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Blockade Strategy Board

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The Blockade Strategy Board, also known as the Commission of Conference, or the Du Pont Board, was a strategy group created by the United States Navy Department at outset of the American Civil War to lay out a preliminary strategy for enforcing President Abraham Lincoln's April 19, 1861 Proclamation of Blockade Against Southern Ports. Enforcing this blockade would require the monitoring of 3,500 miles (5,633 km) of Atlantic and Gulf coastline held by the Confederate States of America, including 12 major ports, notably New Orleans and Mobile. The group, consisting of: Samuel Francis Du Pont, who acted as chairman; Charles Henry Davis; John Gross Barnard; and Alexander Dallas Bache, met in June to determine how best to cut off maritime transport to and from these seaports. Their reports for the Atlantic seaboard were used, with modifications, to direct the early course of the naval war. Their analysis of the Gulf Coast was not so successful, largely because the detailed oceanographic knowledge that marked the Atlantic reports was not available for the Gulf.

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Hi I’m John Green; this is Crash Course U.S. history and today we’re gonna talk about the Cold War. The Cold War is called “Cold” because it supposedly never heated up into actual armed conflict, which means, you know, that it wasn’t a war. Mr. Green, Mr. Green, but if the War on Christmas is a war and the War on Drugs is a war… You’re not going to hear me say this often in your life, Me from the Past, but that was a good point. At least the Cold War was not an attempt to make war on a noun, which almost never works, because nouns are so resilient. And to be fair, the Cold War did involve quite a lot of actual war, from Korea to Afghanistan, as the world’s two superpowers, the United States and the U.S.S.R., sought ideological and strategic influence throughout the world. So perhaps it’s best to think of the Cold War as an era, lasting roughly from 1945 to 1990. Discussions of the Cold War tend to center on international and political history and those are very important, which is why we’ve talked about them in the past. This, however, is United States history, so let us heroically gaze--as Americans so often do--at our own navel. (Libertage.) Stan, why did you turn the globe to the Green Parts of Not-America? I mean, I guess to be fair, we were a little bit obsessed with this guy. So, the Cold War gave us great spy novels, independence movements, an arms race, cool movies like Dr. Strangelove and War Games, one of the most evil mustaches in history. But it also gave us a growing awareness that the greatest existential threat to human beings is ourselves. It changed the way we imagine the world and humanity’s role in it. In his Nobel Prize Acceptance Speech, William Faulkner famously said, “Our tragedy today is a general and universal physical fear so long sustained by now that we can even bear it. There are no longer problems of the spirit. There is only the question: When will I be blown up?” So, today we’re gonna look at how that came to be the dominant question of human existence, and whether we can ever get past it. intro So after WWII the U.S. and the USSR were the only two nations with any power left. The United States was a lot stronger – we had atomic weapons, for starters, and also the Soviets had lost 20 million people in the war and they were led by a sociopathic mustachioed Joseph Stalin. But the U.S. still had worries: we needed a strong, free-market-oriented Europe (and to a lesser extent Asia) so that all the goods we were making could find happy homes. The Soviets, meanwhile, were concerned with something more immediate, a powerful Germany invading them. Again. Germany--and please do not take this personally, Germans--was very, very slow to learn the central lesson of world history: Do not invade Russia. Unless you’re the Mongols. (Mongoltage.) So at the end of World War II, the USSR “encouraged” the creation of pro-communist governments in Bulgaria, Romania, and Poland--which was a relatively easy thing to encourage, because those nations were occupied by Soviet troops. The idea for the Soviets was to create a communist buffer between them and Germany, but to the U.S. it looked like communism might just keep expanding, and that would be really bad for us, because who would buy all of our sweet, sweet industrial goods? So America responded with the policy of containment, as introduced in diplomat George F. Kennan’s famous Long Telegram. Communism could stay where it was, but it would not be allowed to spread. And ultimately this is why we fought very real wars in both Korea and Vietnam. As a government report from 1950 put it the goals of containment were: 1. Block further expansion of Soviet power 2. Expose the falsities of soviet pretensions 3. Induce a retraction of the Kremlin’s control and influence, and 4. In general, foster the seeds of destruction within the Soviet system. Harry Truman, who as you’ll recall, became President in 1945 after Franklin Delano Prez 4 Life Roosevelt died, was a big fan of containment, and the first real test of it came in Greece and Turkey in 1947. This was a very strategically valuable region because it was near the Middle East, and I don’t know if you’ve noticed this, but the United States has been just, like, a smidge interested in the Middle East the last several decades because of oil glorious oil. Right, so Truman announced the so-called Truman Doctrine, because you know why not name a doctrine after yourself, in which he pledged to support “freedom-loving peoples” against communist threats, which is all fine and good. But who will protect us against “peoples,” the pluralization of an already plural noun? Anyway, we eventually sent $400 million in aid to Greece and Turkey, and we were off to the Cold War races. The Truman Doctrine created the language through which Americans would view the world with America as free and communists as tyrannical. According to our old friend Eric Foner, “The speech set a precedent for American assistance to anticommunist regimes throughout the world, no matter how undemocratic, and for the creation of a set of global military alliances directed against the Soviet Union.”[1] It also led to the creation of a new security apparatus – the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Atomic Energy Commission, all of which were somewhat immune from government oversight and definitely not democratically elected. And the containment policy and the Truman Doctrine also laid the foundations for a military build-up – an arms race – which would become a key feature of the Cold War. But it wasn’t all about the military, at least at first. Like, the Marshall Plan was first introduced at Harvard’s Commencement address in June 1947 by, get this, George Marshall, in what turned out to be, like, the second most important commencement address in all of American history. Yes, yes, Stan, okay. It was a great speech, thank you for noticing. Alright, let’s go to the Thought Bubble. The Marshall Plan was a response to economic chaos in Europe brought on by a particularly harsh winter that strengthened support for communism in France and Italy. The plan sought to use US Aid to combat the economic instability that provided fertile fields for communism. As Marshall said “ our policy is not directed against any country or doctrine, but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos.” [2] Basically it was a New Deal for Europe, and it worked; Western Europe was rebuilt so that by 1950 production levels in industry had eclipsed pre-war levels and Europe was on its way to becoming a U.S. style-capitalist-mass-consumer society. Which it still is, kind of. Japan, although not technically part of the Marshall Plan, was also rebuilt. General Douglas MacArthur was basically the dictator there, forcing Japan to adopt a new constitution, giving women the vote, and pledging that Japan would foreswear war, in exchange for which the United States effectively became Japan’s defense force. This allowed Japan to spend its money on other things, like industry, which worked out really well for them. Meanwhile Germany was experiencing the first Berlin crisis. At the end of the war, Germany was divided into East and West, and even though the capital, Berlin, was entirely in the east, it was also divided into east and west. This meant that West Berlin was dependent on shipments of goods from West Germany through East Germany. And then, in 1948, Stalin cut off the roads to West Berlin. So, the Americans responded with an 11-month-long airlift of supplies that eventually led to Stalin lifting the blockade in 1948 and building the Berlin Wall, which stood until 1991, when Kool Aid Guy--no, wait, wait, wait, wait, that wasn’t when the Berlin Wall was built. That was in 1961. I just wanted to give Thought Bubble the opportunity to make that joke. Thanks, Thought Bubble. So right, the Wall wasn’t built until 1961, but 1949 did see Germany officially split into two nations, and also the Soviets detonated their first atomic bomb, and NATO was established, AND the Chinese Revolution ended in communist victory. So, by the end of 1950, the contours of the Cold War had been established, West versus East, Capitalist Freedom versus Communist totalitarianism. At least from where I’m sitting. Although now apparently I’m going to change where I’m sitting because it’s time for the Mystery Document. The rules here are simple. I guess the author of the Mystery Document and about 55% of the time I get shocked by the shock pen. “We must organize and enlist the energies and resources of the free world in a positive program for peace which will frustrate the Kremlin design for world domination by creating a situation in the free world to which the Kremlin will be compelled to adjust. Without such a cooperative effort, led by the United States, we will have to make gradual withdrawals under pressure until we discover one day that we have sacrificed positions of vital interest. It is imperative that this trend be reversed by a much more rapid and concerted build-up of the actual strength of both the United States and the other nations of the free world.” I mean all I can say about it is that it sounds American and, like, it was written in, like, 1951 and it seems kind of like a policy paper or something really boring so I...I mean... Yeah, I’m just going to have to take the shock. AH! National Security Council report NSC-68? Are you kidding me, Stan? Not-not 64? Or 81? 68? This is ridiculous! I call injustice. Anyway, as the apparently wildly famous NSC-68 shows, the U.S. government cast the Cold War as a rather epic struggle between freedom and tyranny, and that led to remarkable political consensus--both democrats and republicans supported most aspects of cold war policy, especially the military build-up part. Now, of course, there were some critics, like Walter Lippmann who worried that casting foreign policy in such stark ideological terms would result in the U.S. getting on the wrong side of many conflicts, especially as former colonies sought to remove the bonds of empire and become independent nations. But yeah, no, nothing like that ever happened. Yeah, I mean, it’s not like that happened in Iran or Nicaragua or Argentina or Brazil or Guatemala or Stan are you really going to make me list all of them? Fine. Or Haiti or Paraguay or the Philippines or Chile or Iraq or Indonesia or Zaire or, I’m sorry, THERE WERE A LOT OF THEM, OKAY? But these interventions were viewed as necessary to prevent the spread of communism, which was genuinely terrifying to people and it’s important to understand that. Like, national security agencies pushed Hollywood to produce anticommunist movies like “The Red Menace,” which scared people. And the CIA funded magazines, news broadcasts, concerts, art exhibitions, that gave examples of American freedom. It even supported painters like Jackson Pollack and the Museum of Modern Art in New York because American expressionism was the vanguard of artistic freedom and the exact opposite of Soviet socialist realism. I mean, have you seen Soviet paintings? Look at the hearty ankles on these socialist comrade peasants. Also because the Soviets were atheists, at least in theory, Congress in 1954 added the words “under God” to the pledge of allegiance as a sign of America’s resistance to communism. The Cold War also shaped domestic policy--anti-communist sentiment, for instance, prevented Truman from extending the social policies of the New Deal. The program that he dubbed the Fair Deal would have increased the minimum wage, extended national health insurance and increased public housing, Social Security and aid to education. But the American Medical Association lobbied against Truman’s plan for national health insurance by calling it “socialized” medicine, and Congress was in no mood to pay money for socialized anything. That problem goes away. But the government did make some domestic investments as a result of the Cold War--in the name of national security the government spent money on education, research in science, technology like computers, and transportation infrastructure. In fact we largely have the Cold War to thank for our marvelous interstate highway system, although part of the reason Congress approved it was to set up speedy evacuation routes in the event of nuclear war. And, speaking of nuclear war, it’s worth noting that a big part of the reason the Soviets were able to develop nuclear weapons so quickly was thanks to espionage, like for instance by physicist and spy Klaus Fuchs. I think I’m pronouncing that right. Fuchs worked on the Manhattan Project and leaked information to the Soviets and then later helped the Chinese to build their first bomb. Julius Rosenberg also gave atomic secrets to the Soviets, and was eventually executed--as was his less-clearly-guilty wife, Ethel. And it’s important to remember all that when thinking about the United States’s obsessive fear that there were communists in our midst. This began in 1947 with Truman’s Loyalty Review System, which required government employees to prove their patriotism when accused of disloyalty. How do you prove your loyalty? Rat out your co-workers as communists. No seriously though, that program never found any communists. This all culminated of course with the Red Scare and the rise of Wisconsin senator Joseph McCarthy, an inveterate liar who became enormously powerful after announcing in February 1950 that he had a list of 205 communists who worked in the state department In fact, he had no such thing, and McCarthy never identified a single disloyal American, but the fear of communism continued. In 1951’s Dennis v. United States, the Supreme Court upheld the notion that being a communist leader itself was a crime. In this climate of fear, any criticism of the government and its policies or the U.S. in general was seen as disloyalty. There was only one question--when will I be blown up--and it encouraged loyalty, because only the government could prevent the spread of communism and keep us from being blown up. We’ve talked a lot about different ways that Americans have imagined freedom this year, but this was a new definition of freedom--the government exists in part to keep us free from massive destruction. So, the Cold War changed America profoundly: The U.S. has remained a leader on the world stage and continued to build a large, powerful, and expensive national state. But it also changed the way we imagine what it means to be free, and what it means to be safe. Thanks for watching. I’ll see you next week. Crash Course is created by all of these nice people and it is possible because of you and your support through Subbable.com. Subbable is a crowdfunding website that allows you to support the stuff you love on a monthly basis. Our Subbable subscribers make this show possible. Thanks to them. If you value Crash Course, please check out our Subbable. There are great perks there. And thanks to all of you for watching. As we say in my hometown, don’t forget to be awesome...Wait, wait, wait Stan, is that music copyrighted? Alright. It’s not. Whew. That saved us a thousand dollars. ________________ [1] Foner. Give me Liberty ebook version p. 954 [2] ibid

Background

Fort Sumter in Charleston Harbor was bombarded and seized by the Confederate States Army on April 12–14, 1861, thereby initiating the Civil War. Following the outbreak of hostilities, on April 19, President Lincoln proclaimed a blockade of all ports in the states that had seceded from the Union at that time: South Carolina; Georgia; Florida; Alabama; Mississippi; Louisiana; and Texas. Later, when the coastal states of Virginia and North Carolina also seceded, the proclamation was modified to include their ports as well.[1]

An 1861 characterized map of General Winfield Scott's plan for a Union blockade of Southern ports, known as the Anaconda Plan.

The blockade, which existed only on paper at this time, became an integral part of the plan to persuade the seceded states to return to the Union that was proposed by General in Chief Winfield Scott. Although Scott's so-called Anaconda Plan was never formally adopted as a strategy to guide the conduct of the war, the U.S. Navy enforced the blockade to the best of its ability for the duration of the conflict.

At the beginning of the war, the Union Navy's ability to carry out its Blockade of Confederate maritime ports was woefully inadequate. It had only 90 ships of all types, and only 42 that were powered by steam. A frenzied program of shipbuilding and conversions of existing merchant vessels increased the number to 671 by the end of the war,[2] but as they came into service, their assignments had to be prioritized.

The person in Lincoln's cabinet most concerned with rationalizing the blockade was Secretary of the Treasury Salmon P. Chase. Treasury's Revenue Cutter Service was the agency most familiar with the nation's ports, and the knowledge of harbor bottoms held by its Coast Survey would be needed by the naval commanders who patrolled their waters. He persuaded Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles to set up a commission to study the entire Southern coast, and on June 25, 1861 Welles issued the necessary orders to Captain (later Rear Admiral) Samuel Francis Du Pont. At the same time, he ordered Commander (later Rear Admiral) Charles Henry Davis to the board to serve as secretary, and requested that Army Major (later Major General) John G. Barnard, chief of the Army Corps of Engineers, and Alexander D. Bache, Superintendent of the Coast Survey, lend their services.[3] Other persons gave advice, but all reports issued by the commission were signed only by these four.

Reports


S. F. Du Pont,
Chairman
   

Charles Henry Davis,
Secretary

Alexander D. Bache
   

John G. Barnard

The board delivered seven reports to the Navy Department between July 5 and September 19, 1861. Each of them has been published as part of the Official Records of the American Civil War. In chronological order they are:

  • July 5, 1861 – ORN I, volume 12, pages 195–198.
    Deals with Fernandina, Florida and its harbor. Recommends seizing it as the southern anchor to the Atlantic blockading line.
  • July 13, 1861 – ORA I, volume 53, pages 67–73.
    Considers the South Carolina coast, particularly Bull's Bay, St. Helena Sound, and Port Royal Sound. Recommends seizure and occupation of at least one.
  • July 16, 1861 – ORN I, volume 12, pages 198–201.
    Recommends dividing the Atlantic Blockading Squadron in two, to be separated at Cape Romain in South Carolina. Suggests ways to complete blockade between Cape Henry and Cape Romain.
  • July 26, 1861 – ORN I, volume 12, pages 201–206.
    Deals with the parts of the Atlantic blockade not covered in the reports of July 13 and 16.
  • August 9, 1861 – ORN I, volume 16, pages 618–630.
    Distinguishes six regions of the Gulf coast, and restricts recommendations to the sections covering New Orleans and Mobile. Suggests that Ship Island be captured as a staging ground for operations against either or both.
  • September 3, 1861 – ORN I, volume 16, pages 651–655.
    Deals with Gulf coast other than the parts not considered in report of 9 August.
  • September 19, 1861 – ORN I, volume 16, pages 680–681.
    Considers Ship Island and the lower Mississippi River in greater detail than report of August 9.

Impact

The recommendations of the board for the Atlantic blockade were mostly accepted, with modifications, by the Lincoln administration. The capture of Fernandina, proposed as the initial offensive action of the Union Navy, was postponed until after the capture of Hatteras Island and Port Royal. The suggestion that Hatteras Inlet be blocked up was overruled by Flag Officer Silas Stringham and Brig. General Benjamin F. Butler, the men who led the expedition.[4] (The board had anticipated that its recommendations would not be followed to the letter. In their report, they included the statement that "These plans may undergo some modification in the hands of the person to whom their execution shall be intrusted.")[5]

The capture of Port Royal Sound also represented a divergence from the board's original plan. They had stated a preference for an attack on St. Helena Sound, which was nearer to Charleston and also would have been harder for the Rebels to defend. The natural advantages of Port Royal were so great, however, that the administration chose to take it. Perhaps ironically, Captain (by then Flag Officer) Du Pont was selected to lead the naval contingent in the expedition against the harbor.[6]

The Gulf blockade diverged much further from board plans for several reasons. One of the most important is the lack of knowledge of the Gulf coast compared with the Atlantic. The hydrography was so imperfectly known that one of the board's more emphatic recommendations was that a Coast Survey vessel should be attached to each blockading squadron.[7] This recommendation was accepted. The Coast Survey proved to be quite useful throughout the war.

Although Ship Island was taken in accord with the report of August 9, the Navy Department used it as the staging ground for David G. Farragut's assault on and capture of New Orleans. The board had opposed any immediate move up the Mississippi River, not because it would be undesirable, but because they believed that it could not be done with the weapons at hand.[8]

The blockade of the southern extreme of the Texas coast also did not conform to board expectations. The problem there was that the port at Brownsville, at the mouth of the Rio Grande, also served the Mexican community of Matamoros. The international problems associated with the blockade there were exacerbated by a rebellion underway at that time in Mexico against Emperor Maximilian.[9]

Although it may appear that the Blockade Strategy Board had only a minimal effect on the war, it nevertheless deserves respect because it was the first effort by the United States to conduct a war by rational principles, rather than simply reacting to events. As the armed forces did not have an Office of Naval Operations or a General Staff at the time, it served as a rudimentary surrogate. As such, it was an important forerunner of the present-day staff system.

See also

References

  1. ^ Civil War naval chronology, 1861–1865, pp. I-9, I-12.
  2. ^ Tucker, Blue and Gray Navies, p. 1.
  3. ^ Reed, Combined operations, p. 7; ORN I, v. 12, p. 195.
  4. ^ Reed, Combined operations,, pp. 12-21.
  5. ^ Official Records, Navies I, v. 12, pp. 198-201.
  6. ^ Browning, Success is all that was expected, pp. 23-41.
  7. ^ Official Records, Navies I, v. 16, p. 655.
  8. ^ Official Records, Navies I, volume 16, pages 618-630.
  9. ^ Wise, Lifeline of the Confederacy, pp. 183-186.
  • Official records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion. Series I: 27 volumes. Series II: 3 volumes. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1894-1922.
  • The War of the Rebellion: A compilation of the official records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Series I: 53 volumes. Series II: 8 volumes. Series III: 5 volumes. Series IV: 4 volumes. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1886-1901.
  • United States Navy Department, Naval History Division, Civil War naval chronology, 1861–1865. Government Printing Office, 1971.
  • Browning, Robert M., Success is all that was expected : the South Atlantic blockading squadron during the Civil War. Washington, D.C. : Brassey's, 2002. ISBN 1-57488-514-6
  • Reed, Rowena, Combined operations in the Civil War. United States Naval Institute, 1978. ISBN 0-87021-122-6
  • Tucker, Spencer C., Blue and Gray Navies; the Civil War afloat. Naval Institute, 2006. ISBN 1-59114-882-0
  • Wise, Stephen R., Lifeline of the Confederacy: blockade running during the Civil War. University of South Carolina, 1988.
This page was last edited on 30 October 2022, at 11:24
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