Part of a series on Shia Islam |
---|
|
In Shi'a Islam the guidance of clergy (collectively called the ulema) and keeping such a structure holds great importance. There are several branches of Shi'ism, of which Twelver Shi'ism is by far the largest, and each of the branches has different clergy structures. Individual clerics are referred to as mullā or ākhūnd, but since those terms have developed "a somewhat pejorative connotation" since at least the 1980s, the term rūḥānī has been "promoted" as an alternative, "especially by the clerical class itself".[1]
YouTube Encyclopedic
-
1/5Views:4 015 0621 022 80513 1521 154 594430
-
Iran's Revolutions: Crash Course World History 226
-
Persia's Last Emperor: How Did The Iranian Monarchy Fall? | Last Persian Shah | Real Royalty
-
Reflections on the Origins of the Iranian Revolution of 1979 by Michael Axworthy
-
The Ayatollah Khomeini: The Cleric, The Emperor and The Great Satan
-
Life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness in the age of global terrorism
Transcription
Hi, I’m John Green and this is Crash Course World History and today we’re talking about Iran. Oh, Mr. Green? Mr. Green? I know that country. It’s in the Middle East. It’s with Egypt. No, Me from the Past, we’re going to talk about Iran. Now, I used to be you so I remember when you would look at this part of the world and you would be like, “oh yeah, that’s a thing.” And in your case that “thing” extended more or less from I guess, like, western China to, like, uh, Poland. Then you’d make a bunch of broad generalizations about that area and no doubt use the terms Arab and Muslim interchangeably. But as usual Me From the Past the truth resists simplicity. So today we are going to talk about Iran and just Iran. Specifically, the 1979 Iranian Revolution. So the 1979 Iranian Revolution and its aftermath are often seen by detractors as the first step in the creation of an isolated, fundamentalist state that supports terrorism, and, you might be surprised to hear me say, that there is some truth to that interpretation. That said, the way you think about the Iranian Revolution depends a lot of which part of it you are looking at. And regardless, it’s very important because it represents a different kind of revolution from the ones that we usually talk about. So the 1979 uprisings were aimed at getting rid of the Pahlavi Dynasty, which sounds, like, impressive, but this dynasty had only had two kings, Reza Shah and Mohammed Reza Shah. Before the Pahlavis, Iran was ruled by the Qajar dynasty, and before that the Safavids. The Safavids and Qajars were responsible for two of the most important aspects of Iran: The Safavids made Shia Islam the official state religion in Iran, starting with Ismail I in 1501, and the Qajars gave the Muslim clergy – the ulema – political power. So most of the world’s Muslims are Sunnis but the Shia, or Shiites are an important sect that began very early on – around 680 CE and today form the majority of Muslims in Iran and Iraq. Now within both Sunni and Shia there are further divisions and many sects, but we’re just going to talk about, like, the historical difference between the two. Shia Muslims believe that Ali should’ve been the first Caliph, Sunni Muslims think that Abu Bakr, who was the first Caliph, was rightly chosen. Since that disagreement, there have been many others, many doctrinal differences but what’s more important is that from the very beginning, Shia Muslims saw themselves as the party of the oppressed standing up against the wealthy and powerful and harkening back to the social justice standard that was set by the prophet. And this connection between religious faith and social justice was extremely important to the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and also to previous revolutions in Iran. This is really crucial to understand because many historians argue that the Iranian revolution represents what the journalist Christian Caryl called an “odd fusion of Islam and late-twentieth century revolutionary politics.” But actually, in the scheme of Iranian history, its not so odd. Because 1979 was not Iran’s first revolution. The first major one was in 1906. It forced the ruling Qajars to accept a constitution. It created a parliament and supposedly some limits on the king, and made Shia Islam the official state religion, but it also protected the rights of minorities in Iran. It ultimately failed partly because the clergy withdrew their support, partly because the shah worked very actively against it, and maybe most importantly, because the Russians and the British worked to keep Persia weak so they could continue to try to dominate the region. Which reminds me that most people in Iran are not Arabs, they are Persian. And most people in Iran don’t speak Arabic, they speak Farsi, or as we often call it in English, Persian. So after WWI European rivalries really heated up because of the discovery of oil in the Middle East. The British established the Anglo Iranian Oil Company – which would later come to be known as BP. They also extracted a bunch of concessions from the Iranian government in addition to extracting lots of oil. And they helped to engineer a change in dynasty by supporting military commander Reza Khan in his coup in February 1921. Reza Khan became Reza Shah and then he attempted to turn Persia, which he re-named Iran in 1935, into a modern, secular, western-style state kind of like Turkey was under Ataturk. But Reza Shah is perhaps best remembered for his over the top dictatorial repression, which turned the clergy against him. Okay, so during World War II Reza Shah abdicated and his young son Mohammad Reza Shah became the leader of Iran. Which he remained, mostly, until 1979 when he definitely stopped being the leader of Iran. So after World War II, the British allowed greater popular participation in Iran’s government. The main party to benefit from this openness was Tudeh, the Iranian communist party. Mohammed Mosaddegh was elected prime minister in 1951 and led the parliament to nationalize Iran’s oil industry, and that was the end of the democratic experiment. Now most history books say that in 1953 the British and the CIA engineered a coup to remove Mosaddegh from office. And that is quite possibly true. It is definitely true that we tried to engineer a coup. It’s also true that Mosaddegh quit and fled Iran following demonstrations against him. But we also know that the Shia clergy encouraged those demonstrations. That’s a bit of a weird decision for the Clergy, considering that Shia Islam traditionally takes a radical stance against oppression. But it’s important to remember that Mosaddegh was supported by the Tudeh party and they were communists. Nationalization of the oil industry was one thing, but a further shift toward communism might mean appropriation of the land that supported the clergy, maybe even a rejection of religion altogether. So now we’ve seen two occasions where the Shia clergy support helped facilitate change. Right, in 1906 and again in 1953. So, let’s flash ahead to 1979. The Shah was definitely an autocrat, and he employed a ruthless secret police called the SAVAK to stifle dissent. In 1975, the Shah abolished Iran’s two political parties and replaced them with one party the Resurgence party. You’ll never guess who was resurging - the Shah. There was a huge round of censorship and arrests and torture of political prisoners signaling that autocracy was in Iran to stay. But before those events in 1975, say between 1962 and 1975, by most economic and social measures Iran saw huge improvements. In 1963, the Shah had tried to institute what he called a White Revolution – top-down modernization led by the monarchy, and in many ways he was successful, especially in improving industry and education. Oil revenues rose from $555 million in 1964 to $20 billion in 1976. And the Shah’s government invested a lot of that money in infrastructure and education. The population grew and infant mortality fell. A new professional middle class arose. But the White Revolution wasn’t universally popular. For instance, it was opposed by one particular Shia cleric - the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Khomeini spoke out against the White Revolution from the religious center of Iran, Qom. One of his main complaints was that the reforms would grant more rights to women, including the right to vote, but he also attacked the government for, quote: “the rigging of elections and other constitutional abuses, neglect of the poor and the sale of oil to Israel.” And in general, Khomeini felt that a king’s power was inherently un-Islamic and that Shia tradition was to fight that power. That noted about Khomeini, the 1979 revolution didn’t start out to create an Islamic state. At first it was a pretty typical uprising by dissatisfied Iranians to overthrow a government that they perceived as corrupt and unresponsive to their needs. In spite of, or arguably because of, oil-fueled economic growth, many Iranians weren’t enjoying economic success. The universities were turning out more graduates than there were jobs and the mechanization of agriculture had the predictable result of displacing farmers who moved to cities. Especially the capital city of Tehran where there weren’t nearly enough jobs for the number of people. So, I think it’s unfair to say that a majority of the demonstrators who took to the streets in late 1978 were motivated by a fundamentalist vision of Islam. They were dissatisfied with economic inequality and political repression and a corrupt regime. So why do we generally remember the 1979 revolution as having been motivated by Shia Islam. Well, Let’s go to the Thought Bubble. So the initial demonstrations did begin after an Iranian newspaper on January 7, 1978 published an article that was critical of Khomeini. By the way, at the time he was living in Paris. These initial demonstrations were pretty small, but when the government police and army forces starting firing on demonstrators, killing some of them, the protests grew. Each time marchers protested against the violent treatment of demonstrators, the government would crack down, and their violent reaction would spur more demonstrations. There was also a lot of criticism of the west tied up in the revolution. According to one woman who participated: “American lifestyles had come to be imposed as an ideal, the ultimate goal. Americanism was the model. American popular culture – books, magazines, film – had swept over our country like a flood...We found ourselves wondering ‘Is there any room for our own culture?’” The Shah never understood why so many people were protesting against him; he thought that they were communists, or being supported by the British. He also thought that merely bringing prosperity would be enough to keep him in power. It wasn’t. On January 16, 1979 he left Iran. He eventually ended up in the U.S., which had unfortunate consequences for diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Iran. But the point here is that the first part of the Iranian revolution was relatively peaceful protests followed by a government crackdown, more protests that eventually led to the collapse of the monarchy, and that looks kind of familiar, especially if you’ve studied, like, the French or Russian or even the American Revolutions. And most historians argue these protests weren’t about Islam, but rather, “The discontent over living conditions, pay cuts, and the threat of unemployment fused with the general disillusionment and anger with the regime.” The government that eventually replaced the monarchy was the second, and in many ways much more revolutionary revolution. Thanks Thought Bubble. So the new Islamic Republic of Iran was based on Khomeini’s idea about what an Islamic government should be, a principle he called velayat-e faqih. Mainly it was that a sharia law scholar, would have ultimate authority, because he was more knowledgeable than anyone about law and justice. There would be a legislature and a president and a prime minister, but any of their decisions could be overturned by the supreme ruler who from 1979 until his death was Khomeini. Now, if democracy is only about holding elections, then the new Iran was a democracy. I mean, Iran has elections, both for president and for the parliament. And for the record, despite what Khomeini might have thought in the ‘60s, women can vote in Iran and they do. They also serve in the parliament and the president’s cabinet. And in the referendum on whether to create an Islamic Republic of Iran, the vast majority of Iranians in a free and open vote, voted “yes.” Now governance in Iran is extremely complicated, too complicated for one Crash Course video. But in once sense at least, Iran is definitely not a democracy. The ultimate authority, written into the constitution, is not the will of the people but god, who is represented by the supreme religious leader. And the actions of the Islamic Republic, especially in the early chaotic days of 1979 but also many times since, don’t conform to most ideas of effective democracy. Like one of the first things that Khomeini did to shore up his support was to create the Islamic Revolutionary Guards and Hezbollah to defend the revolution against coup attempts. Although initially there were opposition parties, their activities were curtailed by the new “revolutionary courts” that applied sharia law in a particularly harsh fashion. Like it’s estimated that by October 1979, several hundred people had been executed. And under the new constitution, Khomeini was given extensive power. I mean, he could appoint the heads of the armed services, and the Revolutionary Guard and the national TV and radio stations. He also approved the candidates for presidential elections and appointed six of the twelve members of the Guardian Council that approved legislation from the parliament before it became law. So structurally Iran’s government looked kind of like other governments, but as Michael Axworthy points out it was different because, quote, “above and beyond stood the faqih, with the power and the responsibility to intervene directly in the name of Islam; indeed with powers greater than those given to most monarchs in constitutional monarchies.” By 1979, Iran already had a long history of clerical involvement in protest and dynamic change, but it also had a long history of pushing for constitutions and liberty. The current end result is the Islamic Republic of Iran, but it’s worth remembering that both those threads of history are still part of Iranian life. Like we saw that in 2009 and 2010 with the so-called Green Revolution where there were huge protests after an Iranian election. Those protests involved young people arguing for more rights and liberties.. But they were also led by, and encouraged by, reformist Shia clerics. In the U.S. we mostly remember the 1979 Iranian Revolution for its burning of American flags and taking of hostages in the American Embassy. That belonged more to the second phase of the revolution, the chaotic period when the Islamic republic was being born. Life in the Islamic Republic of Iran remains highly repressive. I mean, for instance, Iran still executes a very high percentage of criminals. But it’s inaccurate to say that Iran is merely a dictatorship, or that it’s merely repressive. And one of the challenges for people in the West trying to understand Iran is that we have to disentangle the various aspects of the revolution rather than simply relying on the images that have defined it for us. I hope this episode can help a little. You can find more resources in the links below. Thanks for watching. Crash Course is filmed here in the Chad and Stacey Emigholz studio in Indianapolis and it’s made possible because of the hard worth of all of these people. Thank you for watching and as we say in my hometown, “don’t forget to be awesome.”
Twelver
Usooli school
Among the different schools of Twelver Shi'i Islam are Usooli and Akhbari. In the late 18th and early 19th century the Usooli "triumphed" over the Akhbari Twelver.[2]
Usooli Shia argued that "since only someone who has expended the time and effort to become a mujtahid could possibly know all the details of religious observances and law", it was obligatory for "anyone who was not himself a mujtahid to follow the rulings" of one so as to avoid committing religious errors.[3] They believe the 12th Imam, ordered them to follow the scholars (Fuqaha) who: "...guard their soul, protect their religion, and follow the commandments of their master (Allah)..."[4] Consequently, the Usooli Shia community is divided into mujtahid (those who follow their own independent judgement in religious law) and muqallid (those who must follow the rulings of a mujtahid). The practice of following a mujtahid is called taqlid. Because of this, it can be said that clergy in the Usooli Twelver Shi'a have exerted much more authority in their religious community than the Sunni ulema (or Akhbari Shi'i ulema) in theirs.
Also as a consequence of the dominance of Usooli Shi'ism, mujtahid have risen in both importance and number. Up until the mid-19th century there were "three or four" mujtahid "anywhere at any one time"; by the end of the century there were several hundred.[3] Also during the 19th century, improvements in communication technology gave a higher profile to the most eminent mujtahids, as "important or controversial questions" no longer had to be left to local mujtahids. In "this way a small number of eminent mujtahids in Najaf became regarded as being the marja' at-taqlid for a particular area to be referred to "by both "ordinary Shi'is and local mujtahids".[5] As of 2014, there were over 60 recognized Marj in the Shia Muslim world.
In Iran (the largest majority-Twelver Shi'i country) and "to a lesser extent" in other Shi'i communities, "the clerical class [ ulema ] constitutes a fairly distinctive entity".[1]
Shia believe that the study of Islamic literature is a continual process, and is necessary for identifying all of God's laws.[citation needed] They believe that the process of finding God's laws from the available Islamic literature will facilitate dealing with any circumstance. They believe that they can interpret the Qur'an and the Twelver Shi'a traditions with the same authority as their predecessors.[citation needed] This process of ijtihad has provided a means to deal with current issues from an Islamic perspective.
Education
Traditionally (and as of 1985, at least in Iran) education of a member of the ulema (and many other people) began with primary school or maktab. After completing this, those who wanted to be members of the ulama attended madrasa (religious college, "collectively referred to as hawza", plural hawzat)[6] situated in big cities. The most prestigious of them were located in the holy cities of Qum, Mashhad and Najaf. The madrasa course of study has three level:[7]
- Muqaddamat (preliminary level) where they would develop a "good grasp" of Arabic language and their teachers would be "senior students and assistants of the principal mujtahids". This level may take ten years or so.[7]
- As-Sutuh (the externals) here the teachers are usually recently minted mujtahids "seeking to build up their reputations", students may pick and choose lectures and develop a special interest, but must obtain "a thorough grasp" of the "two principal subjects", fiqh and usul al-fiqh to advance to the next level.[7]
- Dars al-Kharij (graduation classes), the students in their mid-twenties, and the teaching done by the principal mujtahids, there are "no set books", and the style of teaching often "dialectical involvement of the audience".[7]
Tuition, room and board is provided for students from charitable contributions, if only at a very spartan level.[8]
Ijaza
Unlike in most Western higher education programs (where failure to graduate is usually considered a failure on the part of some combination of the student, school or society), "only a small percentage" of talib who start out in a madrasa complete these courses and receive a ijaza. Instead, the number of talib thins out at each level of promotion, with the drop-outs going on to less demanding and prestigious, but still respected religious roles. Most drop out at some point out of "financial or personal considerations", lack of intellect, and/or lack of perseverance.[1] To be considered for a ijaza (literally "permission, authorisation", i.e. authorisation to exercise ijtihad and thus can be called a mujtihad) a student (talib) must be
- a. Maturity
- b. Of the male sex
- c. Legitimate birth
- d. Faith
- e. Intelligence
- f. Justice (i.e. following Sharia in words and deeds, its obligations and prohibitions).[1]
They must write a treatise on fiqh or usul al-fiqh and be granted the ijaza from a "recognized mujtahid".[9] It is "uncommon" to obtain an ijaza before the age of 30, and "not uncommon" for 40 and 50-year-olds to still be students.
Hierarchy, types of ulama
The ulama is much larger than just "recognized" mujtahids (i.e. mujtahids who have a following of Muslims who are prepared to refer to them on matters of Islamic law). Below these are those who drop out of madrasa "consider themselves members of the ulama" although they make their livelihood in some non-religious occupation (merchant, craftsman, etc.). Others are talib who "obviously" did not have the ability to complete the course and become a mujtahid, in the eyes of their mujtihad and are asked by him to take up a position as a
- teacher for a maktab
- mullah for a village
- pīshnamāz (prayer leader)
- mutawallī (custodian) of a shrine or endowment
by a town that has asked the mujtihad to provide them with one.[1] Other occupations often filled by drop outs -- though they "need not have attended a madrasa" to be one are
- wāʿiẓ (traveling preacher) or
- rawḍa-khān (narrator of the tragedy of Hussein at Karbalā).[1]
In addition there are those who earned an ijaza but did not become "recognized", because they lacked the patronage of an eminent mujtahid, the prestige among other students, family connections, or talent for preaching and communicating. These are sometimes called mujtahid muḥtaṭ (mujtahid in abeyance).[1]
The hierarchy of Twelver Shi'i "has been described" as one of "deference", that is the lower ranking ulama will defer to a higher ranking one -- "a locally prominent mujtahid" -- who will defer to an "eminent mujtahid" (marja' al-taqlid) in Najaf, Qum or Mashhad.[3]
- Ayatollah (sign of God) is a fairly recent term, originating in the 20th century as a title for marja' at-taqlid, but suffering from inflation such that following the 1979 Iranian Revolution it was used "for any established mujtahid".[10]
- Hujjatu'l-Islam (proof of Islam) originated as a title for certain high-level mujtahids in the 19th century (Sayyid Muhammad Baqir Shafti, Mirza-yi Shirazi); following the 1979 Iranian Revolution it was used for "aspiring mujtahid".[10]
Devaluation trend
The title of Ayatollah (and other Iranian Shi'i titles) has been "cheapened" in recent decades.[11][12][13]
According to Michael M. J. Fischer, the Iranian revolution led to "rapid inflation of religious titles", and almost every senior cleric was called an Ayatollah.[14]
The same phenomenon happened to the title Hujjat al-Islam before, which is today a less prestigious title than Ayatollah. However, as of 19th century it was given to people who were not only Mujtahids, but also were the most distinguished clerics of that time.[12] Today there are "tens of thousands" called with that title,[13] who are just aspiring to become a Mujtahid.[12]
This trend led to the invention of a new title called Ayatollah al-Uzma (lit. 'Great Sign of God').[13] In the beginning, about half a dozen people were addressed with the latter title, but as of 2015, the number of people who claimed that title was reportedly over 50.[13]
Historical role in politics and society
Modern history
The Shia clerics in this period were closely tied with the bazaars that were in turn strongly linked with the artisans and farmers that together formed traditional socioeconomic communities and centers of associational life with Islamic occasions and functions tying them to clerics who interpreted Islamic laws to settle commercial disputes and taxed the well-to-do to provide welfare for devout poorer followers. A succession of prayer meetings and rituals were organized by both clergy and the laity. Bazaars also enjoyed ties with more modern sectors of Iranians society as many Iranian university students were from the merchant class. But since the 1970s, the Shah of Iran aroused the defense and oppositions of the bazaar by attempts at bring under control their autonomous councils and marginalizing the clergy by taking over their educational and welfare activities. This combined with the growing public and clerical dissatisfaction with Shah's secular policies and his reliance on foreign powers, particularly the United States, led to a nationwide revolution, that saw a high-ranking cleric Ayatollah Khomeini and his clerical disciples as its top leadership, that deposed the Pahlavi Shah and founded the Islamic Republic of Iran.[15]
Ismaili
The Imamate in Nizārī Ismā'īlī doctrine (Arabic: إمامة) is a concept in Nizari Isma'ilism which defines the political, religious and spiritual dimensions of authority concerning Islamic leadership over the nation of believers. The primary function of the Imamate is to establish an institution between an Imam who is present and living in the world and his following whereby each is granted rights and responsibilities. See also Imamate in Nizari doctrine for further information.
The term Dāʻī al-Mutlaq (Arabic: الداعي المطلق) literally means "the absolute or unrestricted missionary". In Ismā'īlī Islām, the term dāʻī has been used to refer to important religious leaders other than the hereditary Imāms and the Daʻwa or "Mission" is a clerical-style organization. "The Daʻwa" was a term for the Ismā'īlī faith itself from early on. The Dāʻīs are also called Syednas. See Musta'li and Taiyabi for further information. List of Dai of Dawoodi Bohra
Contemporary scholars
Afghanistan
Azerbaijan
Bahrain
- Abdul Amir al-Jamri
- Ali Salman
- Isa Qassim
- Mohammad al-Sannad
India
- Ali Naqi Naqvi
- Syed Ali Nasir Saeed Abaqati
- Aga Syed Yusuf Al-Moosavi Al-Safavi
- Syed Aqeel-ul-Gharavi
- Ghulam Rasool Noori
- Syed Hamidul Hasan
- Hasan Naqvi
- Syed Kalbe Hussain
- Kalbe Jawad
- Mirza Mohammed Athar
- Aga Syed Mohammad Fazlullah
- Sheikh Mussa Shariefi
- Aga Syed Mustafa Moosavi
- Syed Ali Akhtar Rizvi
- Syed Saif Abbas Naqvi
- Syed Zafrul Hasan Rizvi
- Zeeshan Haider Jawadi
Iran
- Abbas Ali Akhtari
- Abbas-Ali Amid Zanjani
- Abbas Ali Karamatlu
- Abbas Ali Rostami Sani
- Abbas-Ali Soleimani
- Abbas Amirifar
- Abbas Hosseini Kashani
- Abbas Ka'bi
- Abbas Mahfouzi
- Abbas Matin
- Abbas Almohri
- Mohammad Montazeri
- Abbas Mousaviyan
- Abbas Tabrizian
- Abbas Vaez-Tabasi
- Abdul Fattah Nawab
- Abdul Hadi Hussayni Shahroudi
- Abdul Hamid Khodri
- Abdol-Hamid Masoumi-Tehrani
- Abdol Hossein Dastgheib
- Abdul Hussein Mo'ezzi
- Abdol Javad Alamolhoda
- Abdul Karim Abidini
- Abdul Karim Farhani
- Abdolkarim Hasheminejad
- Abdul Karim Haghshenas
- Abdul-Karim Mousavi Ardebili
- Seyyed Abdollah Fateminia
- Abdullah Haji Sadiqi
- Abdullah Hajiani
- Abdullah Hussayni
- Abd al-A'la al-Sabziwari
- Abdollah Javadi-Amoli
- Abdullah Musawi Shirazi
- Abdollah Nouri
- Abdul Mahmoud Abdullahi
- Abdul-Majid al-Khoei
- Abdul Mohammad Rastad
- Abdolmoghim Nasehi
- Abdul-Nabi Mousavi Fard
- Abdul-Nabi Namazi
- Abd al-Rahim Aqiqi Bakhshayishi
- Ayatollah Abdul Rahman Heidari Ilami
- Abdul Rasoul Mousavi
- Abdul Reza Pourzahabi
- Abdolvahed Mousavi Lari
- Abu al-Fazl Mir Mohammedi
- Seyed Abolfazl Mousavi Tabrizi
- Abu al-Fazl Razavi Ardakani
- Abulhassan Navab
- Abolghasem Khazali
- Abu al-Qasem
- Abu al-Qasim al-Khoei
- Abolghasem Wafi Yazdi
- Abu al-Qasim Yaqoubi
- Ahad Azadikhah
- Ahmad Alamolhoda
- Ahmad Azari Qomi
- Ahmad Beheshti
- Ahmad Hemmati Meshgini
- Ahmad Hussayn Fallahi
- Ahmad Hosseini Khorasani
- Ahmad Jannati
- Ahmad Khatami
- Ahmad Khomeini
- Ahmad Khonsari
- Ahmad Marvi
- Ahmad Mazani
- Ahmad Moballeghi
- Ahmad Mohseni Garakani
- Ahmad Mojtahedi Tehrani
- Sayyid Ahmad Mousavi
- Ahmad Parvai'i Rik
- Ahmad Ghabel
- Mir Ahmad Reza Hajati
- Seyyed Ahmad Reza Shahrokhi
- Ahmad Sabiri Hamedani
- Ahmad Salek
- Ahmad Vaezi
- Akbar Ahmadpour
- Akbar Ghaffari Qarabagh
- Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani
- Allah Nour Karimi Tabar
- Ali Ahmadi Mianji
- Ali Akbar al-Modarresi
- Ali Meshkini
- Ali-Akbar Hosseini
- Ali Akbar Masoudi Khomeini
- Ali Akbar Mohtashamipur
- Ali Akbar Kalantari
- Ali Akbar Ghoreishi
- Ali Akbar Hamidzadeh
- Ali Akbar Mousavi Hussayni
- Ali Akbar Nasseri
- Ali Akbar Nategh-Nouri
- Ali Akbar Rashad
- Ali al-Sabziwari
- Ali Asghar Baghani
- Seyed Ali Asghar Dastgheib
- Ali Asghar Hussayni
- Ali Asghar Masoumi Shahroudi
- Ali Asghar Rahimi Azad
- Ali Asghar Rahmani Khalili
- Ali Banaei
- Ali Fallahian
- Ali Davani
- Ali Gharavi
- Ali Ghiouri
- Ali Golzadeh Ghafouri
- Ali Hussayni Ashkevari
- Ali al-Sistani
- Ali Islami
- Ali al-Kazemi Momendi
- Ali Khamenei
- Ali Khatami (Zanjan)
- Ali Mirkhalili
- Ali Mo’alemi
- Ali Mohammad Bozorgvari
- Ali Mohammad Dastgheib Shirazi
- Ali Momenpour
- Ali Nazari Monfard
- Ali Orumian
- Ali Qazi Askar
- Ali Qoddusi
- Ali Razini
- Ali Reza Afqahi
- Alireza Arafi
- Ali Reza Ebadi
- Ali Reza Islamian
- Alireza Panahian
- Alireza Qaeminia
- Alireza Salimi (politician)
- Ali Safi Golpaygani
- Seyyed Ali Shafiei
- Sheikh Ali Shahrokhi
- Ali Shirazi
- Ali Tahiri Gorgani
- Ali Zadsar Jirofti
- Amanallah Alimoradi
- Aman Narimani
- Amir Qoli Jafari Borujeni
- Asadollah Bayat-Zanjani
- Assad-Allah Imani
- Asadallah Kian-Arasi
- Mir Asadollah Madani
- Asgar Dirbaz
- Ataollah Ashrafi Esfahani
- Azizollah Khoshvaght
- Dakhil Abbas Zarazadeh Mehrizi
- Davoud Samadi Amoli
- Fakhraddin Hashemi
- Fakhreddin Mousavi
- Fakhraddin Sabiri
- Fathallah Omid Najafabadi
- Ghiyasaddin Taha Mohammedi
- Gholam Ali Naim Abadi
- Gholam Ali Safai Bushehri
- Mohammad Mohammadi Golpayegani
- Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje'i
- Gholam Hussayn Nadi
- Gholam Reza Fayazi
- Gholamreza Hassani
- Gholamreza Mesbahi Moghaddam
- Gholamreza Rezvani
- Gholam Reza Sultani
- Habibollah Ashouri
- Habiballah Mehman Navaz
- Habiballah Sha’bani Movasaqi
- Habib Boromand Dashghapu
- Hadi al-Modarresi
- Hadi Barikbin
- Hadi Doust Mohammadi
- Hadi Ghaffari
- Hadi Khamenei
- Hadi Khosroshahi
- Hadi Ghabel
- Hadi Rohani
- Hamid Rasai
- Hamid Shahriari
- Mirza Hashem Amoli
- Hashem Bathaie Golpayegani
- Hashem Hamidi
- Hashem Hashemzadeh Herisi
- Hashem Hejazifar
- Hashem Hosseini Bushehri
- Hashem Niazi
- Hassan Abtahi
- Hassan Alemi
- Hassan Alidadi Sulaymani
- Hasanali Morvarid
- Hasan Ali Nejabat Shirazi
- Hassan Ameli
- Hassan Aqa Hussayni Tabataba’i
- Hassan Emami
- Hassan Hassanzadeh Amoli
- Hassan Eslami Ardakani
- Hassan Khomeini
- Hassan Malek Mohammadi
- Hassan Mamduhi
- Hassan Namazi
- Hassan Nowrouzi
- Hassan Rouhani
- Hassan Sanei
- Hassan Shariati Niyasar
- Hassan Shahcheraghi
- Hassan Shuja’i Aliabadi
- Hassan Shuja’i Kiyasari
- Hassan Tabatabaei Qomi
- Hassan Taheri Khorramabadi
- Heydar Moslehi
- Hussein-Ali Montazeri
- Hussayn Ali Sa'adi
- Hossein Borujerdi
- Hossein Ansarian
- Hussayn Ansari Rad
- Hossein Ayatollahi
- Hussayn Hashemian
- Hussayn Irani
- Hussayn Jalali
- Hossein Kazemeyni Boroujerdi
- Hossein Lankarani
- Hossein Mazaheri
- Hussayn Mirza'i
- Hossein Mousavi Tabrizi
- Hossein Noori Hamedani
- Hussayn Rasti Kashani
- Hussayn Sobhani Nia
- Hossein Taeb
- Hossein Wahid Khorasani
- Ebrahim Amini
- Mir Ebrahim Seyyed Hatami
- Ebrahim Raisi
- Isa Tarafi
- Ismail Ferdowsipour
- Esmaeil Khatib
- Seyed Esmaeil Mousavi Zanjani
- Jafar Karimi Divkola'i
- Jafar Sobhani
- Jafar Shojouni
- Jalaleddin Taheri
- Jalal Yahyazadeh Firouzabadi
- Javad Alavi Boroujerdi
- Javad Gharavi Aliari
- Javad Hussayni Kia
- Javad Khamenei
- Jawad Tabrizi
- Javad Mojtahed Shabestari
- Javad Nikbin
- Kamel Khairkhah
- Karamatallah Emadi
- Karamatollah Malek-Hosseini
- Khalil Boyukzadeh
- Khalil Mobasher Kashani
- Seyed Kazem Seyed Bagheri
- Kazem Mousavi
- Kazem Nourmofidi
- Kazem Seddiqi
- Lotfollah Dezhkam
- Lotfollah Safi Golpaygani
- Mahmoud Taleghani
- Mahmoud Alavi
- Mahmoud Da’ai
- Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi
- Mahmoud Hussayni Dowlatabadi
- Mahmoud Madani Bajestani
- Mahmoud Mar'ashi Najafi
- Mahmoud Mohammedi Araqi
- Mahmoud Nabavian
- Mahmoud Nourizadeh
- Mahmoud Salavati
- Mahdi al-Modarresi
- Mahdi Baqiri
- Mahdi Hosseini Rohani
- Mehdi Karroubi
- Mahdi Mousavinejad
- Seyed Mehdi Ghoreishi
- Mehdi Shabzendedar Jahromi
- Mahdi Sheikh
- Mahdi Yasrebi Kashani
- Majdaddin Ghazi Dezfuli
- Majid Ansari
- Majid Nasserinejhad
- Majid Nasira'i
- Majid Talkhabi
- Mansour Leghaei
- Masoud Khamenei
- Ali Younesi
- Mohammad Aba’i Khorasani
- Mohammad-Ali Abtahi
- Mohammad Ali Ale-Hashem
- Mohammad Ali "Mokhtar" Aminian
- Mohammad-Ali Angaji
- Mohammad Ali Araki
- Mohammad Ali Ayazi
- Mohammad Ali Faiz Lahijani Gilani
- Mohammad Ali Gerami Qomi
- Mohammad Ali Hadi Najafabadi
- Mohammad Alavi Gorgani
- Mohammad Ali Esmaeelpoor Ghomsheie
- Mohammad Ali Naseri
- Mohammad Ali Nekounam
- Mohammad Ali Mousavi
- Mohammad Ali Mousavi Jazayeri
- Mohammad Ali Movahed Abtahi
- Ali Movahedi-Kermani
- Mohammad Ali Qazi Tabatabaei
- Mohammad-Ali Rahmani
- Mohammad Ali Reza'i
- Mohammad Ali Sadouqi
- Mohammad-Ali Shahidi
- Mohammad Ali Shar’ai
- Mohammad Ali Shomali
- Mohammad-Ali Taskhiri
- Mohammad Amin Khorasani
- Mirza Mohammad Anvari
- Mohammad Ashrafi Isfahani Khozani
- Mohammed Bahrami Khoshkar
- Mohammad-Bagher Bagheri
- Mohammad Baqir Ebadi
- Mohammad Bagher Kharazi
- Mohammad Baqir Mohammadi La’ini
- Mohammad Baqir Movahed Abtahi
- Mohammad Ebadizadeh
- Mohammed Emami-Kashani
- Mohammad Faqih
- Mohammad Fazel Lankarani
- Mohammad Feyz Sarabi
- Mohammad Hadi Abdekhodai
- Mohammad Hadi Ghazanfari Khansari
- Mohammad Hadi Mofatteh
- Mohammad Hadi Rabbani
- Mohammad Haji Abu al-Qasem Doulabi
- Mohammad Hashemian
- Mohammad-Hassan Aboutorabi Fard
- Mohammad Hassan Ahmadi Faqih
- Mohammad Hassan Jamshidi Ardeshiri
- Mohammad Hassan Mar’ashi
- Mohammad Hassan Nabavi
- Mohammad Hassan Ghadrdan Gharamaleki
- Mohammad Hassan Rahimian
- Mohammad Hassan Zali
- Mohammad Hussayn Ahmadi Shahroudi
- Mohammad Beheshti
- Mohammad Hussayn Hussaynzadeh Bahraini
- Mohammad Hussayni Rouhani Qomi
- Mohammad Hussaini Shahroudi
- Mohammad Hussayni Shahroudi
- Seyyed Mohammad Hosseini Zanjani
- Muhammad Husayn Tabatabai
- Mohammad Hussayn Zarandi
- Mohammad Ebrahim Jannaati
- Mohammad Ibrahim Nekounam
- Mohammad Ismail Shushtri
- Mohammad Ezodin Hosseini Zanjani
- Mohammad Jafari Gilani
- Mohammad Jafar Montazeri
- Muhammad Jafar Moravej
- Mohammad Jafar Sadat Mousavi
- Muhammad Javad Haj Ali Akbari
- Mohammad-Javad Bahonar
- Mohammad Javad Pishvai
- Mohammad Karim Marouji
- Mohammed Kadhim al-Modarresi
- Mohammad Kazem Shariatmadari
- Mohammad Khamenei
- Mohammad Khatami
- Mohammad Mahdi Aftakhari
- Mohammad Mahdi Hussayni Hamedani
- Mohammad Mahdi Mir Baqeri
- Mohammad Mahdi Pourfatimi
- Mohammad Mahdi Rabbani Amlishi
- Mohammad Mahdi Shahrokhi
- Mehdi Tabatabaei
- Mohammad Mofatteh
- Mohammad Mo’adebpour
- Mohammad Mohad
- Mohammad Mohammadi Gilani
- Mohammad Momen
- Mohammad Mousavi Khoeiniha
- Mohammad Mofti al-shia Mousavi
- Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari
- Mohammad Naqi Lotfi
- Mohammad Naqi Shahrokhi Khorramabadi
- Nasser Biria
- Mohammad Qomi
- Mohammad Rahmati Sirjani
- Mohammad Rajaei Baghsiai
- Mohammad Reyshahri
- Mohammad Razavi Yazdi
- Mohammad Reza Abbasi Fard
- Mohammad Reza Amiri Kohnuj
- Mohammad-Reza Ashtiani Araghi
- Mohammad Reza Baqiri Bonabi
- Mohammad Reza Dowlatabadi
- Mohammad Reza Faker
- Mohammad-Reza Golpaygani
- Mohammad-Reza Mahdavi Kani
- Mohammad Reza Meghari Moruji
- Mohammad Reza Mirtajodini
- Mohammad-Reza Modarresi Yazdi
- Mohammad Reza Naseri Yazdi
- Mohammad Reza Nekoonam
- Mohammed Ridha al-Sistani
- Mohammad-Reza Tavassoli
- Mohammad Reza Za’iri
- Mohammad Rouhani Qomi
- Mohammad Sabzi
- Mohammad Sadat Ibrahimi
- Mohammad Sa’id Mahdavi Kani
- Mohammad Sadiq "Mohiaddin" Haeri Shirazi
- Sadegh Khalkhali
- Mohammad Sadeq Rouhani
- Mohammad-Sadegh Salehimanesh
- Mohammad Sadeqi Tehrani
- Mohammad Sadoughi
- Seyyed Mohammad Saeedi
- Mohammad Safari Molkmian
- Mohammad Shahcheraghi
- Mohammad Shahi Arablu
- Mohammad-Taher Shubayr al-Khaqani
- Mohammad Taqi al-Modarresi
- Mohammad Taqi al-Khoei
- Mohammad-Taqi Bahjat Foumani
- Mohammad Taghi Falsafi
- Mohammad-Taqi Ja'fari
- Mohammad-Taghi Khalaji
- Mohammad-Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi
- Mohammad Taqi Mohassil Hamadani
- Mohammed Taqi Morvarid
- Mohammad Taqi Naqd Ali
- Mohammad Taghi Pourmohammadi
- Mohammad Taqi Rahbar
- Mohammad-Taqi Shoushtari
- Mohammad Taghi Vaezi
- Mohammad Waezzadeh Khorasani
- Mohammad Vaez Mousavi
- Mohammad Yasrebi
- Mohammad Yazdi
- Seyyed Mohammad Ziaabadi
- Mohiaddin Fazl Harandi
- Mohsen Araki
- Mohsen Faqihi
- Mohsen Heidari Alekasir
- Mohsen Kazeroni
- Mohsen Kharazi
- Mohsen Koochebaghi Tabrizi
- Mohsen Mojtahed Shabestari
- Mohsin Qara'ati
- Mohsen Qomi
- Mohsen Rohami
- Mohsen Sa'idi Golpaygani
- Seyed Mojtaba Hosseini
- Mojtaba Mo’adpour
- Mujtaba Musavi Lari
- Mojtaba Tehrani
- Mojtaba Zonnour
- Mokhtar Waziri
- Morteza Aghatehrani
- Morteza Fahim Kermani
- Morteza Mati’ayi
- Morteza Moghtadai
- Morteza Motahhari
- Morteza Mousavi
- Morteza Razavi
- Morteza Sadouqi Mazandarani
- Morteza Salehi Khvansari
- Mousa Ahmadi
- Mousa Ghazanfarabadi
- Mousa Mousavi
- Mousa Qorbani
- Mousa Shubairi Zanjani
- Mostafa Boroujerdi
- Mustafa Fargh Dezfuli
- Mostafa Khamenei
- Mostafa Khomeini
- Mustafa Mohami
- Mostafa Mohaghegh Damad
- Mostafa Mousavi Faraz
- Mostafa Pourmohammadi
- Mustafa Tabataba’inejhad
- Mustafa Ulama
- Mustafa Zu al-Qadir
- Moslem Malakouti
- Motahar Kazimi
- Nasir Hosseini
- Nasrollah Pejmanfar
- Nasrallah Shah-Abadi
- Naser Makarem Shirazi
- Seyed Naser Mousavi Largani
- Nasser Mousavi
- Nasser Qawami
- Nematollah Salehi Najafabadi
- Nourallah Tabresi
- Qasem Ravanbakhsh
- Mir Ghesmat Mosavi Asl
- Ghodratollah Alikhani
- Qodratallah Najafi
- Qodratallah Nazari Nia
- Ghorbanali Dorri-Najafabadi
- Qorban Ali Qandahari
- Rahim Tavakol
- Rasoul Fallahati Gilani
- Rasul Jafarian
- Rasoul Montajabnia
- Reza Akrami
- Seyed Reza Bahaadini
- Reza Hosseini Nassab
- Reza Mohammadi Langroudi
- Reza Nouri
- Reza Ostadi
- Reza Ramezani Gilani
- Reza Taqvi
- Ruhollah Beigi
- Ruhollah Hosseinian
- Ruhollah Khatami
- Ruhollah Khomeini
- Ruhallah Sadr al-Sadati
- Sabir Jabbari
- Sadeq Larijani
- Sadiq Tabataba’inejhad
- Saied Reza Ameli
- Seyed Sajjad Izdehi
- Salman Zakir
- Shahab al-Din Ishraqi
- Shahab ud-Din Mar'ashi Najafi
- Shams al-Din Mohammad Mujatahidi Najafi
- Sharaf al-Din Malek Hussayni
- Sirajaddin Mousavi
- Taha Hashemi
- Taher Ahmadzadeh
- Taqi Tabatabaei Qomi
- Teymour Ali Asgari
- Wahid Ahmadi
- Yadollah Duzduzani
- Yahya Ansari Shirazi
- Yahya Nouri
- Yasubedin Rastegar Jooybari
- Younis Mousavi Sarcheshmeh
- Yousef Madani Tabrizi
- Yousef Saanei
- Yousef Tabatabai Nejad
- Zakrallah Ahmadi
- Zaynolabideen Ghorbani
Iraq
- Abbas Modaresi Yazdi
- Abdul Aziz al-Hakim
- Abd al-Hadi al-Fadli
- Abdul Mahdi al-Karbalai
- Abdul-Satar al-Bahadli
- Abu al-Hassan al-Gharifi
- Ahmed Al-Waeli
- Ahmad Hassani Baghdadi
- Akram al-Kaabi
- Al-Sayyed Riyadh Al-Hakeem
- Ali al-Hakim
- Ali al-Milani
- Ali Hassani Baghdadi
- Allaedin Ghoraifi
- Ammar al-Hakim
- Baqir al-Irawani
- Baqir Sharif al-Qurashi
- Fadhil al-Milani
- Fazel Maleki
- Hamid Rashid Ma’aleh
- Hassan al-Qazwini
- Hassan al-Shirazi
- Husham Al-Husainy
- Hussein Al-Sadr
- Hussein al-Shirazi
- Iyad Jamal Al-Din
- Jafar al-Hakim
- Jalal al-Din Ali al-Saghir
- Jawad al-Khalesi
- Kamal al-Haydari
- Kazem al-Haeri
- Mohammad al-Sadr
- Muhammad Ali al-Hakim
- Mohammad Ali Shirazi
- Mohammad Ali Tabatabaei Hassani
- Mohammad Baqir al-Hakim
- Mohammad Baqir al-Sadr
- Mohammad Hadi al-Milani
- Mohammad Ebrahim Ansari
- Mohammed Kadhim al-Qazwini
- Muhammad Saeed al-Hakim
- Mohammad al-Shirazi
- Mohammad Taher Khaqani
- Mohammad Taqi al-Mawla
- Mohammad Yaqoobi
- Muhsin al-Hakim
- Mujtaba al-Shirazi
- Murtadha al-Qazwini
- Murtadha al-Shirazi
- Moustafa Al-Qazwini
- Qais Khazali
- Qasem Taei
- Sadiq al-Shirazi
- Saleh Taei
- Shamsodin Vaezi
Kuwait
Lebanon
- Abbas al-Musawi
- Abdel Karim Obeid
- Ali Al-Kourani
- Hashim Safi Al Din
- Hassan Nasrallah
- Hossein Korani Ameli
- Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah
- Mohammad Mehdi Shamseddine
- Mohammad Yazbek
- Musa al-Sadr
- Naim Qassem
- Ragheb Harb
- Subhi al-Tufayli
Nigeria
Pakistan
- Syed Ali Raza Rizvi
- Syed Ali Naqi Naqvi Qumi
- Arif Hussain Hussaini
- Allama Rasheed Turabi
- Allama Aqeel Turabi
- Bashir Hussain Najafi
- Agha Syed Hamid Ali Shah Moosavi
- Hafiz Riaz Hussain Najafi
- Hassan Raza Ghadeeri
- Allama Hassan Turabi
- Jawad Naqvi
- Muhammad Hussain Najafi
- Muhammad Latif Ansari
- Nasir al-Din Nasir Hunzai
- Syed Safdar Hussain Najafi
- Syed Sajid Ali Naqvi
- Talib Jauhari
- Zeeshan Haider Jawadi
Saudi Arabia
Historical scholars
See also
Notes
- ^ a b c d e f g Momen, An Introduction to Shi'i Islam, 1985, p.203
- ^ Momen, An Introduction to Shi'i Islam, 1985, p.127, 204
- ^ a b c Momen, An Introduction to Shi'i Islam, 1985, p.204
- ^ "The Importance of Ijtihad and Taqlid". Shah e Mardan. Archived from the original on 17 December 2012. Retrieved 26 February 2014.
- ^ Momen, An Introduction to Shi'i Islam, 1985, p.205
- ^ Qasim Zaman, Muhammad (2010). "11. Epilogue: Competing Conceptions of Religious Education". Schooling Islam: The Culture and Politics of Modern Muslim. Princeton University Press. p. 242. Retrieved 4 September 2023.
- ^ a b c d Momen, An Introduction to Shi'i Islam, 1985, p.200
- ^ Momen, An Introduction to Shi'i Islam, 1985, p.202-3
- ^ Momen, An Introduction to Shi'i Islam, 1985, p.202
- ^ a b Momen, An Introduction to Shi'i Islam, 1985, p.205-6
- ^ Algar 1987
- ^ a b c Momen 1985, p. 205–206
- ^ a b c d Momen 2015, p. 178
- ^ Fischer, Michael M. J. (1980). Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution. Harvard University Press]. p. 2016. ISBN 9780674466159.
- ^ Skocpol, Teda. "Rentier state and Shi'a Islam in the Iranian Revolution (Chapter 10) - Social Revolutions in the Modern World". Cambridge Core. Retrieved 2017-06-24.
References
- Algar, Hamid (18 August 2011) [15 December 1987]. "ĀyatallāH". In Yarshater, Ehsan (ed.). Encyclopædia Iranica. Fasc. 2. Vol. III (Online ed.). New York, NY: Bibliotheca Persica Press. p. 133.
- Fischer, Michael M. J. (1980). Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution. Harvard University Press]. p. 2016. ISBN 9780674466159.
- Religion and Politics in Iraq. Shiite Clerics between Quietism and Resistance, M. Ismail Marcinkowski (ISBN 9971-77-513-1).
- Momen, Moojan (1985). An Introduction to Shi'i Islam. New Haven, CT; London, England: Yale University Press. ISBN 0300035314.
- Momen, Moojan (2015), Shi'I Islam: A Beginner's Guide, Oneworld Publications, ISBN 9781780747880