United Nations Security Council Resolution 1816

Transcription

>> Good afternoon ladies and gentleman. Thank you for coming this lunch time and I hope that between us, we will be able to unravel some of the legal mysteries that face the current commercial shipping environment. Piratical attacks on merchant vessels that have occurred in recent times in and around the coast of Somalia have struck at the very core of maritime security and safety. A partial understanding of the difficulties faced by governments on the one hand and commercial shipping interest on the other lies in the fact that the accepted legal definition of piracy has two significant components. The first, the public law concept of the crime against civilized nations and their trade. And secondly, the private law concept of piracy as a contractual risk on the policies of marine insurance and contracts of carriage. Two aspects of public and private aspect both of which is I hope we'll see plus significant role in the present difficulties. Piracy as defined term like risks associated with war and conflict has a long history. In his judicial arbitration handed down in 1982 in a case called the Banbury [phonetic] which concern the faith for insurance purposes of some 80 vessels marooned in the [inaudible] during the course of the long Iran-Iraq war. Mr. Justice Stoughton as he then once said, "The political history of the western world for the last 200 years is reflected in the cases on war risk insurance so as to matters of definition, a crime under public international law and the concept of universal jurisdiction. In an 1820 case in the United States Courts, Mr. Justice Story said, all writers concur in holding that robbery or forcible depredation upon the sea is piracy. And in the same jurisdiction of the United States in 1864, there was quoted in argument, a speech by John Marshall, later chief justice of the Supreme Court who in part said this, "A pirate under the law of nations is an enemy of the human race. Being the enemy of all, he is liable to be punished by all." And in our in courts, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in 1934 and the celebrated universal jurisdiction case could In re Piracy Jure Gentium, it was said piracy maybe committed on the high seas by any national on any ship. Any national on any ship. A person guilty of piracy has placed himself beyond the protection of any state. He is no longer a national but Hostis Humanis Generis and as such, he is just [inaudible] by any state anywhere. This universal jurisdiction has found its way into the present international convention governing this certain of this maters, the United Nations Convention on The Law of the Sea 1982 Article 101 of which says in definition of piracy that the concept concludes any illegal act of violence or depredation committed for private ends by the crew or passengers of a private ship on the high seas against another ship or property on both such ship. That introduces a new concept which complicates matters, the concept of private gain. Article 100 of the same convention states that signatory states have a mutual duty to cooperate to bring pirates to justice. We shall see how difficult that is proven to be as we proceed. So thus far, we the see concept to the public law of crime judicable in the courts of any country and that the pirate perpetuating an act for private gain is liable to find himself apprehended and potentially tried in any court which concedes him and take jurisdiction over his actions. The concept to private gain, however, has sort and included quite a number of nuances as the cases have developed. In the 1909 case in the United Kingdom, the Court of Appeal said, "Piracy consists in the pursuit of private as oppose to public ends. Primarily, the pirate is a man who satisfies his personal vengeance by robbery or murder in places beyond the jurisdiction of any state." So again, we see the concept of a private criminal act committed on the high seas, beyond the jurisdiction of any state. This has lead to other niceties of definition as English cases have developed over the years where there is a clear interaction between the public law concept and the private law risk in contrast of carriage and policies of marine insurance. In the 1923 case, the [inaudible] Yacht with French passengers and crew was seized and disappeared off the coast of Turkey in the aftermath of the First World War. Neither vessel, no crew, no passengers were ever seen and investigations locally showed that they have been seized by a local warlord and the crew and passengers put to death. The case came before the English courts to determine whether the lost of that vessel from marine insurance purposes was a lost cost by piracy where it was some other insured peril. And the court had little distinction in finding that this was a lost by seizure and not by piracy. The reason being that because though individual concern, the warlord who ordered acts had arrived as even a brigand may do at a position of considerable authority and was virtually controlling as a dictator might do, the region in which the seizure took place. So here was an act-- a criminal act and most probably committed to private ends but done in the so called name and authority of a local warlord who on investigation had assumed power in the region and the attack was carried out by forces, individual or collective, under his jurisdiction. So, not a lot by piracy, seizure by local authority even if hostile. In the 1977 case concerning the vessel Andreas Lemos, a party of man boarded the vessel while she was anchored off the port of Chittagong and on the cover of nights stole mooring ropes. They did not offer violence to the crew and there was no hostilities. The case came before Mr. Justice Staughton who has heard many cases in this area in the commercial court and he had some very interesting observations to make time in the context both of the public law area where jurisdiction might be taken and the private law concept in the policy of marine insurance. He said amongst other things in his judgment, "I see no reason to limit piracy to acts outside territory waters. In the context of insurance policy, if a ship is in the ordinary meaning at sea or if the attack upon her can be described as a maritime offense, then for the business of the policy of insurance, she is in a place where piracy can be committed. Theft without force or theft with force is not piracy under a policy of marine insurance." So, theft of mooring ropes without violence but within the territorial waters or area of the court of Chittagong could for those purposes be piracy if that was proven which wasn't in that particular case. In the case of the Salem in 1979 which was a vessel, the subject to the huge conspiracy to defraud oil companies and others and import into the Republic Of South Africa at height of the Apartheid sanctions, the vessel was scuffled and the case came before the Court of Appeal and a number of issues. It was a subject to the significant judgment by Lord Denning who described the events as a gigantic ship used for a gigantic fraud. But because there was no violence offered, at least none shown, he said there were no pirates here because there was no forcible robbery. This was purely a conspiracy under scuttling if one can put it in those mild terms and come to distinction in the 1998 case of the Petro Ranger. A vessel was seized by Indonesian pirates. All her cargos stolen, the crew put over the side in lifeboats, the vessel taken to several ports, dimensions and description and superstructure were changed and the vessel was used for piratical activity leaving other cargos and the vessel changed her identity. It was accepted both in arbitration and in the court that the theft of the cargo, the violence offered to the crew putting them over the side in the lifeboat, and the use of the vessel for piratical activities did count as piracy for the purposes in the exception in a contract of carriage. >> I turn to the case to the Panagia Tinou in 2002, the case in which I was involved when I was in practice. This vessel was trading between the Black Sea and the Coast of India and she suffered an engine breakdown on the Gulf of Aden. The master and chief engineer decided that they needed to seek refuge near to the shore and did so on the northern coast of Somalia. The vessel was boarded by pirates and held to ransom. This was probably one of the earliest cases which had occurred in what has now become a long stream of unfortunate and well-known incidents. When the first ransom demands were made, a team rapidly assembled in London to try to deal with this novel and unexpected situation, erudite words from elders came through. It was suggested that the attack was in retaliation for the despoliation of the coastline in maritime heritage of Somalia by foreign fishing fleets, ruining the fishing grounds, destroy the livelihood and threaten starvation to the inhabitants of many ports. And did also result from significant pollution caused by ocean vessels belonging to other nations overspilling their ballast and other dirty materials into Somalian waters. There is no doubt that these arguments have some merit as everybody reflected at the time but, unfortunately, there was more than a hint of criminality which of course is almost become the norm. Negotiations followed towards the ransom payment but many of the difficulties faced by present-- present governments and ship owners were found in that case. The vessel was flagged and registered in Cyprus. She was managed in Greece and crewed by Filipinos. Once the ransom had been put forward on essentially humanitarian grounds, it became clear that none of the government interest concerned had any significant role to play in the release of the vessel. When contacted, most were very content to point to another party and say, this is not a matter for national government. It's for somebody else to hang on too. A native flotilla was operating in the area at that time, three warships found by the German and Spanish navy's and it became clear during negotiations with their ministries and their commanding officers that their intervention was highly restricted. The sphere of operations was limited and in the absence of real threats to loss of life, there was nothing operationally or illegally that they were able to do. So after several weeks of rather fraught and negotiations in an area that was completely new to all of us, recommendations were given by security and hostage and ransom experts that the ransom should indeed be paid. And what comes from this case was that payment of a ransom came down at the end to a decision by lawyers and commercial insures rather than governments and that is where the problem currently resides. Governments have found it very difficulty to respond in the early stages and all the ransom payments which have been made notoriously over the last five or six years having the main have to been generated by commercial interest, most notably marine insures holding the risk of piracy for the vessels concerned. This reached the stage where in the 2009 case of Masefield and Amlin, which was heard in the Commercial Court last year before Mr. Justice Steel, the position had been reached that seven years after the Panagia Tinou, which we've just discussed, that on the basis of a significant number of similar cases, there was uncontested expert evidence accepted that Somalia pirates were not interested in stealing or discharging cargo and that once a random demand had been made and negotiation opened, there was a high expectation that a ransom would be paid. That is fairly extraordinary situation that uncontested expert evidence before the English commercial court was accepted and indeed had to be accepted. But once a piratical attack or hijacking is taking place, there was no alternative but to release the vessel upon payment of a ransom. Seven years is a long time but, unfortunately, it's almost the case that the precedent system has been reached. So how is this situation then allowed to develop? What are the-- what is being the response of the international community? We need to look back in other areas to see how the international community has responded. And the late 1960s and the 1970s was the first threat to the safety of modern postwar aviation none so than the hijacking of four international aircraft which were landed at Cairo by representatives of the people from for the Liberation of Palestine. The crew and passengers were held to ransom although they're subsequently released. One of the vessels was destroyed-- one of the aircraft was destroyed on the ground at Cairo by the terrorist, three were flown to an airfield in Jordan where they were similarly destroyed by explosives. This became the subject to the very significant arbitration before the late Lord Justice Michael Kerr. For our purposes today, we need merely to note that in similar hijackings at that time was responded to by the international community with a series of international binding multilateral conventions seeking to enhance postwar aviation and security. We sadly know that this problem continues in a different framework today. In a maritime context, the attack on the passenger liner, Achille Lauro, in 1985 leading to the well-publicized murder of an American citizen at the port of Alexandria had similar results. The international community responded urgently and quickly with the community passing in quite short order. The well known SUA, Suppression of Unlawful Acts at Sea Convention of 1988 more recently updated with protocols in 2005, and for our purposes today, the significance of that convention is that it set out a binding criminal jurisdiction or regime for crimes of robbery and violence against ships and also fixed platforms. It was a very farsighted convention and the intention was the party signing up to it and ratifying it should be able to enacted into their own municipal legal systems and make it a binding criminal regime within that particular state. And that ladies and gentleman is one of the areas where the piracy problems has a reason because there is no equivalent binding criminal international convention onto which this-- that particular crime can hang. So the SUA Convention was the response in the maritime context to the equivalent of the attack, the hijacking attacks on aircraft that takes us forward to the tragic event of 09/11/2001 and the attacks on the United States of America. The international community responded in a similar way. The United Nation Security Council delegated to the International Maritime Organization an obligation to formulate as soon as possible an international of code of safety and security equivalent to the SUA Convention. And in 2004, most nations signed off and ratified the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code which was a groundbreaking convention binding together shipping and shore interests, operators, national governments and flag states for the very first time and involved other organization such as customs, international labor unions, and others. And this in itself became a multilateral convention in the same way as the SUA Convention and spawn several bilateral initiatives between the United States and other states of the world including to Container Security Initiative, the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism which allowed extra territorial jurisdiction to agents of the U.S. Security Forces and Customs Imports outside the United States leading to a groundbreaking accord in 2008 between the United States and the People's Republic of China which allowed U.S. agents to operate in PRC ports. So we can see that in response to draconian and devastating attacks in the air, on the sea, and on land, the international community came together and responded with a series of binding conventions and the courts have not been slow to recognize that there is an evolutionary pattern to these matters. In the 1980 case, that was called [inaudible] case, Mr. Justice Mustill [phonetic] as he then was had a lengthy insurance arguments about the faith for insurance purposes of property damaged during the course of civil war and civil commotion in the Lebanon. He is perhaps inevitably such a distinguish figure said this, "Methods of pursuing political aims and of waging an armed struggle do not stand still. A situation existing today might fall outside a definition formulated in the past, not because the Judge or scholar who proposed it considered that the situation should be excluded but simply because the possibility that it might exist had not crossed his mind." >> And this is presaged in the judgment of Lord Justice Rix in a case called "The Silver Cloud" which involved the position for ensurers of the large cost cancellation of tickets by passengers following the 9/11 outrage. Many passengers and-- canceled their tour and cruise obligations and their tickets and the question arose where did the liabilities for that fall? In a judgment which was not directed solely at the causative issues of the 9/11 tragedy, Lord Justice Rix said this, "Are terrorists to be treated as combatants or criminals? The fact that everyone would agree that 9/11 was an example of the terrorist attack does not, to my mind, answer the question whether it amounted to something more." To what are the international response to piracy against this background and there has been a significant response. During the last 10 years, the Comité Maritime International, CMI, has paid enormous attempts to try to achieve a model law on piracy defining the offenses, widening its scope, and modeling itself from the SUA Convention so that nations who might sign up to this model law could enact very rapidly into their municipal systems. Sadly, the proposed system of apprehension and reciprocal recognition and extradition has not been-- is not found favor with all States concerned and there's a significant resistance to this model law being inactive as widely as the CMI hoped. Of course, the national governments and the commercial interest have themselves taken steps to try to alleviate the problems which they have face through contact with piratical attacks and there's been significant work done by the ICC, the International Chamber of Commerce and its piracy reporting on the International Maritime Bureau. There's been enormous and very diligent diplomatic activity by the International Maritime Organization and many other national and international shipping and insurance organizations. Major steps have been taken in terms of ship identification and security, identification of problem areas and problem attacks that has, of course, been increase naval activity and participation of governments in UAEU and other flotillas of the Somalian Coast and in Indian Ocean but has become [inaudible]. And this has been a-- this is a huge task on an operational basis. There's also been significant progress on regional initiatives and accords to combat South piracy that dominated the South China Sea for some 10 or 15 years beforehand. The Southeast Asian Nations in 2004 signed an agreement called [inaudible] which bound together states bordering on the South China Sea and the cooperative arrangement is to prevent [inaudible] and apprehend piracies suspects. And this was followed by the IMOs initiative in 2009 in relation to the piratical situation in the Gulf of Aden and the East Coast of Somalia leading to the Djibouti Code of Conduct which itself was an enhanced insurance and security and intelligence exchange binding together nations in the way of-- in a cooperative attempt to try to prevent some [inaudible]. And in 2008, the United State Security Council at the lobbying of the IMO passed another groundbreaking resolution number 1816 which for the first time allowed foreign warships to gain access to pursuit into the territorial waters of Somalia. Why this all has not succeeded? Some of the problems, I think, can be found in the case of the Alondra Rainbow, a 1999 case which involved the hijacking and piracy aboard an international freighter off the-- in the South China Sea by Indonesian nationals. The vessel followed the pattern of the Petro Ranger. She was reconfigured, repainted, her cargo sold, the crew dismissed. A new pirate crew took over the vessel and with her new definition and configuration the name started to trade her for their own criminal purposes. Broadcast to the new intelligence agencies for the description of the vessel were put out and picked up by cargo vessels of the Indian subcontinent. The Indian Maritime authorities and their coast guard themselves spotted the vessel and the Indian Navy and coast guard where instructed to apprehend the vessel and the pirates on board which to their great credit succeed in doing. All Indonesian pirates were brought to shore and put on trial for piracy. The [inaudible] has begun to examine the case. It was found that India was not a signatory to the UNCLOS Convention and there have been no incorporation of the UNCLOS Convention into domestic law. India was not a signatory to the SUA Convention. And once it was thought that the universal jurisdiction in Piracy Jure Gentium could be advanced lawyers with pessimistic [inaudible] would succeed. And then the only way at the end where these perpetrators of the crime were bought to justice was on the basis of criminal sanction still be existing on the 1947 legislation hangover from the British days in India. There was no modern piracy crime equivalent in the time between independence in 1999. As far as the UK is concerned, statutory legislation has meant that piracy is a crime that can be committed within UK territorial waters and on high seas and as we've seen in UK policy is that the courts here will take universal jurisdiction against any offender whether on a British ship or elsewhere. So, what is the future and where are we now? Well, one of the problems that has been repeatedly said is the unfortunate and tragic state of Somalia which for several decades now has been a country without central government [inaudible] result in the maritime context is that its long [inaudible] and along the Gulf of Aden and East Africa is unpoliced. There is no coast guard. There is no maritime security in any sense and then as far as the shore side is concerned, there is no central government, no established legal system and no system for criminal justice to what it's name regretfully which could have a sanction against the havens and piratical activity which operates from within it's ports. It's quite clear that it was-- it maybe said that the early attacks on vessels where in a sense a cry for help as occurred in the Panagia Tinou. Since then intelligence [inaudible] criminal activity was taken to the full. The length of time and the amount of ransoms been clearly demonstrative of the fact that private gain is at the very halt of the attacks which being made. When I count the Western nations do more to prosecute, when I count the established jurisdiction against defenders, many of these issues are very difficult to resolve but I'm against the background we have decided-- we've discussed; the private law or public law into action. Prosecutions and jurisdiction issues have stumbled on issue such as human rights. Asylum of offen-- claims for asylum by offenders-- offender seeking refuge status on national warships or cargo vessels, individual national security concerns, limitations imposed by national governments on the rules of engagement of a naval vessels, restricted spheres of legal and diplomatic influence, problems of evidence identity, and jurisdiction. All of these have been [inaudible] the hugely loadable and hardworking attempts of organization such as the IMO, commercial shipping organizations, the ICC and indeed, of course, naval forces to try to prevent and cure the problem. But, unfortunately, the problem is proving very difficult and there are many of those you say that the problem cannot be solve at sea but can only be solve ashore. And there's no doubt that if the tragic state of Somalia could be translated into a modern efficient state with each own maritime security regime and criminal justice regime, there is gonna be a strong arguments that piratical attacks would cease. There is, of course, a lack of Western appetite for involvement in a way which in times past might have put an end to the activities of those perpetrating what has been done at the moment. And there's another problem as we saw in the case of Masefield and Amlin. There is now recognition, perhaps starting in 2002, that a ransom tariff exists. There's extensive debate should ransoms be paid and those continues to be a standoff between commercial interest anxious to recover property and governments on the other hand who do not wish to condemn ransom payments. That standoff continues and until it's resolved and until the situation in Somalia by the shore and along its coastline resolved, there's very grim pessimism that these matters may continue. And it may be worth just noting in conclusion, ladies and gentleman, in that same case with Masefield and Amlin, an issue arose in the Commercial Court as to whether in the context of this piratical attacks the payment of ransom was illegal or country to public policy under English law. It was held that it was not. So, it may be the sucker and comfort for those demanding ransom and making life more difficult for those who had preferred them not to be paid. Thank you very much, indeed. [ Applause ] >> Thank you. We have some time for questions about 10 minutes or so. I-- please raise your hand if you have a question and when I call on you, please wait to ask your question 'til microphones arrive so that we can have your wonderful voice on the tape for the lunch time lecture. I see one right there, gentleman in the red shirt? >> Hi. Is there an idea that the insurance company, is there some money problem goes on will have-- will stop paying ransoms because it's not in their interest financially or is the value with the cargo is so much that the insurance company too happy to pay ransoms indefinitely because it's always gonna be [inaudible] well. >> Well, as far as the Masefield and Amlin case is concerned, a claim for the lost of value of the cargo which was on a hijack vessel so in that case was specific to a cargo and question as whether it became a natural constructive total lost marine insurance purposes. The problem remains is that at the moment unless an actual attack can be prevented once it has occurred, the only solution, apart from one or two draconian and rather well-known incidence where there has been successful military intervention in the majority of case, is as the case itself recognize, the only solution to release a ship, crew, and cargo is the payment of a the ransom and this still [inaudible] to the accounting marine insurance whether they'd be insurance of the vessel of [inaudible] machine or the cargo. So, I think the answer to the your question comes back to the situation that unless there is a regime on the shore which can act itself in the preventive way then at the moment even though the edicts by governments is not to pay ransoms, they recognized but unfortunately a tariff exist and that tariff, of course, has both lengthened in time and increased in an amount. I'm afraid the prognosis is really well the pessimistic. So, I think, the short answer is that absent to change a regime in Somalia and a complete overhaul on what's occurred on shore then continued threats on the present state exist, will continue to do so. >> Gentleman on the blue shirt. [ Noise ] >> Thank you very much for your talk. I think it's worth pointing out further to the question that was just asked that the insurers will continued to pay ransoms for as long as they are allowed too. But the moment that a connection is made between the piracy gangs and the insurgent groups of Southern Somalia, particularly al-Shabab but as soon as that connection is made then the payment to ransoms becomes the funding of terrorism. At that stage the insurers will be obliged to stop paying ransoms. >> I agree entirely, I'd stirred away from strategic questions during that because the concept of maritime terrorist has been [inaudible] in many occasions and there have been certainly some extremely erudite articles which prepared in the press equating the acts of pirates to maritime terrorist. And the reason why lawyers have been nervous about getting to that areas, the very reason so which you mentioned that once it becomes established, the payment of ransom is being made against the background of ransoms by-- demanded by terrorist [inaudible] it becomes illegal as a matter of English law and counter-terrorism legislation and indeed national legislation in the New United States and elsewhere. So, at the moment there's been a significant degree of anxiety between those seeking to release ships and cargo and cruise on hand by payment of a ransom looking over their shoulder to see whether the national government is at some point will take up the [inaudible] as you've said. But this brings us back to the Panagia Tinou how far the national governments have to act and there is here undoubtedly a threat to the global supply chain in exactly the same way as occurred after 9/11. So you make a very good point which I entirely agree with, another [inaudible] for lawyers and insurers. Thank you for asking it. >> Gentleman? >> Maybe a naive question but historical precedent. When I was a kid I learned about the Barbary Pirates. They went on for ages and ages I understand. How is that resolved, if at all, and where else in this wonderful quite world can we get into a business as good as this is and have to be in other instances of piracy that were resolved, [inaudible], or what? >> Very good question. Well, as far as the Barbary Pirates and Mediterranean Corsairs were concerned, I think it goes back to classical times. And nation states even in classical times took exemplary military reaction to put out the threat of pirates case. And this occurred right through to Victorian times when there were-- the Red Sea and the Middle East was still an area of pirate activity. But the states at large running world trade took exemplary action, a military action to wipe out the threat. This is still a feasible possibility but the Western appetite for intervention in Somalia in a way which would cure this issue, of course is an issue outside this discussion. So, military intervention was the key to success in the past. Whether it will be here in the future is a matter we have to see. As far as other areas of lucrative trade is concern which you've mentioned, certainly Nigeria and South China Sea have both shown different aspects. The Nigerian problem has been partially ongoing dispute with the Nigerian nationals and oil companies offshore activity. South China Sea was like the cases we've seen with theft to vessels and cargos trading phantom ships and so on. But regional agreements in Far East to put an end to the Southeast China Sea type piracy, Nigeria remains an ongoing problem. Not so much of piracy ransom problem. It's more robbery, theft, and political motivation. As far as your aspirations of a future [inaudible], I would hate to forecast where it could be. Let's hope it would be well and I wish you very well sir. Thank you [laughter]. >> Can I just ask your opinion on in terms of the current legal framework as it stands, how did the actions of Israel against the numerous humanitarian flotillas that tried to reach the Gaza [phonetic] shores, how do they stand up in the current legal standings as of today? >> Well, the attacks, you mean the attacks from the vessels that was sent to Gaza with humanitarian aid? >> Yeah. >> Well, I think from lawyers prospective whatever the motivation of execution of those attacks they could not be classed in any sense as piratical within the definitions of which we've seen today. So, where those-- where those actions be put before, court will tribunal here. The question would be where the-- was the motivation personal gain or some public activity. It was quite clear from what you've see in the newspapers that this was an [inaudible]. It's really a concern of national security. So that's-- it's a very good example of which you raise of the distinction between a public law act at and a private law risk. That's a [inaudible] a question. Thank you for asking it. >> Gentleman back there, please? [ Noise ] >> With regard to the Chandlers who were seized October 23 last year and in captivity in Somalia, does the British government have any duty to rescue them in someway? They're not covered by insurance I understand. >> Well, again, this of course is a true kidnapping-ransom situation on a tragedy which has befall on these two people and thoroughly innocent people. It falls outside of course, escape of commercial discussions. And the question there is of direct payment to the ransom by those acting on behalf of the unfortunate couple. And at the moment as you say there are no commercial interests and I'm really not in a position to say. But one suspects that the British government at least outwardly would be unprepared to sanction payment of a ransom to release its nationals although it has of course unknowingly been done by other European and other nations to free nationals in the absence of any military activity. And the French clearly took out the military incursion against the couple who were held on the yacht and of course it's a sad fact that the Navy were unable to rescue the Chandlers at the time when that might have occurred it just wasn't possible, I understand. So, has they-- has the crowd got to do to pay a ransom it's entirely a matter of current policy and the government is differ. But as we said by the gentleman here, I mean, the current trend of government is to try to discourage ransom payments even in a commercial context. So I would imagine that that policy would maintain and unless a private venture could be launch which has been attempted, I fear the faith of those poor people is still rather uncertain.