**Resolvability criterion** can refer to any voting system criterion that ensures a low possibility of tie votes.

- In Nicolaus Tideman's version of the criterion, for every (possibly tied) winner in a result, there must exist a way for one added vote to make that winner unique.
- Douglas R. Woodall's version requires that the proportion of profiles giving a tie approaches zero as the number of voters increases toward infinity.

Methods that satisfy both versions include approval voting, range voting, Borda count, instant-runoff voting, minimax Condorcet, plurality, Tideman's ranked pairs,^{[1]} and Schulze.^{[2]}

Methods that violate both versions include Copeland's method and the Slater rule.^{[citation needed]}

## References

**^**"Proof MAM is resolvable and reasonably deterministic".*alumnus.caltech.edu*. Retrieved 2018-07-21.**^**Schulze, Markus (3 March 2017). "A New Monotonic, Clone-Independent, Reversal Symmetric, and Condorcet-Consistent Single-Winner Election Method" (PDF).