Tarski's undefinability theorem, stated and proved by Alfred Tarski in 1933, is an important limitative result in mathematical logic, the foundations of mathematics, and in formal semantics. Informally, the theorem states that "arithmetical truth cannot be defined in arithmetic".^{[1]}
The theorem applies more generally to any sufficiently strong formal system, showing that truth in the standard model of the system cannot be defined within the system.
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Transcription
History
In 1931, Kurt Gödel published the incompleteness theorems, which he proved in part by showing how to represent the syntax of formal logic within firstorder arithmetic. Each expression of the formal language of arithmetic is assigned a distinct number. This procedure is known variously as Gödel numbering, coding and, more generally, as arithmetization. In particular, various sets of expressions are coded as sets of numbers. For various syntactic properties (such as being a formula, being a sentence, etc.), these sets are computable. Moreover, any computable set of numbers can be defined by some arithmetical formula. For example, there are formulas in the language of arithmetic defining the set of codes for arithmetic sentences, and for provable arithmetic sentences.
The undefinability theorem shows that this encoding cannot be done for semantic concepts such as truth. It shows that no sufficiently rich interpreted language can represent its own semantics. A corollary is that any metalanguage capable of expressing the semantics of some object language (e.g. a predicate is definable in ZermeloFraenkel set theory for whether formulae in the language of Peano arithmetic are true in the standard model of arithmetic^{[2]}) must have expressive power exceeding that of the object language. The metalanguage includes primitive notions, axioms, and rules absent from the object language, so that there are theorems provable in the metalanguage not provable in the object language.
The undefinability theorem is conventionally attributed to Alfred Tarski. Gödel also discovered the undefinability theorem in 1930, while proving his incompleteness theorems published in 1931, and well before the 1933 publication of Tarski's work (Murawski 1998). While Gödel never published anything bearing on his independent discovery of undefinability, he did describe it in a 1931 letter to John von Neumann. Tarski had obtained almost all results of his 1933 monograph "The Concept of Truth in the Languages of the Deductive Sciences" between 1929 and 1931, and spoke about them to Polish audiences. However, as he emphasized in the paper, the undefinability theorem was the only result he did not obtain earlier. According to the footnote to the undefinability theorem (Twierdzenie I) of the 1933 monograph, the theorem and the sketch of the proof were added to the monograph only after the manuscript had been sent to the printer in 1931. Tarski reports there that, when he presented the content of his monograph to the Warsaw Academy of Science on March 21, 1931, he expressed at this place only some conjectures, based partly on his own investigations and partly on Gödel's short report on the incompleteness theorems "Einige metamathematische Resultate über Entscheidungsdefinitheit und Widerspruchsfreiheit" [Some metamathematical results on the definiteness of decision and consistency], Austrian Academy of Sciences, Vienna, 1930.
Statement
We will first state a simplified version of Tarski's theorem, then state and prove in the next section the theorem Tarski proved in 1933.
Let be the language of firstorder arithmetic. This is the theory of the natural numbers, including their addition and multiplication, axiomatized by the firstorder Peano axioms. This is a "firstorder" theory: the quantifiers extend over natural numbers, but not over sets or functions of natural numbers. The theory is strong enough to describe recursively defined integer functions such as exponentiation, factorials or the Fibonacci sequence.
Let be the standard structure for i.e. consists of the ordinary set of natural numbers and their addition and multiplication. Each sentence in can be interpreted in and then becomes either true or false. Thus is the "interpreted firstorder language of arithmetic".
Each formula in has a Gödel number This is a natural number that "encodes" In that way, the language can talk about formulas in not just about numbers. Let denote the set of sentences true in , and the set of Gödel numbers of the sentences in The following theorem answers the question: Can be defined by a formula of firstorder arithmetic?
Tarski's undefinability theorem: There is no formula that defines That is, there is no formula such that for every sentence holds in .
Informally, the theorem says that the concept of truth of firstorder arithmetic statements cannot be defined by a formula in firstorder arithmetic. This implies a major limitation on the scope of "selfrepresentation". It is possible to define a formula whose extension is but only by drawing on a metalanguage whose expressive power goes beyond that of . For example, a truth predicate for firstorder arithmetic can be defined in secondorder arithmetic. However, this formula would only be able to define a truth predicate for formulas in the original language . To define a truth predicate for the metalanguage would require a still higher metametalanguage, and so on.
To prove the theorem, we proceed by contradiction and assume that an formula exists which is true for the natural number in if and only if is the Gödel number of a sentence in that is true in . We could then use to define a new formula which is true for the natural number if and only if is the Gödel number of a formula (with a free variable ) such that is false when interpreted in (i.e. the formula when applied to its own Gödel number, yields a false statement). If we now consider the Gödel number of the formula , and ask whether the sentence is true in , we obtain a contradiction. (This is known as a diagonal argument.)
The theorem is a corollary of Post's theorem about the arithmetical hierarchy, proved some years after Tarski (1933). A semantic proof of Tarski's theorem from Post's theorem is obtained by reductio ad absurdum as follows. Assuming is arithmetically definable, there is a natural number such that is definable by a formula at level of the arithmetical hierarchy. However, is hard for all Thus the arithmetical hierarchy collapses at level , contradicting Post's theorem.
General form
Tarski proved a stronger theorem than the one stated above, using an entirely syntactical method. The resulting theorem applies to any formal language with negation, and with sufficient capability for selfreference that the diagonal lemma holds. Firstorder arithmetic satisfies these preconditions, but the theorem applies to much more general formal systems, such as ZFC.
Tarski's undefinability theorem (general form): Let be any interpreted formal language which includes negation and has a Gödel numbering satisfying the diagonal lemma, i.e. for every formula (with one free variable ) there is a sentence such that holds in . Then there is no formula with the following property: for every sentence is true in .
The proof of Tarski's undefinability theorem in this form is again by reductio ad absurdum. Suppose that an formula as above existed, i.e., if is a sentence of arithmetic, then holds in if and only if holds in . Hence for all , the formula holds in . But the diagonal lemma yields a counterexample to this equivalence, by giving a "liar" formula such that holds in . This is a contradiction. QED.
Discussion
The formal machinery of the proof given above is wholly elementary except for the diagonalization which the diagonal lemma requires. The proof of the diagonal lemma is likewise surprisingly simple; for example, it does not invoke recursive functions in any way. The proof does assume that every formula has a Gödel number, but the specifics of a coding method are not required. Hence Tarski's theorem is much easier to motivate and prove than the more celebrated theorems of Gödel about the metamathematical properties of firstorder arithmetic.
Smullyan (1991, 2001) has argued forcefully that Tarski's undefinability theorem deserves much of the attention garnered by Gödel's incompleteness theorems. That the latter theorems have much to say about all of mathematics and more controversially, about a range of philosophical issues (e.g., Lucas 1961) is less than evident. Tarski's theorem, on the other hand, is not directly about mathematics but about the inherent limitations of any formal language sufficiently expressive to be of real interest. Such languages are necessarily capable of enough selfreference for the diagonal lemma to apply to them. The broader philosophical import of Tarski's theorem is more strikingly evident.
An interpreted language is stronglysemanticallyselfrepresentational exactly when the language contains predicates and function symbols defining all the semantic concepts specific to the language. Hence the required functions include the "semantic valuation function" mapping a formula to its truth value and the "semantic denotation function" mapping a term to the object it denotes. Tarski's theorem then generalizes as follows: No sufficiently powerful language is stronglysemanticallyselfrepresentational.
The undefinability theorem does not prevent truth in one theory from being defined in a stronger theory. For example, the set of (codes for) formulas of firstorder Peano arithmetic that are true in is definable by a formula in second order arithmetic. Similarly, the set of true formulas of the standard model of second order arithmetic (or th order arithmetic for any ) can be defined by a formula in firstorder ZFC.
See also
 Chaitin's incompleteness theorem – Measure of algorithmic complexity
 Gödel's completeness theorem – Fundamental theorem in mathematical logic
 Gödel's incompleteness theorems – Limitative results in mathematical logic
References
Primary sources
 Tarski, A. (1933). Pojęcie Prawdy w Językach Nauk Dedukcyjnych (in Polish). Nakładem Towarzystwa Naukowego Warszawskiego.
 Tarski, A. (1936). "Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten Sprachen" (PDF). Studia Philosophica (in German). 1: 261–405. Archived from the original (PDF) on 9 January 2014. Retrieved 26 June 2013.
 Tarski, A. (1983). "The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages" (PDF). In Corcoran, J. (ed.). Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics. Translated by J. H. Woodger. Hackett. English translation of Tarski's 1936 article.
Further reading
 Bell, J. L.; Machover, M. (1977). A Course in Mathematical Logic. NorthHolland.
 Boolos, G.; Burgess, J.; Jeffrey, R. (2002). Computability and Logic (4th ed.). Cambridge University Press.
 Lucas, J. R. (1961). "Mind, Machines, and Gödel". Philosophy. 36 (137): 112–27. doi:10.1017/S0031819100057983. S2CID 55408480. Archived from the original on 20070819.
 Murawski, R. (1998). "Undefinability of truth. The problem of the priority: Tarski vs. Gödel". History and Philosophy of Logic. 19 (3): 153–160. doi:10.1080/01445349808837306. Archived from the original on 20110608.
 Smullyan, Raymond M. (1992). Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems. Oxford: Oxford University Press, USA. ISBN 0195046722.
 Smullyan, R. (2001). "Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems". In Goble, L. (ed.). The Blackwell Guide to Philosophical Logic. Blackwell. pp. 72–89. ISBN 9780631206934.