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Hezbollah–Iran relations

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

A meeting between Supreme Leader of Iran Ali Khamenei and Secretary general of Hezbollah Hassan Nasrallah in 2005

The Islamic Republic of Iran is a key patron of the Lebanese Shia Islamist militant group and political party Hezbollah.

Part of a series on
Hezbollah
Political activities
Military activities
Capabilities
Organizations
Media
People
Secretaries-General
Senior officials

Iranian support, including financial aid, deployment of Revolutionary Guards, and training, has played an important role in Hezbollah's formation and development. Hezbollah has functioned as Iran's proxy since its inception, and is considered to be part of the "Axis of Resistance".[1]

Hezbollah itself, founded in 1982, originated as an Iranian-backed Shi'ite militant group in Lebanon. The organization's founders adopted the model outlined by Ayatollah Khomeini after the 1979 Iranian Revolution, and its forces were trained by a contingent of Revolutionary Guards from Iran. Hezbollah officially aligned itself with the Iranian regime in 1985, and the close relationship between Hezbollah and Iran has persisted ever since.

Iran considers its relationship with Hezbollah as crucial, as it provides Iran with a means to expand its influence in the Levant, exert pressure on Israel and US interests, discourage any attempts at regime change, and uphold its ideological commitments.[2]

Hezbollah has received substantial financial support from Iran, estimated to range from $700 million to $1 billion annually. Additionally, Iran provides weapons, training, and other forms of assistance to Hezbollah.[3][4]

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  • Iran's Revolutions: Crash Course World History 226

Transcription

Hi, I’m John Green and this is Crash Course World History and today we’re talking about Iran. Oh, Mr. Green? Mr. Green? I know that country. It’s in the Middle East. It’s with Egypt. No, Me from the Past, we’re going to talk about Iran. Now, I used to be you so I remember when you would look at this part of the world and you would be like, “oh yeah, that’s a thing.” And in your case that “thing” extended more or less from I guess, like, western China to, like, uh, Poland. Then you’d make a bunch of broad generalizations about that area and no doubt use the terms Arab and Muslim interchangeably. But as usual Me From the Past the truth resists simplicity. So today we are going to talk about Iran and just Iran. Specifically, the 1979 Iranian Revolution. So the 1979 Iranian Revolution and its aftermath are often seen by detractors as the first step in the creation of an isolated, fundamentalist state that supports terrorism, and, you might be surprised to hear me say, that there is some truth to that interpretation. That said, the way you think about the Iranian Revolution depends a lot of which part of it you are looking at. And regardless, it’s very important because it represents a different kind of revolution from the ones that we usually talk about. So the 1979 uprisings were aimed at getting rid of the Pahlavi Dynasty, which sounds, like, impressive, but this dynasty had only had two kings, Reza Shah and Mohammed Reza Shah. Before the Pahlavis, Iran was ruled by the Qajar dynasty, and before that the Safavids. The Safavids and Qajars were responsible for two of the most important aspects of Iran: The Safavids made Shia Islam the official state religion in Iran, starting with Ismail I in 1501, and the Qajars gave the Muslim clergy – the ulema – political power. So most of the world’s Muslims are Sunnis but the Shia, or Shiites are an important sect that began very early on – around 680 CE and today form the majority of Muslims in Iran and Iraq. Now within both Sunni and Shia there are further divisions and many sects, but we’re just going to talk about, like, the historical difference between the two. Shia Muslims believe that Ali should’ve been the first Caliph, Sunni Muslims think that Abu Bakr, who was the first Caliph, was rightly chosen. Since that disagreement, there have been many others, many doctrinal differences but what’s more important is that from the very beginning, Shia Muslims saw themselves as the party of the oppressed standing up against the wealthy and powerful and harkening back to the social justice standard that was set by the prophet. And this connection between religious faith and social justice was extremely important to the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and also to previous revolutions in Iran. This is really crucial to understand because many historians argue that the Iranian revolution represents what the journalist Christian Caryl called an “odd fusion of Islam and late-twentieth century revolutionary politics.” But actually, in the scheme of Iranian history, its not so odd. Because 1979 was not Iran’s first revolution. The first major one was in 1906. It forced the ruling Qajars to accept a constitution. It created a parliament and supposedly some limits on the king, and made Shia Islam the official state religion, but it also protected the rights of minorities in Iran. It ultimately failed partly because the clergy withdrew their support, partly because the shah worked very actively against it, and maybe most importantly, because the Russians and the British worked to keep Persia weak so they could continue to try to dominate the region. Which reminds me that most people in Iran are not Arabs, they are Persian. And most people in Iran don’t speak Arabic, they speak Farsi, or as we often call it in English, Persian. So after WWI European rivalries really heated up because of the discovery of oil in the Middle East. The British established the Anglo Iranian Oil Company – which would later come to be known as BP. They also extracted a bunch of concessions from the Iranian government in addition to extracting lots of oil. And they helped to engineer a change in dynasty by supporting military commander Reza Khan in his coup in February 1921. Reza Khan became Reza Shah and then he attempted to turn Persia, which he re-named Iran in 1935, into a modern, secular, western-style state kind of like Turkey was under Ataturk. But Reza Shah is perhaps best remembered for his over the top dictatorial repression, which turned the clergy against him. Okay, so during World War II Reza Shah abdicated and his young son Mohammad Reza Shah became the leader of Iran. Which he remained, mostly, until 1979 when he definitely stopped being the leader of Iran. So after World War II, the British allowed greater popular participation in Iran’s government. The main party to benefit from this openness was Tudeh, the Iranian communist party. Mohammed Mosaddegh was elected prime minister in 1951 and led the parliament to nationalize Iran’s oil industry, and that was the end of the democratic experiment. Now most history books say that in 1953 the British and the CIA engineered a coup to remove Mosaddegh from office. And that is quite possibly true. It is definitely true that we tried to engineer a coup. It’s also true that Mosaddegh quit and fled Iran following demonstrations against him. But we also know that the Shia clergy encouraged those demonstrations. That’s a bit of a weird decision for the Clergy, considering that Shia Islam traditionally takes a radical stance against oppression. But it’s important to remember that Mosaddegh was supported by the Tudeh party and they were communists. Nationalization of the oil industry was one thing, but a further shift toward communism might mean appropriation of the land that supported the clergy, maybe even a rejection of religion altogether. So now we’ve seen two occasions where the Shia clergy support helped facilitate change. Right, in 1906 and again in 1953. So, let’s flash ahead to 1979. The Shah was definitely an autocrat, and he employed a ruthless secret police called the SAVAK to stifle dissent. In 1975, the Shah abolished Iran’s two political parties and replaced them with one party the Resurgence party. You’ll never guess who was resurging - the Shah. There was a huge round of censorship and arrests and torture of political prisoners signaling that autocracy was in Iran to stay. But before those events in 1975, say between 1962 and 1975, by most economic and social measures Iran saw huge improvements. In 1963, the Shah had tried to institute what he called a White Revolution – top-down modernization led by the monarchy, and in many ways he was successful, especially in improving industry and education. Oil revenues rose from $555 million in 1964 to $20 billion in 1976. And the Shah’s government invested a lot of that money in infrastructure and education. The population grew and infant mortality fell. A new professional middle class arose. But the White Revolution wasn’t universally popular. For instance, it was opposed by one particular Shia cleric - the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Khomeini spoke out against the White Revolution from the religious center of Iran, Qom. One of his main complaints was that the reforms would grant more rights to women, including the right to vote, but he also attacked the government for, quote: “the rigging of elections and other constitutional abuses, neglect of the poor and the sale of oil to Israel.” And in general, Khomeini felt that a king’s power was inherently un-Islamic and that Shia tradition was to fight that power. That noted about Khomeini, the 1979 revolution didn’t start out to create an Islamic state. At first it was a pretty typical uprising by dissatisfied Iranians to overthrow a government that they perceived as corrupt and unresponsive to their needs. In spite of, or arguably because of, oil-fueled economic growth, many Iranians weren’t enjoying economic success. The universities were turning out more graduates than there were jobs and the mechanization of agriculture had the predictable result of displacing farmers who moved to cities. Especially the capital city of Tehran where there weren’t nearly enough jobs for the number of people. So, I think it’s unfair to say that a majority of the demonstrators who took to the streets in late 1978 were motivated by a fundamentalist vision of Islam. They were dissatisfied with economic inequality and political repression and a corrupt regime. So why do we generally remember the 1979 revolution as having been motivated by Shia Islam. Well, Let’s go to the Thought Bubble. So the initial demonstrations did begin after an Iranian newspaper on January 7, 1978 published an article that was critical of Khomeini. By the way, at the time he was living in Paris. These initial demonstrations were pretty small, but when the government police and army forces starting firing on demonstrators, killing some of them, the protests grew. Each time marchers protested against the violent treatment of demonstrators, the government would crack down, and their violent reaction would spur more demonstrations. There was also a lot of criticism of the west tied up in the revolution. According to one woman who participated: “American lifestyles had come to be imposed as an ideal, the ultimate goal. Americanism was the model. American popular culture – books, magazines, film – had swept over our country like a flood...We found ourselves wondering ‘Is there any room for our own culture?’” The Shah never understood why so many people were protesting against him; he thought that they were communists, or being supported by the British. He also thought that merely bringing prosperity would be enough to keep him in power. It wasn’t. On January 16, 1979 he left Iran. He eventually ended up in the U.S., which had unfortunate consequences for diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Iran. But the point here is that the first part of the Iranian revolution was relatively peaceful protests followed by a government crackdown, more protests that eventually led to the collapse of the monarchy, and that looks kind of familiar, especially if you’ve studied, like, the French or Russian or even the American Revolutions. And most historians argue these protests weren’t about Islam, but rather, “The discontent over living conditions, pay cuts, and the threat of unemployment fused with the general disillusionment and anger with the regime.” The government that eventually replaced the monarchy was the second, and in many ways much more revolutionary revolution. Thanks Thought Bubble. So the new Islamic Republic of Iran was based on Khomeini’s idea about what an Islamic government should be, a principle he called velayat-e faqih. Mainly it was that a sharia law scholar, would have ultimate authority, because he was more knowledgeable than anyone about law and justice. There would be a legislature and a president and a prime minister, but any of their decisions could be overturned by the supreme ruler who from 1979 until his death was Khomeini. Now, if democracy is only about holding elections, then the new Iran was a democracy. I mean, Iran has elections, both for president and for the parliament. And for the record, despite what Khomeini might have thought in the ‘60s, women can vote in Iran and they do. They also serve in the parliament and the president’s cabinet. And in the referendum on whether to create an Islamic Republic of Iran, the vast majority of Iranians in a free and open vote, voted “yes.” Now governance in Iran is extremely complicated, too complicated for one Crash Course video. But in once sense at least, Iran is definitely not a democracy. The ultimate authority, written into the constitution, is not the will of the people but god, who is represented by the supreme religious leader. And the actions of the Islamic Republic, especially in the early chaotic days of 1979 but also many times since, don’t conform to most ideas of effective democracy. Like one of the first things that Khomeini did to shore up his support was to create the Islamic Revolutionary Guards and Hezbollah to defend the revolution against coup attempts. Although initially there were opposition parties, their activities were curtailed by the new “revolutionary courts” that applied sharia law in a particularly harsh fashion. Like it’s estimated that by October 1979, several hundred people had been executed. And under the new constitution, Khomeini was given extensive power. I mean, he could appoint the heads of the armed services, and the Revolutionary Guard and the national TV and radio stations. He also approved the candidates for presidential elections and appointed six of the twelve members of the Guardian Council that approved legislation from the parliament before it became law. So structurally Iran’s government looked kind of like other governments, but as Michael Axworthy points out it was different because, quote, “above and beyond stood the faqih, with the power and the responsibility to intervene directly in the name of Islam; indeed with powers greater than those given to most monarchs in constitutional monarchies.” By 1979, Iran already had a long history of clerical involvement in protest and dynamic change, but it also had a long history of pushing for constitutions and liberty. The current end result is the Islamic Republic of Iran, but it’s worth remembering that both those threads of history are still part of Iranian life. Like we saw that in 2009 and 2010 with the so-called Green Revolution where there were huge protests after an Iranian election. Those protests involved young people arguing for more rights and liberties.. But they were also led by, and encouraged by, reformist Shia clerics. In the U.S. we mostly remember the 1979 Iranian Revolution for its burning of American flags and taking of hostages in the American Embassy. That belonged more to the second phase of the revolution, the chaotic period when the Islamic republic was being born. Life in the Islamic Republic of Iran remains highly repressive. I mean, for instance, Iran still executes a very high percentage of criminals. But it’s inaccurate to say that Iran is merely a dictatorship, or that it’s merely repressive. And one of the challenges for people in the West trying to understand Iran is that we have to disentangle the various aspects of the revolution rather than simply relying on the images that have defined it for us. I hope this episode can help a little. You can find more resources in the links below. Thanks for watching. Crash Course is filmed here in the Chad and Stacey Emigholz studio in Indianapolis and it’s made possible because of the hard worth of all of these people. Thank you for watching and as we say in my hometown, “don’t forget to be awesome.”

Background

Hezbollah was established in 1982 by young Shi’a Lebanese clerics who had studied in Najaf. The organization adopted the model outlined by Ayatollah Khomeini after the 1979 Iranian Revolution, and its founders chose the name "Hezbollah" as instructed by Khomeini.[5] Lebanese Hezbollah, or the "Party of God," emerged from an Iranian initiative to unite various militant Shi’a groups in Lebanon during a period of domestic and regional instability, particularly the country's civil war. The organization is considered by some an attempt by Lebanon's historically marginalized Shi’a Muslims to assert economic and political influence

Hezbollah's forces were trained and organized by a contingent of 1,500 Revolutionary Guards from Iran, with permission from the Syrian government. They were allowed to transit through the eastern highlands of Syrian-controlled Lebanon and establish a base in the Bekaa Valley during Lebanon's occupation.[6]

Iranian support, including the deployment of Revolutionary Guards and financial aid, played a significant role in Hezbollah's formation and development. Initially, Hezbollah operated as a network of radical Shia paramilitary groups with shared strategic goals, such as establishing an Islamic republic, but differing on tactical matters.[7]

Following the opening of the 1982 war marked by Israel's invasion of Lebanon some 800 Revolutionary Guards were sent to Lebanon through Syria to help recruit Hezbollahi, provide political and religious indoctrination and military training, including instruction in terrorist tactics.[8]

In July 1982, Iran reacted to the war by deploying 1,500 Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) advisers to Lebanon's Bekaa Valley with the aim of establishing and training a new Shiite militia, which later transformed into Hezbollah. The approximately 1,500 Pasdaran set up their headquarters in the Syrian-controlled Beqaa Valley, where they organized training camps. Under the supervision of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the fighters underwent guerrilla training, and military material was established in the Bekaa Valley in 1982. Iran sent a contingent of Revolutionary Guards to Lebanon, ostensibly to combat the Israeli invaders. Iran provided financial support to the newly-formed Islamist groups, including Hezbollah.[9]

In 1985, Hezbollah officially aligned itself with the Iranian regime and Ayatollah Khomeini's leadership. Hezbollah has functioned as Iran's proxy since its inception, and it is estimated that Iran provides substantial financial support, ranging from $700 million to $1 billion annually.[4]

Islamic Jihad Organisation proxy

Hezbollah adopted the alias Islamic Jihad Organization to create plausible deniability and obscure its connection with Iran.[10][11]

Despite attempts to maintain separation, evidence, including declassified information, revealed the close relationship between Hezbollah, its Islamic Jihad terrorist wing, and Iran.[12]

In 1983 he CIA reported that Islamic Jihad “more likely is a cover used by Iran for its terrorist operations, whether employing local Shias in Lebanon or locally recruited agents of other nationalities” and that “[s]urrogates provide Iran with an excellent means for creating the illusion that an independent, international organization is at work against U.S. interests.”[13]

The use of the Islamic Jihad alias was an attempt to create the illusion of an independent, international organization working against U.S. interests. While initially loosely organized, Iran played a key role in transforming Islamic Jihad into the organized entity known as Hezbollah. The formalization and professionalization of Hezbollah occurred through substantial support from Iran, including money, weaponry, personnel, training, and guidance.[14]

Iranian embassy officials in Damascus and the IRGC were actively involved in coordinating radical Shi’a activities through the Council of Lebanon, within Lebanon. According to US intelligence, thus solidifying Hezbollah as a significant arm of Iran's military apparatus.[15] Iranian auxiliaries were embedded within Hezbollah units, sharing communication and support networks.[16]

Ideological and religious influence

Iranian influence took shape through shared ideological, cultural, and religious principles derived from the Iranian Revolution and the concept of waliyat al-faqih (guardianship of the jurist).[17]

Hezbollah embraced Ayatollah Khomeini's revolutionary message and its clerics committed to establishing a fundamentalist state on a global scale. The early growth of Hezbollah can be attributed to the influence of Iranian-trained clerics and a dedication to Ayatollah Khomeini and the mission of sparking an Islamic revolution in Lebanon.[18]

The close connection between the Shi’a religious hierarchy in Lebanon and Iran is also historical and through familial ties, involving the training of Lebanese clerics in Iran, intermarriage with Iranian clerical families, and the propagation of Iranian theological discourse. Beyond educational and familial routes, Iranian ideology permeated Lebanon through official channels, with the IRGC in Lebanon providing not only paramilitary and terrorist skills but also political and religious indoctrination. In 1987, the CIA emphasized that while an independent Islamic fundamentalist movement might have emerged in Lebanon, Iranian support significantly accelerated its development.[19][20]

Hezbollah autonomy

Hezbollah has sought to present an image of autonomy. The organization's founding statement “to determine our fate by our own hands”.[20] Hezbollah, whilst advocating an Iran-inspired Islamist regime, states that it wishes for the Lebanese to have freedom of determination.[21]

Financial Funding

Hezbollah receives funding from several sources including the Bashar Al-Assad regime in Syria, the Lebanese diaspora, international crime and legal businesses.[22]

Iran is believed to provide substantial financial support to Hezbollah, ranging from at least $100 million to a potentially higher figure of around $200 million annually. In 2020 according to the state department, Hezbollah received US$700 million from Iran.[3]

This increased funding is thought to align with Iran's interest in destabilizing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, according to US intelligence, Hezbollah serves as a key proxy in achieving this objective. The support extends beyond cash funds, with Iranian cargo planes delivering weapons, including rockets and small arms, to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Material assistance is also channeled through purportedly private charities closely affiliated with Iran's revolutionary elite.[23]

Hezbollah has obtained weaponry supplied by Iran, including 11,500 missiles deployed in southern Lebanon. 3,000 Hezbollah militants have undergone training in Iran, covering various skills such as guerrilla warfare, missile and rocket artillery firing, unmanned drone operation, naval warfare, and conventional military operations.[24]

Iran provides financial and material aid and offers training, establishing training programs and camps. For instance, as of August 2002, Iran was reported to have financed and established terrorist training camps in the Syrian-controlled Beka'a Valley to train Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and PFLP-GC terrorists. Iran has consistently supported Hezbollah's involvement in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, assigning Imad Mughniyeh, Hezbollah's international operations commander, to assist Palestinian militant groups such as Hamas and PIJ.[25]

Iran's financially supports Hezbollah affiliated media, notably the television station al-Manar, called the "station of resistance."[26][27][28][29]

Iran according to the US indirectly funds al-Manar, contributing to its approximately $15 million annual budget, with estimates suggesting Iran provides $100–200 million per year to Hezbollah, which is then transferred to the TV station.[30][27]

Weapons

Missiles found abroad Francop

Hezbollah has obtained weaponry supplied by Iran, with 11,500 missiles already positioned in southern Lebanon. 3,000 Hezbollah militants have completed training in Iran, covering various aspects such as guerrilla warfare, missile and rocket artillery firing, operation of unmanned drones, naval warfare, and conventional military operations.[31]

Mahmoud Ali Suleiman, the Hezbollah operative captured by the IDF in August 2006 for his involvement in the kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers during a cross-border raid on July 12, confessed during his interrogation to receiving weapons training and religious instruction in Iran. He informed interrogators that he traveled in a civilian car to Damascus and then flew to Iran. Apart from the Russian-made Katyusha, Hezbollah's reported artillery cache consists entirely of Iranian-made weapons.[32][33]

History

1980s-2006

In June 1985, Hezbollah hijacked TWA Flight 847, demanding the release of 700 Shiite Muslims. The hijackers, with logistical support from Iran, engaged in a campaign that included killing a U.S. Navy diver and threatening Jewish passengers. Hezbollah has denied its involvement.[34][35][36]

On March 27, 1992, Islamic Jihad, a group linked to Hezbollah, claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing outside the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires, resulting in 20 deaths and 252 injuries. The US National Security Agency and the Israeli intelligence found that the highest levels of the Iranian government had authorized the attack. Seven Iranian diplomats were expelled from Argentina after the Argentine government stated they had convincing proof of Iranian involvement.[37][38]

On July 18, 1998, in Islamic Jihad took credit for a blast outside the Argentine-Israeli Mutual Association in Buenos Aires, resulting in 95 fatalities and 200 injuries. In 2004, Argentine intelligence determined that a 21-year-old Hezbollah operative executed the attack with logistical support from Iran. The bombing is the deadliest terrorist incident in Argentina. In 2006, Argentine authorities issued an international arrest warrant for Ali Fallahian, the head of Iranian intelligence, accusing him of orchestrating the operation. Subsequently, in 2007, INTERPOL added Ali Fallahian, along with four other Iranian officials and one Hezbollah member, to its most wanted list, citing their purported involvement in the bombing.[39][40]

May 17, 1995: Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei appointed Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah and Shura Council member Mohammad Yazbek as his religious representatives in Lebanon.[41]

June 25, 1996: Hezbollah, with Iranian support, claimed responsibility for a truck bombing near Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, killing 19 and injuring 500. In 2001, a US federal court alleged that an Iranian officer was involved in the directing of the operation.[42]

Aug. 1, 2005: Nasrallah met with Supreme Leader Khamenei and President Ahmadinejad in Tehran.[43][44]

2006 Lebanon war

An Iranian missile, found in a Hezbollah stash, 2006

Jane's Defence Weekly, a defense industry magazine, disclosed on August 4, 2006, that during the 2006 Israel-Lebanon conflict, Hezbollah formally requested Iran to provide a continuous stream of weapons to bolster its operations against Israel. According to Western diplomatic sources cited in the report, Iranian authorities assured Hezbollah of an ongoing supply of weapons for "the next stage of the confrontation.

Iran has denied supplying Hezbollah with weapons.[45][46] Multiple reports have consistently pointed to the contrary.[47] Mohtashami Pur, a former ambassador to Lebanon and the current secretary-general of the 'Intifada conference,' stated in an Iranian newspaper that Iran had supplied the missiles to the Shiite militia. He further emphasized that Hezbollah had the endorsement of his country to deploy the weapons in defense of Lebanon.[48]

The Israel Defense Forces regard Hezbollah as virtually an arm of the Iranian armed forces; a senior Israeli defence official told Jane's Defence Weekly that "we should consider that what we are facing in Lebanon is not a militia but rather a special forces brigade of the Iranian Army."[49]

During a 2007 interview with the Iranian Arabic-language TV station al-Qawthar, Hezbollah Deputy Secretary-General Naim Kassem stated that the endorsement of the ayatollahs in Tehran is necessary for all suicide bombings and other operations in Lebanon. In 2008, Iran commemorated a recently deceased Hezbollah leader by issuing a postage stamp.

Timeline

  • 2007: Nasrallah visited Damascus, Syria, meeting with Iranian President Ahmadinejad.[50]
  • 2010: The leaders of Hezbollah, Syria and Iran meet in Damascus.[51]
  • May 2008: Hezbollah operatives planned a bomb attack against the Israeli embassy in Baku, Azerbaijan in retaliation of the killing of Imad Mughniyah, but Azerbaijani authorities foiled the plot, revealing alleged IRGC-ordered attacks against U.S., Israeli, and Western embassies.[52]
  • February 26, 2010: Syrian President Bashar al-Assad hosted Iranian President Ahmadinejad and Nasrallah.[53]
  • October 13–14, 2010: President Ahmadinejad visited Lebanon, expressing anti-Zionist sentiments in Bint Jbeil and meeting with Nasrallah.[54]
  • December 16, 2010: Iran reportedly reduced funding to Hezbollah by 40 percent due to international sanctions over its nuclear program.[55]
  • February 7, 2012: Nasrallah acknowledged Iran's comprehensive support for Hezbollah since 1982, rejecting U.S. allegations of money laundering and drug smuggling.[56]
  • February 13, 2012: Coordinated bombing attempts in India and Georgia targeted Israeli embassy personnel, with Israel attributing the operations to Tehran and Hezbollah.[57]
  • July 18, 2012: A suicide bombing at Sarafovo Airport in Bulgaria killed six Israeli tourists and a Bulgarian driver, leading Israel to blame Hezbollah and Iran.[58]
  • October 11, 2012: Nasrallah confirmed Hezbollah's drone incursion into Israel, boasting of Iran's support in assembling the drone in Lebanon.[59]
  • May 25, 2013: Nasrallah admitted Hezbollah's involvement in Syria, emphasizing Syria's role as the resistance's backbone.[60][61]
  • April 14, 2014:  In Southeast Asia, a Hezbollah network involved in a failed truck-bombing targeting the Israeli embassy in Bangkok had close ties to Iranian intelligence agents, indicating the interconnected nature of their operations. These instances highlight the direct contacts each Hezbollah cell maintains with senior Hezbollah and/or Iranian intelligence operatives.[62][63]
  • November 22, 2014: IRGC General claimed Iran provided Hezbollah with Fateh missiles capable of reaching any target in Israel.[64]
  • January 18, 2015: Israeli airstrike killed IRGC General Allah-Dadi and six Hezbollah fighters in Syria's Golan Heights.[65][66]
  • December 22, 2016: Hezbollah played a key role in aiding the Syrian government, an Iranian ally in their victory against rebels in a pivotal battle.[67]
  • September 2019: With the support of Iran, Hezbollah reportedly established a facility in the Bekaa Valley for manufacturing precision-guided missiles.[68]
  • January 5, 2020: Following the killing of Iranian Revolutionary Guards’ general Qassem Soleimani, Hezbollah Secretary General, Hassan Nasrallah pledged to push U.S. forces out of the Middle East to avenge Gen. Qassem Soleimani's killing.[69][70]
  • February 9, 2022: Nasrallah said “a strong regional state and any war with it will blow up the entire region”, he denied automatic obedience to Tehran, stating Hezbollah's actions are for Lebanon's sake.[71]
  • October 12, 2023: Iranian Foreign Minister met Nasrallah in Beirut to discuss the war between Hamas and Israel, in the meeting, Hezbollah expressed readiness to respond to Israeli acts.[72][73]

See also

References

  1. ^ "What Is Hezbollah?". Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved 2023-12-27.
  2. ^ Akbarzadeh, S. (2019). Proxy Relations: Iran and Hezbollah. In Routledge Handbook of International Relations in the Middle East (pp. 321-329). Routledge.
  3. ^ a b "Iran's Islamist Proxies in the Middle East | Wilson Center". www.wilsoncenter.org. Retrieved 2023-12-21.
  4. ^ a b Anziska, Seth (2019-08-28), "Arab-Israeli Wars and US Foreign Relations", Oxford Research Encyclopedia of American History, Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acrefore/9780199329175.013.756, ISBN 978-0-19-932917-5, retrieved 2023-12-21
  5. ^ Hirst, David (2010). Beware of small states: Lebanon, battleground of the Middle East. London: Faber and Faber. ISBN 978-0-571-23741-8.
  6. ^ Adam Shatz (29 April 2004). "In Search of Hezbollah". The New York Review of Books. Archived from the original on 22 August 2006. Retrieved 14 August 2006.
  7. ^ Raad, Samih (2007-12-15). "Une expérience politique islamique au Liban". Le Portique. doi:10.4000/leportique.1408. ISSN 1283-8594.
  8. ^ Beinin, Joel (January 1993). "Money, Media and Policy Consensus: The Washington Institute for near East Policy". Middle East Report (180): 10–15. doi:10.2307/3013225. ISSN 0899-2851. JSTOR 3013225.
  9. ^ Mason, Robert Scott (1989). "National Security". In Collelo, Thomas (ed.). Lebanon: a country study. Washington, D.C.: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress. pp. 202, 208, 239, 243. OCLC 44356055. Public Domain This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.
  10. ^ "Hezbollah's Regional Activities in Support of Iran's Proxy Networks". Middle East Institute. Retrieved 2023-12-21.
  11. ^ "HEZBOLLAH'S REGIONAL ACTIVITIES IN SUPPORT OF IRAN'S PROXY NETWORKS".
  12. ^ "CIA, Report, Terrorism as a Political Weapon ::Four Middle Eastern Case Studies, April 23, 1985, Secret, CREST". U.S. Intelligence on the Middle East, 1945–2009. doi:10.1163/9789004249028.b08172. Retrieved 2023-12-21.
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