To install click the Add extension button. That's it.

The source code for the WIKI 2 extension is being checked by specialists of the Mozilla Foundation, Google, and Apple. You could also do it yourself at any point in time.

How to transfigure the Wikipedia

Would you like Wikipedia to always look as professional and up-to-date? We have created a browser extension. It will enhance any encyclopedic page you visit with the magic of the WIKI 2 technology.

Try it — you can delete it anytime.

Install in 5 seconds
4,5
Kelly Slayton
Congratulations on this excellent venture… what a great idea!
Alexander Grigorievskiy
I use WIKI 2 every day and almost forgot how the original Wikipedia looks like.
Live Statistics
English Articles
Improved in 24 Hours
Added in 24 Hours
What we do. Every page goes through several hundred of perfecting techniques; in live mode. Quite the same Wikipedia. Just better.
Great Wikipedia has got greater.
.
Leo
Newton
Brights
Milds

Tideman alternative method

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Part of the Politics series
Electoral systems
Ballot box
Single-winner/majoritarian
Plurality

Multi-round voting

Ranked / preferential systems

Cardinal / graded systems

Proportional representation
Party-list

Proportional forms of ranked voting

Proportional forms of cardinal voting

Biproportional apportionment

Fair majority voting

Weighted voting

Mixed systems
By type of representation

Non-compensatory mixed systems

Compensatory mixed systems

Other systems and related theory
Semi-proportional representation

Other systems

Social choice theory

List of electoral systems

icon Politics portal

Tideman's Alternative Methods, including Alternative Smith and Alternative Schwartz, are two electoral systems developed by Nicolaus Tideman which select a single winner using votes that express preferences. These methods can also create a sorted list of winners.

These methods are Smith- and Schwartz-efficient, respectively, and thus are Condorcet methods. They operate by using instant-runoff voting for cycle resolution.

Procedure

Tideman's Alternative Smith with three in the Smith set
Tideman's Alternative Smith with three in the Smith set

Tideman's Alternative procedure is as follows:

  1. Identify the Smith or Schwartz set.
  2. If the set consists of one candidate, elect that candidate.
  3. Eliminate all candidates outside the set and redistribute ballots.
  4. Eliminate the plurality loser.
  5. Repeat the procedure.

To create a sorted list of preferred candidates, select a winner, remove that winner from the list of candidates, and repeat.

Features

Tideman's Alternative Methods are easier to understand than other methods, such as Ranked Pairs and Schulze, owing to the simplicity of explaining both the Smith set (the smallest set of all candidates who each defeat every non-Smith candidate) and Instant run-off voting (eliminating the candidate with the fewest votes). This increases the likelihood of voter acceptance.

This method strongly resists both tactical voting and tactical nomination, reducing the amount of political manipulation possible or favorable in large elections. They inherit this resistance from instant run-off voting, as both methods resolve a Condorcet winner from the Smith set by eliminating non-Smith (or non-Schwartz) candidates and performing instant run-off voting on the result.

Although IRV itself faces criticism for theoretical and historical failures, all Smith- and Schwartz-efficient voting methods attempt to resolve a candidate from these respective sets. Unlike IRV, these methods invariably elect a Condorcet winner; when there is none, they elect different winners based on arbitrary criteria. Ranked Pairs elects the winner with the strongest overall ranking, while the Schulze method attempts to elect a winner without the worst pairwise loss. Tideman's Alternative Method elects a candidate in a manner strongly resisting tactical nomination and voting.

Tideman's Alternative Methods fail independence of irrelevant alternatives. However, the methods adhere to a less strict property, sometimes called independence of Smith-dominated alternatives (ISDA). It says that if one candidate (X) wins an election, and a new alternative (Y) is added, X will win the election if Y is not in the Smith set. ISDA implies the Smith criterion and Condorcet criterion.

Note that the Condorcet winner can be used as the "set" (if there is a Condorcet winner, they are the only member of the set. Otherwise, all candidates are in the set). This variation is known as Benham's method.

Comparison table

The following table compares Tideman's Alternative Methods with other preferential single-winner election methods:

Comparison of preferential electoral systems
System Monotonic Condorcet winner Majority Condorcet loser Majority loser Mutual majority Smith ISDA LIIA Independence of clones Reversal symmetry Participation, consistency Later­no­harm Later­no­help Polynomial time Resolvability
Schulze Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes
Ranked pairs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes
Tideman's Alternative No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No No No Yes Yes
Kemeny–Young Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No No No Yes
Copeland Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No No No Yes No
Nanson No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes No No No Yes Yes
Black Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No Yes No No No Yes Yes
Instant-runoff voting No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Smith/IRV No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No No No Yes Yes
Borda Yes No No Yes Yes No No No No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Baldwin No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No No Yes Yes
Bucklin Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Plurality Yes No Yes No No No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Contingent voting No No Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Coombs[1] No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No No No Yes Yes
Mini­Max[specify] Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No No No No No No Yes Yes
Anti-plurality[1] Yes No No No Yes No No No No No No Yes No No Yes Yes
Sri Lankan contingent voting No No Yes No No No No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Supplementary voting No No Yes No No No No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dodgson[1] No Yes Yes No No No No No No No No No No No No Yes

References

  1. ^ a b c Anti-plurality, Coombs and Dodgson are assumed to receive truncated preferences by apportioning possible rankings of unlisted alternatives equally; for example, ballot A > B = C is counted as 1/2 A > B > C and 1/2 A > C > B. If these methods are assumed not to receive truncated preferences, then later-no-harm and later-no-help are not applicable.
This page was last edited on 4 September 2021, at 11:48
Basis of this page is in Wikipedia. Text is available under the CC BY-SA 3.0 Unported License. Non-text media are available under their specified licenses. Wikipedia® is a registered trademark of the Wikimedia Foundation, Inc. WIKI 2 is an independent company and has no affiliation with Wikimedia Foundation.
Contact WIKI 2
Introduction
Terms of Service
Privacy Policy