Presidents of the Regional Government of the Azores

Transcription

>> Just before I start, first of all, can everyone hear me? [ Inaudible Remark ] >> Excellent. Before I start, let me give you an academic health warning. And what I'm gonna cover today is really the tip of the iceberg. This is a very complicated story where the context of the story, the setting of the story is almost as important as the events which took place themselves. And in order to understand the context or the setting, we have to go through a number of different stages looking at various different things from Spain to the role of the Catholic Church and various other things connected with Portugal. Okay. So hopefully we'll be able to go through that. I'm gonna focus mainly on the period between 1940 to 1942. The reason I'm doing this is partly for time, but also this period was the time when in Lisbon things were not fully organized. This wasn't unexpected development to the Portuguese which took them by surprise. And the response took more or less 2 years to be fully systematic and to understand obviously as the war went on, the demand to try and escape out of Europe from the horrors of the Nazis through to Lisbon grew. But as they came to Lisbon, the systems of which they came into Lisbon were much better organized in a much more systematic way. So I'm gonna focus mainly on the period when the refugee crisis started in the summer of 1940 and go up until 1942, start of 1942. [Inaudible] learned of the outbreak of World War II from the morning papers which contain the latest proclamation from the Portuguese authoritarian government. The government warned that while the seat of war was distant, it could not be a matter of indifference to Portugal. It went on to caution that the country could not expect to escape the reactions of a long terrible war and the government called upon the population to bear with fortitude the inevitable sacrifices and difficulties that lay ahead. Of greater significance, however, was the confirmation that despite defense obligations of an ancient alliance with England which the government claimed that it had no wish to refrain from confirming at so grave a moment, it did not oblige the country to abandon his position of neutrality. The statement itself did not amount to a formal declaration of neutrality but its intent was clear for all to see. The government in Lisbon hoped to quietly sit out the war. Almost overnight, however, Lisbon and Portugal became one of the major centers of world affairs. Its geographical position, its excellent shipping facilities for traffic to the Mediterranean and to the north and south of America, the strategic importance of the Azores islands and the Portuguese colonies in Africa and the far east, and the existence in Portugal of raw materials such as [inaudible] gave Lisbon and Portugal a sudden importance to the plans of both sides in the war. Naturally, all this importance had a downside. If Portugal did not keep each side of the war happy, there was a real chance of having economic sanctions imposed against it by the Allied Powers and of invasion by the Germans possibly with the help of Spanish. Demand which struggle to deal with Portugal's problems prior to the war and was some success now face the difficult job of trying to navigate his country through the complexities of World War II. Portugal's leader Dr. Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, who one British official described as the most physically beautiful of all European dictators, sat alone in his sparsely furnished office in the prime minister's residence behind the magnificent Palacio de Sao Bento assessing the situation, the international situation on a daily basis. A man hugely dedicated to his job and his country, Salazar was determined that his carefully crafted policy of neutrality would save the nation and the Portuguese empire from the horrors of war. At the start of the war, Salazar served as the president of the council, the prime minister, a position that he'd held since 1932. He was however, no primus inter pares prime minister. He also held the cabinet portfolios of minister of war, minister of foreign affairs, and minister of finance. In this respect, his style of rule resembled more that of Benito Mussolini of Italy than General Francisco Franco of Spain who never held a ministry. Political power as a result was almost totally centralized in Salazar's hands whose love of detail, ability to work long hours and apparent lack of interest in the social life or family allowed him to deal personally and directly with issues that other leaders would have delegated to their lieutenants. 1940, summer, as you know, France falls. Many thousands of refugees that arrived in Lisbon during the long hot summer of 1940 had fled Paris and traveled to the south of France and through Spain and across Portugal. As Arthur Koestler, the right to put it, Lisbon was the best bottleneck of Europe, the last open gate of a concentration camp extending over the greater part of the continent surface. By watching that [inaudible] possession, one realized that the catalogue of possible reasons for persecution under the new order was much longer than any specialist could imagine. Of the original refugees, many if not the majority were Jewish and were looking to collect the relevant and complex paper work needed to get to United States or Palestine. A large number of the Jewish refugees were wealthy, former residence of Paris and the surrounding areas and were using their funds the best way they could to secure their onward passage. Other refugees were less financially well off, particularly those of Eastern Europe, and needed support from the Portuguese authorities and the British. Nearly all the refugees had in common was the weight. Once in Lisbon, nothing happened quickly. Both the American consulate and the British embassy were initially hugely understaffed to deal with the number of the influx of refugees coming to Lisbon. The completion of paperwork and gathering of the correct stamps and passports all took time. On top of this, transport arrangements had to be arranged for the limited number of places on ships going to United States or other destinations. Among the refugees were royalty, many famous artists, all who had to experience the uncertainties of Lisbon life for a few difficult months. The refugee crisis equipped Lisbon in the summer of 1940 was largely caused by the actions of one man. Aristides de Sousa Mendes, the Portuguese consul in Bordeaux, like Salazar, Aristides de Sousa Mendes has graduated in law from Coimbra University. He was a son of a highly regarded court judge in the center of the country and was considered to be from a moderately aristocratic family. He enjoyed a relatively poorer diplomatic career. His career was overshadowed by his twin brother Cesar who had served as Salazar's first minister of foreign affairs. In June 1940, thousands of refugees had gathered in Bordeaux in the hope of fleeing the German advance through France. With the fall of Paris, Bordeaux had become the temporary capital of France. It was from Bordeaux that on the morning of the 17th of June 1940 that Charles de Gaulle climbed aboard a small plane and left the country with his, Winston Churchill put it, carrying the honor of France. In his cramped office in this first floor building in the center of Bordeaux, Aristides de Sousa Mendes was working long days and nights issuing transit visas to refugees who had been waiting several days in order to get the correct paperwork. In the middle of June, the situation in Bordeaux had become chaotic. Soldiers were imposing discipline and order on the cues of increasingly desperate people. According to his nephew, Sousa Mendes became ill, exhausted and had to lie down. At this point, he considered what to do and whether he should enforce the strict criteria of visas imposed by Salazar and the ministry of foreign affairs in Lisbon regarding who should be allowed to enter Portugal and who not. Eventually, he decided to abandon this policy and to issue visas to anyone over a period of time. The previous year on the 13th of November 1939, Sousa Mendes like all other Portuguese consuls around the world, had received a circular from the Portuguese foreign ministry known as Circular 14 which for the first time introduced a racial or religious criteria to the question of temporary immigration to Portugal. >> Circular 14 instructed the consuls that any stateless person or Jew would need to have their case directly referred to the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Sousa Mendes noted that the new process would have been difficult to implement at the best of times. But given the situation in Portugal in 1940 and in Europe in general, it made from possible delays. He was also aware that the foreign ministry was turning down nearly all requests by Jews for visas to enter Portugal. Eventually, with the help of a team of helpers, he understood that if he failed at-- these people would simply not get out of Europe. Circular 14 itself was not issued out of thin air, throughout the 1930s that the dictatorship had made efforts to erect barriers to stop any refugees staying in Portugal. This type of action was not unique to Portugal but with the country's limited economic means, it was viewed as necessary. Refugees who did manage to enter Portugal during this time were generally not treated badly. Efforts were made to house them-- tourist areas away from Lisbon, but with limited means, the country was not able to support the outside parties to do much. Put simply, during this period, it was primarily economic constraints that made the Portuguese reluctant to accept more refugees. Those who did come were not allowed to enter the Portuguese jobs market nor were they able to claim any state benefits that were open to the Portuguese. When the story of Aristides de Sousa Mendes started to become public during the 1960s, original estimates were put at the number of visas that they issued at around 30,000. On the basis of these numbers, Sousa Mendes came to be known as the Portuguese version of Raoul Wallenberg who saved 100,000 Jews in Hungary between 1944 to '45 approximately. However, for a number of reasons, this comparison is not particularly valid and I'll explain why. The number of 30,000 refugees that Sousa Mendes was sort of said has been widely quoted by both journalistic and academic sources. The real number, however, is considerably lower. The report of the Portuguese secret police, the PVDE who are responsible for controlling Portugal's orders indicates a much lower number. The PVD report for 1940 puts the numbers as follows, entry by land to Portugal, 30,854; by sea, 6,800; by air, 5,843 making a total of 43,540. Exits, peoples leaving come to a total of 36,000 leaving 6,000 who are still there. So according to the records of the consulate in Bordeaux, the actual number of visas granted by Sousa de Mendes between the 1st of January and the 22nd of June when he was recalled to Lisbon, was only 2,862. The majority of these visas, 1,500 were granted between the 11th and 22nd of June. In terms of the number of Jews amongst this group, it is clear that according to official estimates of Jewish rescue groups operating in Lisbon during the 2nd half of 1940, some 1,500 Jews came to Portugal without onward visas and they subsequently sailed from Lisbon. To this figure, you have to add those Jews who are able to make their own transport arrangements to the city and will not dependent on the rescue groups operating there. Even allowing for this figure, there was a massive gap between reality and the actual number that Sousa Mendes saved. And it was clear that the 30,000 figure has become something of an exaggeration. However, that said, most of the Jews who did escape through France in summer of 1940 clearly did so was the work of Sousa Mendes. And therefore perhaps it's better if we describe as a Wallenberg light. In Portugal, his work and such as his fame now that when the RTP, the state broadcaster ran it's equivalent [foreign language] which was the equivalent of the same, the similar BBC program, The Greatest Briton, Aristides de Sousa Mendes was voted the third greatest Portuguese person of all time as Antonio Oliveira de Salazar was number 1. >> Yeah. >> Whatever the real number of refugees, Salazar was furious with Mendes Sousa for his insubordination. He ordered his immediate recall back to Lisbon where disciplinary procedures were soon started against him. In truth, Salazar's anger was based on 2 points, number 1, the insubordination itself and the timing of-- and number 2, the timing of Sousa Mendes' actions. From Salazar's perspective, the first reason was not difficult to comprehend. Sousa Mendes had worked independently of the fore-- the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs when it should not be forgotten that Sir Salazar was the serving minister. He'd clearly not followed the rules for the granting of visas as outlined clearly in Circular 14 and his actions had huge repercussions for Lisbon which would have to house the refugees before their onward passage on the limited number of ships that could be arranged. Portugal should be remembered, remain the country of limited economic means that despite marked improvements that had taken place, still was one of the first in Europe. Many of the refugees that arrived in Lisbon had limited financial means and many of-- many-- much of their money had been taken up already paying for transportation and their money [inaudible] went to Lisbon on hotel and bureaucratic charges. The timing of Sousa Mendes' action caused enormous problems to Salazar and has carefully planned attempt to preserve Portuguese neutrality for duration of the war. Salazar believed that in order to achieve this key policy goal, he needed to personally retain sole control over all areas and aspects of foreign policy. Indeed the consul's action led directly to a major increase in diplomatic tensions between Portugal and Spain, had a key juncture in the war. It was a German army on the French-Spanish border. Pressure was increasing from the Germans on General Franco to join the war on the Axis side. Mussolini had already joined battle with the Italians on the [inaudible] side and was a sense that not only Portugal's neutrality but also its very independence was in great peril. The actions of Sousa Mendes led directly displaying cross the-- closing its border with France. And as one Spanish official suggested, that the Germans might well choose to go after the refugees and to Spain and Portugal. The careful strategy of Salazar and the British are trying to induce finance-- General Franco of Spain economically and politically to stay out the war. It was in the eyes of Salazar being jeopardized by the actions of his lone [inaudible] diplomat. The Portuguese Ambassador to Spain, Pedro Teotonio Pereira reported Salazar that situation on the boarder was truly distressing and there was a chance that the Germans would force Spain to join the war and subsequently come into Portugal. June 2nd, 1940, Salazar ordered that Sousa Mendes return immediately to Lisbon and on the 4th of July, the disciplinary hearings against him started. Aristides de Sousa [inaudible] white-haired and well dressed man, he was rarely seen without his gray spots, defended himself at the inquiry at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The evidence against him was complex and was based on a number of factors. This was not his first brush with the foreign office or indeed Salazar. The diary of Salazar of 13th of January 1935 actually notes there was an ongoing investigation into the affairs Aristides de Sousa Mendes over budgets being sent to Portugal. The investigations sent upon a delay in sending funds to Lisbon when he had served as a consul in Antwerp. In January 1940 earlier in the year while serving in Bordeaux, Sousa Mendes had been warned about his conduct in issuing visas to foreigners against the regulation issued in Lisbon. The final straw for Salazar possibly came in the form of a written protest from the British embassy in Lisbon which complained by an alleged special attacks being charged by the Portuguese consul in Bordeaux in the name of charity. More specifically, the ambassador was instructed by the foreign office in London to complain about the opening hours of the Portuguese consulate in Bordeaux and the fact that [inaudible] visas were being charged for. And the British alleged that at least on one occasion, a British subject had been asked to pay tax to a Portuguese charity before the visa application had been signed. Though other cases against Sousa Mendes as well, there was a case from San Francisco in 1923. Overall, of the 15 allegations against him, the key allegation of course focused on his issuing the visas for finance. Sousa Mendes denied all the charges. He denied the fact that he asked for money except only on one occasion when a member of the [inaudible] family had demanded to be served on that particular day and it was a Sunday, and so therefore there was a special charge made. >> And he also denied issuing anything for Portuguese charities and he accepted the charge but the embassy at state open outside normal hours because he argued the [inaudible] for so long, what could I possibly do? In the end, the committee ruled that Sousa Mendes was guilty and that he should be barred from the diplomatic service for between 30 to 180 days, was the subsequent loss of pay. This was overturned personally by Salazar who issued another decree stating that he would be retained in the service without working for 6 months and after that, he would be effectively kicked out. It would be the end, it was the end of his diplomatic career. Aristides de Sousa Mendes appealed against decision, and for the next 10 years, both himself and his family spent the time trying to clear his name but without any success. Salazar refused to even comment on the issue and made no official-- no official statement about it. So, of the Jews who were escaping-- as time is short, I'm gonna have to flick through this quite quickly. Let me just give you some key personalities. Moses [inaudible] was the head of the permanent Jewish community in Lisbon. Why was he significant? Well, he was significant in different ways. But his most significance was that he was very close personally to Antonio de Oliveira Salazar. And often when the Jewish refugees were stopped on the border, he would have to personally intervene with the PVDE, the Portuguese secret police in order to allow them or try and make a case for them to be able to enter the country. Sometimes he was successful, other times he was not. The major problem people had in trying to enter Portugal at that time was related to the fact that their documents for leaving France often did not coincide with the expiry date of their documents for entering Portugal. So by the time they left France, their visa, their transit visa to come through Portugal had expired. So either, in some cases, they tried to forge the date on it and they were caught. Or in other times, people like Moses [inaudible] had to try and negotiate extension with the Portuguese police. Sometimes this involved [inaudible] changing hands and other times it was simply done as an active charity by the police. Much of the network that was coming to Lisbon came from this man here [inaudible] who was responsible initially between 1940 and 1942 for getting out a number of Jewish intellectuals and artists, people such as Peggy Guggenheim, the artist Marc Chagall all came throughout through his network as did [inaudible] as well. There were a number of people who came out who he was very responsible for bringing them out. And if I had more time, I would go on. The refugees arrived in Lisbon at an incredibly strange time while the rest of Europe was fighting. The Portuguese had planned for years to hold a huge exhibition, something like a modern day expo exhibition which took place down exactly in the area where the refugees were trying to leave the country. So here they were trying to get on to ships and there was this huge exhibition, something in the region of about a square kilometer which was going on. If you look up there to the right you'll see [inaudible] at night during the war. [Inaudible] was the center square in Portugal. It was a square where the majority of refugees hang out in the cafes. It's where they were being watched by the Portuguese secret police. There were a number of cafes around the square. And that is where when you read accounts of Lisbon during the war such as Arthur Koestler's arrival and departure. This is the area that he's essentially writing about. And there again you see it. When you read accounts of the refugees, the one thing that struck them when they first arrived in Portugal in Lisbon was the precursor lights. While the lights were going out all over Europe, blackout, Lisbon continued to be beautifully lit at night with white lights. And just a final point before I conclude, the refugees, particularly the wealthy refugees stayed in hotels, major hotels, the [inaudible] were Hotel [inaudible] in Estoril and the Hotel Aviz in Lisbon. These hotels were hotels that were used by both Germans and British. So often the refugees would be having breakfast in the morning next to the German intelligence officer. I mean it was a strange situation where it's very, very open. And contact between both sides, the British and the Germans was very direct. But this was the context that the refugees were coming into. If I had more time, I could go on and describe some of the experience of the refugees which I hope to do. But as time is short, I'm just gonna go through and show you some visuals. This was the clipper [phonetic], this is what every refugees dream was, was to get a place on the clipper. So, very wealthy refugees, the clipper flew from Lisbon to New York. It flew twice a week, luxurious airliner obviously taking off in the sea. The man, the British were responsible for organizing the initial dealing with the refugees. And when you read the book, I hope that when you read the book, you will notice that the British object initially to any Jewish organizations working out of Lisbon. They object to any rescued groups going to work in Lisbon to deal with the Jewish refugees. The foreign office advises Salazar that he should not allow these groups to operate in Lisbon. Salazar rejects their advice and these groups do actually start to take part. These are pictures here from the US Holocaust Memorial Museum, refugees waiting to embark on the ships, it was chaotic, noisy. Again, here you see another group here waiting. These two pictures are of-- there were 3 major groups of children who got out [inaudible] some saying I think it was just over 300 people. There would have been a lot more but because of the problem I just described, it was the visas running out and the transit visas in Lisbon not corresponding with other visas. Lots of these children unfortunately didn't make it to Lisbon. But 3 groups did get out. Each group was run about just over, just over a hundred. And here you can see them. They are posing for a photograph. Again, this is at the docks. That is-- this is the departure of them there. This is another group arriving at the railway station at Santa Apolonia in Lisbon. This is what everyone really wanted to get on the left which was a first class ticket on the boat. On the right we see a telegram confirming that 111 children have been rescued on the ship. And the picture on the left are the various members of the Jewish welfare organizations of operating in Lisbon enjoying a banquet together. And the picture on the right are a group refugees about to board Portuguese ship. Again, here you see other pictures of waiting and waiting to get on a ship. And finally, this is a picture of the director of the American Joint Distribution Committee. There were mainly 3 ships that we used and the most famous was Serpa Pinto. And the final point if I can make, even once you are on the ship your ordeal might not be over. In 1944, the German U-boat stopped the ship in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean. It pulled all the passengers off the ship claiming there was an illegal cargo on, made them go into the lifeboats where they waited for 3 hours before the Germans got orders from Berlin whether or not to sink the ship. >> Eventually, the order came not to sink the ship, it was a mutual ship. And they put the passengers back on and they were allowed to go on their way. Unfortunately, 1, possibly 2 people died while remounting the ship doing different accounts of this in different sources. I hope to say more to you today, but as time is very short, this is just a very basic outline of the story. There are many, many other factors which affected the refugees in Lisbon. You need to look at areas such as [inaudible] and you need to also look at hugely at the role of the Catholic Church in Portugal as well. But for there, I'll stop and give you some time to ask questions. [ Applause ] [ Noise ] >> Thanks very much Neil [phonetic] for a wonderful and informative view of a slice of history. Do we have any questions? Do we have-- yes, I got a question here. I'll start straight off? >> What was Franco [inaudible] having the refugees going through his country? And two, what was the attitude of the Catholic Church which must have been very strong in Portugal at that time to the refugees coming in? >> It's a good question, the attitude of Franco was horror. He did not want the refugees coming through Spain. If they were coming through, they would give them very tight schedules as to how long they could spend in Spain. Franco attitude, Franco and his [inaudible] attitude towards Jews in general was much more anti-Semitic than Salazar. When you look at his attitude prior to Second World War, it was much less favorable in the Portuguese. He saw it as potentially allowing the Germans an excuse to apply more pressure on him as well. So for him, it was something that he wished to stop and he put a lot of pressure on Salazar to-- if Salazar was going to allow this to happen, that they must come through Spain very, very quickly and not be allowed to stopped. They were put on trains and their first stop was basically at the Portuguese border. [ Inaudible Remark ] >> Yes. Actually the Catholic Church was much more and Portugal was very complicated. On the one level, they were acting on a humanitarian level. On the other level, they initially when the refugees came, there were some concerns as to the impact they might have in Portugal. But once they understood that refugees are gonna be there for a very short period of time and the Catholic Church applied pressure on Salazar to be much more humanitarian, to allow the refugees to come, to effectively bend the rules, the bureaucratic rules to help them as much as possible. >> Good, any questions over here? Yes. >> What was the rationale of Sir Ronald Campbell in trying to persuade the authorities [inaudible]? >> His rationale was quite simple. He sort of gave the Germans an excuse to effectively, a propaganda victory. At the time, Britain and Germany were competing within Portugal for influence. And Campbell felt the Germans would use this as an excuse to stir things up and possibly to try to make an attempt to, well, certainly to make an attempt to try and turn many Portuguese people against Britain. It was-- that was his basis. He was looking at the picture of the whole war rather than anything else. Initially, I thought it might have been something to do with Palestine. But from what I can figure out, that was a kind of irrelevant at that time. >> Was there somewhat of a similar question, does the historical perspective show that Salazar's reluctance to allow these immigrants because it would compromise the neutrality of Portugal turn out to be irrational or was that really a well founded apprehension? >> Salazar's rational was two fold. One, it was based on what you've just said that he believed that the Germans would possibly use it as an excuse. There was, at that time, there were a lot of different factors involved. So that was certainly one, one factor in it but I'm not sure if it was the only factor. But certainly, there was an additional internal factor as well which was Salazar, he wasn't sure initially who these people were. The secret police were telling him lots of these people were communists. In Portugal, the communists were the major opposition to Salazar at that time. So he feared all of a sudden, all these communists coming into the country. Would they make connections with the local communists and would this lead to civil, civil dispute. So there was a huge internal element as well. >> But I think we got time for one more question. Do we have one more question? Yes, I have one here. >> Yes, it's just the question about de Sousa Mendes. Did he have any personal reason to do what he did or was there a story or a diary that he left? >> He claims that he acted out of humanitarian motivation. When he defended himself with against the tribunal, he argued that he was trying to repair some of the damage for Portugal's difficult past with the Jews. The charge against him which was never really made but was always in the background was the fact that he had 13 children and therefore financially, he needed to attract funds above and beyond his salary to pay for his family. So that the tribunal argued somewhat that he was looking for financial gain whereas his arguments was that he'd acted simply out of humanitarian good. And he also argued with Salazar that this had done Portugal a lot of good because it got a lot of good publicity in the world. Portugal was seen as a caring Christian country trying to absorb these people and help them. >> Well, 13 children, he'd been busy. [ Laughter ] >> Thank you so much, Neil. That was a really wonderful presentation. Please, thank you. [ Applause ]