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Militia (United States)

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The U.S. ideal of the citizen soldier, in the militia, depicted by The Concord Minute Man of 1775, a monument created by Daniel Chester French and erected in 1875, in Concord, Massachusetts.
The U.S. ideal of the citizen soldier, in the militia, depicted by The Concord Minute Man of 1775, a monument created by Daniel Chester French and erected in 1875, in Concord, Massachusetts.

The militia of the United States, as defined by the U.S. Congress, has changed over time.[1]

During colonial America, all able-bodied men of certain ages were members of the militia.[2] Individual towns formed local independent militias for their own defense.[3] The year before the US Constitution was ratified, The Federalist Papers detailed the founders' vision of the militia.[4][5] The new Constitution empowered Congress to "organize, arm, and discipline" this national military force, leaving significant control in the hands of each state government.[6][7]

Today, as defined by the Militia Act of 1903, the term "militia" is primarily used to describe two groups within the United States:

There is a third militia that is widely unknown to most. This militia is called a state defense force.They are authorized by state and federal laws.[10]

YouTube Encyclopedic

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  • One of America's Most Notorious Militias


[MUSIC - I'M IN YOU, "HERE COMES THE WAR"] THOMAS MORTON: If there's anybody more excited about the impending '90s revival than us and Mudhoney frontman Mark Arm, it is the militia movement. Born out of the baby-ridden ashes of Waco and Ruby Ridge, groups of armed citizens, like the Tri-States Militia of South Dakota and Norm Olson's Michigan Militia, coalesced to the delight of hack TV reporters and editorial cartoonists worldwide. Though their depiction in the media typically ranged from hey, look at these kooky anti-government gun nuts to hey, look at these kooky anti-government racists, the movement's numbers grew and grew. They were even making inroads into mainstream politics until Tim McVeigh pulled off the ultimate PR coup by blowing up 149 people and 19 children in Oklahoma City. Plagued by its association with the attack, the militia movement foundered, and as one of its most visible groups, the Michigan Militia bore the brunt of the shit storm. There were allegations that the Nichols brothers and McVeigh were members, brow-beatings at the hands of congressional pantywaists like Arlen Specter, and lively infighting by militia members upset over the leadership's alternative hypothesis for the bombing. The militia disbanded in the early '00s, and founders Norm Olson and Ray Southwell left Michigan for Alaska. While this seemed like the sad but likely end to their endeavor, according to a Homeland Security report earlier this year, militia activity, like ketamine and Docs with shorts, is once again on the hot list. And Norm and Ray are gearing up to hit the reunion circuit. RAY SOUTHWELL: How're you doing? THOMAS MORTON: Thomas. RAY SOUTHWELL: Thomas. THOMAS MORTON: How are you doing? RAY SOUTHWELL: Fine, fine. You're from the VBS TV, huh? THOMAS MORTON: Yes. RAY SOUTHWELL: Well, come on in. We've got a lot to talk about here. THOMAS MORTON: [LAUGHTER]. RAY SOUTHWELL: [INAUDIBLE]. THOMAS MORTON: Hi, I'm in Nikiski, Alaska, on the Kenai Peninsula with Norman Olson and Ray Southwell, formally of the Michigan Militia. Currently of the Alaska Militia. NORMAN OLSON: Hi, I'm Norman Olson, and a longtime proponent of the Constitution. 20-year-plus military veteran. Standing by the red, white, and blue, no matter what happens. And telling it like it is. Michigan Militia from the very beginning. This goes back to, let's see. Dates-- oh, 1994. Started the little militia in-- in fact, this one goes back even earlier than that. "Patriots gather to rail against the 'New World Order.'" My, were we young then, huh? Year number one was what was called Operation Visibility. We knew that we had to become visible. If we didn't maintain our visibility, we couldn't maintain our legitimacy. It's so important that if you believe in what you're doing is right, you've got to stand up and make yourself visible. Look at that mean look on that man's face. Oh, boy. But we were just regulars, trying to point out that we're not the terrorists. We're counter-terrorists. We're going to stop those people that are destroying America. RAY SOUTHWELL: What we've always done with our militia-- and this is what people don't understand, again-- militias command information. So I may be a commander. My job is not to give you orders. My job as a commander is to give you information so that you sort that out in your own conscience and decide what action you should take. The army is command control. You're my soldier, I'm going to give you an order, and you better carry it out. An example, when you go back to the Revolutionary War, Washington had a heck of a time when the militia would show up. The militia was not command control. If these guys got there and they looked at that battlefield and they decided, this is not a battle worth fighting, they left. That's the way it is today, too. NORMAN OLSON: So we went fast all over the country, starting up militias in every state. Some of our militia training exercises brought in folks from all over the country. But we'd put on these training sessions, dog-and-pony shows, and the media loved that too. They came in from all over the world to see what we were doing, because it never happened before, since 1776, you know, of course. Or 1775, I should say, Lexington and Concord. And we were growing and getting more national exposure. RAY SOUTHWELL: Our goal was to unite these militias. And understand, there's militias all over the country, all over the peninsula, but they're small groups-- five people, ten people. So we networked with each other so we can be a unified force, a protective force, so we don't have to call upon the federal troops or Blackwater. THOMAS MORTON: It's important, it would seem to me, that it'd be as important in times of crisis or impending crisis as it is in times of well-being to have what the Second Amendment describes, which you're talking about-- an unorganized citizens' militia. How do you go about that in times when-- NORMAN OLSON: In times of peace? THOMAS MORTON: Bingo. Of fatness, good-- NORMAN OLSON: Here's the thing. When you put a life preserver on your child and you're going out on a lake, do you do it after? Or do you do it with the perception that something could happen out on the lake? Of course you do. You don't wait for your child to drown. You think ahead. You're frightened of the possible situation. That fear motivates you to do something good. So is the-- RAY SOUTHWELL: Who would you rather trust? Your neighbor, or a stranger? NORMAN OLSON: Yeah. RAY SOUTHWELL: You know, that's-- NORMAN OLSON: And when somebody comes rolling up your driveway, when the lights go out, would you be comforted if you knew it was your neighbors in it, bringing over a generator or bringing over foodstuffs, rather than a big, black SUV coming to take your guns away? Again, to keep the control. So the question is, who will come in to aid us? If we are well-disciplined and well-trained and well-equipped, then we can take care of ourselves, thank you. But you see, the media won't allow that to happen. The media has to spin it so that we are always demonized with misinformation and looked at as the bogeyman running around the woods with our cammies on, rather than people who can help and organize each other. It looks like Mark Farner. You know Mark Farner? THOMAS MORTON: Um, Grand Funk, right? NORMAN OLSON: Yeah, yeah. He's a personal friend of ours. THOMAS MORTON: Oh. Neat. NORMAN OLSON: Yeah, he's a good boy. THOMAS MORTON: Are you guys buddies with the Nuge? NORMAN OLSON: Oh yeah, you betcha. We did a program on the steps of the Capitol with Ted. Ray and I went out to Montana there, we went up to the FBI lines, and I was carrying a teddy bear, and Ray was carrying a Red Cross pack. What we want to do is humanize it, put a human face on it, so that those people wouldn't be bulldozed. Western New York that I helped, they were going to bulldoze his house trailer because it didn't comply with building codes. We went to help this old gentleman, bless his heart. Here's an old fellow that was-- he was a construction worker in Northern Michigan, 87 years old, he and his wife. And they had all this old machinery on their property. Well, the county came out and said it was a blight and they had to remove it all. And so we went out there and faced down the sheriff and fought for him for a long time. The Stitt family. And they lived down a little island in northern Lake Huron, and they were being pushed off the island because they were preparing for Y2K. And they were raising chickens and emus and all sorts of stuff. THOMAS MORTON: Were they trying to grow hemp? NORMAN OLSON: I think so. Now I don't have anything bad to say about marijuana. To me, it's just like alcohol. All things in moderation. I'm a libertarian when it comes to that. Again, it's a human right. If it's a measure of relaxation and enjoyment, then what's the difference between smoking a joint or popping a Quaalude, you know? We went out there to support them. We're always trying to support the little guy, you know? THOMAS MORTON: One thing that's marked a lot of the coverage and, I think, has muddied the waters is trying to overlay many of these issues with kind of racial politics. Mitch-- NORMAN OLSON: Mitch [INAUDIBLE]. He was a Hawaiian. THOMAS MORTON: Ah. NORMAN OLSON: Yeah, yeah. So from the very beginning, we had racial diversity. THOMAS MORTON: Now you guys have referred to the Black Panthers and stuff as a militia-- not necessarily exactly the same as you, but in the same spirit, in its early days. NORMAN OLSON: Whether you sit down with the Black Panthers or you sit down with the Native Americans, I'm sure that we all want the very same thing. RAY SOUTHWELL: So it's not the black community that sees us as racists. It's the ignorant white community, who are so quickly misled by the media. NORMAN OLSON: Who keeps us divided? Remember we were talking about control and power and central government? Of course. It's to the benefit of a central government to keep us divided, to set up these little target groups, marginalizing so that people cannot come together, so that the power cannot be given back to the people. As long as we're squabbling among ourselves, we'll never be able to stand up against tyranny and oppression. We'll be arguing with ourselves while they march us into a trench to machine-gun us. It just doesn't make any sense. Then it happened. Boy, it all hit the fan. I'll tell you what. When Oklahoma City, that event happened, it surprised everyone. I had heard rumors along the Missouri border that there was going to be a bombing against the federal building, either in Tulsa or in Oklahoma City. It was common knowledge. The Feds knew that. They knew it was going to happen. They didn't know where. But when it happened, it surprised everybody in the militia. I remember Leslie Stahl was in the gun shop there when it all happened, and they made the mention of Timothy McVeigh and the brothers, what are their names? RAY SOUTHWELL: Nichols. NORMAN OLSON: Nichols. Terry Nichols. And they linked it with the Michigan Militia. And then it all started to unravel it. We deactivated after seven years and started to go home. Some stayed. Some stayed. People got frightened then, because the media picked up on it and ran with the militia connection, to the extent that the militia, a third of the militia ran and hid. A third of them went underground. Didn't want to be seen, didn't want to be on a list, didn't want to be photographed. Another third just quit the militia altogether. They realized this wasn't paintball in the woods on the weekend. This was life-and-death stuff. And another third became more aggressive, more adamant about standing up against the government, because we saw the conspiracy against it, against what was happening. THOMAS MORTON: Do you think there was ever a possibility that what happened in Oklahoma and as a result of it could have been fully averted? Or was it just-- NORMAN OLSON: Actually, I believe it was the CIA. It sounds crazy. THOMAS MORTON: Well, the CIA's done a lot of crazy things. NORMAN OLSON: Well, listen to me. You know, when you talk about neo-Nazis and skinheads and white supremacists, which McVeigh was closely associated with-- who's funding all of that hatred? And if they could get a stooge like Timothy McVeigh to do that, and Terry Nichols collaborating? But what about the unknown? What about this fellow that went back to Germany? I don't think it'll ever be known, the extra leg they found in the rubble with the military boot on it, that they couldn't match up to anybody. Where did that come from? You don't read about that, but it was there. And so did they know beforehand? Did somebody go in there and set charges? I don't know. But I'm welcome to hear any theory, because that's all I have, is a theory. There's something out there, but I guess Fox Mulder was right. The truth is out there, somewhere. Did the federal government stage the Oklahoma City bombing to bust up the militia because the militia was growing too strong? That could be argued. And history may reveal it. I don't know. We think it did. We think that they had to stop the militia because we were growing so fast across the country that we were threatening to take the power away from the federal government. THOMAS MORTON: Did you personally meet Tim McVeigh before-- NORMAN OLSON: No, not personally. He was downstate. I was up north. I didn't get a chance to meet him. Of course, the federal government did a fine job of proving that Timothy McVeigh was working out of an act of revenge. So when I went up to Washington to testify before the Senate and got into that pissing contest with Arlen Specter, I pointed that out to him. And he couldn't understand how I could understand what was going on in Timothy McVeigh's mind. Well, you don't understand the problem that we've had in Northern Ireland. You don't understand the problem that we've had in South Africa. You do not understand the hatred and retaliation, the retribution and the revenge that has been going on around this globe since time immortal. Then you don't understand the dynamic, sir. ARLEN SPECTER: Well, Mr. Olson, I may not understand. And that's why we've had these hearings, so that you could have a full opportunity to express yourself. NORMAN OLSON: I said well, it'd be about as simple as I slap you, you slap me in retaliation. OK? What don't we understand about that? Of course, we tried to distance ourself from all of that. And we threw the meat in on the other side of the river, claiming the Japanese did it, but what happened was is that took all of the emphasis away from us and headed it in another direction. Kind of dispersed that whole feeling. And fear is strong. THOMAS MORTON: About the theory that the Japanese were retaliating for the sarin gas thing? NORMAN OLSON: No, we didn't have any strong connection. We brought that out-- actually, what it did was it defused the direction we were going. Because we were going headlong into a big confrontation with the Feds. They thought we were all wacky and crazy. But that actually freed us up to go in a different direction at that time, which we needed. And what may be thought of as bad actually worked out good. Today, they laugh at us and make-- but it's a matter of strategic decisions that we made. But things changed after Oklahoma City, changed drastically. And a lot of people fell away. And then Bush came onto the scene and everything got to be nice and the government was seen to be a kind, friendly, benevolent government, ready to help us. But that was just a facade. That was just a cover. They're not there to help us at all. They're there to eke out our substance and to rob us of everything that we have. And take away our power. So power to the people, huh? Our job in Michigan was pretty well done. THOMAS MORTON: Why did you leave Michigan? And why did you pick Alaska? NORMAN OLSON: I often ask people that question. Why did you come to Alaska? I'm always interested where they come from and the reason why. And many people don't really know. Something just drew them. I know that sounds ethereal and all of that, but here's the thing. Alaska is a place, it's a new frontier. I think socially, economically, culturally there is much that appeals to us. We were in Michigan. Michigan, anybody who wants to look at the statistics knows that Michigan is going bottom-up economically. There was nothing there for us, no reason to stay. And people had pretty well lost their desire to stand up. I think the spirit of resistance, the spirit of standing up against the encroaching IRS and federal government intrusion into people's lives had pretty well wasted away their spirit. And so they feel like leaving. We were on the tail-end of that, and seeing it all come about, some of us came up here for new adventures, new opportunities. Others came up here to leave something behind. RAY SOUTHWELL: And it's the last adventure state left in the union, as far as I'm concerned. So I think that was probably the big emphasis on why we moved up. NORMAN OLSON: This one was just from a couple weeks ago, September 16. We are free from individual income tax here. Much of the state is free from sales tax. So there are many, many benefits. THOMAS MORTON: It seems very personal-liberty-oriented, and yet there's some odd spots about it. I think the lack of sheriffs in the entire state-- how do you feel about Alaskan state politics, in that sense? RAY SOUTHWELL: We had an excellent working relationship in Michigan with our sheriff. I met with him on usually a monthly basis to let him know when we were doing training, where we were training. And officially, he could never support us, you know, the politics involved with it. But he publicly came out and told the community through the media that we were doing nothing wrong. So the sheriff, as an elected servant of the people, truly understands how to build that relationship with the people. So we trusted him. NORMAN OLSON: You see, people say, well, we can trust the Alaskan government. Well, I don't know how far Alaska has sold out to the federals for whatever payment is due for all that the federal government has poured into Alaska. There's too many strings attached to a lot of the bailouts and all the rest of it. So I'm always concerned about what liberties and what rights are at risk when we give the promise of safety into the hands of governmental authorities. I like to keep this liberty and this freedom at the lowest level possible-- among the citizens themselves. RAY SOUTHWELL: I think the other part of this area, and probably throughout Alaska, is our independence. And I was talking to one of the local gun dealers. The peninsula has 50,000 people. And this particular one gun dealer is selling 1,000 military arms a month. So in the last month, or last year, he has sold 12,000 firearms to 50,000 people. So you can start seeing those numbers. But what's happening-- NORMAN OLSON: They're upgrading. RAY SOUTHWELL: There's two mindsets, I think, that are out there, is Alaskans' independence. I can take care of myself and my family. I will arm myself and I will prepare for whatever may come, and I'll be ready. The other mindset is I am doing that same issue, but I don't want anybody to know it. It's a secret, because the feds might come and take my guns, or just a tremendous amount of independence, but there's also a tremendous amount of fear. What my fear is is that if and when there's an economic disintegration, there's going to be anarchy all over the country. THOMAS MORTON: Given the rate at which things are going, does it concern you that militia may not be ready? RAY SOUTHWELL: Yes. NORMAN OLSON: Oh, yes. RAY SOUTHWELL: Yeah. Yes. NORMAN OLSON: Too little, too late. RAY SOUTHWELL: Yes. I foresee more anarchy. NORMAN OLSON: We're very vulnerable. RAY SOUTHWELL: Neighbor fighting neighbor for goods. NORMAN OLSON: There's only two extremes-- anarchy and tyranny. I'm concerned that we are not networked. We are not prepared. We are very vulnerable here in Alaska. One road in, one road out. The wise people will prepare for what may be coming, and what we believe will come with economic collapse, with social disruption, with more government intrusion. So all we are doing is being prudent, long-viewed people who are able to read the times, prepare for the worst. It's as simple as that. And we still have some pages to fill. Isn't that optimistic? If nothing else, you know, they say at the end of your life, everything that you own is either going to be put out by the side of the road, auctioned off, or end up in a landfill. The only thing you can leave your children is a legacy of who you were, what you tried to do. If it's a life well spent doing what you think is right, then can't argue with that. Just try and help the little guy, you know? Help the little guy survive. There's a lot of folks out there that are being chewed up by the system and need help. So we just keep on helping, you know? Call us crazy, call us fanatics, call us loons, but don't call us shortsighted. Trying to look far enough ahead to prepare for what's coming. [MUSIC - I'M IN YOU, "HERE COMES THE WAR"]



The term "militia" derives from Old English milite meaning soldiers (plural), militisc meaning military and also classical Latin milit-, miles meaning soldier.

The Modern English term militia dates to the year 1590, with the original meaning now obsolete: "the body of soldiers in the service of a sovereign or a state". Subsequently, since approximately 1665, militia has taken the meaning "a military force raised from the civilian population of a country or region, especially to supplement a regular army in an emergency, frequently as distinguished from mercenaries or professional soldiers".[11]

The spelling of millitia is often observed in written and printed materials from the 17th century through the 19th century.[12][13]

First Muster, Spring 1637, Massachusetts Bay Colony
First Muster, Spring 1637, Massachusetts Bay Colony


Early-mid Colonial era (1607–1754)

See article: Colonial American military history

The early colonists of America considered the militia an important social institution, necessary to provide defense and public safety.[14]

French and Indian War (1754–1763)

See article: Provincial troops in the French and Indian Wars

During the French and Indian Wars, town militia formed a recruiting pool for the Provincial Forces. The legislature of the colony would authorize a certain force level for the season's campaign, based on that set recruitment quotas for each local militia. In theory, militia members could be drafted by lot if there were inadequate forces for the Provincial Regulars; however, the draft was rarely resorted to because provincial regulars were highly paid (more highly paid than their regular British Army counterparts) and rarely engaged in combat.

In September 1755, George Washington, then adjutant-general of the Virginia militia, upon a frustrating and futile attempt to call up the militia to respond to a frontier Indian attack:[15]

... he experienced all the evils of insubordination among the troups, perverseness in the militia, inactivity in the officers, disregard of orders, and reluctance in the civil authorities to render a proper support. And what added to his mortification was, that the laws gave him no power to correct these evils, either by enforcing discipline, or compelling the indolent and refractory to their duty ... The militia system was suited for only to times of peace. It provided for calling out men to repel invasion; but the powers granted for effecting it were so limited, as to be almost inoperative.[15]

See New Hampshire Provincial Regiment for a history of a Provincial unit during the French and Indian War.

Pre-American Revolutionary War era (1763–1775)

Just prior to the American Revolutionary War, on October 26, 1774, the Massachusetts Provincial Congress, observing the British military buildup, deemed their militia resources to be insufficient: the troop strength, "including the sick and absent, amounted to about seventeen thousand men... this was far short of the number wanted, that the council recommended an immediate application to the New England governments to make up the deficiency":[16]

... they recommended to the militia to form themselves into companies of minute-men, who should be equipped and prepared to march at the shortest notice. These minute-men were to consist of one quarter of the whole militia, to be enlisted under the direction of the field-officers, and divide into companies, consisting of at least fifty men each. The privates were to choose their captains and subalterns, and these officers were to form the companies into battalions, and chose the field-officers to command the same. Hence the minute-men became a body distinct from the rest of the militia, and, by being more devoted to military exercises, they acquired skill in the use of arms. More attention than formerly was likewise bestowed on the training and drilling of militia.[16]

American Revolutionary War (1775–1783)

See article: List of United States militia units in the American Revolutionary War

The Battle of Lexington, April 19th, 1775. Blue coated militiamen in the foreground flee from the volley of gunshots from the red coated British Army line in the background with dead and wounded militiamen on the ground.
The Battle of Lexington, April 19th, 1775. Blue coated militiamen in the foreground flee from the volley of gunshots from the red coated British Army line in the background with dead and wounded militiamen on the ground.

The American Revolutionary War began near Boston, Massachusetts with the Battles of Lexington and Concord, in which a group of local militias constituted the American side (the "Patriots"). On April 19, 1775, a British force 800 strong marched out of Boston to Concord intending to destroy patriot arms and ammunition. At 5:00 in the morning at Lexington, they met about 70 armed militiamen whom they ordered to disperse, but the militiamen refused. Firing ensued; it is not clear which side opened fire. This became known as "the shot heard round the world". Eight militiamen were killed and ten wounded, whereupon the remainder took flight. The British continued on to Concord and were unable to find most of the arms and ammunition of the patriots. As the British marched back toward Boston, patriot militiamen assembled along the route, taking cover behind stone walls, and sniped at the British. At Meriam's Corner in Concord, the British columns had to close in to cross a narrow bridge, exposing themselves to concentrated, deadly fire. The British retreat became a rout. It was only with the help of an additional detachment of 900 troops that the British force managed to return to Boston.[17] This marked the beginning of the war. It was "three days after the affair of Lexington and Concord that any movement was made towards embodying a regular army".[18]

In 1777, the Second Continental Congress adopted the Articles of Confederation, which contained a provision for raising a confederal militia that consent would be required from nine of the 13 States. Article VI of the Articles of Confederation states,

... every State shall always keep up a well-regulated and disciplined militia, sufficiently armed and accoutered, and shall provide and constantly have ready for use, in public stores, a due number of field pieces and tents, and a proper quantity of arms, ammunition and camp equipage.

Some militia units appeared without adequate arms, as evidenced in this letter from John Adams to his wife, dated August 26, 1777:

The militia are turning out with great alacrity both in Maryland and Pennsylvania. They are distressed for want of arms. Many have none, we shall rake and scrape enough to do Howe's business, by favor of the Heaven.[19]

The initial enthusiasm of Patriot militiamen in the beginning days of the war soon waned. The historian Garry Wills explains,

The fervor of the early days in the reorganized militias wore off in the long grind of an eight-year war. Now the right to elect their own officers was used to demand that the men not serve away from their state. Men evaded service, bought substitutes to go for them as in the old days, and had to be bribed with higher and higher bounties to join the effort – which is why Jefferson and Samuel Adams called them so expensive. As wartime inflation devalued the currency, other pledges had to be offered, including land grants and the promise of "a healthy slave" at the end of the war. Some men would take a bounty and not show up. Or they would show up for a while, desert, and then, when they felt the need for another bounty, sign up again in a different place. ... This practice was common enough to have its own technical term – "bounty jumping".[20]

The burden of waging war passed to a large extent to the standing army, the Continental Army. The stay-at-home militia tended then to perform the important role of the internal police to keep order. British forces sought to disrupt American communities by instigating slave rebellions and Indian raids. The militia fended off these threats. Militias also spied on Loyalists in the American communities. In Albany County, New York, the militia established a Committee for Detecting and Defeating Conspiracies to look out for and investigate people with suspicious allegiances.[21]

Confederation period (1783–1787)

Politically, the militia was highly popular during the postwar period, though to some extent, based more on pride of victory in the recent war than on the realities.[22] This skepticism of the actual value of relying upon the militia for national defense, versus a trained regular army was expressed by Gouverneur Morris:

An overweening vanity leads the fond many, each man against the conviction of his own heart, to believe or affect to believe, that militia can beat veteran troops in the open field and even play of battle. This idle notion, fed by vaunting demagogues, alarmed us for our country, when in the course of that time and chance, which happen to all, she should be at war with a great power.[23]

Robert Spitzer, citing Daniel Boorstin, describes this political dichotomy of the public popularity of the militia versus the military value:[22]

While the reliance upon militias was politically satisfying, it proved to be an administrative and military nightmare. State detachments could not be easily combined into larger fighting units; soldiers could not be relied on to serve for extended periods, and desertions were common; officers were elected, based on popularity rather than experience or training; discipline and uniformity were almost nonexistent.

General George Washington defended the militia in public, but in correspondence with Congress expressed his opinion of the militia quite to the contrary:

To place any dependence on the Militia, is, assuredly, resting upon a broken staff. Men just dragged from the tender Scenes of domestic life; unaccustomed to the din of Arms; totally unacquainted with every kind of military skill, which being followed by a want of confidence in themselves, when opposed to Troops regularly trained, disciplined, and appointed, superior in knowledge and superior in Arms, makes them timid, and ready to fly from their own shadows ... if I was called upon to declare upon Oath, whether the Militia have been most serviceable or hurtful upon the whole, I should subscribe to the latter.[24]

In Shays' Rebellion, a Massachusetts militia that had been raised as a private army defeated the main Shays site force on February 3, 1787. There was a lack of an institutional response to the uprising, which energized calls to reevaluate the Articles of Confederation and gave strong impetus to the Constitutional Convention which began in May 1787.

At the end of the Revolutionary War, a political atmosphere developed at the local level where the militia was seen with fondness, despite their spotty record on the battlefield. Typically, when the militia did act well was when the battle came into the locale of the militia, and local inhabitants tended to exaggerate the performance of the local militia versus the performance of the Continental Army. The Continental Army was seen as the protector of the States, though it also was viewed as a dominating force over the local communities. Joseph Reed, president of Pennsylvania viewed this jealousy between the militia forces and the standing army as similar to the prior frictions between the militia and the British Regular Army a generation before during the French and Indian War. Tensions came to a head at the end of the war when the Continental Army officers demanded pensions and set up the Society of the Cincinnati to honor their own wartime deeds. The local communities did not want to pay national taxes to cover the Army pensions, when the local militiamen received none.[25]

Constitution and Bill of Rights (1787–1789)

The delegates of the Constitutional Convention (the founding fathers/framers of the United States Constitution) under Article 1; section 8, clauses 15 and 16 of the federal constitution, granted Congress the power to "provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia", as well as, and in distinction to, the power to raise an army and a navy. The US Congress is granted the power to use the militia of the United States for three specific missions, as described in Article 1, section 8, clause 15: "To provide for the calling of the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions." The Militia Act of 1792[26] clarified whom the militia consists of:

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America, in Congress assembled, That each and every free able-bodied white male citizen of the respective States, resident therein, who is or shall be of age of eighteen years, and under the age of forty-five years (except as is herein after excepted) shall severally and respectively be enrolled in the militia, by the Captain or Commanding Officer of the company, within whose bounds such citizen shall reside, and that within twelve months after the passing of this Act.

Civilian control of a peacetime army

At the time of the drafting of the Constitution, and the Bill of Rights, a political sentiment existed in the newly formed United States involving suspicion of peacetime armies not under civilian control. This political belief has been identified as stemming from the memory of the abuses of the standing army of Oliver Cromwell and King James II, in Great Britain in the prior century, which led to the Glorious Revolution and resulted in placing the standing army under the control of Parliament.[27] During the Congressional debates, James Madison discussed how a militia could help defend liberty against tyranny and oppression. (Source I Annals of Congress 434, June 8, 1789) Though during his presidency, after enduring the failures of the militia in the War of 1812, Madison came to favor the maintenance of a strong standing army.

The shift from States' power to Federal power

A major concern of the various delegates during the constitutional debates over the Constitution and the Second Amendment to the Constitution revolved around the issue of transferring militia power held by the States (under the existing Articles of Confederation) to Federal control.

Congress shall have the power ... to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress

— US Constitution, article 1, section 8, clause 15

The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States; he may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices, and he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.

— US Constitution, article II, section 2, clause 1[22]

Political debate regarding compulsory militia service for pacifists

Records of the constitutional debate over the early drafts of the language of the Second Amendment included significant discussion of whether service in the militia should be compulsory for all able bodied men, or should there be an exemption for the "religiously scrupulous" conscientious objector.

The concern about risks of a "religiously scrupulous" exemption clause within the second amendment to the Federal Constitution was expressed by Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts (from 1 Annals of Congress at 750, 17 August 1789):

Now, I am apprehensive, sir, that this clause would give an opportunity to the people in power to destroy the constitution itself. They can declare who are those religiously scrupulous, and prevent them from bearing arms. What, sir, is the use of a militia? It is to prevent the establishment of a standing army, the bane of liberty. Now it must be evident, that under this provision, together with their other powers, congress could take such measures with respect to a militia, as make a standing army necessary. Whenever Governments mean to invade the rights and liberties of the people, they always attempt to destroy the militia, in order to raise an army upon their ruins.

The "religiously scrupulous" clause was ultimately stricken from the final draft of second amendment to the Federal Constitution though the militia clause was retained. It should be noted that the Supreme Court of the United States has upheld a right to conscientious objection to military service.[28]

Concern over select militias

William S. Fields & David T. Hardy write:[29]

While in The Federalist No. 46, Madison argued that a standing army of 25,000 to 30,000 men would be offset by "a militia amounting to near a half million of citizens with arms in their hands, officered by men chosen from among themselves ..." [119] The Antifederalists were not persuaded by these arguments, in part because of the degree of control over the militia given to the national government by the proposed constitution. The fears of the more conservative opponents centered upon the possible phasing out of the general militia in favor of a smaller, more readily corrupted, select militia. Proposals for such a select militia already had been advanced by individuals such as Baron Von Steuben, Washington's Inspector General, who proposed supplementing the general militia with a force of 21,000 men given government- issued arms and special training. [120] An article in the Connecticut Journal expressed the fear that the proposed constitution might allow Congress to create such select militias: "[T]his looks too much like Baron Steuben's militia, by which a standing army was meant and intended." [121] In Pennsylvania, John Smiley told the ratifying convention that "Congress may give us a select militia which will in fact be a standing army", and worried that, [p.34] with this force in hand, "the people in general may be disarmed". [122] Similar concerns were raised by Richard Henry Lee in Virginia. In his widely-read pamphlet, Letters from the Federal Farmer to the Republican, Lee warned that liberties might be undermined by the creation of a select militia that "[would] answer to all the purposes of an army", and concluded that "the Constitution ought to secure a genuine and guard against a select militia by providing that the militia shall always be kept well organized, armed, and disciplined, and include, according to the past and general usage of the states, all men capable of bearing arms.

Note: In Federalist Paper 29 Hamilton argued the inability to train the whole Militia made select corps inevitable and, like Madison, paid it no concern.

Federalist period (1789–1801)

In 1794, a militia numbering approximately 13,000 was raised and personally led by President George Washington to quell the Whiskey Rebellion in Pennsylvania. From this experience, a major weakness of a States-based citizen militia system was found to be the lack of systematic army organization, and a lack of training for engineers and officers. George Washington repeatedly warned of these shortcomings up until his death in 1799. Two days before his death, in a letter to General Alexander Hamilton, George Washington wrote: "The establishment of a Military Academy upon a respectable and extensive basis has ever been considered by me as an object of primary importance to this country; and while I was in the chair of government, I omitted no proper opportunity of recommending it in my public speeches, and otherwise to the attention of the legislature."[30]

Early republic (1801–1812)

In 1802, the federal military academy at West Point was established, in part to rectify the failings of irregular training inherent in a States-based militia system.[30]

War of 1812 (1812–1815)

Kentucky Mounted Militia riflemen in 1813 attack British troops at the Battle of Raisin River in the War of 1812 by artist, Ken Riley
Kentucky Mounted Militia riflemen in 1813 attack British troops at the Battle of Raisin River in the War of 1812 by artist, Ken Riley

In the War of 1812, the United States militia, because of a lack of discipline and poor training, were often routed in battle on open ground by British regulars.[31] They fared better and proved more reliable when protected behind defensive entrenchments and fixed fortifications, as was effectively shown at Plattsburgh, Baltimore, and New Orleans. Because of their overall ineffectiveness and failure during the war, militias were not adequate for the national defense. Military budgets were greatly increased at this time and a smaller, standing federal army, rather than States' militias, was deemed better for the national defense.[31]

Antebellum era (1815–1861)

1826 North Carolina militia roster of 86 men, standard wage of ​46 1⁄2 cents per day. Text reads: "A List of that Part of the Millitia Commanded by Elisha Burk an went after the Runaway Negroes. ... The within is a True Return of that part of the Millitia Commanded by Elisha Burk While out after the Runaway Negroes: Given under my hand this 15th day of August 1826". (signed) Elisha Burk Captain.
1826 North Carolina militia roster of 86 men, standard wage of 46 12 cents per day. Text reads: "A List of that Part of the Millitia Commanded by Elisha Burk an went after the Runaway Negroes. ... The within is a True Return of that part of the Millitia Commanded by Elisha Burk While out after the Runaway Negroes: Given under my hand this 15th day of August 1826". (signed) Elisha Burk Captain.

The states' militia continued service, notably, in the slave-holding states, to maintain public order by performing slave patrols to round up fugitive slaves.

Responding to criticisms of failures of the militia, Adjutant General William Sumner wrote an analysis and rebuttal in a letter to John Adams, May 3, 1823:

The disasters of the militia may be ascribed chiefly, to two causes, of which the failure to train the men is a principle one; but, the omission to train the officers is as so much greater, that I think the history of its conduct, where it has been unfortunate, will prove that its defects are attributable, more to their want of knowledge or the best mode of applying the force under their authority to their attainment of their object than to all others. It may almost be stated, as an axiom, that the larger the body of undisciplined men is, the less is its chance of success; ...[32]

During this inter-war period of the nineteenth century, the states' militia tended towards being disorderly and unprepared.

The demoralizing influences even of our own militia drills has long been notorious to a proverb. It has been a source of general corruptions to the community, and formed habits of idleness, dissipation and profligacy... musterfields have generally been scenes or occasions of gambling, licentiousness, and almost every vice. ... An eye-witness of a New England training, so late as 1845, says, "beastly drunkenness, and other immoralities, were enough to make good men shudder at the very name of a muster".[33]

Joseph Story laments in 1842 how the militia has fallen into serious decline:

And yet, though this truth would seem so clear, and the importance of a well regulated militia would seem so undeniable, it cannot be disguised, that among the American people there is a growing indifference to any system of militia discipline, and a strong disposition, from a sense of its burdens, to be rid of all regulations. How it is practicable to keep the people duly armed without some organization, it is difficult to see. There is certainly no small danger, that indifference may lead to disgust, and disgust to contempt; and thus gradually undermine all the protection intended by this clause of our National Bill of Rights.[34]

The Mormon militia, in 1857 and 1858, fought against US federal troops in the Utah War over control of government territory.

During the violent political confrontations in the Kansas Territory involving anti-slavery Free-Staters and pro-slavery "Border Ruffians" elements, the militia was called out to enforce order on several occasions,[35] notably during the incidents referred to as the Wakarusa War.

During John Brown's raid on Harpers Ferry, local militia companies from villages within a 30-mile radius of Harpers Ferry cut off Brown's escape routes and trapped Brown's men in the armory.[36]

American Civil War

At the beginning of the American Civil War, neither the North or the South was nearly well enough prepared for war, and few people imagined the demands and hardships the war would bring. Just prior to the war the total peacetime army consisted of a paltry 16,000 men. Both sides issued an immediate call to forces from the militia, followed by the immediate awareness of an acute shortage of weapons, uniforms and trained officers. Among the available States' militia regiments there existed an uneven quality, and none had anything resembling combat training. The typical militia drilling at the time amounted to, at best, parade-ground marching. The militia units, from local communities, had never drilled together as a larger regiment. Thereby lacking in the extremely important skill, critically necessary for the war style of the time, to maneuver from a marching line into a fighting line. Yet, both sides were equally unready, and rushed to prepare.[37]

Confederate militia

The most important:

Union militia

New York state militia, Civil WarCompany "E", 22nd N.Y. State Militia, near Harpers Ferry.
New York state militia, Civil War
Company "E", 22nd N.Y. State Militia, near Harpers Ferry.

Following the Confederate taking of Fort Sumter, which marked the beginning of the Civil War, President Lincoln called up 75,000 States' militiamen to retake the seized Federal property and found that the militia "strength was far short of what the Congressional statute provided and required".[38]

In the summer of 1861, military camps circled around Washington, D.C. composed of new three-year army volunteers and 90-day militia units. The generals in charge of this gathering had never handled large bodies of men before, and the men were simply inexperienced civilians with arms having little discipline and less understanding of the importance of discipline.[39]

In the West, Union state and territorial militias existed as active forces in defense of settlers there. California especially had many active militia companies at the beginning of the war that rose in number until the end of the war. It would also provide the most Volunteers from west of the Rocky Mountains: eight regiments and two battalions of infantry, two regiments and a battalion of cavalry. It also provided most of the men for the infantry regiment from Washington Territory. Oregon raised an infantry and a cavalry regiment. Colorado Territory militias were organized both to resist the Confederacy and any civil disorder caused by secessionists, Copperheads, Mormons, or most particularly the Native tribes. The Colorado Volunteers participated in the Battle of Glorieta Pass turning back a Confederate invasion of New Mexico Territory. Later they initiated the Colorado War with the Plains Indians and committed the Sand Creek massacre. The California Volunteers of the California Column were sent east across the southern deserts to drive the Confederates out of southern Arizona, New Mexico and west Texas around El Paso, then fought the Navajo and Apache until 1866. They also were sent to guard the Overland Trail, keep the Mormons under observation by the establishment of Fort Douglas in Salt Lake City, and fought a campaign against the Shoshone culminating in the Battle of Bear River. In Nevada, Oregon and Idaho Territory, California, Oregon and Washington Territorial Volunteers tried to protect the settlers and pacified tribes from each other and they fought the Goshute, Paiute, Ute and hostile Snake Indians in the Snake War from 1864 until 1866. In California, volunteer forces fought the Bald Hills War in the northwestern forests until 1864 and also the Owens Valley Indian War in 1862–1863.

Reconstruction era

With passage of federal reconstruction laws between 1866 and 1870 the U.S. Army took control of the former rebel states and ordered elections to be held. These elections were the first in which African Americans could vote. Each state (except Virginia) elected Republican governments, which organized militia units.[40] The majority of militiamen were black.[41] Racial tension and conflict, sometimes intense, existed between the Negro freedmen and the ex-Confederate whites.

In parts of the South, white paramilitary groups and rifle clubs formed to counter this black militia; regardless of the laws prohibiting drilling, organizing, or parading except for duly authorized militia. These groups engaged in a prolonged series of retaliatory, vengeful, and hostile acts against this black militia.[42]

... the militia companies were composed almost entirely of Negroes and their marching and counter-marching through the country drove the white people to frenzy. Even a cool-headed man like General George advised the Democrats to form military organizations that should be able to maintain a front against the negro militia. Many indications pointed to trouble. A hardware merchant of Vicksburg reported that with the exceptions of the first year of the war his trade had never been so brisk. It was said that 10,000 Spencer rifles had been brought into the State.[43]

The activity of the official black militia, and the unofficial illegal white rifle clubs typically peaked in the autumn surrounding elections, for instance the race riot of Clinton, Mississippi in September 1875, and the following month in Jackson, Mississippi, an eyewitness account:

I found the town in great excitement; un-uniformed militia were parading the streets, both white and colored. I found that the white people—democrats—were very much excited in consequence of the governor organizing the militia force of the state. ... I found that these people were determined to resist his marching the militia (to Clinton) with arms, and they threatened to kill his militiamen.[44]

Outright war between the state militia and the white rifle clubs was avoided only by the complete surrender of one of the belligerents, though tensions escalated in the following months leading to a December riot in Vicksburg, Mississippi resulting in the deaths of two whites and thirty-five black people. Reaction to this riot was mixed, with the local Democrats upset at the influx of federal troops that followed, and the Northern press expressing outrage: "Once more, as always, it is the Negroes that are slaughtered while the whites escape."[45]

The Posse Comitatus Act

Enacted in the wake of the Civil War, the Federal Congress passed the Posse Comitatus Act intended to prohibit federal troops and militia from supervising elections. This act substantially limits the powers of the Federal government to use the military serving on active duty under Title 10 for law enforcement, but does not preclude governors from using the National Guard in a law enforcement role as long as the guardsmen are serving under Title 32 or on state active duty.

Spanish–American War

Despite a lack of initial readiness, training, and supplies, the Militas of the United States fought heroically and achieved victory in the Spanish–American War.[46]

The Ludlow massacre

Militia at Ludlow, 1914
Militia at Ludlow, 1914

In 1914, in Ludlow, Colorado, the militia was called out to calm the situation during a coal mine strike, but the sympathies of the militia leaders allied with company management and resulted in the deaths of roughly 19 to 25 people.[citation needed]

The state National Guard was originally called out, but the company was allowed to organize an additional private militia consisting of Colorado Fuel & Iron Company (CF&I) guards in National Guard uniforms augmented by non-uniformed mine guards. The Ludlow Massacre was an attack by the Colorado National Guard and Colorado Fuel & Iron Company camp guards on a tent colony of 1,200 striking coal miners and their families at Ludlow, Colorado on April 20, 1914.[citation needed] In retaliation for Ludlow, the miners armed themselves and attacked dozens of mines over the next ten days, destroying property and engaging in several skirmishes with the Colorado National Guard along a 40-mile front from Trinidad to Walsenburg. The entire strike would cost between 69 and 199 lives. Thomas Franklin Andrews described it as the "deadliest strike in the history of the United States".[citation needed]

Mexican Revolution

American organized and unorganized militias fought in the Mexican Revolution. Some campaigned in Mexico as insurgent forces and others fought in battles such as Ambos Nogales and Columbus in defense of the interests of United States.

World War I

The Plattsburg Movement. The Hays Law.[47]

Twentieth century and current

Organized militia

Each state has two mandatory forces, namely the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard. Many states also have state defense forces and a naval militia, which assist, support and augment National Guard forces.

National Guard

The National Guard (or National Guard of a State) differs from the National Guard of the United States; however, the two do go hand-in-hand.

The National Guard is a militia force organized by each of the states and territories[dubious ] of the United States. Established under Title 10 and Title 32 of the U.S. Code, state National Guard serves as part of the first-line defense for the United States.[48][not in citation given] The state National Guard is divided up into units stationed in each of the 50 states and the U.S. territories and operates under their respective state governor or territorial government.[49][not in citation given] The National Guard may be called up for active duty by the state governors or territorial commanding generals to help respond to domestic emergencies and disasters, such as those caused by hurricanes, floods, and earthquakes.[49][not in citation given]

The National Guard of the United States is a military reserve force composed of state National Guard members or units under federally recognized active or inactive armed force service for the United States.[50][51] Created by the 1933 amendments to the National Defense Act of 1916, the National Guard of the United States is a joint reserve component of the United States Army and the United States Air Force. The National Guard of the United States maintains two subcomponents: the Army National Guard of the United States[50] for the Army and the Air Force's Air National Guard of the United States.[50]

The current United States Code, Title 10 (Armed forces), section 246 (Militia: Composition and Classes), paragraph (a) states: "The militia of the United States consists of all able-bodied males at least 17 years of age and, except as provided in section 313 of title 32, under 45 years of age who are, or who have made a declaration of intention to become, citizens of the United States and of female citizens of the United States who are members of the National Guard."[52] Section 313 of Title 32 refers to persons with prior military experience. ("Sec. 313. Appointments and enlistments: age limitation (a) To be eligible for original enlistment in the National Guard, a person must be at least 17 years of age and under 45, or under 64 years of age and a former member of the Regular Army, Regular Navy, Regular Air Force, or Regular Marine Corps. To be eligible for reenlistment, a person must be under 64 years of age. (b) To be eligible for appointment as an officer of the National Guard, a person must – (1) be a citizen of the United States; and (2) be at least 18 years of age and under 64.")

These persons remain members of the militia until age 64. Paragraph (b) further states, "The classes of the militia are: (1) the organized militia, which consists of the National Guard and the Naval Militia; and (2) the unorganized militia, which consists of the members of the militia who are not members of the National Guard or the Naval Militia."[53]

The National Guard of the United States is the largest of the organized federal reserve military forces in the United States.[citation needed] The National Guard of the United States is classified (under title 10, United States Code (see above)) as the organized federal reserve military force. Under federal control, the National Guard of the United States can be called up for active duty by the President of the United States. Since the 2003 Invasion of Iraq, many National Guard units have served overseas – under the Total Force Policy of 1973[54] which effectively combined the National Guard with the armed forces, making them regular troops. This can lead to problems for states that also face internal emergencies while the Guard is deployed overseas. To address such issues, many of the states, such as New York and Maryland also have organized state "militia" forces or state guards which are under the control of the governor of a state; however, many of these "militia" also act as a reserve for the National Guard and are thus a part of it (this varies from state to state depending on individual state statutory laws). New York and Ohio also have active naval militias, and a few other states have on-call or proposed ones. In 1990, the United States Supreme Court ruled in the case of Perpich v. Department of Defense that the federal government has plenary power over the National Guard, greatly reducing (to the point of nonexistence) the state government's ability to withhold consent to federal deployments and training missions of the National Guard.[55]

State defense forces

Since the Militia Act of 1903, many states have created and maintained a reserve military force known as state defense forces (Some states refer to them as state military reserve, state guard, or foot guard). They were created to assist, support and augment National Guard forces during peacetime conditions. Also during the call up of National Guard forces for wartime deployments, state defense forces can be used to assume the full military responsibilities of the state. Their mission includes the defense of the state and the enforcement of military orders when ordered by their Governor.

Throughout the 20th century, state defense forces were used in every major war. New York Guard Soldiers patrolled and secured the water aqueduct of New York, mass transit areas, and were even deployed to France to assist in logistical operations in World War I. The Texas State Guard's soldiers suppressed a riot and maintained peace and order in Texas throughout World War II.

Today state defense forces continue to assist, support and augment the National Guard of the state. They provide logistical, administration, medical, transportation, security, and ceremonial assistance. Some states have provided additional support such as the New York State Defense Force (New York Guard) providing its Soldiers to help support and augment the National Guard CERFP Team[jargon]. The California State Military Reserve provides the National Guard with Soldiers to assist with military police training and the Alaska State Defense Force constantly provides armed military police troops to assist with the security of Alaska. One of the major roles of the Mississippi State Guard is providing operational support during natural disasters such as hurricanes relief operations.

Militias Modeled After State Defense Forces

One militia in the United States has modeled themselves after the state defense forces on a national level. They are known as the United States National Defense Corps.[56]

The reserve militia

All able bodied men, 17 to 45 of age, are ultimately eligible to be called up into military service and belong to the class known as the reserve militia, also known as the unorganized militia (10 USC). Able bodied men who are not eligible for inclusion in the reserve militia pool are those aliens not having declared their intent to become citizens of the United States (10 USC 246) and former regular component veterans of the armed forces who have reached the age of 64 (32 USC 313). All female citizens who are members of National Guard units are also included in the reserve militia pool (10 U.S.C. § 246).

Other persons who are exempt from call to duty (10 U.S.C. § 247) and are not therefore in the reserve militia pool include:

  • The Vice President (also constitutionally the President of the Senate, that body which confirms the appointment of senior armed forces officers made by the Commander in Chief).
  • The judicial and executive officers of the United States, the several States and Territories, and Puerto Rico.
  • Members of the armed forces, except members who are not on active duty.
  • Customhouse clerks.
  • Persons employed by the United States in the transmission of mail.
  • Workmen employed in armories, arsenals, and naval shipyards of the United States.
  • Pilots on navigable waters.
  • Mariners in the sea service of a citizen of, or a merchant in, the United States.

Many individual states have additional statutes describing their residents as part of the state militia; for example Washington law specifies all able-bodied citizens or intended citizens over the age of eighteen as members of the state militia, as explicitly distinct from the National Guard and Washington State Guard.[57]

Modern citizen-militia organizations

Within the United States, since approximately 1992, there have been a number of private organizations that call themselves militia or unorganized militia.[58] In states such as Texas, the state constitution classifies male citizens between the ages of 17 and 45 to belong to the "Unorganized Reserve Militia".[59] The Texas constitution also grants the county sheriff and the governor of the state the authority to call upon the unorganized reserve militia to uphold the peace, repel invasion, and suppress rebellion, similar to the early "Texas Rangers".

List of militia in the United States

U.S. federal militia forces

U.S. states' militia

See also


  1. ^ Spitzer, Robert J.: The Politics of Gun Control, Page 36. Chatham House Publishers, Inc., 1995.
  2. ^ Justice Scalia, Opinion of the court. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., PETITIONERS v. DICK ANTHONY HELLER: on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the district of columbia circuit. 2008. " . . . the 'militia' in colonial America consisted of a subset of 'the people'—those who were male, able bodied, and within a certain age range."
  3. ^ Young, David E. The American Revolutionary Era Origin of the Second Amendment's Clauses. JOURNAL ON FIREARMS & PUBLIC POLICY, Volume 23. 2011. Extended excerpt from Mason's Fairfax County Militia Plan. 1776.
  4. ^ The Federalist Papers No. 29, Hamilton, Alexander. Concerning the Militia. Daily Advertiser. 1788. "What plan for the regulation of the militia may be pursued by the national government, is impossible to be foreseen . . . were the Constitution ratified . . . 'The project of disciplining all the militia of the United States is as futile as it would be injurious, if it were capable of being carried into execution.'"
  5. ^ The Federalist Papers, No. 46, Madison, James Jr. New York Packet. 1788. " . . . the State governments, with the people on their side, would be able to repel the danger. . . . a militia amounting to near half a million citizens [~1/5 of the free population] with arms in their hands, officered by men chosen from among themselves, fighting for their common liberties, and united and conducted by governments possessing their affections and confidence."
  6. ^ U.S. Constitution, Article I, Sec. 8 : "Congress shall have the Power . . . To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions; To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress;"
  7. ^ U.S. Constitution, Article II, Sec. 2, Clause 1: "The President shall be the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States when called into the actual service of the United States."
  8. ^ Department of Defense, Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, Military compensation background papers, Seventh edition, page 229. Department of Defense, 2005.
  9. ^ Beard, Charles Austin: Readings in American Government and Politics, Page 308. Macmillan, 1909. "Sec. 1. That the militia . . . shall be divided into two classes . . . the organized militia, to be known as the National Guard . . . and the remainder to be known as the Reserve Militia."
  10. ^ 32 U.S. Code § 109 - Maintenance of other troops
  11. ^ Oxford English Dictionary, Draft Revision March 2002.
  12. ^ O'Callaghan, Edmund B.: The Documentary History of the State of New-York, Volume 1, Weed, Parsons, & Co., 1819.
  13. ^ North Carolina August 15th 1826 Militia Roll.
  14. ^ Wills, Garry (1999). A Necessary Evil, A History of American Distrust of Government Page 27. New York, NY; Simon & Schuster. ISBN 0-684-84489-3
  15. ^ a b Sparks, Jared: "The Life of George Washington", page 70. F. Andrews, 1853.
  16. ^ a b Sparks, Jared: "The Life of George Washington", page 134-135. F. Andrews, 1853.
  17. ^ Shepherd, William (1834). A History of the American Revolution Page 67. London, England. Published I.N. Whiting
  18. ^ Sparks, Jared: The Life of George Washington, page 135. F. Andrews, 1853.
  19. ^ Adams, John: Letters of John Adams, Addressed to His Wife, page 257. C.C. Little and J. Brown, 1841.
  20. ^ Wills, Garry (1999). A Necessary Evil: A History of American Distrust of Government, Page 35. New York, NY; Simon & Schuster
  21. ^ Wills, Garry (1999). "A Necessary Evil: A History of American Distrust of Government". New York, NY: Simon & Schuster. p. 36. Missing or empty |url= (help) (rebuttal of Wills book – page 16.)
  22. ^ a b c Spitzer, Robert J.: The Politics of Gun Control. Chatham House Publishers, Inc., 1995.
  23. ^ Sparks, Jared: The Life of Gouverneur Morris, with Selections from His Correspondence and Miscellaneous Papers. Boston, 1832.
  24. ^ Weatherup, Roy G.: Standing Armies and the Armed Citizens: An Historical Analysis of the Second Amendment. Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly (Fall 1975), 973
  25. ^ Wills, Garry (1999). A Necessary Evil: A History of American Distrust of Government, Page 37-38. New York, NY; Simon & Schuster
  26. ^ Militia Act of 1792
  27. ^ Wills, Garry (1999). A Necessary Evil, A History of American Distrust of Government. New York, NY; Simon & Schuster ISBN 0-684-84489-3
  28. ^ Robert Paul Churchill, "Conscientious Objection", in Donald K. Wells, An Encyclopedia of War and Ethics. Greenwood Press 1996. ISBN 0313291160 (p.99- 102).
  29. ^ Fields, William S.; Hardy, David T. (Spring 1992). "The Militia and the Constitution: A Legal History". Military Law Review. Archived from the original on 2008-04-10.
  30. ^ a b Cullum, George and Wood, Eleazer:Campaigns of the War of 1812–1815, Against Great Britain: Sketched and Criticized.. J. Miller, 1879.
  31. ^ a b citation needed
  32. ^ Sumner, William H.: An Inquiry Into the Importance of the Militia to a Free Commonwealth, Page 23. Cummings and Hillard, 1823.
  33. ^ Beckwith, George Cone: The Peace Manual: Or, War and Its Remedies. American Peace Society, 1847.
  34. ^ Story, Joseph. A Familiar Exposition of the Constitution of the United States, p. 265. T. H. Webb & co., 1842.
  35. ^ "Archived copy". Archived from the original on 2011-12-09. Retrieved 2014-03-01.
  36. ^
  37. ^ Catton, Bruce (2004). The Civil War, Pages 28–29. Mariner Books. ISBN 0-618-00187-5
  38. ^ Burgess, John Williams (1901). The Civil War and the Constitution, 1859–1865. Scribner's Sons. p. 173 C.
  39. ^ Catton, Bruce (2004). The Civil War, Page 39. Mariner Books. ISBN 0-618-00187-5
  40. ^ Singletary, Otis (1957). Negro militia and Reconstruction. Austin: University of Texas Press. ISBN 0-313-24573-8
  41. ^ Dickerson, Donna Lee: The Reconstruction Era: Primary Documents on Events from 1865 to 1877 Page 371. Greenwood Press 2003. ISBN 0-313-32094-2
  42. ^ Dickerson, Donna Lee: The Reconstruction Era: Primary Documents on Events from 1865 to 1877 Page 372. Greenwood Press 2003. ISBN 0-313-32094-2
  43. ^ Rhodes, James Ford. (1906) History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850 Pages 132–133. Macmillan & co., ltd.
  44. ^ Singletary, Otis (1957). Negro militia and Reconstruction, page 81. Austin: University of Texas Press. ISBN 0-313-24573-8. Quoted from Congressional testimony, S. Rep. 527, 44th Cong., 1st Sess., P. 1801.
  45. ^ Singletary, Otis (1957). Negro militia and Reconstruction, page 85. Austin: University of Texas Press. ISBN 0-313-24573-8
  46. ^
  47. ^ Perry, Ralph Barton: The Plattsburg Movement: A Chapter of America's Participation in the World War". E.P. Dutton & Company, 1921
  48. ^ "32 USC 102 General policy".
  49. ^ a b "Military Reserves Federal Call Up Authority".
  50. ^ a b c "32 USC 101. Definitions (National Guard)".
  51. ^ "10 USC 12401. Army and Air National Guard of the United States: status".
  52. ^ See 10 U.S.C. § 246.
  53. ^ See 32 U.S.C. § 313; "WAIS Document Retrieval".
  54. ^ Archived 2006-02-26 at the Wayback Machine.
  55. ^ FindLaw for Legal Professionals – Case Law, Federal and State Resources, Forms, and Code
  56. ^ UNITED STATES NATIONAL DEFENSE CORPS The US National Defense Corps is a militia para-military organization and corporation. The mission of the USNDC CORPORATION is to provide emergency support services, in the best interest of the community or upon request, to recognized outside agencies in the event of both manmade and natural disasters and to provide activities to honor and support our veterans and their families.
  57. ^ Revised Code of Washington 38.04.030. Accessed via
  58. ^ Mulloy, Darren. American Extremism: History, Politics and the Militia Movement, Routledge, 2004.
  59. ^



Further reading

  • Cooper, Jerry M. (1993). Militia and the National Guard Since Colonial Times: A Research Guide. Research guides in military studies. Westport, Conn., United States: Greenwood Press. ISBN 0-803-26428-3.
  • Dunbar-Ortiz, Roxanne (January 23, 2018). Loaded: A Disarming History of the Second Amendment. City Lights Publishers. ISBN 978-0872867239.
  • Fischer, David Hackett (1994). Paul Revere's Ride. New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-508847-6.
  • Mahon, John K. (1983). History of the Militia and the National Guard. Macmillan Wars of the United States. New York: Macmillan. OCLC 9110954.
  • Newland, Samuel J. (2002). The Pennsylvania militia: Defending the Commonwealth and the nation, 1669–1870. Annville, Pa.: Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Dept. of Military and Veterans Affairs.
  • Singletary, Otis. Negro militia and Reconstruction, Austin: University of Texas Press. (1957) ISBN 0-313-24573-8
  • Smith, Joshua M. "The Yankee Soldier's Might: The District of Maine and the Reputation of the Massachusetts Militia, 1800–1812," New England Quarterly LXXXIV no. 2 (June 2011), 234–264.
  • Stentiford, Barry M. "The Meaning of a Name: The Rise of the National Guard and the End of a Town Militia," Journal of Military History, July 2008, Vol. 72 Issue 3, pp 727–754
  • Stentiford, Barry M. The American Home Guard: The State Militia in the Twentieth Century (Williams-Ford Texas A&M University Military History Series)" ISBN 1-585-44181-3

External links

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