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Executive privilege

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Executive privilege is the power of the President of the United States and other members of the executive branch of the United States Government to resist certain subpoenas and other interventions by the legislative and judicial branches of government in pursuit of information or personnel relating to the executive. The power of Congress or the federal courts to obtain such information is not mentioned explicitly in the United States Constitution, nor is there any explicit mention in the Constitution of an executive privilege to resist such requests from Congress or courts.[1] The Supreme Court of the United States has ruled this privilege may qualify as an element of the separation of powers doctrine, derived from the supremacy of the executive branch in its own area of Constitutional activity.[2]

The Supreme Court confirmed the legitimacy of this doctrine in United States v. Nixon in the context of a subpoena emanating from the judiciary, instead of emanating from Congress.[3] The Court held that there is a qualified privilege, which once invoked, creates a presumption of privilege, and the party seeking the documents must then make a "sufficient showing" that the "Presidential material" is "essential to the justice of the case". Chief Justice Warren Burger further stated that executive privilege would most effectively apply when the oversight of the executive would impair that branch's national security concerns.[3] Regarding requests from Congress (instead of from the courts) for executive branch information, as of a 2014 study by the Congressional Research Service,[4] only two federal court cases had addressed the merits of executive privilege in such a context, and neither of those cases reached the Supreme Court.[5]

In addition to which branch of government is requesting the information, another characteristic of executive privilege is whether it involves a "presidential communications privilege" or instead a "deliberative process privilege" or some other type of privilege.[4] The deliberative process privilege is often considered to be rooted in common law, whereas the presidential communications privilege is often considered to be rooted in separation of powers, thus making the deliberative process privilege less difficult to overcome.[4][6] Generally speaking, presidents, congresses and courts have historically tended to sidestep open confrontations through compromise and mutual deference in view of previous practice and precedents regarding the exercise of executive privilege.

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This episode of CrashCourse is brought to you by SquareSpace. Hello. My name's Craig, and this is CrashCourse Government and Politics, and today we're gonna really figure out why the President is the most powerful man in the world. Okay, not really, I guess, obviously, the reason he's the most powerful person in the world is he leads what's currently the most powerful nation in the world, and he can't really take credit for America's global position. Besides, there's a good case to be made that the richest man in the world is the most powerful, and if we're talking cultural influence, then who's more powerful than Kanye? According to Kanye, no one. But rather than go down the rabbit hole of power and the secret Cabal that actually runs the world, let's talk about the powers of the President that are not in the Constitution, at least, not literally. So the Constitution lays out a specific limited number of expressed powers, but the President's able to do a lot more than what the Constitution says. Expressed powers are sometimes called 'formal powers', but the President also has informal powers that do not appear within the written text of the Constitution. Sometimes the powers he has are implied by the wording of the Constitution, while sometimes, they're considered inherent in the office of the Presidency, which means that they flow logically from the ideas in the Constitution. A little confusing, right? Well, maybe the Thought Bubble can explain. Let's start easy with an expressed power, which is not the same as an espresso power, which is what I'm currently running on. The Constitution says right here in the text that the President is the commander in chief of the army and the navy. This also implies that he can and perhaps will lead the armed forces when the nation is at war. It also implies that he can command the Air Force, even though it only mentions the Army and Navy. So far, so good, but what about when the nation is not technically at war? Remember that the Constitution gives Congress the power to declare war as a check on Presidential power, but the President still has the inherent power to use troops even when Congress hasn't actually formally declared war. Logically, if there's an immediate threat to the US and Congress doesn't have the time or the opportunity to declare war, the Commander in Chief must be able to use force. So this power is said to be inherent in the office. The problem is that once you grant that the President must have the power to use troops, how do you limit him? What sorts of threats are so immediate and dangerous that the President should have free reign to send troops? Other than Martian invasions or Taco Tuesday riots, obviously. If you look at most of the times America has sent troops into conflict, especially during the 20th and 21st centuries, it's been done with him acting as Commander-in-Chief without a formal declaration of war. We sent troops to Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and twice to Iraq without Congress declaring war, and these are just the big ones. We're not even gonna talk about Grenada and Panama and all the other small interventions, so is there any check on this power? After Vietnam, Congress tried to put on the brakes by passing a War Powers Resolution, which requires the President to get authorization to use troops within 60 days of when he first commits them, or else he has to bring the troops back. This sounds like a pretty powerful check, but in practice, Congress always authorized the President to use force. Thanks, Thought Bubble. Sometimes I use force without being authorized. The President has informal powers in foreign policy, too. Formally, the Constitution says the President has the power to make treaties, receive foreign ambassadors, and appoint ambassadors and ministers. The President has developed the power to negotiate executive agreements, which are nowhere in the Constitution. Executive agreements are, well, they're agreements between the US and foreign nations that look like treaties but aren't formally treaties. They can come with treats, though. Brownies. Cookies. Trade concessions. The most important difference between an executive agreement and a treaty is that the agreements don't need to be ratified by 2/3rds of the Senate, but they become valid with only a majority of vote in both houses. This makes them easier to pass than a formal treaty and explains why Presidents prefer executive agreements to treaties. Lately, there have been some very important executive agreements, like the general agreement on tariffs and trade or GATT that has morphed into the WTO, and the North American Free Trade Agreement, better known as NAFTA, 'cause if it were a treaty, it'd be NAFTT, and that would be NAFTY. Although it isn't mentioned in the Constitution, the President is effectively the Chief Executive Officer or CEO of the US. Where does this power come from? Formally, it's in the faithfully executed clause in the Presidential Oath of Office, but more practically, it comes out of his power to appoint judges, ambassadors, and other ministers. Sorry, judges and ambassadors, but when it comes to executive power, it's the other ministers that matter here, because there are the cabinet secretaries and other heads of administrative agencies that make up the bulk of the government. The President chooses agency heads that agree with his policies- at least he hopes they do. So his appointments shape the political agenda. But more importantly, in appointing the ministers, the President assumes an inherent power to direct them and their agencies on how to implement laws. This makes since. As anyone who's ever worked for a boss knows, once you're hired you're sort of expected to know what your boss wants and to do it. This power to direct agencies and how to execute laws is enormous. It basically directs the way the government acts. The President has pretty limited formal powers over Congress. Other than convening special sessions, and the veto, and the State of the Union Address, maybe, he can't do all that much to influence them. I mean Congress usually meets without the President telling them to and he almost never vetoes bills. But that doesn't mean that the President doesn't have a big informal role to play in the legislative process. The President can attempt to set the legislative agenda by making recommendations for laws that he'd like to see passed. This is sometimes called the Legislative Initiative, and in practice it usually means that executive branch officials will actually draft the legislation they want and give it to Congress to refine into something they can pass. This is what happens with big agenda items like the Affordable Care Act. You may know it as ObamaCare. Or the Dodd-Frank Act, which, despite being named for its two Congressional sponsors was actually written with a lot of input from the White House. I should note here that even though it might look like the President is usurping legislative power, Congress often gives its power to the President willingly, because it wants to avoid responsibility for unpopular policies. He said it. I didn't say it. He said it. Also this is pretty limited power for the President because he can't force Congress to pass anything, even if he wrote it and says "Please, please, please, please, please." And because a President's ability to move the agenda decreases as his popularity decreases. There's another legislative power that the President has that is probably the most important one. He can give executive orders. These are presidential directives, or rules, that have the force of law. Executive orders can be overturned by actual Congressional lawmaking, or by Supreme Court decisions. These executive orders allow the President to circumvent the legislative process and act unilaterally. Ideally the President and Congress should work together, but c'mon! Sometimes the President decides to go it alone. 'Cause they're... they don't work together that often. These days anyway. Some really important policies have been made by executive orders, including desegregating the military and the creation of the Environmental Protection Agency. But executive orders may not be as durable as a law passed through the normal channels. If the next president in office disagrees with the order as a president put in place, he or she can get rid of them just as easily as his or her predecessor put them in place. The other informal power the President has is kind of obscure, but also pretty important. The President can impound the funds that Congress has appropriated for certain programs or projects if he doesn't want them implemented. More generally, under his power to execute the laws, he can order the bureaucracy to implement policies in a certain specific way. Or sometimes not at all. Although this can get him in to trouble There's one last inherent power I'll mention that the President currently has and that's executive privilege. There's probably more, but no president has asserted them yet. Basically this is the President's ability to keep information secret by claiming that it's too important to be revealed, usually for reasons of national security. There's a check on executive privilege though. It can be overturned by a court order as happened in the landmark Supreme Court case U.S. vs. Nixon. There they court ordered Nixon to turn over tapes of his conversations with aids that might have related to the Watergate Scandal. So even though the President isn't given a ton of power in the Constitution, the President is pretty powerful. This is especially true during war. Even if that war hasn't been declared. And this is a point you should remember. You should remember everything I say, but you should remember this too. Congress and the American people are usually willing to defer to the President on military matters and the inherent powers of the Commander in Chief are enormous. Often increased presidential power has been the result of a president seizing the initiative and expanding his own inherent or implied power. And once a president has established an implied power, the next president's very unlikely to do away with it. Oh, please, more power? No thank you. But just as often as presidents imply their own powers, Congress willingly hands over more power. And that's what we're going to talk about in the next episode. Thanks for watching. Crash Course Government and Politics is produced in association with PBS Digital Studios. Support for Crash Course US Government comes from Voqal. Voqal supports non-profits that use technology and media to advance social equity. Learn more about their mission and initiatives at Crash Course is made with the help of these commanders-in-chief. Thanks for watching.


Early precedents

Deliberative process privilege is a specific instance of the more general principle of executive privilege. It is usually considered to be based upon common law rather than separation of powers, and its history traces back to the English crown privilege (now known as public-interest immunity).[6] In contrast, the presidential communications privilege is another specific instance of executive privilege, usually considered as being based upon separation of powers, and for that reason it is more difficult to overcome than deliberative process privilege.[4] A significant requirement of the presidential communications privilege is that it can only protect communications sent or received by the President or his immediate advisors, whereas the deliberative process privilege may extend further down the chain of command.[4]

In the context of privilege assertions by United States presidents, law professor Michael Dorf has written: "In 1796, President George Washington refused to comply with a request by the House of Representatives for documents related to the negotiation of the then-recently adopted Jay Treaty with the Kingdom of Great Britain. The Senate alone plays a role in the ratification of treaties, Washington reasoned, and therefore the House had no legitimate claim to the material. Therefore, Washington provided the documents to the Senate but not the House."[7]

President Thomas Jefferson continued the precedent for this in the trial of Aaron Burr for treason in 1809. Burr asked the court to issue a subpoena duces tecum to compel Jefferson to testify or provide his private letters concerning Burr. Chief Justice John Marshall, a strong proponent of the powers of the federal government but also a political opponent of Jefferson, ruled that the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution, which allows for these sorts of court orders for criminal defendants, did not provide any exception for the president. As for Jefferson's claim that disclosure of the document would imperil public safety, Marshall held that the court, not the president, would be the judge of that. Jefferson refused to personally testify but provided selected letters.

In 1833, President Andrew Jackson cited executive privilege when Senator Henry Clay demanded he produce documents concerning statements the president made to his cabinet about the removal of federal deposits from the Second Bank of the United States during the Bank War.[8]

Cold War era

During the period of 1947–49, several major security cases became known to Congress. There followed a series of investigations, culminating in the famous Hiss-Chambers case of 1948. At that point, the Truman Administration issued a sweeping secrecy order blocking congressional efforts from FBI and other executive data on security problems.[citation needed] Security files were moved to the White House and Administration officials were banned from testifying before Congress on security related matters. Investigation of the State Department and other cases was stymied and the matter left unresolved.

During the Army–McCarthy hearings in 1954, Eisenhower used the claim of executive privilege to forbid the "provision of any data about internal conversations, meetings, or written communication among staffers, with no exception to topics or people." Department of Defense employees were also instructed not to testify on any such conversations or produce any such documents or reproductions.[9] This was done to refuse the McCarthy Committee subpoenas of transcripts of monitored telephone calls from Army officials, as well as information on meetings between Eisenhower officials relating to the hearings. This was done in the form of a letter from Eisenhower to the Department of Defense and an accompanying memo from Eisenhower Justice. The reasoning behind the order was that there was a need for "candid" exchanges among executive employees in giving "advice" to one another. In the end, Eisenhower would invoke the claim 44 times between 1955 and 1960.

United States v. Nixon

The Supreme Court addressed "executive privilege" in United States v. Nixon, the 1974 case involving the demand by Watergate special prosecutor Archibald Cox that President Richard Nixon produce the audiotapes of conversations he and his colleagues had in the Oval Office of the White House in connection with criminal charges being brought against members of the Nixon Administration. Nixon invoked the privilege and refused to produce any records.

The Supreme Court did not reject the claim of privilege out of hand; it noted, in fact, "the valid need for protection of communications between high Government officials and those who advise and assist them in the performance of their manifold duties" and that "[h]uman experience teaches that those who expect public dissemination of their remarks may well temper candor with a concern for appearances and for their own interests to the detriment of the decisionmaking process." This is very similar to the logic that the Court had used in establishing an "executive immunity" defense for high office-holders charged with violating citizens' constitutional rights in the course of performing their duties. The Supreme Court stated: "To read the Article II powers of the President as providing an absolute privilege as against a subpoena essential to enforcement of criminal statutes on no more than a generalized claim of the public interest in confidentiality of nonmilitary and nondiplomatic discussions would upset the constitutional balance of 'a workable government' and gravely impair the role of the courts under Article III." Because Nixon had asserted only a generalized need for confidentiality, the Court held that the larger public interest in obtaining the truth in the context of a criminal prosecution took precedence.

"Once executive privilege is asserted, coequal branches of the Government are set on a collision course. The Judiciary is forced into the difficult task of balancing the need for information in a judicial proceeding and the Executive's Article II prerogatives. This inquiry places courts in the awkward position of evaluating the Executive's claims of confidentiality and autonomy, and pushes to the fore difficult questions of separation of powers and checks and balances. These 'occasion[s] for constitutional confrontation between the two branches' are likely to be avoided whenever possible. United States v. Nixon, supra, at 692."[10]

Post-Watergate era

Reagan administration

In November 1982, President Ronald Reagan signed a directive regarding congressional requests for information. Reagan wrote that if Congress seeks information potentially subject to executive privilege, then executive branch officials should "request the congressional body to hold its request in abeyance" until the president decides whether to invoke the privilege.[11] [12]

George H. W. Bush administration

Prior to becoming Attorney General in 1991, Deputy Attorney General William P. Barr issued guidance in 1989 about responding to congressional requests for confidential executive branch information. He wrote: "Only when the accommodation process fails to resolve a dispute and a subpoena is issued does it become necessary for the president to consider asserting executive privilege".[13][11]

Clinton administration

The Clinton administration invoked executive privilege on fourteen occasions.

In 1998, President Bill Clinton became the first president since Nixon to assert executive privilege and lose in court, when a federal judge ruled that Clinton aides could be called to testify in the Lewinsky scandal.[14]

Later, Clinton exercised a form of negotiated executive privilege when he agreed to testify before the grand jury called by Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr only after negotiating the terms under which he would appear. Declaring that "absolutely no one is above the law", Starr said such a privilege "must give way" and evidence "must be turned over" to prosecutors if it is relevant to an investigation.

George W. Bush administration

The Bush administration invoked executive privilege on six occasions.

President George W. Bush first asserted executive privilege in December 2001 to deny disclosure of details regarding former Attorney General Janet Reno,[15] the scandal involving Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) misuse of organized crime informants James J. Bulger and Stephen Flemmi, and Justice Department deliberations about President Bill Clinton's fundraising tactics.[16]

Bush invoked executive privilege "in substance" in refusing to disclose the details of Vice President Dick Cheney's meetings with energy executives, which was not appealed by the GAO. In a separate Supreme Court decision in 2004, however, Justice Anthony Kennedy noted "Executive privilege is an extraordinary assertion of power 'not to be lightly invoked.'" United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7 (1953).

Further, on June 28, 2007, Bush invoked executive privilege in response to congressional subpoenas requesting documents from former presidential counsel Harriet Miers and former political director Sara Taylor,[17] citing that:

The reason for these distinctions rests upon a bedrock presidential prerogative: for the President to perform his constitutional duties, it is imperative that he receive candid and unfettered advice and that free and open discussions and deliberations occur among his advisors and between those advisors and others within and outside the Executive Branch.

On July 9, 2007, Bush again invoked executive privilege to block a congressional subpoena requiring the testimonies of Taylor and Miers. Furthermore, White House Counsel Fred F. Fielding refused to comply with a deadline set by the chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee to explain its privilege claim, prove that the president personally invoked it, and provide logs of which documents were being withheld. On July 25, 2007, the House Judiciary Committee voted to cite Miers and White House Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten for contempt of Congress.[18][19]

On July 13, less than a week after claiming executive privilege for Miers and Taylor, Fielding effectively claimed the privilege again, this time in relation to documents related to the 2004 death of Army Ranger Pat Tillman. In a letter to the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Fielding claimed certain papers relating to discussion of the friendly fire shooting "implicate Executive Branch confidentiality interests" and would therefore not be turned over to the committee.[20]

On August 1, 2007, Bush invoked the privilege for the fourth time in little over a month, this time rejecting a subpoena for Karl Rove. The subpoena would have required Rove to testify before the Senate Judiciary Committee in a probe over fired federal prosecutors. In a letter to Senate Judiciary Chairman Patrick Leahy, Fielding claimed that "Rove, as an immediate presidential advisor, is immune from compelled congressional testimony about matters that arose during his tenure and that relate to his official duties in that capacity."[21]

Leahy claimed that President Bush was not involved with the decision to terminate the service of U.S. attorneys. Furthermore, he asserted that the president's executive privilege claims protecting both Bolten and Rove were illegal. The Senator demanded that Bolten, Rove, Sara Taylor, and J. Scott Jennings comply "immediately" with their subpoenas. This development paved the way for a Senate panel vote on whether to advance the citations to the full Senate. "It is obvious that the reasons given for these firings were contrived as part of a cover-up and that the stonewalling by the White House is part and parcel of that same effort", Leahy concluded.[22][23][24][25]

As of 17 July 2008, Rove still claimed executive privilege to avoid a congressional subpoena. Rove's lawyer wrote that his client is "constitutionally immune from compelled congressional testimony."[26]

Obama administration

On June 20, 2012, President Barack Obama asserted executive privilege in order to withhold certain Department of Justice documents related to the Operation Fast and Furious controversy ahead of a United States House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform vote to hold Attorney General Eric Holder in contempt of Congress for refusing to produce the documents.[27][28] Later the same day, the House Committee voted 23–17 along party lines to hold Holder in contempt of Congress over not releasing the documents.[29]

Executive privilege was also used in a lawsuit stemming from the 2012 implementation of the "Net Worth Sweep" against Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The Obama administration did not disclose roughly 11,000 documents from the plaintiffs in the discovery process as they related to the reasoning behind the 2012 actions.[citation needed]

House investigation of the SEC

Leaders of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) testified on February 4, 2009 before the United States House Committee on Financial Services subcommittee. The subject of the hearings was why the SEC had failed to act when Harry Markopolos, a private fraud investigator from Boston, alerted the SEC, detailing his persistent and unsuccessful efforts to get the SEC to investigate Bernard Madoff beginning in 1999.[30] One official claimed executive privilege in declining to answer some questions.[31][32]

Trump administration

While investigating Russian interference in the 2016 election, the Senate Intelligence Committee subpoenaed former FBI Director James Comey to testify. Comey was fired several weeks before being subpoenaed but had appeared before the committee once before in March while still serving as director. Less than a week before the scheduled hearing, it was reported that President Trump was considering invoking executive privilege to prevent Comey's testimony.[33][34] According to attorney Page Pate, it seemed unlikely that executive privilege would be applicable, as Trump had publicly spoken about the encounters in question multiple times.[35]

Sarah Huckabee Sanders, a White House spokesman, released a statement on June 5 stating: "The president's power to assert executive privilege is very well-established. However, in order to facilitate a swift and thorough examination of the facts sought by the Senate Intelligence Committee, President Trump will not assert executive privilege regarding James Comey's scheduled testimony."[36]

Also in June 2017, other officials in the Trump administration, including Dan Coats and Jeff Sessions, declined to describe in congressional hearings conversations they had with President Trump, on the ground that they wanted Trump to have an opportunity to decide whether to invoke executive privilege.[37][38]

See also


  1. ^ Cox, Archibald. "Executive Privilege", University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Volume 122, page 1384 (1974).
  2. ^ Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority in US v. Nixon noted: "Whatever the nature of the privilege of confidentiality of Presidential communications in the exercise of Art. II powers, the privilege can be said to derive from the supremacy of each branch within its own assigned area of constitutional duties. Certain powers and privileges flow from the nature of enumerated powers; the protection of the confidentiality of Presidential communications has similar constitutional underpinnings. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (Supreme Court opinion at FindLaw)
  3. ^ a b United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (Supreme Court opinion at FindLaw)
  4. ^ a b c d e Garvey, Todd. Presidential Claims of Executive Privilege: History, Law, Practice, and Recent Developments, Congressional Research Service, p. 1 (2014).
  5. ^ Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Comm. on the Judiciary v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53 (D.D.C. 2008)
  6. ^ a b Narayan, S. "Proper Assertion of the Deliberative Process Principle". p. 6. Retrieved June 3, 2017.
  7. ^ Dorf, Michael (February 6, 2002). "A Brief History Of Executive Privilege, From George Washington Through Dick Cheney". Findlaw. Retrieved June 3, 2017.
  8. ^ David and Jeanne Heidler, Henry Clay: The Essential American (2010) p. 264
  9. ^ Blacklisted by History p. 575
  10. ^ Holding, Reynolds. Time, March 21, 2007. Holding, Reynolds (March 21, 2007). "The Executive Privilege Showdown". Time. Retrieved 2007-03-27.
  11. ^ a b Savage, Charlie. "Explaining Executive Privilege and Sessions’s Refusal to Answer Questions", The New York Times (June 15, 2017).
  12. ^ Reagan, Ronald. "Procedures Governing Responses to Congressional Requests for Information", The White House (November 4, 1982).
  13. ^ Barr, William. "Congressional Requests for Confidential Executive Branch Information", U.S. Department of Justice (June 19, 1989).
  14. ^ Baker, Peter; and Schmidt, Susan. "President is Denied Executive Privilege". The Washington Post. July 22, 1998. Retrieved 2007-03-27. The Washington Post, May 6, 1998.
  15. ^ Stolberg, Sheryl Gay (June 29, 2007). "Bush Asserts Executive Privilege on Subpoenas". Retrieved June 3, 2017 – via
  16. ^ Lewis, Neil A. (December 14, 2001). "Bush Claims Executive Privilege in Response to House Inquiry". The New York Times. Retrieved July 17, 2007.[dead link]
  17. ^ "White House refuses to answer subpoenas". June 28, 2007. Retrieved June 3, 2017.
  18. ^ "House inches toward constitutional showdown with contempt vote". Politics. CNN. July 25, 2007. Retrieved 2007-07-25.
  19. ^ "House Judiciary Reports Contempt Citations to the House of Representatives" (Press release). U.S. House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary. July 25, 2007. Archived from the original on July 25, 2007. Retrieved July 26, 2007.
  20. ^ "White House Rebuffs Congress on Tillman Papers". Politics. The Seattle Times. August 1, 2007. Archived from the original on May 10, 2008. Retrieved August 1, 2008.
  21. ^ "Bush won't let aide Rove testify to Congress". Politics. Reuters. August 1, 2007. Retrieved 2008-08-01.
  22. ^ "Leahy: Bush not involved in firings". Yahoo! News. Retrieved 2008-11-30.[dead link]
  23. ^ "Leahy: Rove, others must comply with subpoenas". CNN. Archived from the original on 2007-12-01. Retrieved 2008-11-30.
  24. ^ "Leahy again orders Karl Rove to appear". Bennington Banner. Retrieved 2008-11-30.
  25. ^ "Leahy again demands U.S. attorney info". Earth Times. Retrieved 2008-11-30.
  26. ^ "Rove ignores committee's subpoena, refuses to testify". CNN. July 10, 2008. Retrieved 2008-07-10.
  27. ^ Jackson, David (June 20, 2012). "Obama team: 'Fast and Furious' documents are privileged". USA Today. Retrieved 20 June 2012.
  28. ^ Savage, Charlie (June 8, 2012). "House Recommends Contempt for Holder". The New York Times. Retrieved June 6, 2017.
  29. ^ Madhani and Davis, Aamer and Susan (June 20, 2012). "House panel votes to cite Holder for contempt of Congress". USA Today. Retrieved 20 June 2012.
  30. ^ Henriques, Diana (February 4, 2009). "Anger and Drama at a House Hearing on Madoff". The New York Times.
  31. ^ Jamieson, Dan (February 4, 2009). "SEC officials dodge questions; one claims privilege". InvestmentNews.
  32. ^ Ahrens, Frank (February 5, 2009). "Lawmakers Sink Teeth Into the SEC: Agency Mocked for Not Catching Madoff". The Washington Post. pp. D01.
  33. ^ "Error". CNN. Retrieved June 3, 2017.
  34. ^ "Trump Reviewing Whether to Block Comey Testimony to Senate". June 2, 2017. Retrieved June 3, 2017 – via
  35. ^ Pate, Page (June 2, 2017). "Trump can't stop Comey with executive privilege". CNN. Retrieved June 3, 2017.
  36. ^ "White House: Trump will not assert executive privilege to block Comey's testimony". POLITICO. Retrieved 2017-06-05.
  37. ^ Litt, Robert. "Some Thoughts on the Coats-Rogers Testimony and Executive Privilege", Lawfare (blog) (June 8, 2017).
  38. ^ Barrett, Paul. "Why Trump’s Intel Chiefs Can Stonewall Congress", Bloomberg News (June 8, 2017).
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