Panic of 1837

Whig cartoon showing the effects of unemployment on a family that has portraits of Democratic Presidents Andrew Jackson and Martin Van Buren on the wall

The Panic of 1837 was a financial crisis in the United States that began a major depression (not to be confused with the Great Depression), which lasted until the mid-1840s. Profits, prices, and wages dropped, westward expansion was stalled, unemployment rose, and pessimism abounded.

The panic had both domestic and foreign origins. Speculative lending practices in the West, a sharp decline in cotton prices, a collapsing land bubble, international specie flows, and restrictive lending policies in Britain were all factors.^[1]^[2] The lack of a central bank to regulate fiscal matters, which President Andrew Jackson had ensured by not extending the charter of the Second Bank of the United States, was also key.

The ailing economy of early 1837 led investors to panic, and a bank run ensued, giving the crisis its name. The bank run came to a head on May 10, 1837, when banks in New York City ran out of gold and silver. They immediately suspended specie payments, and would no longer redeem commercial paper in specie at full face value.^[3] A significant economic collapse followed: despite a brief recovery in 1838, the recession persisted for nearly seven years. Over 40% of all banks failed, businesses closed, prices declined, and there was mass unemployment. From 1837 to 1844, deflation in wages and prices was widespread.^[4]

As the nation underwent hardships, positive forces were at work that, in time, would invigorate the economy. Railroads had begun their relentless expansion, and furnace masters had discovered how to smelt greater quantities of pig iron. The machine tool and the metalworking industries were taking shape. Coal had begun its ascent, replacing wood as the nation’s major source of heat. Innovations with agricultural machinery would bring greater productivity from the land. The nation’s population would also increase by more than one-third during the 1840s, despite the economic turmoil.

After downturns in 1845-1846 and 1847-1848, gold was discovered in California in 1848, setting off a prosperity of its own. Meanwhile, individuals and institutions were hurting.^[5]

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Now through the middle of the 1830s as entrepreneurs had borrowed more and more money, whether they were entrepreneurs in the sense of cotton planters or factory owners or merchants in Illinois or Indiana, all around the country they had borrowed huge amounts of money, expanded their operations, and taken on a lot of debt. Everything was fine as long as the revenue was flowing in. They were able to make their interest payments and maybe even pay a little bit of the principal. But they were also producing much more stuff. In particular, this is true with the cotton plantations. The cotton sector in the South doubled its output between 1830 and 1837. And by early 1836, the cotton price was creeping slowly downward. And people in Britain started to get nervous, specifically people who ran textile factories and even more the people who lent money to those factories. As the amount of cloth and clothes bought by consumers, produced by those factories, but bought by consumers around the world. As that starts to slow down in comparison to the amount of clothes and textiles that are getting pumped out, those factory start to lay off workers. As they lay off workers, the lenders get even more nervous. And eventually they cut off credit. They also cut off credit to the cotton buyers in Liverpool who by the American cotton crop each year. And when they do that, the merchants back in New Orleans lose their credit as well. And when they lose their credit, then they stop being able to make their payments to the local banks. The local banks go to the planters to try to call in the loans to the planters. But the planters aren't getting any money. So the entire financial sector shuts down. Pretty soon this isn't just something in the cotton economy. It's all around the country. The economy has entered a full blown liquidity crisis in which everybody who has lent money wants their money back. So they can pay back the people who have lent them money. But because everybody's in the same situation, nobody is able to pay their money back. The economy shuts down. And we are in what is known as the Panic of 1837. In an advanced complex economy, the liquidity crisis can lead very quickly to deflation, unemployment, massive unemployment, and an even deeper crisis that spirals into worse and worse effects as time goes on. As mass unemployment, for instance, can lead to social and political unrest pretty quickly. This is the situation in which policy makers in Washington, bank officials, cotton merchants, factory owners find themselves in 1837. So how do they get out of it? Well, there's three theories about how to get out of a liquidity crisis. One is to build up enough of a set of financial regulators and institutions that have the capacity put brakes on runaway crises that you never even get to that point in the first place. In other words to maintain confidence. This confidence that eventually the economy will be restarted enables borrowers to wait a little longer to get their money back from their creditors, instead of producing this sort of avalanche effect. Now unfortunately, this was not possible in 1837 because the Bank of United States had been destroyed. But that's the role that the Federal Reserve and other so-called lenders of last resort play in the world economy today. All right. So what's the second possibility? The second possibility is to let the crisis play out, to liquidate bad debts as, for instance, Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon will say during the Great Depression in the 1930s. Liquidate everything he says. The problem with that is that it produces great suffering, extreme economic suffering. And it's not possible in any case to liquidate all the debts. If, for instance, you have no reliable currency, if nobody will accept the credit of the government or the credit of individual borrowers which was the case again by 1837. Finally a third option might be to prime the pump. This is what happens when a government essentially borrows money to put people back to work. When it puts people back to work, infrastructure projects, things like that which were accomplished during the New Deal are a popular way to do that. When it puts people back to work, the government gets spending started again in the economy. And when spending starts to flow again, then borrowers can start to pay back their debts. This was not an option that Martin Van Buren was interested in taking. But there was one more actor in 1837 who decided he was going to try to accomplish really a couple of these roles at once. So we'll turn to that next. The one actor in the economy, perhaps, if we're looking at all of the different interlocking financial sectors of the Atlantic economy, from Amsterdam to London to New York to New Orleans, the one person who really could do what comes next is Nicholas Biddle. And what he tries to do, he's now the director of a private bank in Philadelphia very large one, is to issue what's essentially his own currency to get the economy started again, a set of IOUs he calls post notes which he and his deputies give in exchange for cotton. The idea is these will start to circulate in the economy like money. And in the year or so when the economy's doing better, he will sell the cotton and repay the IOUs and make a nice profit. And things seem great in late 1837, in 1838. People are encouraged by the fact that these post notes are circulating in the economy. And guess what they do? Planters make a huge amount of cotton. They make so much, in fact, that the cotton market which was recovering crashes again. The price drops. Biddle goes bankrupt. He dies in 1842, disgraced, bankrupt still. And the economy particularly in the South sinks into worse doldrums. It'll recover in the North a little bit faster. But in the South the level of indebtedness is so great that it produces a major policy problem. The banks that had issued the bonds which are backed by the states, the individual states, go bankrupt. And now the creditors of the banks, the bondholders in the financial markets of the world who bought what were essentially securitized slaves, they want their money back. So they come looking to the states of Mississippi and Louisiana and Alabama and so on and ask for repayment. The citizens of those states, most of whom are not slave holders, do not feel that this is just. They feel that this is an example of what we would in the present day call privatizing the gains, because it's the planters and the bankers who made the money, and socializing the risk, spreading the risk out, extending the cost to all of the citizens of the political unit, in this case, the individual states. So they elect new legislatures. And these legislatures repudiate the bonds. They default on the state debts. And what happens is that for the next 20 and, in some cases, 100 years, those states, Mississippi, Alabama, et cetera are going to be unable to borrow on the world financial market. And they get a very, very bad reputation in general that extends beyond the question of their financial reputation. It turns many elites in the North and in London and other places against the planters of the South. And they start to think that even though this process of an expanding cotton based slavery is yielding tremendous revenue, maybe it's actually producing a set of elites, the planters of the South who cannot be trusted. All of these dynamics are part of the development of the conflicts that eventually become the American Civil War. And they start in the financial crisis of the 1830s.

Causes

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The crisis followed a period of economic expansion from mid-1834 to mid-1836. The prices of land, cotton, and slaves rose sharply in those years. The boom's origin had many sources, both domestic and international. Because of the peculiar factors of international trade, abundant amounts of silver were coming into the United States from Mexico and China.^[6]^[7] Land sales and tariffs on imports were also generating substantial federal revenues. Through lucrative cotton exports and the marketing of state-backed bonds in British money markets, the United States acquired significant capital investment from Britain. The bonds financed transportation projects in the United States. British loans, made available through Anglo-American banking houses like Baring Brothers, fueled much of America's westward expansion, infrastructure improvements, industrial expansion, and economic development during the antebellum era.^[8]

From 1834 to 1835, Europe experienced a surge in prosperity, which resulted in confidence and an increased propensity for risky foreign investments. In 1836, directors of the Bank of England noticed that its monetary reserves had declined precipitously in recent years due to an increase in capital speculation and investment in American transportation. Conversely, improved transportation systems increased the supply of cotton, which lowered the market price. Cotton prices were security for loans, and America's cotton kings defaulted. In 1836 and 1837 American wheat crops also suffered from Hessian fly and winter kill which caused the price of wheat in America to increase greatly, which caused American labor to starve.^[9]

The hunger in America was not felt by England, whose wheat crops improved every year from 1831 to 1836, and European imports of American wheat had dropped to "almost nothing" by 1836.^[10] The directors of the Bank of England, wanting to increase monetary reserves and to cushion American defaults, indicated that they would gradually raise interest rates from 3 to 5 percent. The conventional financial theory held that banks should raise interest rates and curb lending when they were faced with low monetary reserves. Raising interest rates, according to the laws of supply and demand, was supposed to attract specie since money generally flows where it will generate the greatest return if equal risk among possible investments is assumed. In the open economy of the 1830s, which was characterized by free trade and relatively weak trade barriers, the monetary policies of the hegemonic power (in this case Britain) were transmitted to the rest of the interconnected global economic system, including the United States. The result was that as the Bank of England raised interest rates, major banks in the United States were forced to do the same.^[11]

When New York banks raised interest rates and scaled back on lending, the effects were damaging. Since the price of a bond bears an inverse relationship to the yield (or interest rate), the increase in prevailing interest rates would have forced down the price of American securities. Importantly, demand for cotton plummeted. The price of cotton fell by 25% in February and March 1837.^[12] The American economy, especially in the southern states, was heavily dependent on stable cotton prices. Receipts from cotton sales provided funding for some schools, balanced the nation's trade deficit, fortified the US dollar, and procured foreign exchange earnings in British pounds, then the world's reserve currency. Since the United States was still a predominantly agricultural economy centered on the export of staple crops and an incipient manufacturing sector,^[13] a collapse in cotton prices had massive reverberations.

In the United States, there were several contributing factors. In July 1832, President Jackson vetoed the bill to recharter the Second Bank of the United States, the nation's central bank and fiscal agent. As the bank wound up its operations in the next four years, state-chartered banks in the West and the South relaxed their lending standards by maintaining unsafe reserve ratios.^[2] Two domestic policies exacerbated an already volatile situation. The Specie Circular of 1836 mandated that western lands could be purchased only with gold and silver coin. The circular was an executive order issued by Jackson and favored by Senator Thomas Hart Benton of Missouri and other hard-money advocates. Its intent was to curb speculation in public lands, but the circular set off a real estate and commodity price crash since most buyers were unable to come up with sufficient hard money or "specie" (gold or silver coins) to pay for the land. Secondly, the Deposit and Distribution Act of 1836 placed federal revenues in various local banks, derisively termed "pet banks", across the country. Many of the banks were located in the West. The effect of both policies was to transfer specie away from the nation's main commercial centers on the East Coast. With lower monetary reserves in their vaults, major banks and financial institutions on the East Coast had to scale back their loans, which was a major cause of the panic, besides the real estate crash.^[14]

Americans attributed the cause of the panic principally to domestic political conflicts. Democrats typically blamed the bankers, and Whigs blamed Jackson for refusing to renew the charter of the Bank of the United States and on the withdrawal of government funds from the bank.^[15] Martin Van Buren, who became president in March 1837, was largely blamed for the panic even though his inauguration had preceded the panic by only five weeks. Van Buren's refusal to use government intervention to address the crisis, such as emergency relief and increasing spending on public infrastructure projects to reduce unemployment, was accused by his opponents of contributing further to the hardship and the duration of the depression that followed the panic. Jacksonian Democrats, on the other hand, blamed the Bank of the United States for both funding rampant speculation and introducing inflationary paper money. Some modern economists^[who?] view Van Buren's deregulatory economic policy as successful in the long term, and argue that it played an important role in revitalizing banks after the panic.^[16]

Effects and aftermath

Virtually the whole nation felt the effects of the panic. Connecticut, New Jersey, and Delaware reported the greatest stress in their mercantile districts. In 1837, Vermont's business and credit systems took a hard blow. Vermont had a period of alleviation in 1838 but was hit hard again in 1839–1840. New Hampshire did not feel the effects of the panic as much as its neighbors did. It had no permanent debt in 1838 and had little economic stress the following years. New Hampshire's greatest hardship was the circulation of fractional coins in the state.^[17]

Conditions in the South were much worse than in the East, and the Cotton Belt was dealt the worst blow. In Virginia, North Carolina, and South Carolina the panic caused an increase in the interest of diversifying crops. New Orleans felt a general depression in business, and its money market stayed in bad condition throughout 1843. Several planters in Mississippi had spent much of their money in advance, which led to the complete bankruptcy of many planters. By 1839, many plantations were thrown out of cultivation. Florida and Georgia did not feel the effects as early as Louisiana, Alabama, or Mississippi. In 1837, Georgia had sufficient coin to carry on everyday purchases. Until 1839, Floridians were able to boast about the punctuality of their payments. Georgia and Florida began to feel the negative effects of the panic in the 1840s.^[18]

At first, the West did not feel as much pressure as the East or the South. Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois were agricultural states, and the good crops of 1837 were a relief to the farmers. In 1839, agricultural prices fell, and the pressure reached the agriculturalists.^[19]

Within two months the losses from bank failures in New York alone aggregated nearly $100 million. Out of 850 banks in the United States, 343 closed entirely, 62 failed partially, and the system of state banks received a shock from which it never fully recovered.^[20] The publishing industry was particularly hurt by the ensuing depression.^[21]

Many individual states defaulted on their bonds, which angered British creditors.^[22]^: 50–52 The United States briefly withdrew from international money markets. Only in the late 1840s did Americans re-enter those markets.^{[citation needed]} The defaults, along with other consequences of the recession, carried major implications for the relationship between the state and economic development. In some ways, the panic undermined confidence in public support for internal improvements.^[22]^: 55–57 The panic unleashed a wave of riots and other forms of domestic unrest. The ultimate result was an increase in the state's police powers, including more professional police forces.^[23]^[22]^{: 137–138}

Recovery

Most economists agree that there was a brief recovery from 1838 to 1839, which ended when the Bank of England and Dutch creditors raised interest rates.^[24] The economic historian Peter Temin has argued that when corrected for deflation, the economy grew after 1838.^[25] According to the Austrian economist Murray Rothbard, between 1839 and 1843, real consumption increased by 21 percent and real gross national product increased by 16 percent, but real investment fell by 23 percent and the money supply shrank by 34 percent.^[26]

In 1842, the American economy was able to rebound somewhat and overcome the five-year depression, but according to most accounts, the economy did not recover until 1844.^[27] The recovery from the depression intensified after the California gold rush started in 1848, greatly increasing the money supply. By 1850, the US economy was booming again.

Intangible factors like confidence and psychology played powerful roles and helped to explain the magnitude and the depth of the panic. Central banks then had only limited abilities to control prices and employment, making bank runs common. When a few banks collapsed, alarm quickly spread throughout the community and were heightened by partisan newspapers. Anxious investors rushed to other banks and demanded to have their deposits withdrawn. When faced with such pressure, even healthy banks had to make further curtailments by calling in loans and demanding payment from their borrowers. That fed the hysteria even further, which led to a downward spiral or snowball effect. In other words, anxiety, fear, and a pervasive lack of confidence initiated devastating, self-sustaining feedback loops. Many economists today understand that phenomenon as an information asymmetry. Essentially, bank depositors reacted to imperfect information since they did not know if their deposits were safe and so fearing further risk, they withdrew their deposits, even if it caused more damage. The same concept of downward spiral was true for many southern planters, who speculated in land, cotton, and slaves. Many planters took out loans from banks under the assumption that cotton prices would continue to rise. When cotton prices dropped, however, planters could not pay back their loans, which jeopardized the solvency of many banks. These factors were particularly crucial given the lack of deposit insurance in banks. When bank customers are not assured that their deposits are safe, they are more likely to make rash decisions that can imperil the rest of the economy. Economists have concluded that the suspension of convertibility, deposit insurance, and sufficient capital requirements in banks can limit the possibility of bank runs.^[28]^[29]^[30]

References

^ Timberlake, Richard H. Jr (1997). "Panic of 1837". In Glasner, David; Cooley, Thomas F. (eds.). Business cycles and depressions: an encyclopedia. New York: Garland Publishing. pp. 514–16. ISBN 978-0-8240-0944-1.
^ ^a ^b Knodell, Jane (September 2006). "Rethinking the Jacksonian Economy: The Impact of the 1832 Bank Veto on Commercial Banking". The Journal of Economic History. 66 (3): 541. doi:10.1017/S0022050706000258. S2CID 155084029.
^ Damiano, Sara T. (2016). "The Many Panics of 1837: People, Politics, and the Creation of a Transatlantic Financial Crisis by Jessica M. Lepler". Journal of the Early Republic. 36 (2): 420–422. doi:10.1353/jer.2016.0024. S2CID 148315095.
^ "Measuring Worth – measures of worth, prices, inflation, purchasing power, etc". Retrieved 27 December 2012.
^ Swett, Steven C. (30 June 2022). The Metalworkers. The Baltimore Museum of Industry. pp. 19–21. ISBN 978-0-578-28250-3.
^ Temin, Peter (1969). The Jacksonian Economy. New York: W.W. Norton & Company. pp. 22.
^ Campbell, Stephen W. (2017). "The Transatlantic Financial Crisis of 1837". The Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Latin American History. doi:10.1093/acrefore/9780199366439.013.399. ISBN 978-0-19-936643-9.
^ Jenks, Leland Hamilton (1927). The Migration of British Capital to 1875. Alfred A. Knopf. pp. 66–67.
^ Davis, Joseph H. (2004). "Harvests and Business Cycles in Nineteenth-Century America" (PDF). Quarterly Journal of Economics. 124 (4). Vanguard Group: 14. doi:10.1162/qjec.2009.124.4.1675. S2CID 154544197.
^ Alison, Archibald. History of Europe: From the Fall of Napoleon, in MDCCCXV to the..., Volume 3. New York: Harper and Brothers. p. 265.
^ Temin, Peter (1969). The Jacksonian Economy. New York: W.W. Norton & Company. pp. 122–147.
^ Jenks, Leland Hamilton (1927). The Migration of British Capital to 1875. Alfred A. Knopf. pp. 87–93.
^ North, Douglass C. (1961). The Economic Growth of the United States 1790–1860. Prentice Hall. pp. 1–4.
^ Rousseau, Peter L (2002). "Jacksonian Monetary Policy, Specie Flows, and the Panic of 1837" (PDF). Journal of Economic History. 62 (2): 457–488. doi:10.1017/S0022050702000566. hdl:1803/15623.
^ Bill White (2014). America's Fiscal Constitution: Its Triumph and Collapse. PublicAffairs. p. 80. ISBN 9781610393430.
^ Hummel, Jeffery (1999). "Martin Van Buren The Greatest American President" (PDF). The Independent Review. 4 (2): 13–14. Retrieved 2017-08-01.
^ Steven P. McGiffen, "Ideology and the Failure of the Whig Party in New Hampshire, 1834–1841." New England Quarterly 59.3 (1986): 387–401.
^ John R. Killick, "The Cotton Operations of Alexander Brown and Sons in the Deep South, 1820–1860." Journal of Southern History 43.2 (1977): 169–194.
^ McGrane, Reginald (1965). The Panic of 1837: Some Financial Problems of the Jacksonian Era. New York: Russell & Russell. pp. 106–126.
^ Hubert H. Bancroft, ed. (1902). The financial panic of 1837. Vol. 3. {{cite book}}: |work= ignored (help)
^ Thompson, Lawrance. Young Longfellow (1807–1843). New York: The Macmillan Company, 1938: 325.
^ ^a ^b ^c Roberts, Alasdair (2012). America's First Great Depression: Economic Crisis and Political Disorder after the Panic of 1837. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. ISBN 9780801450334.
^ Larson, John (2001). Internal Improvement: National Public Works and the Promise of Popular Government in the Early United States. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. pp. 195–264.^{[page range too broad]}
^ Friedman, Milton. A Program for Monetary Stability. p. 10.
^ Temin, Peter. The Jacksonian Economy. p. 155.
^ Rothbard, Murray (18 August 2014). A History of money and Banking in the United States: The Colonial Era to world War II (PDF). p. 102.
^ Cheathem, Mark R.; Corps, Terry (2017). Historical Dictionary of the Jacksonian Era and Manifest Destiny. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 282–283. ISBN 9781442273191; Roberts, Alasdair (2013). America's First Great Depression: Economic Crisis and Political Disorder After the Panic of 1837. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. pp. 204–205. ISBN 9780801478864.
^ Chen, Yehning; Hasan, Iftekhar (2008). "Why Do Bank Runs Look Like Panic? A New Explanation" (PDF). Journal of Money, Credit and Banking. 40 (2–3): 537–538. doi:10.1111/j.1538-4616.2008.00126.x.
^ Diamond, Douglas W.; Dybvig, Philip H. (1983). "Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity". Journal of Political Economy. 91 (3): 401–419. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.434.6020. doi:10.1086/261155. JSTOR 1837095. S2CID 14214187.
^ Goldstein, Itay; Pauzner, Ady (2005). "Demand-Deposit Contracts and the Probability of Bank Runs". Journal of Finance. 60 (3): 1293–1327. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.500.6471. doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00762.x.

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v t e Economic expansions and recessions in the United States and Commonwealth of Nations countries
Aggregate demand/Supply Effective demand General glut Model Overproduction Paradox of thrift Price-and-wage stickiness Underconsumption Business cycle Deflation/Inflation Chronic Classical dichotomy Disinflation Money supply/demand Neutrality of money Price level Real and nominal values Velocity of money Economic expansion Recovery Stagnation U.S. expansions Interest rate Nominal interest rate Real interest rate Yield curve/Inverted Recession Balance sheet Depression Global Rolling Shapes Stagflation U.K. recessions U.S. recessions Shock Demand Supply Unemployment
Commercial revolution (1000–1760)	Great Slump (1430–1490) Slump of 1706 Great Frost of 1709
1st Industrial Revolution (1760–1840)	British credit crisis of 1772–1773 1772–1774; England Scotland Thirteen Colonies 1785–1788 Copper Panic of 1789/Panic of 1792 (1789–1793) Panic of 1796–1797 (1796–1799) 1802–1804 1807–1810 1812 Post-Napoleonic Depression (1815–1821) 1822–23 Panic of 1825 (1825–1826) 1828–29 1833–34 Panic of 1837 (1836–1838 and 1839–1843)
Early Victorian Britain/ Civil War-era United States (1840–1870)	1845–46 Panic of 1847 (1847–1848) 1853–54 Panic of 1857 (1857–1858) 1860–61 Panic of 1866 (1865–1867) Black Friday (1869–1870)
Gilded Age/ 2nd Industrial Revolution (1870–1914)	Long Depression 1873–1879; United Kingdom United States Depression of 1882–1885 1887–88 Baring crisis (1890–1891) Panic of 1893 (1893–1897) 1899–1900 Panic of 1901 (1902–1904) Panic of 1907 (1907–1908) Panic of 1910–1911 (1910–1912) Financial crisis of 1914 (1913–14)
Interwar period (1918–1939)	Post–World War I recession (1918–1919) Depression of 1920–1921 Roaring Twenties 1923–1924 1926–1927 Great Depression 1929–1939; Australia Canada India New Zealand South Africa United Kingdom United States Recession of 1937–1938
Post–WWII expansion (1945–1973)	1945 Recession of 1949 (1948–1949) Recession of 1953 (1953–1954) Recession of 1958 (1957–1958) Recession of 1960–1961 Recession of 1969–1970
Great Inflation (1973–1982)	1973–1975 recession United Kingdom United States Early 1980s recession 1980–1982; Canada United Kingdom United States
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v t e Andrew Jackson
7th President of the United States (1829–1837) Senator from Tennessee (1797–1798, 1823–1825) Federal Military Commissioner of Florida (1821) U.S. Representative for Tennessee at-large (1796–1797)
Life	Battle of Hanging Rock The Hermitage Creek War Fort Strother Battle of Talladega Battles of Emuckfaw and Enotachopo Creek Battle of Horseshoe Bend Treaty of Fort Jackson Battle of Pensacola (1814) Battle of New Orleans Seminole Wars 1824 United States presidential election United States Senate Committee on Armed Services Corrupt bargain 1828 United States presidential election Andrew Jackson 1828 presidential campaign Coffin Handbills Jacksonian democracy
Presidency	First inauguration of Andrew Jackson Tenure of Office Act (1820) Spoils system Petticoat affair Kitchen Cabinet Indian removal Indian Removal Act Trail of Tears Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek Bank War Senate censure Banking in the Jacksonian Era Hard money Specie Circular 1829 State of the Union Address 1830 State of the Union Address 1832 United States presidential election 1832 Democratic National Convention Maysville Road veto Second inauguration of Andrew Jackson Nullification crisis Tariff of 1832 Ordinance of Nullification Force Bill Tariff of 1833 Pet banks Panic of 1837 List of federal judges appointed by Andrew Jackson
Public image	List of memorials to Andrew Jackson Andrew Jackson (U.S. Capitol statue) Andrew Jackson (Washington D.C. and New Orleans statues) Black Jack stamp The President's Lady The Buccaneer (1938) The Buccaneer (1958) The Gorgeous Hussy The Remarkable Andrew Bloody Bloody Andrew Jackson Man of Conquest USRC Jackson (1832) USS Andrew Jackson (SSBN-619) USS President Jackson
Family	Rachel Jackson (wife) Andrew Jackson Donelson (adopted son) Daniel Smith Donelson (adopted son) Lyncoya Jackson (adopted son) Emily Donelson (acting First Lady) Sarah Yorke Jackson (acting First Lady)
← John Quincy Adams Martin Van Buren → Category

v t e Martin Van Buren
8th President of the United States (1837–1841) 8th Vice President of the United States (1833–1837) U.S. Minister to the United Kingdom (1831–1832) 10th United States Secretary of State (1829–1831) 9th Governor of New York (1829) U.S. Senator from New York (1821–1828) Attorney General of New York (1815–1819)
Life	Bucktails Albany Regency Tammany Hall 1821 United States Senate election in New York United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary Tariff of Abominations Democratic Party 1828 New York gubernatorial election Petticoat affair Kitchen Cabinet 1832 Democratic National Convention 1832 United States presidential election 1836 United States presidential election 1835 Democratic National Convention Second Party System Martin Van Buren National Historic Site 1844 Democratic National Convention Barnburners and Hunkers 1848 Democratic National Convention Free Soil Party 1848 United States presidential election Reformed Dutch Church
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← Andrew Jackson William Henry Harrison → ← John C. Calhoun Richard Mentor Johnson → Category

v t e Financial crises
Bank run Commodity price shocks Credit crunch Credit cycle Currency crisis Debt crisis Energy crisis Financial contagion Social contagion Flash crash Hyperinflation Liquidity crisis Accounting Capital Funding Market Minsky moment Social crisis Stock market crash
Pre-1000	Crisis of the Third Century (235–284 CE)
Commercial revolution (1000–1760)	Great Bullion Famine (c. 1400–c. 1500) The Great Debasement (1544–1551) Dutch Republic stock market crashes (c. 1600–1760) Kipper und Wipper (1621–1623) Tulip mania crash (1637) South Sea bubble crash (1720) Mississippi bubble crash (1720)
1st Industrial Revolution (1760–1840)	Amsterdam banking crisis of 1763 Bengal bubble crash (1769–1784) British credit crisis of 1772–1773 Dutch Republic financial collapse (c. 1780–1795) Copper Panic of 1789 Panic of 1792 Panic of 1796–1797 Danish state bankruptcy of 1813 Post-Napoleonic Irish grain price and land use shocks (1815–1816) Panic of 1819 Panic of 1825 Panic of 1837
1840–1870	European potato failure (1845–1856) Great Irish Famine Highland Potato Famine Panic of 1847 Panic of 1857 Panic of 1866 Black Friday (1869)
2nd Industrial Revolution (1870–1914)	Panic of 1873 Paris Bourse crash of 1882 Panic of 1884 Arendal crash (1886) Baring crisis (1890) Encilhamento (1890–1893) Panic of 1893 Australian banking crisis of 1893 Black Monday (1894) Panic of 1896 Panic of 1901 Panic of 1907 Shanghai rubber stock market crisis (1910) Panic of 1910–1911 Financial crisis of 1914
Interwar period (1918–1939)	Early Soviet hyperinflation (1917–1924) Weimar Republic hyperinflation (1921–1923) Shōwa financial crisis (1927) Wall Street Crash of 1929 Panic of 1930
Post–WWII expansion (1945–1973)	Kennedy Slide of 1962 1963–1965 Indonesian hyperinflation
Great Inflation (1973–1982)	1970s energy crisis (1973–1980) 1973 oil crisis 1973–1974 stock market crash Secondary banking crisis of 1973–1975 Steel crisis (1973–1982) Latin American debt crisis (1975–1982) 1976 British currency crisis 1979 oil crisis Brazilian hyperinflation (1980–1982)
Great Moderation/ Great Regression (1982–2007)	Brazilian hyperinflation (1982–1994) Souk Al-Manakh stock market crash (1982) Chilean crisis of 1982 1983 Israel bank stock crisis Black Saturday (1983) Savings and loan crisis (1986–1995) Black Monday (1987) 1988–1992 Norwegian banking crisis Japanese asset price bubble crash (1990–1992) Rhode Island banking crisis (1990–1992) 1991 Indian economic crisis 1990s Swedish financial crisis 1990s Finnish banking crisis 1990s Armenian energy crisis Cuban Special Period (1991–2000) Black Wednesday (1992 Sterling crisis) Yugoslav hyperinflation (1992–1994) 1994 bond market crisis Venezuelan banking crisis of 1994 Mexican peso crisis (1994–1996) 1997 Asian financial crisis October 1997 mini-crash 1998 Russian financial crisis 1998–1999 Ecuador economic crisis 1998–2002 Argentine great depression Samba effect (1999) Dot-com bubble crash (2000–2004) 9/11 stock market crash (2001) 2001 Turkish economic crisis South American economic crisis of 2002 Stock market downturn of 2002 2002 Uruguay banking crisis 2003 Myanmar banking crisis 2000s energy crisis (2003–2008) 2004 Argentine energy crisis 2007 Chinese stock bubble crash Zimbabwean hyperinflation (2007–present)
Great Recession (2007–2009)	2007–2008 financial crisis September 2008 October 2008 November 2008 December 2008 2009 Subprime mortgage crisis 2000s U.S. housing market correction U.S. bear market of 2007–2009 2008 Latvian financial crisis 2008–2009 Belgian financial crisis 2008–2009 Russian financial crisis 2008–2009 Ukrainian financial crisis 2008–2011 Icelandic financial crisis 2008–2011 Irish banking crisis 2008–2014 Spanish financial crisis Blue Monday Crash 2009 European debt crisis Greek government-debt crisis
Information Age (2009–present)	2009 Dubai debt standstill Venezuelan banking crisis of 2009–2010 2010–2014 Portuguese financial crisis Energy crisis in Venezuela (2010–present) Syrian economic crisis (2011–present) August 2011 stock markets fall 2011 Bangladesh share market scam 2012–2013 Cypriot financial crisis 2013 Chinese banking liquidity crisis Venezuela economic crisis (2013–present) 2014–2016 Brazilian economic crisis Puerto Rican government-debt crisis (2014–2022) Russian financial crisis (2014–2016) 2015 Nepal blockade 2015–2016 Chinese stock market turbulence 2015–2016 stock market selloff Brexit stock market crash (2016) Venezuelan hyperinflation (2016–2022) 2017 Sri Lankan fuel crisis Ghana banking crisis (2017–2018) Turkish economic crisis (2018–present) Lebanese liquidity crisis (2019–present) Sri Lankan economic crisis (2019–present) COVID-19 pandemic Financial market impact 2020 stock market crash Recession Chinese property sector crisis (2020–present) 2021–2023 inflation 2022 Russian financial crisis 2022 stock market decline 2023 United States banking crisis
List of banking crises List of economic crises List of sovereign debt crises List of stock market crashes and bear markets

v t e Financial bubbles
Market trend Credit cycle Irrational exuberance Social contagion Real-estate bubble Stock market bubble
Commercial revolution (1000–1760)	Tulip mania (1634–1637) Mississippi bubble (1684–1720) Brazilian Gold Rush (c. 1690–c. 1900) South Sea bubble (1711–1720) Bengal Bubble of 1769 (1757–1769)
1st Industrial Revolution (1760–1840)	Canal Mania (c. 1790–c. 1810) Carolina gold rush (1802–1825) 1810s Alabama real estate bubble Georgia Gold Rush (1828–c. 1840) 1830s Chicago real estate bubble Chilean silver rush (1830–1850)
1840–1870	Railway Mania (c. 1840–c. 1850) California gold rush (1848–1855) Queen Charlottes Gold Rush (1851) Victorian gold rush (1851–c. 1870) New South Wales gold rush (1851–1880) Australian gold rushes (1851–1914) Fraser Canyon Gold Rush (1858) Pike's Peak gold rush (1858–1861) Rock Creek Gold Rush (1859) Pennsylvania oil rush (1859–1891) Similkameen Gold Rush (1860) Stikine Gold Rush (1861) Colorado River mining boom (1861–1864) Otago Gold Rush (1861–1864) Cariboo Gold Rush (1861–1867) First Nova Scotia Gold Rush (1861–1874) West Coast Gold Rush (1864–1867) Big Bend Gold Rush (c. 1865) Vermilion Lake gold rush (1865–1867) Kildonan Gold Rush (1869) Omineca Gold Rush (1869)
2nd Industrial Revolution (1870–1914)	1870s Lapland gold rush Coromandel Gold Rushes (c. 1870–c. 1890) Cassiar Gold Rush (c. 1870–c. 1890) Black Hills gold rush (1874–1880) Colorado Silver Boom (1879–1893) Western Australian gold rushes (c. 1880–c. 1900) Indiana gas boom (c. 1880–1903) Ohio oil rush (c. 1880–c. 1930) Tierra del Fuego gold rush (1883–1906) Cayoosh Gold Rush (1884) Witwatersrand Gold Rush (1886) Encilhamento (1886–1890) Cripple Creek Gold Rush (c. 1890–c. 1910) Klondike Gold Rush (1896–1899) Second Nova Scotia Gold Rush (1896–1903) Kobuk River Stampede (1897–1899) Mount Baker gold rush (1897–c. 1925) Nome Gold Rush (1899–1909) Fairbanks Gold Rush (c. 1900–1918) Texas oil boom (1901–1918) Cobalt silver rush (1903–1918) Porcupine Gold Rush (1909–1918)
Interwar period (1918–1939)	1920s Florida land boom (c. 1920–1925) Fairbanks Gold Rush (1918–c. 1930) Texas oil boom (1918–1945) Cobalt silver rush (1918–c. 1930) Porcupine Gold Rush (1918–1945) 1930s Kakamega gold rush Third Nova Scotia Gold Rush (1932–1942)
Post–WWII expansion (1945–1973)	Texas oil boom (1945–c. 1950) Porcupine Gold Rush (1945–c. 1960) Poseidon bubble (1969–1970)
The Great Inflation (1973–1982)	1970s commodities boom Mexican oil boom (1977–1981) Silver Thursday (1980) New Zealand property bubble (c. 1980–1982)
Great Moderation/ Great Regression (1982–2007)	1980s oil glut New Zealand property bubble (1982–) Spanish property bubble (1985–2008) Japanese asset price bubble (1986–1990) Dot-com bubble (1995–2000) Baltic states housing bubble (2000–2006) Irish property bubble (c. 2000–2007) 2000s commodities boom (2000–2008) 2000s Danish property bubble (2001–2006) United States housing bubble (2002–2006) Romanian property bubble (2002–2007) Polish property bubble (2002–2008) Canadian property bubble (2002–) Chinese property bubble (2005–11) Lebanese housing bubble (2005–2008) Chinese stock bubble of 2007 Uranium bubble of 2007
Information Age (2007–present)	2000s commodities boom (2008–2014) Lebanese housing bubble (2008–) Corporate debt bubble (2008–) Australian property bubble (2010–) Cryptocurrency bubble (2011–) Everything bubble (2020–21)
Carbon bubble Green bubble Social media stock bubble Unicorn bubble U.S. higher education bubble

This page was last edited on 28 May 2024, at 17:59

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