global war." Quote/end quote. So Finland lay outside of the western defense system. And lay beyond it was not under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. So this had to be recognized. And even before the end of Finland's participation in the war. Two major Finnish political leaders, J.K. Paasikivi and Urho K. Kekkonen publicly recognized and argued. That if Finland were to survive and remain independent. It would have to strike a new relationship with its superpower Eastern neighbor. Both Paasikivi and Kekkonen spoke out forcefully on the need for a new national realism. The two leaders stressed that Finland's independence could be secured only by winning Soviet confidence that Finland could be relied upon as a good neighbor. Ladies and gentlemen, let me confirm to you, based on my experience and other American diplomats in relations with Finlands and the knowledge of the record of the U.S. Department of State and all other relevant U.S. agencies and departments in Washington. And most especially the responsible U.S. Diplomatic Officers at the U.S. Embassy in Helsinki had a full understanding of all of the factors that we have just been discussing. And therefore of Finland's difficult situation. At the beginning of and during the Cold War. We understood that Finnish leaders had drawn the only logical conclusion. If Finland were to survive as an independent state. It would have to establish a new relationship with the Soviet Union as described. But we understood that in return, Finland expected that the Soviets would not interfere in Finland's domestic affairs or form of government. Alas, the Soviets did not always fully live up to their side of the bargain. But fortunately, the two aforementioned towering post-war presidential leaders emerged to guide Finland through these difficult Cold War years: J.K. Paasikivi and Urho K. Kekkonen. It was a tough sell for, for many Finns. You do not turn off your hereditary, your hatred for your hereditary enemy overnight. And believe that they are now your friendly, neighborly neighbors. And yet, that was what any responsible government of Finland would have to do. I would like to add here a personal anecdote that touches on just this point. In the fall of 1978, I was invited to the town of Lappeenranta in Eastern Finland to speak to the local chapter of the Finnish American Societies. An organization very similar to your organization here. Which has chapters scattered. And I'm not sure how strong they are right now, but they've been scattered into different towns and cities of Finland. And there was one in Lappeenranta. And they had invited me to speak. And so it was a good meeting. I spoke about the timely topic of the 1978 Presidential, coming Presidential elections in the United States. Between President Gerald Ford, and his challenger Jimmy Carter of Georgia. Yes, that really happened. [Laughter] And it so happened that a number of members of the Finnish/American chapter of Lappeenranta were also members of the local war veterans organization. And they had, prior to my arrival, they had invited me on a moose hunt the day following my presentation. The hunt took place in the afternoon and was followed by a rustic dinner at a remote hunting lodge. As the vodka flowed and the night wore on. It became clear to me that this moose hunt was a good excuse for these Finnish war veterans to get together and relive their experiences fighting the Russians. Whose border after the imposed loss of Karelia was now right there next to Lappeenranta. We all know that now because we see the border town movie. [Laughter] Anyway, the straightforward patriotism and honesty of these Finnish war veterans. As well as their warmth, friendship, and admiration for the United States was touching, and clean. It almost brought tears to my eyes to be welcomed as a friend and to share their good cheer and vodka. The more vodka drunk, the more the hatred of the eastern neighbor was exposed to me like a raw, open wound. It was an emotional and deeply moving experience. And it gave me an insight into the cruel reality of Finland's Cold War position. The need for the government to try to soften the hard edges of the hatred and the bitterness. Bitter wartime experiences. In order to try to meet the requirements of the new national realism. I could see the conflicting emotions. And I mean it when I say I could see good Finns on both sides of that issue. The government doing what it had to do. And the people and the war veterans unable really to come to grips with the Soviet Union as a friendly neighbor. It was a remarkable experience. And I, I have to admit that I was not the last man standing at the end of that evening. [Laughter] I admit that freely. Finland faced a continuing problem during the Cold War. And the term I believe was coined by a political scientist George Maud. He called it, "The Finnish dilemma." That is that to the extent that Finland gave continual assurances to the Soviet Union and seemed to support some Soviet security interests that were at odds with western interests. There were elements in the West that questioned Finland's neutrality and independence. And the quality of their, of their neutrality and independence. And the ugly term Finlandization was coined. But the other horn of the dilemma was that to the extent that Finland reached out economically. Or politically to the West and promoted its neutrality. Rumbles would emanate from the Kremlin. Questioning whether Finland was truly acting in a good neighborly manner. Whatever the challenges of dampening down the traditional antipathy of Finns toward Russia or the Soviet Union. Presidents Paasikivi and Kekkonen attempted each in his own way to try to strike the right balance during their respective terms of office. President Urho Paasikivi, the first Cold War Finnish President, becoming president in 1946, succeeding Marshal Mannerheim. President from '46 to '56. By the way, his birth name was Johan Gustaf Hellsten. He was one of those Swedish families that had changed their names from Swedish to Finnish. Did you know that? A lot of people did not know that. President Paasikivi had to deal with several difficult situations as president. He was president in 1948 when the Czech communists overthrew the democratic government of Czechoslovakia. There were indications that a similar movement among Finnish communists might be underway in March and April of 1948. Paasikivi put military and police forces on quite public alert. And the crisis passed. And it has never been confirmed whether or not there was a real threat. But Paasikivi's actions underscored that regardless of the participation of the Finnish Communist Party in Finland's Parliamentary Democracy which the Finnish Communist Party, by the way, accepted. Much to the chagrin of the, of the Soviet Union Communist Party. In any case, what are despite their participation in Finland's Parliamentary Democracy, they would not be permitted to undermine the system from within. Paasikivi also insisted on appointing as prime minister a Social Democrat: K.A. Fagerholm. Even though Fagerholm was opposed by the Soviet Union who didn't like the Social Democrats at the time. In his memoirs which were not published until years later, Paasikivi noted that if the President of Finland allowed the Soviet Union to decide which Finns would be allowed to serve in the government cabinet. Then Finland truly in effect would have lost its independence. A final major achievement by Paasikivi was his ability to negotiate the early withdrawal of the Soviet military enclave in Porkkala, only 17 miles west of Helsinki. On which the Soviets, if you recall, held a 50-year lease. The very existence of a Soviet base in Porkkala, stood as evidence to many that Finland could not be considered a truly independent country. Paasikivi was able to negotiate Soviet, Soviet withdrawal from Porkkala. And its full return to Finland in January 1956, a huge step in beginning to restore Finland's sense of full independence. President Paasikivi was succeed by President Kekkonen in 1956. And until 1982 as you see. President Urho Kekkonen articulated the same, the same national realism policies and as he stay in office, the policy became known as the Paasikivi-- Kekkonen Line. There were major achievements during the Kekkonen presidency. He was able to strengthen contacts with the other Nordic countries to partially offset the Soviet looming presence and pressure. Despite Soviet misgivings, he was able to win their acquiescence in Finland's becoming in the 1960s an Associate Member of EFTA. And a, an important economic grouping of Western European countries. And again, in the 1970s, he was able to win Soviet acquiescence in Finland's, when, when the EFTA and the EEC countries joined together, Finland was able to join on a purely economic basis without any political commitments. These were extremely important measures linking Finland to Western economies. Another major achievement was Finland's brilliant initiative in the early 1970s in promoting developing and negotiating and finally hosting in 1975 the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the CSCE Conference. It's a long story. We don't have time to get much into it, but it created a forum of 37 countries. All of European countries plus the United States and Canada signed onto this agreement which provided a, a, a, a, a way for countries to engage on economic and even human rights issues. It was, there was a blossoming of so-called Helsinki watch groupings all throughout Eastern Europe who were taking their governments to task on human rights issues. Totally unforeseen by the Soviet Union in its effort to get a ratification of the existing borders in Europe. Just to jump ahead here for a moment. In 1985, Finland hosted a tenth anniversary of the 1975 CSCE Conference. And it was represented at the, at the, at the Foreign Minister level. I was back, I was at the Embassy then as U.S., as Deputy Chief of Mission. The U.S. delegation was headed by Secretary of State George Shultz. And the Soviet Union delegation was headed by the brand-new Foreign Minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, who had, who Soviet, whom Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev had just named to replace the hard, cold liner, the cold hardliner, I guess. [Laughter] That's English [inaudible]. Andrei Gromyko and this was to be Shevardnadze's maiden event. And the, back to the '75, I forgot that Secretary General, General Secretary Brezhnev and President Ford were represented at that meeting. And, and met and talked at that conference. And then this, the, the tenth anniversary meeting, you see George Schultz shaking hands at a bilateral meeting with Eduard Shevardnadze. The two of course also met at the Finlandia [inaudible] in the Plenary Sessions. But there were two bilateral meetings. The first one was at the U.S. Embassy. And I watched them shaking hands as they went into the meeting. After the meeting, the, the U.S. negotiating team, after decades of confronting the Andrei Gromyko, could scarcely conceal their general optimism over the meeting. My former U.S. Ambassador to Finland, the Honorable Rozanne Ridgway, was on the U.S. delegation at the, at this meeting. And she was there because she was the Assistant Secretary in charge of European affairs. The first woman ever to hold that position in the Department of State. And she told me later that the immediate reaction within our delegation was that they, that, that with Gorbachev and Shevardnadze at the helm. There seemed to be real possibilities that real agreements could be reached. Anyway, the second slide got me ahead. I want to go back to Urho Kekkonen because it's, it has to be acknowledged that critics have argued that President Kekkonen, over his 26-year presidency. Accumulated far too much power and authority in the presidency. At the expense of Parliament and the Cabinet. There was concern that President Kekkonen was allowing too much influence, political influence by the Soviets. And by the Soviet Embassy, the feared [foreign language] Embassy in dealing with Finnish political parties. Also that he encouraged self-censorship, self-censorship by the Finnish media. Some felt that President Kekkonen and his inner circle played the Moscow card. That is to say implying that anyone who did not support him as a candidate for President means that that person was opposed to good relations with the Soviet Union. Full disclosure: I, myself made some of these arguments in my book. And there are several examples, other examples we could discuss if we have more time. One example was, was when Parliament put forward after the 1958 elections as Prime Minister the same Fagerholm that Paasikivi had put forward. Had been put forward to Paasikivi, and that Paasikivi endorsed despite Soviet opposition. Well, the Soviet Union again expressed their total opposition to Fagerholm. And they instituted a kind of deep freeze on Finnish, on relations with Finland. And President Kekkonen, unlike Paasikivi, did not support Fagerholm until finally, finally Fagerholm had to withdraw. In effect, the Soviet Union was allowed to block the appointment of a high Finnish official. In this case, the Prime Minister, something Paasikivi had warned against. But President Kekkonen remained in office until poor health caused him to resign in 1982. After Kekkonen's long stay in office, Parliament passed constitutional change limiting presidents to two six-year terms. Which brings us to the next and third and final Cold War President in Finland, Mauno Koivisto, President from 1982 to 1994. President Koivisto conveyed a, a far more laid-back presidential approach than did his predecessor. He was known as having express-- used favoring a more vigorous parliamentary role as indeed came to pass within two years in Finland. At the same time, President Koivisto, like his predecessors, recognized the national realism, and was careful like his predecessors to recognize the Soviet Union's security interest in Finland. However, Soviet political influence, and I was there-- I was back there by then-- had notably and quickly, quickly diminished during the Koivisto period. As did Finnish media self-censorship. And President Koi-- Koivisto in no way could be considered to have ever played the Moscow card against his domestic rivals. Although some of his rivals tried to use it against him. Also upon the collapse of the Soviet Union, President Koivisto moved quickly and unilaterally to remove uni-- renounce all of the treaty restrictions that had been enforced upon Finland by the Armistice, the Peace Treaty, and by the Friendship Treaty. The Cold War was over. Let me underscore that throughout the 45-year Cold War period, my U.S. Embassy colleagues and I, and there are several of us here today. Drew tremendous satisfaction in knowing that the consistent overriding U.S. national objective with regard to Finland was to support its Western values. And independence and to promote respect for Finland's efforts to be recognized as a neutral country. We knew that our policy exactly paralleled Finland's own aspirations. But we understood that Finland's existential relationship with the Soviet Union meant that Finland could not really acknowledge U.S. support. Much less admit that the only threat to Finland's independence and system of government at any time had been the Soviet Union. Also, my wife Magda, who unfortunately cannot be here with us today because she's suffering from the effects of bronchitis and was told she shouldn't fly. At any rate, we are so privileged to have lived in Finland during six with our children, during six of those Cold War years. So many good friendships, a number of which still survive. Despite the 30 or 40 years that have passed, that have elapsed. So many fond memories. The whole family, learning how to cross-country ski in [inaudible], in northern Finland over New Year's holiday 1977. And then my putting my very modest cross country skiing skills to use almost ten years later in the 75-kilometer 1986 Finlandia heathto. Placing 8656 [laughter] in only ten hours and 30 minutes. [Laughter] But there were 10,000 people that participated. [Laughter] And mostly behind me were the women. And [inaudible] women. But the Cold War ended in 1990, and there are, and we, but the events keep rolling on. And I, I would have normally stopped here, but I can't. I can't stop here. We have to talk about the significant new dimensions to Finland's policies and to the European security context. And the Transatlantic context which we have to bring up to date because it is so immediately relevant. A U.S. Presidential visit last year to Finland should remind us that there's quite a history in Helsinki and Finland of, of high-level visits. And I just jotted down or noted a few of them. They would take place usually at the Presidential Palace here at the lower right on the South Harbor. Here we have President Koivisto and one of [inaudible] several meetings with General Secretary Gorbachev in the 1980s. Here you have President Reagan and President Koivisto meeting in Helsinki in 1975. Here you have, -- . In 1985, sorry. Here we have President Clinton and President Yeltsin meeting in 1997. And then jumping pretty far ahead, we have President Sauli Niinisto and President Vladimir Putin meeting December of 2016. And then of course President Niinisto in between the two visitors that he had last May, President Trump and President Putin. And then Presidents Trump and Putin went off to a private meeting where they discussed, well we don't know what they discussed. [ Laughter ] This slide records that NATO has expanded to 29 countries with nine new countries joining NATO since 2000-- since 1999, the year that Vladimir became the effective leader of the Soviet Union, or of Russia, of Russia. Russian Federation. Under President Putin, the Eastern neighbor, once again, has pretentions that it can intervene in and direct the national security policies of its neighbors. Meanwhile, Finland has been reevaluating its security policies big time. In 2002, Finland signed onto the NATO Ukraine action plan. In February 2005, Finland joined NATO's Partnership for Peace program. Enhancing its relations with NATO. In 2008, Russia intervened militarily in Georgia, removing two provinces from that country. In, in 2014, Russia seized by force the Ukraine area of Crimea, including Sevastopol and incorporated them into the Soviet Union. And today, even today volunteer so-called Russian troops still today occupy parts of the East Ukraine and fight against Ukraine government forces. Meanwhile, Finland has signed, and the U.S. signed a Defense Cooperation Pact in October 2016. Was signed by Finland's then-Minister of Defense, Jussi Niinisto, and U.S. Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work. This was during the final year of the Obama presidency. And then you have in 19-- last year, May of last year. Eleven, eleven months ago here you have Finland, Sweden, and the United States signing in Washington a Trilateral Agreement to increase joint security cooperation. It was signed by the then-U.S. Defense Minister, James Mattis, and the then-Minister of Defense, Jussi Niinisto of Finland. And the Swedish Minister of Defense, Peter Hultqvist. I don't know if he's still in that position. And then in April of last year, President Sauli Niinisto announced that Finland will host major multinational military exercises in Finland in 2021. He said that the exercises will be similar to those hosted by Sweden in 2017. In which 19,000 military personnel from nine countries participated, seven NATO countries, plus Sweden and of course Finland. Finland has obviously decided it will not be left again alone facing the Russian Federation. But suddenly we find ourselves in a period of considerable uncertainty. As Finland has strengthened its security ties and cooperation and become an integral partner of Western Europe and NATO, we have seen some mixed signals emanating, emanating from Washington about its security relationship with Europe. President Trump at one point a year or so ago, was questioning why should the U.S. remain in NATO? On the other hand, we had last month a, an apparently good visit to Washington by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg. Meanwhile, he was honored also, Stoltenberg, during this trip by very obvious declaration of, of support for NATO by a bipartisan Congress when he addressed these, the only member, he was the only member, he was the only first time that a, the leader of a, the head of the international organization has direct-- has addressed a joint session of Congress. A clear message by the U.S. Congress on both parties of their support for NATO. Just in case anybody had any doubts. And also, let's, let's acknowledge at the current U.S. Administration, unlike its predecessor administration, the Obama Administration has provided lethal defensive arms and weapons to Ukraine. U.S. last year announced substantial increase military equipment and training for the Baltic countries. More than 5000 U.S. troops have participated in recent military exercises in Baltic countries. In Finland last month, Defense Force Chief General Jarmo Lindberg in a speech in Helsinki stated that it was the Russian invasion and takeover of Crimea that has caused a large and justifiable increase in the level of military exercises in, in, of NATO and countries like Sweden and Finland. And increased defense preparedness. And he strongly supported the need for Finland to buy new generation of fighter aircraft. So Finland has been hanging tough. But you had elections in Finland two weeks ago, and there, there it seems that there could be some significant political shifts that result from these elections. Which may pre-stage a difficult government formation period. One notes that there were significant gains of left-of-center parties. And one notes that the, the, the Center Party which had been the major party in the recent coalition lost 18 seats. So Finnish attitudes and European attitudes as far as defense issues could change. And they could be affected by attitudes in the United States. So these are uncertain times. Where are matters headed? And all I can say is this is where I hope they end up. U.S. and Finnish flags flying side by side, joint defense of Western Europe. And cross, and joint cross-Atlantic cooperation. That's where it has to end up. I would welcome any questions or comments. [ Applause ] Yes, sir? >> Thank you, thank you, thank you very much for this-- . >> James Ford Cooper: I thank you. >> Excellent summary of the Finnish history and your deep understanding of the position of Finland between West and East. >> James Ford Cooper: Thank you very much. >> So we have five minutes for, or something like that. >> James Ford Cooper: I know I went on too long. But I couldn't help it. >> We need to be out of the building before seven o'clock so-- . >> Actually, they extended the, the door opening time until 7:30 so. >> Okay. >> James Ford Cooper: Well, I, I slipped the guy a five dollar bill on the way in. [Laughter] Any, any comments or questions? We have some distinguished, [inaudible] we have, another former DCM, another two-time server in Finland. Except he has the advantage of speaking absolutely fluent Finnish. And then we have, we have Dave here who has been, we were colleagues together. And we had also very knowledgeable about Finland and Finnish affairs. And as is his wife, by the way. Yes, yes sir? [ Inaudible ] >> Can everybody hear? Oh, thank you. >> Thank you. You have one country was not mentioned so much, Sweden. >> James Ford Cooper: Yes. >> And in fact Sweden did support Finland on the voluntary basis in the Winter War because official Sweden could not. >> James Ford Cooper: Yes. >> But I think of the 9000 men who came over to the [inaudible] sector. They were actually in their other duties. They had been part of the Swedish military. And one-third of the Swedish air force at that time was supporting. It could not do it probably and so I note. And now again, and after these election probably the military cooperation with Finland and Sweden is further strengthened. It has been building up over the last two or three years. >> James Ford Cooper: Yes, yes I-- yeah. I think I acknowledged that. And no, you're absolutely right. Finland received no official help during the Winter War, but they did have volunteers, many from Sweden, and also some from Norway and, and from Denmark. Including a neighbor of ours, Dr. Barnard Rasmussen. Who came to Finland to help on the front and married a Finn and stayed forever. >> And of course, as you mentioned earlier, Finnish history, I think both of our institution and culture has, you know Sweden was an important country for us in those days. >> James Ford Cooper: Indeed. >> I'm not really a Swede. I'm totally Finn, but I do, I do have to recognize the Swedish contributions. >> James Ford Cooper: Yeah, but as I say, sociologists believe that, that the Finnish structure, they refer to it as the, as the sort of the, the, the Eastern Nordic Finnish structure. And then they refer to the, the Danish Norwegian Swedish structure. But they're very similar. But Finland, yes, direct, a direct inheritant of that today. Yes? >> Thank you. I'm curious about the economic position of Finland. I assume that they probably have some trade with the Soviet Union? And I was wondering how that affected things politically within the country? >> James Ford Cooper: That, it, the Finnish, it became clear to the Soviet Union that it was perhaps a great advantage to have a, a Western-oriented country with links to the Western economies as a neighbor. Because they were able to take advantage of, of, of getting high-tech material and equipment from Finland. And the Finnish-- Soviet trading relationship was done almost by barter. And it was like a classic trading arrangement between an advanced country and an underdeveloped country. With Finland being the advanced country providing ice breakers and machinery and woodworking materials and machines. And the Soviet, and, and, and paying for, being paid for by, by logs and, and timber and gasoline and oil. So by, that was an important relationship. And Finland benefited from that as well. It was mutually beneficial. I think most people will agree. Yes? Okay, well I can't drag, I can't [inaudible] you into staying any longer. So thank you so much. It's been a lot of fun for me. [ Applause ]

Democratic nomination

Governor Busbee won the primary with 503,875 votes (72.41%), defeating Roscoe Dean, Jr and his 111,901 votes (16.08%). Notable segregationist J. B. Stoner finished 3rd with 37,654 votes (5.41%).

Republican nomination

Rodney Cook, who had served in the Georgia House of Representatives defeated Bud Herrin with 23,231 votes (87.32%) to his 3,374 votes (12.68%).

General election results

This election was a contest between the Democratic Governor Busbee and civil rights icon Rodney Cook who ran on the Republican ticket. Despite fewer votes from the previous election four years earlier, Busbee defeated Cook in every single county and by over 400,000 votes.

Georgia gubernatorial Election 1978
Party Candidate Votes % ±
Democratic George Busbee 534,572 80.65%
Republican Rodney Mims Cook, Sr. 128,319 19.33%


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