List of ambassadors of the United States to Tunisia

Transcription

What I'd thought I'd do is give a talk for a few moments about the revolution and then open it up for any questions you might have or any remarks. But, let me start out by saying, as the University president said that, Ben-Ali ruled Tunisia with an increasingly iron fist for 23 years. And, his very sudden departure on January 14th, following four weeks of civil strife, really set the country on a new, much more hopeful path as far as seeking greater participation in the government and also greater personal freedom. At the same time, this set off a wave of democratic protests throughout the Arab world that has come to be known as "The Arab Spring." What I'd like to talk about this morning - first of all the speed with which the revolution took place, the nature of the revolution itself, the progress that Tunisians have made since January 14th, which has been marked by a bit of political ferment, but at the same time by, in my opinion, by a surprising degree of political consensus - their prospects for successful transition, and what the US is doing to help and to set this on the right path. Let me start out with the revolution's momentum. The revolution that toppled Ben-Ali really began on Friday December 17th in a small town called Sidi Bouzid in the interior of the country. An underemployed, educated but underemployed fruit and vegetable vendor got into an altercation with a police woman, who basically confiscated his cart because he was selling his wares without a permit. Reports are - we'll never know exactly what happened. Reportedly she slapped him. Whatever the story was he felt humiliated by this and marched down to see the governor, and no one would see him. And he was so dismayed by this that he set himself on fire. As a result of this act of desperation and civil disobedience, there was a wave of demonstrations that began and spread to other areas in the interior of the country. They were captured on Facebook. The Internet was extremely tightly controlled and blocked - the previous regime was very sophisticated unfortunately at doing that, but Facebook was not blocked. And so, word of the demonstrations spread to other towns in the interior. It was really though, not until the weekend of January 8th and 9th that there was a tipping point. That weekend of the 8th and 9th there were security forces who fired on demonstrators. Reports were that at least 20 or more were shot by the security forces. As a result of this, the demonstrations really spread and took off, and spread to the coastal areas where the largest cities in Tunisia are located. I think there was a transformation of the demonstrations from being more economic in nature to political, because obviously when a government starts shooting at its own people it starts to lose legitimacy in the eyes of the people. Demonstrations that led unfortunately to these shootings - the shootings were over the weekend. Ben-Ali gave his third and final speech on Thursday, the 13th of January. Interestingly, it was the first speech that he gave in the Tunisian dialect of Arabic. Are there any Arabic students here? Ok, good. I'm assuming you are learning modern standard Arabic; that was the language which Ben-Ali used for his speeches. He's very formal and not very comfortable with people. When he gave this speech in Tunisian dialect, which was the third of the three speeches but the first one in the Tunisian dialect, which is the language that people speak in their homes - a lot of Tunisians said it was the first time they had heard him speak the Tunisian dialect. For those of you who aren't in an Arabic class and aren't studying – might not be studying Arabic, there are significant differences between the languages. I don't want to over-draw the analogy but it's a bit like Latin and Italian, or another Romance Language. Some people say if he had spoken frankly to the Tunisian people in their own language earlier that the demonstrations might not have spread as rapidly as they did. However, hindsight is always 20/20 and his speech did not resonate. And the next day, Friday, January 14th, he got on a plane with his family for Saudi Arabia, where he remains to this day. There are actually a lot of similarities between what went on in Tunisia and what went on in Egypt just a few weeks afterwards, down to the fact that Ben-Ali gave three speeches and Mubarak gave three speeches. Ben-Ali's third speech was on a Thursday and Mubarak’s third and last speech was on a Thursday. The next day, they each stepped down from power. There was a joke at that time that Gadhafi was going to outlaw Fridays in Libya as a result. Maybe now he wishes he did, I don't know about that. Let me talk now - that gives you a bit of context about how quickly it spread. Let me mention the nature of the revolution. Really, the spark for the revolution - it was rooted in economic grievances; it started in an area that historically has been disadvantaged. But, I would say it was neither economic nor political in nature. There is one member of civil society that told me shortly after the revolution - poverty exists everywhere. What this revolution was about was about dignity and dialogue. Specifically, the loss of dignity and the lack of dialogue in Tunisia. I think that can probably be applied to some of the revolutions and some of the popular movements that we are seeing in the other Arab countries that are undergoing a similar transformation. I'd say that the Tunisian revolution could be called the first post-modern revolution. I'd give four reasons for that. First of all, it was not ideological in nature. People were insisting on values; they were protesting for these values to be adhered to. Values such as transparency, which was missing in Tunisia under Ben-Ali, and human rights - as well as economic opportunity. Since it wasn't primarily ideological in nature, unlike a lot of revolutions that allows for different groups competing within Tunisian society the opportunity to cooperate more than if there was a rigid ideology that was pushing the revolution forward. Secondly, it was truly a grass roots revolution. This was a revolution conducted outside the capital, mostly by young people and there were really no leaders. There's no icon of the revolution; there's no Mandala or Lequilles or anyone like that which Tunisians can point to. This has certain advantages because no single group, be it a leftist group or an Islamist group or whatever, can claim ownership of the revolution. The political parties and the leaders of the political opposition were really playing catch up on this. And third, it was a revolution in which the participants really weren't seeking to take power. They werent trying to take power they were trying to get rid of Ben-Ali and remove the existing regime. That provides certain opportunities and there are also certain risks in that the challenge is how do you create political consensus? I'll talk about political consensus in a second. And the fourth and final reason that I think we can describe this as a post-modern revolution, if you will, was the role of technology, particularly more specifically social media and particularly Facebook. It was not - the Tunisian revolution was a Tunisian accomplishment. There was no foreign hand in it. The Tunisian people deserve the credit for their accomplishment. I'm not trying to fit their revolution into our narrative, and our narrative these days is very much Facebook. At the same time, Facebook was not censored and it did allow a mechanism for news of the demonstrations to spread and to mobilize Tunisians, I think especially when the demonstrations spread to the cities which had obviously larger population centers to mobilize. Let's shift now to some of the progress that we've seen since January 14th. In talking about the nature of the revolution I touched on political consensus. And I've been struck by the fact that the Tunisians have been able to create a consensus at three key points thus far in just the 8 months or so since Ben-Ali fled. I think this is particularly interesting because Ben-Ali had such a strong control of the country through his security services that there was really no political space. There were three legitimate opposition parties prior to January 14th. Their platform, if you will, was basically "no to Ben-Ali." So, we're moving from a situation where people, through no fault of their own - the fault was really Ben-Ali's - really did not have very much experience in consensus and coalition building - all those things we take for granted in the United States. You have to remember that in talking about Tunisia, non-governmental organizations were not allowed. They did not have all the things that we take for or certainly I take for granted. As far as elements of democracy, be it the PTA or be it people's involvement in a kids youth league or something like that , all of that is, ya know student council elections or whatever - all of that is totally missing, was totally missing in Tunisia. But the....The three critical points at which the Tunisians thus far have been able to create a consensus - the first one came at the end of February. The government that succeeded Ben-Ali - It was democratically it, it I shouldn't say it wasn't democratically selected, but it followed the constitution. The Speaker of the Parliament became the interim president and he asked the Prime Minister Benucci to continue in office. Some ministers stayed in office and some didn't. But that grew untenable because for the Tunisians that had been active in the demonstrations, they really saw that there was no - from their perspective there was no change because they still had the same Prime Minister, still had many ministers who were member of the previously ruling party. And so, they continued to demonstrate, demanding a political change. So, on February 27th, a new Prime Minister, Beji Caid el Sebsi, is currently the, remains as Prime Minister, came into office and he took a number of steps right away. First of all he got rid of all the ministers who had been hold-overs from the previous regime. Second of all, he dismissed all of the ministers who had political aspirations of their own, even though many of them were legitimate opposition leaders. Third and perhaps most importantly, he set the nation on the course for the future, which was to have elections for a constituent assembly, whose purpose is to write the constitution and defer having presidential elections. This reassured the Tunisian people for a number of reasons. First of all there was a wariness about having a strong president moving too quickly to presidential elections. An imperfect analogy would be the way American colonialists felt about a government after our revolution - there were a lot of things we didn't know, but one thing we did know was that we didn't want a repetition of King George III. Another reason that it reassured Tunisians is it gave a road map to the future and people realized that they wanted to move forward and the road map gave them the oppurtunity to look forward rather than looking to the past. I think that was very important for Tunisian’s political oppostion. The second crunch point, I would say, came in June when the elections had been announced for the constituent assembly had been announced to be held on July 24th. The mechanics of setting up the elections were proceeding fairly slowly - part of it was appointing the right number and the right mix of people for the Independent Election Commission and part of it was that Tunisians just didn't have the experience for organizing credible elections because the elections in the past had been a sham. The last presidential election was October of 2009 and Ali allegedly got 89.62% of the vote, and allegedly the participation figure was also 89%. I think the participation figure was probably the more incredible of those two figures because people just didn't vote. The foregone conclusion: why waste your Sunday on going down to a polling station? So, because of these technical problems, the Independent Elections Commission called for postponement of the elections until October. The government at first said no; they wanted to hold them on this date, July 24th, but the Independent Elections Commission insisted. And so, the elections will be held on October 23rd. I had thought, and I'm very happy to say I was wrong, I had thought that the postponement of the elections would lead to some - a bit of political ferment on people thinking, well, the government just wants to keep in power, so that's why they were delaying the elections - even though it was the Independent Elections Commission that was actually making the decision, but I was wrong. I mean, there was no, I thought there would be demonstrations, there were no demonstrations Again, this is the second point I would say at which there was a consensus on moving ahead. Those elections - ah those elections will be held on October 23rd. There will be independent observers both from within Tunisian civil society but also from outside the country. Carter's Center is going to be observing, Organization for Security, Cooperation for Europe is going to be observing - other NGOs and other governments will be observing. We're going to have an embassy participation in the observation effort as well. I think the third illustration of the Tunisian’s ability to create consensus came about just a week ago when almost all of the major political parties - I should say now there are 110 political parties registered in Tunisia, which strikes me as a lot. I think it shows the thirst of people to participate in the democratic process and I'm told this is not inconsistent with what has happened in other democratic transitions. I'm told that after Franco left the scene there were something like 250 political parties in Spain. Obviously with 110 political parties, some are stronger than others. 11 of the most important parties got together, signed an agreement that is not legally binding, but says that they will limit the time of the constituent assembly, after they are elected to it, to one year to write the constitution. This set out a plan for the next step. This had been a contentious issue - some people were saying we need a referendum on the scope of the constituent assembly, but again this was an illustration of the Tunisian’s ability to work behind the scenes and create a consensus. I think that will serve them well when they move to the constituent’s assembly. I'm going to take the dangerous step of getting out my crystal ball and you can judge further down the road whether I was accurate or not when I talk about the prospects for a successful transition. I'll break the cardinal rule of diplomacy and publicly express optimism about something happening. But in all seriousness, I am optimistic about the chances of the Tunisians to have a successful transition. I guess the first reason I'm , Im well optimistic is seeing the track record thus far where there have been these - at these three possible turning points, Tunisians have shown the ability to a - have show the ability to creat a census to move forward politically. That's going to be essential during the writing of the constitution in the constituent assembly, as we're going to have 218 people charged with doing this task. I - As someone who has worked in the government for a few years, I can't imagine a committee of 218 people accomplishing anything, but I'm sure they will be able to do it and hopefully expeditiously. There also are a few - more than a few ingredients or factors when you look at Tunisia society that I think suggests that they have the ingredients for a successful transition. It is a remarkably homogeneous society. It is people are fairly moderate and fairly tolerant. It's not perfect but there is good equality between males and females. When the first president, Bourguiba became president upon Tunisia's independence, mandated education for both boys and for girls. So now women in universities are 60% of the university population. It was the first country in which first Arab country in which polygamy was outlawed first an only and thus far country, ah Arab country in which polygamy was outlawed. Tunisian women got to vote before Swiss women. So, there are a number of factors like that. Also importantly, I think, is there is a large Middle class in Tunisia. Home ownership rate is greater in Tunisia than it is in the United States as well. That kind of stability is extremely important for a successful transition. Tunisians also have a lot of exposure to Western ideas of democracy. They very much look to Turkey as a place where democracy can thrive in a Muslim country. And, I would argue that they are familiar with the institutions of democracy, even if those were not democratic institutions under Ben-Ali. What I mean by that is the idea of a parliament is well established. The idea that the judiciary should be independent is well established idea, even if it was - in the performance under Ben-Ali, that wasn't the case. I think this is very important because if you compare Tunisia's transition to the transition that the Libyans will have to go through, they are really starting from the floor. I wish them well, but they have a lot more institution building than the Tunisians will have. I don't want to be “PollyAnn-ish” about this; there are challenges out there, no question about it. They - The Tunisians have a high unemployment rate that they recognize. It's a structural problem that's not going to be solved the day after the elections or it's not going to be solved the year after the elections. So there are challenges to the transition but in some I think they have all the necessary conditions for a successful transition. Whether they - whether those conditions are sufficient, we'll see. But, my guess is that they will be a they will be successful. Another reason that I'm optimistic for the prospects for the success in Tunisia is that they are open to foreign assistance for this transition period. That gets me to the point I want to make about what the United States is doing in this regard. There are a number of different sectors where we can and we are assisting. I mentioned the election observation as one, that is very welcome by the Tunisians. But a - it's not just election observation There's also - we are working on making grants to civil society groups, helping to train political parties, working to provide technical assistance to the independent election commission and the like. Thus far we have already provided over 30 million dollars in assistance to civil society groups and we're trying to make sure that that money goes to groups throughout the country, not just to groups in the capital, so the disadvantaged areas benefit as much as NGOs, say in the capital. Security is also obviously very important for - for the Tunisians especially, they live in a tough neighborhood with Algeria to the west and Libya to the east. Last fiscal year we provided 18 million dollars in military financing for basically to sustain their equipment. We also provided roughly 2 million dollars through a program called International Military Education and Training. I mention this because the Tunisian military - that basically brings Tunisian officers to the United States to study in our military institutions or at our military forces. I mention this because the military - the Tunisian military played exactly the role that we in the United States would've hoped that it would play. It a - historically it has been political at the time of the revolution, it did not support the government during the Ben-Ali regime, it did not fire on demonstrators. When the discredited police forces faded away the military moved in to provide security. They were very much welcomed by the people. I saw people putting bouquets of flowers on tanks for example in Tunis - things like that. We're also - United States is seeking to address Tunisia's economic - economic problems. We've brought delegations of senior business leaders to Tunisia. We are trying to encourage entrepreneurship through a training program and we are trying to give technical advice on banking reform, and the like. Just to sum up - looking at 2011 and I really address these comments to the students in the audience, we will look back at 2011 and what it means to the Arab world, the same way that we look back at 1989 and what that meant for Europe, Eastern Europe, and Russia. This is a - really a tremendous opportunity for, first and foremost for the Tunisian people, but I think also for friends of democracy in the Arab world. We're trying to do our bit. As a diplomat it's a tremendous privilege and also a heck of a lot of fun to be serving in Tunisia at a time like that Again, for the students in the audience, especially if you are studying Arabic, that suggests a certain number - a certain degree of interest in foreign countries and cultures. I'd really encourage you to stick with it. We have got lots of opportunities to serve overseas. The State Department, military, NGOs - I was a Peace Corps volunteer. There are all kinds of oppurtuniies out there. And I really encourage you to take advantage of them It's fascinating, it's educational. - I can't think of anything more honorable to do than serving your country. It really gives you the oppurtunity to do that. I don't want to delay your colleagues they may want to be delayed - having taught for two years in the Peace Corps, I don't want to delay another professor in another class. Thanks so much for coming out and for listening. I very much appreciated your questions. Like I say, stay engaged. It's really interesting. Thank you. [Clapping]