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List of metropolitan areas that overlap multiple countries

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

This is a list of metropolitan areas that overlap multiple countries. Excluded from list are city-states being part of the overlap. One example of that would be Rome since Vatican City is isolated within Italy.

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  • ✪ The Future of Orthodox Christianity in Ukraine
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Transcription

- Good evening everyone. I ask you to grab a seat so we can launch into this absolutely fascinating discussion and an amazing panel that we have. My name is Shaun Casey. I'm the director of the Berkeley Center for Religion Peace and World Affairs. It's great to have all of you here. Let me just say a few preliminary words about process and then I'm going to shut up and get out of the way and let our experts share their wisdom with us. The title of our event is The Future of Orthodox Christianity in Ukraine. Several years ago when I was working in the State Department, I had the pleasure of meeting a Telly and Nadieszda in a sort of Ukrainian orthodoxy dummy, a course for dummies and I was the dummy who is being educated in that private seminar. So I owe a tremendous debt of gratitude to both Telly and Nadieszda for that initial discussion we had in Princeton and I've been very much their pupil in the intervening years. Tonight we're going to ask each of our panelists to speak for 10 minutes and you've seen the flyer or attempt to look at a variety of dynamics the political, theological, historical and geopolitical dimensions of the recent events. We have three theologians, one sociologist of religion and one historian, and I've been led to believe that's a combustible combination. We shall see by the time the evening is over. - [Male] George is cringing at the theologian. - I'm sorry. Apologies are in order. I will make amends. Now, for some people that's an insult, to some people it's a compliment. - [Male] I'll take the theologian. (laughs) - The sparks are flying already. We've yet to turn to Ukraine. In terms of process, we're going to proceed alphabetically and I'm going to introduce the panel in a moment in alphabetical order. I've asked each of them simply take 10 minutes and assess the current situation from their own particular academic location but also personal location. We will then proceed to some crosstalk. I'm sure there'll be some interesting dynamics there. But as soon as we can, I'd like to pivot to your questions and when we get to that phase, I'm fairly stern in the sense that against the Washington consensus, I insist that you disguise your comment as a question. We don't need sermons. If you have the impulse to preach a sermon, speak to me afterwards. We'll find you some proper ecclesiastical locations to work on that skill set but really the more questions you ask, the more answers and wisdom we will get from the panel itself. So I ask you to identify yourself and your institutional affiliation and then present the question and then we will either address it to a specific panelist or to the panel as a whole and we will to get as many of those in as possible. So let me introduce our panel and then let the conversation start. To my far left is a Jose Casanova who's one of the world's top scholars in the sociology of religion. He is also a professor in the Department of Sociology and Theology. So the theologian hat is well-deserved, here at Georgetown. He's also a senior fellow at the Berkeley Center where his work focuses on globalization, religions and secularization. To my immediate left is George Demacopoulos. He's father John Meyendorff and Patterson family chair of Orthodox Christian studies and the Co director of the Orthodox Christian Studies Center at Fordham University. Sitting to my immediate right is Nadieszda Kizenko. She is a professor at the State University of New York at Albany. She researches and teaches Russian history with a focus on religion and culture. And at the far end, seated next to Nadieszda is Aristotle or Telly Nicolaus, most of us know him. He's a professor of theology and the Archbishop Demetrius chair at Orthodox Theology and Culture at Fordham University. He is co founding director of Fordham's Orthodox Christian Study Center. I should also express my gratitude to both Telly and George for cosponsoring this event. So this is a Berkeley Center event as well as a Fordham Orthodox Christian Study Center event. And we have collaborated personally in the past. It's wonderful to have this institutional affiliation and we hope that we can continue to deepen and build on that relationship. So thank you both for your sponsorship. So with that, let me turn it over to Jose. - Thank you. Thank you everybody for coming. Three points. Why now? What next in three possible scenarios, longterm scenarios. Why now? Well, the situation was unsustainable. Certainly since the war in Donetsk in the annexation of Crimea to a certain as you said, the long term was not sustainable in any case. You have roughly 20 million orthodox faithful in Ukraine that do not want to belong to the Moscow Patriarchate. Roughly 15 million who are members of the so called two schismatic churches, the Ukraine Orthodox church (mumbles) probably 12 $30 million. And then about two million were members of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church. And then you have probably, we have no estimate, but certainly about at least five million faithful in the Ukraine Orthodox church, Moscow Patriarchate who would like to move to a canonical Ukrainian Orthodox church. They are today the Moscow Patriarchate because there is no other canonical church. But the moment there is a canonical church we don't know how many will move, but certainly large numbers of those parishioners will move. So you are talking of 20 million, probably the largest, larger than any other orthodox country with the exception of Russia. And again, in terms of faithfulness, one could say that it's a much more religious population than the Russian Orthodox population in many, many, many ways. Ukraine has many Russian Orthodox church parishes as the entire Russian Federation. Has always been the source of priests for the entire Moscow Patriarchate and has always been the core, the religious core in many ways. So it is a lot of things that it's taken for the Russian Orthodox Church. Why now? Probably a combination of, I assumed that the Ecumenical Patriarchate had enough of the pressure he has been receiving in the last two years from Moscow. Probably the pressure now from the politicians in Ukraine, Poroshenko, but you must understand Poroshenko himself, he's a member of the Russian Orthodox Church. He and his family, and he would like to be a canonical Ukrainian Orthodox church, not the Russian Orthodox Church And then there are many other politicians and many other faithful. I assume that the pressure from Erdogan, from being accused of having been with the Feta Glulam, now somehow Erdogan can use him against Moscow in whichever plans he has and certainly probably pressure from the US at this point. What's next? Well the C note. The process supposed to be, once the anathema and the two schismatic churches have been lifted already by the Ecumenical Patriarchate, that a C note takes place of the two previously schismatic churches and of those, of the Russian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate, let's call it, Ukraine Orthodox is Moscow Patriarchate, they would like to participate in the C note and be members of the new church. A new church is supposed to be formed out of these three churches, a new church. Will it happen? How, we don't know. The question is how much pressure can be put on Filarate not to rub his feet. Obviously Filarate would like to continue being the patriarch of the new church. Most likely this will be an impediment for a C note to take place, which is legitimate. So we don't know how the C note is going to take place. Probably some pressure on the part of Ecumenical Partier, in Poroshenko will help the process but we don't know. So the idea will be that will be new statute for a new church made up of these three churches, not simply a continuation of any of the three but the new church made up of these three. So these immediately. Longterm, longterm there are three scenarios. One that obviously you have hotheads, either Ukraine nationalists or actually provocateurs on the part of Russia. They try to basically cause mayhem basically by trying to occupy shrines or let's say Moscow Patriarchate sites and that it leads to violence. Cashews barely, obviously we see now even the crisis, let's say in the CFR south and these could continue and be a situation in which there is no resolution of the crisis and a conflictive situation continues. Particularly if the C note is not successful and you have not many bishops from the contemporary Moscow Patriarchate moving into the new church. I think the condition here is for the Ukrainian government is extremely, extremely careful not to allow any type of violence around Christian ecumenical or orthodox sites shrines it actually protects the religious freedom of all people in Ukraine. Now, the second scenario will be muddling through. There will be no resolution, there will be still a conflict between the two, the old Orthodox Moscow Patriarchate, the new Orthodox Church and these will last for years, for decades, we don't know. The most positive scenario and the one I would like to see is the emergence of three churches in Ukraine or claiming to be the inheritors of the Kievan rules all headed by somebody who has the title of Metropolitan of Kiev and all rules and basically representing the three Romes. You have the Greek Catholic Church, the Uniate Catholic church which already the head calls itself metropolitan of Kiev and of rules and claims to be the inheritor of the old Kievan rules. After all Kiev rules church was established before the season in was in communion with Rome. Not only with Constantinople, but also with Rome and they'll have these ones, they are the council of Florence and then the breast to create this condition. The Greek Catholic Church today in Ukraine plays the role of being the only one that talks to all the religious communities in Ukraine. That means it plays this role and it has also a self understanding of having these ecumenical role to play with the sister Orthodox churches in Ukraine. A second will be of course, a legitimate canonical, Ukraine Orthodox church in communion with ecumenical patriarch and with all the other orthodox churches that want to recognize it as a canonical church. It's going to be very hard for the Moscow Patriarchate. It will take a while until they recognize this as canonical church. Simply, it'll take a lot of changing their understanding of their own rights, canonical, judical territory. Ukraine is a canonical judical territory of the Moscow Patriarchate, not recognizing principles of religious freedom, not recognizing principles that several Christian churches can live within the same territory and so on and continuing calling those uniatists, those schismatics, the Protestants, heretics and so on. And then the third church that will remain even if large sections of the contemporary Orthodox Church, Moscow Patriarchate moves to the new church, lots of sections of it are going to remain in communion with Moscow. So we're I went to have three churches in Ukraine, one in communion with Rome, one in communion with Constantinople, one in communion with Moscow. Is this bad? No, if they learn to live as sister churches recognizing each other. These after all is what Christian community means in the rest of the world. Both Catholic world and Protestant world. Latin America it has happened, was a Catholic territory. Now you have sister, Protestant churches basically living in relatively good relations with the Catholic church and vice versa. So this will be the ideal scenario. We must understand that Ukraine is the only country of Europe that has broken the European model of National Church and religious minorities and has what could we called an American denominational system. Multiple Churches, multiple sex, multiple denominations. You have not only the three contemporary Orthodox churches competing and the Greek Catholics and the Roman Catholics and Pentecostals and Baptists and Lutherans and large Jewish community and a large Muslim community of starters, all of them being part of the all Ukrainian council of religious communities, to which all of them belong is the only country in Europe that has such a council of religious communities. And the head of the council rotates every six months among the different churches. So actually when my turn happened, it happened by chance that then the Moscow patriarch was the head of the council, and he could not go along with the rest of the religious communities that were basically the time supporting my turn. I think with this, I will stop here. - Thank you very much George. - Thank you. There's some fascinating points in there that I'd love to discuss. I teach in the theology department, which is why he called me the theologian, but I'm trained as a historian. (mumbles) No, no, no, no. So I think what I'm going to do is I'm going to pull back a little bit and offer a little historical context for how the kind of very long history of Orthodoxy helps to frame some of the challenges and questions that we have before us in the Ukraine. And in doing so, what I want to do is I want to keep three different questions separate. I realized they overlap and in stories in the media, they're very much confused, but there really are three different issues at play here. So the first issue is what does autocephaly mean in the Orthodox Church? How is it granted? What's its history? What's its relationship to political power? The second is, how does the Orthodox Church in real terms go about resolving internal jurisdictional schisms? We currently have a three-way schism, as was alluded in Ukraine. What's the process that that sort of thing gets resolved? And the third I'm going to offer a few comments about the fact that the Moscow Patriarchate has now broken communion with the Ecumenical Patriarchate over these issues. So all three of those things get conflated into a single thing, but they really are three different things. All right? So in the Orthodox world, in the canonical Calcedonian Orthodox world, there are 14 autocephalous jurisdictions which basically means there are 14 self-governing churches. Historically, you had this model of autocephalous churches since basically the time of Constantine, since the fourth century. So the orthodox world has jurisdictionally, historically self-governed itself or divided itself in ways that somewhat belatedly, but always mirrored geopolitical realities. So the ancient autocephalous jurisdictions in the Orthodox church were precisely the centers of provincial governance in the Roman Empire. So Alexandria, Antioch, Constantinople, Rome, et Cetera. Over the long history of Byzantium, as political conditions shifted, so too did the number of autocephalous churches. So it was always often a little bit delayed, but it always mirrored a geopolitical reality within a concept of a unified imperial whole. When the Ottomans came and disrupted all of that, it kind of went into a frozen holding pattern. And then when they Ottomans dissolved and so many historically Orthodox territories in eastern Europe created their own nation states on a kind of French model, activists in those countries who wanted their own nation state, took the concept of autocephaly and tried to use the church for sort of nationalist interests. And so in the 19th and 20th century, you had an explosion in the number of autocephalous churches in the Orthodox world. In terms of the new ones, almost always conformed to the boundaries of a nation state. So roughly half of the autocephalous jurisdictions in the modern world basically represent the borders of a nation state. And half of the jurisdictions in the Orthodox world are either ancient or medieval and represent territories that don't have national interests. And to be very clear in the ancient world or in the medieval world, that provisional geography had absolutely nothing to do with culture or language or national identity. The way that the Romans divided their provinces had more to do with how they would raise taxes and move armies. It had nothing to do with what language somebody spoke. So the Orthodox world today kind of faces this kind of existential question of what constitutes an autocephalous church. Is it natural or cultural identity? Like you have in Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia, or what have you, or is it this kind of ancient model. Anyway it's an existential question. It's an open question that's not being resolved very easily. So that's one thing. The second situation. Well actually let me back up and offer one more point there. Because what now is the Moscow patriarchate has a medieval anchor which initiated in Kiev. You have a jurisdiction that is much larger than the nation state of Russia. But you have Ukrainians who have for more than 100 years, some of them sought their own autocephalous church to match their kind of national cultural identity like you have in other jurisdictions, but the Russians for a variety of reasons, don't want to see that happen. So you have this mismatch of a kind of a premodern jurisdiction and modern national sensibilities that are in conflict with one another. The second issue is. The second issue concerns, how do you resolve schism? It is, if you are a medieval historian, church historian like I am, you will know that there are an infinite number of schisms in the course of church history that more often than not are the consequence of political and cultural conflict that then kind of manifests itself in the church. And we could go through the list, but why be tedious? More often than not, the way those things have been resolved historically, has almost always been very, very ugly. It's almost always required a kind of high handedness by whoever is in charge because the cause of Christian unity trumps the reasons that cause the schism in the first place. And more often than not, it takes a generation or two for the kind of memory of the messiness of how it got resolved to fade away so that the unity works. So whether we're talking about the fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth century, schisms are typically, when schisms are resolved, it is almost always an ugly process that literally we cry as the next generation of bishops to resolve because the current generation of bishops typically don't like one another enough to make it happen. That's just the way it has always worked. Now, the third situation is what has basically happened here is the ecumenical patriarch has stepped into a situation in Ukraine where you have three churches that are theologically in communion with one another and theologically on the same page. So they are all orthodox, but for a variety of jurisdictional reasons, many of which have to do with the desire for autocephaly, they are broken apart. Normally, it would be the responsibility of the Patriarchate of Moscow to resolve that schism. That has not happened or schisms, that has not happened. And so the Ecumenical Patriarch has stepped in and he has initiated a vehicle for that resolution by recognizing as Orthodox those two jurisdictions that the rest of the Orthodox world was not recognizing as Orthodox. It's not that they were theologically unorthodoxed, it's that they weren't playing by the rules jurisdictionally. Moscow is so upset with this that Moscow has broken communion, which I in other settings have referred to as the nuclear option. They basically went with the absolute final, most powerful thing they could do, which is to break communion with the Ecumenical Patriarchate over what are ultimately, administrative jurisdictional questions. I actually think that this was a mistake on their part, not only theologically, but it was a mistake on their part politically because they probably could have lobbied other autocephalous leaders to line up with them and respond to the way that the ecumenical patriarchate had asserted itself with respect to the healing of the schism in Ukraine. And by gesturing towards the fact that it's going to grant autocephaly against their wishes that the Russians. Moscow probably would have found a sympathetic ears in Serbia or Romania or elsewhere where they're worried about their own breakaway territories. But because Moscow has taken what I call the nuclear option and broken communion, I find it extremely unlikely that any other autocephalous church is going to follow suit. We have seen absolutely no indications from any of the other 12 jurisdictions that any of them are going to break communion with Constantinople over this issue. And so Russia, I think Nadieszda may disagree but I think that Russia has kind of, first of all, I think they've played this wrong all the way along but I think they have really overplayed, they've overplayed it with this break of communion and I'll stop there. - Great, thank you very much. - You set me up. (laughs) Alright then. Since I have no choice. To consider the future of the church in Ukraine, let us think just briefly about the 1686 documents moving Kiev under Moscow that so many people are citing now. This is not breaking news. There is no smoking gun. These documents were published as long ago as the 19th century and we all know what they said. Yes, in the 17th century, Moscow was anxious to bring the Orthodox church in Ukraine under its control. Yes, the local hierarchy was wary of Moscow. Yes, Moscow pressed Constantinople and in the end the patriarch of Constantinople agreed to the transfer of Kiev to Moscow and was well compensated for it. All of this is true. This is well documented and it's well described in any number of works. Now, the move from Kiev to Moscow did not come out of the blue. Relations between the Kiev metropolis and that of Moscow had never stopped, especially among monasteries, but these relations were sporadic. It was only after the Union of Breast when the Orthodox in Ukraine had to respond to the challenges posed by Uniatism and a Catholic state bent on turning all of its Christian population into Catholics did the contacts between the Orthodox in Ukraine and in Muscovy become more frequent. But whatever the misgivings of the individual hierarchs, the majority of the people in Ukraine in 1686 saw in union with the Patriarchate of Moscow under an orthodox ruler, a guarantee of a freedom to practice their faith. And I must say the interest was not one sided. If the Orthodox church in Ruthenian lands sort material help and protection from Muscovy, it certainly gave back through cultural contributions to the modernization of the church in Russia. The Ukrainian influence on the Russian church through it's learned monks and through the many bishops who in the 18th century were of Ukrainian background bound the two parts of the empire still more tightly It would actually be hard to say which part exercised more influence on the other. The Ukrainian on the Russia or vice versa, but like the eternal peace sign between Moscow and Poland in 1686, few things in human affairs are immutable. Whether political boundaries or the boundaries of church jurisdictions. The documents of 1686 do not tell us anything definitive and even more to the point, history and life just don't work that way. You can't go back hundreds of years and say it never happened. Let's say that the Catholic Church wanted to reject the treaty of Westphalia. Like okay, but it's too late. If it were that easy to cancel agreements that were unquestioned for centuries, our world history could be rewritten. But that kind of an approach ignores the fact that history has gone on since the event that one would like to cancel. You cannot erase an event from history. It's not possible to turn the wheel back. George noted that we can all think of numerous examples of an ecclesiastical uncanonical acts that were allowed to stand. I'm very happy to talk about them. Time does not permit to do so here. Let's just take the one that I know best. In the Russian empire, when Peter I abolished the Patriarchate and replaced it with a holy synod, not only Russian bishops, but also the rest of the orthodox world accepted the fact because there was nothing else they could do about it and the four ancient patriarchates gave their approval to the new form of church government although it was clearly uncanonical. They even commemorated the holy ruling synod in the diptychs. So mistakes have been made all around and we all live with the consequences. But obviously, Kiev and Moscow having formed one church jurisdiction at various points is not destiny. There are real differences between the church in Ukraine and the church in Russia, in local traditions and in their approaches to the challenges of contemporary life. It is not at all surprising that for a long time, there has been a widely held and legitimate aspiration for the Orthodox Church in Ukraine to be fully independent in serving its faithful in the country and abroad. This aspiration first became apparent at the end of the Russian empire when there were attempts to create an autocephalous church in Ukraine. Nicholas Denasenko has recently published about this. This church which was alas uncanonical because it lacked a bishop was initially supported by the Bolsheviks, but it met a violent end in the general persecution of religion in the Soviet Union. Another attempted autocephaly was made during the German invasion, but when the Red Army gained control of Ukraine, the Orthodox, were once again subordinated to the Russian Orthodox Church. And now to consider the situation as it stands now. We can't go back to 1686 and start from there. We can't go back to 1946. We have to start from 2018. On September 7th of this year, the Ecumenical Patriarchate decided to nominate two of its bishops as exocs for Ukraine, which made as George notes, the Russian Orthodox Church interrupt communion at the level of clergy. When in early October, the Ecumenical Patriarchate lifted the anathemas on the bishops who had been up until that point, uncanonical. The Russian Orthodox church interrupted communion completely. I have to make one note, George, that it's important to note that the ecumenical patriarchate lifted the excommunications on the bishops of the uncanonical churches. The Ukrainian autocephalous Orthodox Church and the Ukrainian Orthodox church of Patriarchate and on their followers, but it did not acknowledge their church structures as such. Canonically, those persons as individuals are in communion with Constantinople but they do not have a canonical structure. At least they didn't when we walked into the room. (laughs) And now the elephant in the room. In all of this, the Ecumenical Patriarchate has made no attempts to come to terms with the only canonical church in Ukraine, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. Ukrainian Orthodox Church. If the ecumenical patriarchate is serious about pursuing church unity, might this not have been better served with a step by step approach that would have involved the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and the Russian Orthodox Church? The only churches that the ecumenical patriarchate itself accepted as legitimate in Ukraine for decades? Instead, the Ecumenical Patriarchate presented these church with an ex post facto. That's just not right. Now, semantics. There is a tendency to present the Ukrainian Orthodox Church as a non Ukrainian church. i.e Ukrainian Orthodox Church sometimes calls Moscow Patriarchate. I will turn to that in a moment. This tendency has become much stronger in the last few years. That is not fair. Why? Because the Ukrainian Orthodox Church understands itself as a church which lives and acts in Ukraine. It fully respects the Ukrainian state. It has several times confirmed the territorial integrity of the country. i.e that Crimea and Donbass belongs to Ukraine. The name of the church is the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. The UOC, adding the MP is not a self designation. It is rather added by outsiders, either to make clear which of the Orthodox churches in the country they're talking about or to subliminally evoke the idea that the Ukrainian Orthodox Church is not Ukrainian somehow. But its Ukrainian character is very strong and it conducts in many parishes, services in the vernacular language. This I might note is not possible in the Russian Orthodox Church where only i.e the Russian Orthodox Church in Russia where only church Slavonic is allowed. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church's website functions in Ukrainian. Its heads attend all official church events and it is instructive to remember that on Ukrainian Independence Day, this August 24th, President Poroshenko received a metropolitan enufri and each side published images showing both personalities in a cordial conversation. Now, what's really ironic about this, is that many Orthodox churches are fairly criticized for being primarily bearers of national historic and cultural traditions rather than being evangelizers of all people, whereas ironically, although the Ukrainian Orthodox Church has repeatedly supported the Ukrainian independence and territorial integrity, because it is consistently refused to define itself ethnically, it is now an object of attacks and discrimination. It is the two presiding hierarchs of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church since the independence of Ukraine, metropolitan Vladmir of blessed memory and metropolitan Enufri who have consistently stressed unlike the Ecumenical Patriarchate, unlike the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, unlike the Ukrainian Orthodox Church key of Patriarchate that the question of autocephaly is first and foremost is not a political or a national question, but an ecclesial one. So I'm asking myself, who are the driving forces between the decisions of the Ecumenical Patriarchate? There are several bishops of Ukrainian origin in the Ecumenical Patriarchate who administer dioceses in America or Europe. Two of them are the exotics set to Kiev. Do they think that an overwhelming majority of Ukrainian faithful and clergy will enter the new ecclesiastical structure? Now, okay I'm not suggesting causality in what I'm about to say. I stress this. We can't help but note that the State Department of the United States gave its stamp of approval to the Ecumenical Patriarchate's actions something which by the way dismays me both as a secular American who believes in the separation of church and state, hello and as an Orthodox Christian who would like to see Orthodox countries head in a similar direction. This happened, obviously, coincidence or just as the west and above all the United States are imposing sanctions on Russia for other reasons and pressing Russia at every possible level. So let's pull back and think about what happens next. Okay, we've had two scenarios. I propose the following. One is the number of bishops from the Ukrainian Orthodox Church who will join this new church structure. The Ukrainian Orthodox churches that stands now has about 90 bishops. The forces in favor of autocephaly hope that some of them will switch to the new church and are putting some pressure on them to do so. If that number remained small, there will be two churches in Ukraine for a long time. If a large majority of Ukrainian Orthodox Church bishops joins the new church, then the church in communion in Moscow will become a marginal factor in Ukraine. George alluded to the other autocephalous churches, how they will react. For the moment, they are in communion with Constantinople and with Moscow because they're sane. (laughs) Several however, have declared officially that they will not enter into communion with a hierarchy and clergy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church Kiev and patriarchate and the Ukrainian autocephalous church even though the Ecumenical Patriarchate has done so. If the other churches side with one of the two patriarchates, the two camps of churches will form. It will lead to a new schism with orthodoxy which could last for a long time. How much time do I have? (mumbles) Could I have one minute? - Take it. - Okay. So my only two last points. One is who's your daddy or who's your mother? The autocephaly question is connected with the canonical territory with the idea of a mother church. Even if we agree that the mother church must play the decisive role on the autocephaly process, it is not clear who that is and anyway, I suggest here and now that we just drop this whole sibling family imagery, mother church, who is the father, sister churches who are step siblings. I don't think these ideas are actually either appropriate or helpful. Sorry, I just don't. And finally, I'm afraid that the means that the Ukrainian government is using to promote adherence to the idea of autocephaly or at least to promote a show of adherence to it has nothing to do with European values, but frankly resembles more of a throwback to the Soviet Union. It was several presidents and it was the parliament of Ukraine who demanded autocephaly. Church issues were neglected and again, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church as the canonical Orthodox church in the country was completely ignored in the process. People are bused free of charge i.e at the government's expense to demonstrations in favor of autocephaly. Schools well, all right. I'm not going to get into that. Just say it's obvious while anyway, just one more thing. It's a pity because from a wider national and state perspective, this will lead to a polarization of the country and the population not to speak of Crimea and the Donbass and this is a pity because it is a pity of what the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in Ukraine has been up until now and could and should continue doing. Within Orthodoxy in Ukraine, there is still potential to become a real alternative to the kind of Orthodox church, which is frequently and frequently correctly criticized. It is a church with an openness to today's world and problems yet with a strong awareness of the Christian and Orthodox tradition. It has an ecumenical approach to other Christian churches and communities in Ukraine, both historically and right now, there is an original way of theological thinking. Ukraine is a multi-religious and diverse country and a Ukrainian orthodoxy independent from Russia and also from Constantinople but maintaining relations with these and other Orthodox churches could achieve what many others in the region have attempted. But by becoming an object of national enthusiasm, the church in Ukraine is in danger of forfeiting this potential. I hope it does not. - Thank you very much. Telly, bring us home. - I have no problem claiming to be the theologian. (laughs) And of course since theology is the queen of the sciences, if you want to ignore everything you've heard so far, you go ahead and do that? (laughs) - We're going to put you on the front of our work. (laughs) - Alright, so I'm gonna ask a question. I'm going to sort of raise the issue of what theology has to do with it. And I'm going to ask, I'm going to raise the question of whether there can be something called the theology of autocephaly. But in order to raise the question of theology of autocephaly, basically you're really asking the question, what is the church? So in theological language, that's called ecclesiology, the logos and the ecclesio or the logos on the church, the teaching of the church. What is the church? And that's a pretty important question. Now in the history of Christianity, there've been various kinds of answers to that, but in essence, really the church is the body of Christ theologically. Asking what is the church and identifying the church as the body of Christ and as the body of Christ, really the next question becomes, where is the church? And that's really the more contentious issue. For me, there are a variety of answers to that admittedly, but for me, it makes the most sense to really answer that question by pointing to, especially for the Roman Catholic and the Orthodox traditions, to the Eucharist, to the celebration of the Eucharist. Now, most of us are familiar with the celebration of the Eucharist in the sense of taking the body of Christ. But there's a sense in which in that taking and in that congregation, there is a sense of being constituted as the body of Christ. Being united with Christ. Being united in with Christ by the Holy Spirit. So in some sense, every parish, every eucharistic assembly is the church. So if you ask where is the church, you point to the eucharistic assembly. And to think about and the eucharistic assembly is not part of the church, it's not a little piece of the church, it's the church. The church in its fullness and so far as is Christ. So one example of that is that if you have a Christian Eucharist assembly and there's no other Christian Eucharist assembly for hundreds or thousands of miles around, that eucharistic assembly is not a piece of the church. It's the church, right? It's their sort of symbolically representing the fullness of the church. So then the real challenge then is how do those particularly Eucharist assemblies relate to other eucharistic assemblies? What kind of structure then? So now we're starting to get into the territory of the institutional a little bit more. We are still at the Eucharistic assembly, but now even more getting into the area of how do you structure now these various Eucharistic assemblies together? And very importantly, how do you structure them in such a way that the very structure itself can somehow continued to represent the fullness of the body of Christ in a way that's present in the Eucharist Assembly? The institutions can ever really do that. Let's be clear about that. It's a little bit like language. So if you have a particular kind of experience to move a little bit in the other direction, if you have a certain kind of experience of war, once you start to put that experience into language, into particular kinds of symbolic forms, there's always a bit of a one removed from the actual experience itself. So at once with the church starts to move into thinking about institutional structures of how it can relate these various Eucharistic assemblies together, the institution itself can never quite reflect the being constituted as the body of Christ as one gets in the experience of worship. Because institution is not worship. So now in the history of the Orthodox Church, theologically, I think that has something like what's called conciliatory structures flow out of identifying each Eucharist Assembly as the body of Christ because you have representatives of these eucharistic assemblies and they'd get them together in some form of councilliary manner to ultimately, even in its own way, express the unity that exists amongst these various kinds of Eucharist assemblies and also solve common practical problems. So you can do that regionally. Now as you do this regionally, we're getting a little closer to this idea about autocephaly and independence. But then you have to think about it globally and so how can you then take these concilliary structures that are somehow representative of kind of a regional unity and ultimately relate them to other kinds of regional structures around the world. So the challenge to some extent globally as to how do you think about the kinds of structures institutionally that ultimately could represent the kind of global unity and ecclesial global unity that itself is consistent with the kind of experience of the body of Christ, of the eucharistic assembly. So to some extent this is a long way of saying that autocephaly can be theologically justified. Autocephaly in and of itself because what it is really is setting up the church and a bunch of independent regional zones. Regional zones that themselves somehow are reflective of unity of various eucharistic assemblies. And regional zones that some are also kind of in communion with other regional zones. And ultimately designed and structured in such a way as to institutionally to resolve and to solve institutional practical kinds of issues and problems. So again, I want to be very clear here. What I'm really trying to say is that theologically, something like autocephaly is theologically justifiable and that's why the Orthodox Church has a issues with something like people primacy. Not per se, not per se, because in this global unity structure that I'm talking about something like a primates, someone who symbolically represents the church globally to the world and ultimately clergy, clerical leaders do that. They are symbolic presences of some sort. The notion of a primate per se is not, is theologically justifiable. The issue with the Roman Catholic Church and the Orthodox churches really are that the pope theoretically, canonically can intervene in any regional zone that he wants. And that's the issue in the Orthodox churches because independent regional zones have a certain kind of independence. The other regional zone as a way of reflecting the fullness of its own kind of presence of the church cannot interfere whenever they feel like it in other regional zones. You might have a primate who symbolically represents the global Orthodox church, but that primate is restricted from actually just going into any other regional zone that somehow and thinks that they can do whatever they want in that particular regional zone. Now, I promise you I am getting to the Ukraine in just a second. (laughs) Historically, George is right. Historically, there is no theological way to identify how the zones are drawn, the borders of the zone. That's the issue. Historically, there's no theological way to go church is the body of Christ, therefore use the Danube as a border. (laughs) There's no way to do that. There's no way to actually do that at all. And historically, and the great historian Francis Devonecar did this and kind of expose this and others after him. There's no way and historically, these regional zones kind of emerged by accident. By accident, and it's because of the structure of the Byzantine Empire. And eventually now and eventually in the 20th century, they're emerging because of the nation state, because of the borders of the nation state, which there are problems to that. So I at least want to lay that on the table that to some extent, this idea about acephaly, I guess what I want to say is that theology matters because if there's a dispute between Russia and the Ukraine and Ukrainian Christians, Russian Orthodox Christians, or all the Christians in that particular region about where the zones or where the line should be drawn, I do think that to some extent, theology can sort of indicate that yeah, we have this kind of sense in which we can have these regional zones but theology can't really resolve the specific dispute that's going on here. Now there's another reason why theology is important. If in fact we define the church in this way, especially kind of identifying with the eucharistic assembly as the body of Christ, it raises the issue of how the church relate to the world. So how the church relates to public life, how should it relate to government. How Christians as part of these Eucharist assembly afterwards go out into the world. And when that happens, then things start to intersect with especially nowadays with ethnic, nationalistic and other kinds of what might call nonecclesial kinds of issues. And I think that to bring it back full circle to a little bit to Jose's comments, I think we are dealing with a particular kind of issue that has geopolitical significance and it has something to do with how it is that, how the church world relationship is being conceptualized. And I think what I want to draw attention to to some extent is that in this particular kind of a debate and conflict, there's definitely no question about it that the Russian Orthodox Church over the past 20 years has been operating in such a way as to advance Russian national interests. There's absolutely no question about that. And it's what I would say. Now I take it that within Russia, there are wonderful priests, there are wonderful bishops, there are wonderful Christians, there are wonderful programs. There's all kinds of wonderful things going on, but the Russian, the Moscow Patriarchate globally only acts to advance either in Russian national interest or to advance its own interest internally. And I would say that that is in contradiction with the kind of theology of the church and the church world relation that implies. So that's why theology matters too, because the way I think that the Russian Orthodox church is approaching this particular issue, at least one of the ways is that it has Russian national interests in mind. And for me, it's one of the reasons why they couldn't speak up when Russia invaded Crimea. They couldn't speak up when Russia invaded eastern Ukraine. It can't speak up, it has to speak negatively against the Maidan. Because it's put itself into theologically unjustifiable position. So I don't really know what that means for Ukraine under the acephaly, whether that justifies it or not, whether the time is now because of the fact that the Russian Orthodox Church seem to be in theological contradiction with what it means to be church. Maybe, but I throw it out there at least for consideration. But that that piece has to enter into the equation. So it's not simply about what is the church it's how the church relates to the world and all of that is sort of being mixed up in this particular kind of debate. Thank you. - Well, thank you very much. I mean that's given us a lot to chew on. May I add just one piece of commentary even though I'm allegedly just the moderator. I will say that in the Obama administration, you would not have seen a specific American government endorsement of any ecclesiastical path in Ukraine. And again, in terms of political commentary, I think it was a cheap utilitarian in the moment, move on the part of this administration that take the move. Now, the irony is the ultimate impotence of the American government to actually influence any events on the ground there may undermine the harm they may have been attached to what I thought was a diplomatic blender. But I take your point and I just want to for personal reasons, sort of make the distinction. We've only got half an hour left, so let me just quickly ask the panelists. Do you have a question or comment in response and let's take maximum five to 10 minutes on that and then move to the audience. So Jose. - To the theological question. There is the fundamental theological question of the mother principle of religious freedom. We are dealing with the principle of territorial canonical jurisdiction, which is an old historical principle which is irreconcilable with the principle of religious freedom. As long as the Catholic Church doesn't accept religious freedom, and then accept religious pluralism, there was no possibility for the Catholic church to release democratic structures. So ultimately what's at stake is either recognize the principle of religious freedom as being more important than principle of territorial canonical. I mean it was Max Webber who precisely defined both the state and the church with the same terms. That state is an institution that claims the monopoly of the means violence of the territory. The church is an institution that claims the monopoly of the means of grace over the territory as long as you have such a conception of a church, there is no possibility not only for freedom. This is why we had religious wars in Europe. It was not the religionists precisely because no Christian at the time could accept the possibility of having multiple churches within the same territory. Multiple Ukrainian churches, excuse me, Christian churches. Multiple eucharistic communities within the same territory. They had to go to war. Even those who wanted to have basically good relationship between Christians. So unless we abandon this principle, there is no solution and in the modern world I don't see how we can claim to the principle of canonical territory. - I would say the religious freedom issue is tricky a little bit because I think that for me theological anyway, I mean the idea in principle that somehow the Orthodox church should promote sort of government structures that allow for maximized religious pluralism, I think they logically is justifiable. The issue is the debate within the Orthodox Church, whether religious freedom applies in such a way that you can semi-theologically justify that just by virtue of there being a nation state that the nation state justifies the establishment independence ethnic Orthodox church. That's the issue. - [Jose] I have not supported autocephaly. It is not the point. The point is the right to have multiple Ukrainian Orthodox canonical churches in Ukraine. - Well, I would say theologically-- - [Jose] And recognize each other. - I would say theologically that's possible because like I said, there is no theological justification for how to draw the lines of the zone. But just simply the fact that there should be regional independent zones. - I have to say, I found that point very provocative and very, in the Orthodox world, we tend to not think in that way, but it's really fascinating and almost ironically such a situation would mirror the situation of the Orthodox in the United States. And your comment about how Ukraine is one of the only places, if not the only place in Europe that does have this kind of respected religious, pluralistic diversity that's operative on a kind of national level. There is a certain kind of irony to have that kind of models, the orthodox experience in the United States. And I think you're right. Certainly in the short to midterm, that's precisely what's going to happen. You're gonna have these overlapping jurisdictions that most of the rest of the Orthodox world are going to recognize as canonical and they're just gonna throw their hands up and say we can't sort it out because we don't have an emperor and you can't have an ecumenical council without an emperor. (laughs) No, no I mean actually that's a really important point to make. - Unity was influenced by the emperor. - Precisely. There has never been an acumen nor could there be an ecumenical council without a political actor that forced disputing parties to the table. Because we just saw this in Crete in 2016. There was no heavy hand that made Georgia and Russia calm. Orthodox have this illusion that the ecumenical councils was this golden age where everybody got along. Oh my God, it was the most horrific battle, like the most horrific theological, cultural battles that ever existed in orthodoxy and the only reason those councils worked apart from the Holy Spirit, was that you had an emperor whole literally forced everybody to the table and that doesn't exist and without that existing, the Orthodox world is just going to have to learn to kind of recognize these overlapping and multiple jurisdictions. - I used up my time and there's loads of clever people. (laughs) - So we have a microphone being passed around. So please, wait til the microphone comes. Let's start here with John Borelli in the second row and tell us who you are, where are you from and give us your question and thank you John. - I'm John Borelli. I work in the president's office and for many years, eight years, while I worked at the USCCB, I staffed Orthodox Catholic relations. Jon Erickson and I have a book of resources that in the pre-website days, publications. Once the five major C's were well established and in that last council, the east and west accept together, the order of the east were accepted and that had to do with major metropolitan C's in the history of Christianity. But after that, has not the establishment of the declaration of autocephaly been one of expediency more than anything else? This was pastorly expedient. And in fact, in the 19th century or before that, was not the condemnation of phyletism confusing that with nation state autocephaly? - So you drew your historical boundary with seventh council. Throughout the remainder of the Byzantine period, there were other grantings of autocephaly to what was become modern day Bulgaria, Serbia, and so forth. But those kind of came and went as it was politically expedient. Church and state, they didn't always get along. In fact, they rarely, rarely did in the Byzantine Empire. But for things like the recgnition of autocephaly, these were imperial laws. The granting of autocephaly, like there's no real difference between ecclesiastical law and imperial law in the Byzantine Empire. And so there was a kind of granting. These autocephalous, the number of autocephalous churches and whether they were recognized or not shifted at different points throughout the Byzantine Empire. You are right that with the collapse of the Ottomans and this explosion of national churches, which was yes, pastorally expedient to do so, you do have this question of phyletism but it's kind of the reaction against it. Everybody wants their own church now and that's not gonna work either and it's being conceptualized along ethnic lines and that had simply never been the case. And so you do get that reaction against it and so forth. But so yes, a kind of pastoral expediency. No one's really said it, but I'll proffer that 50 years from now, everybody thought Moscow is going to recognize a Ukrainian autocephalous church. I really don't think that's an open, like everybody's going to recognize it. There might be overlapping jurisdictions in Ukraine as a consequence, but I don't see a scenario where that's not gonna happen because that's happened for every other church in the 20th century that's gained autocephaly. Maybe Nadieszda feels differently. (mumbles) (laughs) - I don't see why you think of Moscow won't recognize the church. (laughs) - There you go. - Let's go here in the middle aisles. - Hi, I'm Arianan Dukenwarh. (mumbles) I'm a fellow at the Berkeley Center of Religion, Peace and World Affairs. And I actually have a very short question for each of you and I promise they're all very short. For Jose-- - Just give us one if you don't mind. - Sure, in that case, I have a question for one, two, three, four, for any one of you wants to pick this up. Based on the previous comment just now about the recognition of one Ukrainian Orthodox Church, what's going to stop Moscow from granting autocephaly to the metropolitan? What would that do to the picture? Because I'm totally with Nadieszda because I understand the situation as Nadieszda does that the Ukrainian Orthodox church/Moscow Patriarchate feels itself very much to be the Ukrainian church and feels very offended that Constantinople did not ask them. If they actually talked to them and said, hey, we're actually an important person here too. So I'd like to throw a different scenario, which is that Moscow eventually gives them autocephaly and considers them to be the canonical church. So what's going to happen? - It's a great question. - You'll have three churches, precisely. You'll have an orthodox church, autocephalous, recognized by the Moscow patriarchate and autocephalous orthodox church in communion with Costantine. You have a Greek Catholic church in communion with Rome. Galtsya, Ruthenia, that you mentioned. Ruthenia of course was the stronghold of Orthodoxy against the uniates then became the stronghold of the Greek Catholic Church. Under the Stalin, everybody was forced to become members of the Russian Orthodox Church and after independence, you have the most pluralistic structure in all of Ukraine, in with some people went back to the Greek Catholic church. You have the three Orthodox churches being very, very active in Galicia and the Baptist and the Pentecostals and so on. So again, this is the situation of people having the freedom to choose their church in Galicia and this is the only thing that basically most Ukrainians would like to have in Ukraine. - Yeah, please. Anybody want to. - I would say rather than what if the Moscow Patriarchate were to do this, it actually in the category of all the things of Tongan pen, the sadist or these that might've been, they actually blew a great opportunity to do it earlier because if the Moscow Patriarchate had been clever and granted autocephaly to metropolitan Enufri whom everyone respects, then that actually would have undercut Constantinople's position and they would have had for at least a few decades, someone that they liked and trusted, etc. But oh, well. (laughs) - I get accused of leaning one way instead of the other. So the gentleman in the back there. - I'm Fr. Dennis Bradley. Member of the autocephalous orthodox church in this country. I think there's a lot of politics and history that all of you have left out. Certainly I don't think the conflict between Moscow and Constantinople can be just understood in terms of the Ukraine. I would think you would all very well agree about the century's long struggle between the second and third Rome. The crisis in Ukraine could have been resolved by the Russian church. Patriarchal Alexi seriously considered giving Ukrainian church autocephaly. He was prevented by a number of hierarchs who were not in favor of that, but mostly by the government who was absolutely not in favor of it. The situation presently, we can give great credit to patriarch Correll for creating. He pushed Bartholomew into such a corner at Crete that if Bartholomew had not reacted, he would be effectively recognizing patriarch Correll as the de facto leader of world orthodoxy. So I do not think we can quite understand all of these issues narrowly. They involve very wide historical and political conflicts that go beyond the Ukraine. So I would caution trying to understand Ukraine just in Ukrainian terms. - Yeah, I mean I just a quick comment. He's right. There's a lot more... There's a lot more to this, obviously that's kind of surrounding it. This is not a big secret. It's very personal between Correll and Bartholomew. It's extremely personal between them and when it gets to that level of it being personal, then things head in a really bad direction. And it's called especially probably have both their judgments but Correll as Nadieszda pointed out and so many people have pointed out, Correll has made a series of blunders right here which to some extent has created the situation. - Come to the gentleman in the, I won't name the color of the scarf. The beautiful scarf. - [Male] Thank you very much. I was waiting for a compliment all day. John with FDD. We just-- - FDD can you explain. - Foundation for Defensive Democracies and we just wrote a piece on the schism in Provenance Magazine and my question is on another aspect of this story that we're trying to write about now about Moscow potentially trying to set up a rival Turkish Orthodox church to rival that and undermine Bartholomew and whether or not you guys have seen any action there and whether or not you have seen any outreach to the only Turkish Orthodox people, or I shouldn't have said that but the ones that I know of, the Gagaous in Moldova. - I'm gonna cheat and ask why the Ecumenical Patriarchate is only worried about Ukraine and not concerned about the Orthodox in northern Macedonia or the old calendarists in Greece. Sorry, that was cheating, I know but I can't comment on that. Although you're right, what you're saying does get to the principle of canonical territory. Yes, sort of hacked apart yet again. Point taken. - Let's keep moving. The gentleman here. - Hi, I'm Brian Flanagan from Marymount University. My question is for Telly as a theologian. So on one level attracted to Jose's sort of vision of the overlapping jurisdictions of three different autocephalous churches in the same space and kind of the thousand flowers blooming possibility there. But I'm wondering if that vision of church fits with the kind of ecclesiality of communion that you're talking about. - I think it can. I think it can as long as you have several issues. So I think it can. I mean I think that... I personally think that it's theological consistent to say that you can't really have multiple bishops in one city doesn't seem to make sense. It doesn't really promote a communion in that way. I do think that as you draw the borders, so again the drawing oF the borders is not necessarily dictated by theology as long as they're Drawn in such a way that they facilitate communion. And so just because you have multiple jurisdictions within a nation state, is in and of itself not a problem. It can facilitate communion. In other words, let me put it another way. It's not simply, it's not dictated that somehow that the borders have to be drawn along the lines of the nation state because that's the only pastoral way that seems to be effective or the only way to facilitate communion. - [Male] What if they don't share communion? - Well, you asked me if they're overlapping jurisdiction can facilitate communion. If they don't share communion, in other words, you mean with the Ukrainian, with a Greek Catholics? - No, I'm talking about relations between the three (mumbles) - That's a whole other ballgame there. (mumbles) That's a whole other issue. (mumbles) - [Male] The Orthodox church, the Ukrainian Orthodox church. - But I can imagine a situation. This is what someone who's very good on this issue Degenego Denesenco is recommending as well. There is this kind of perhaps assumption that in the creation of this Ukrainian orthodox or this newly established Ukrainian autocephalous Orthodox church that somehow the Orthodox church, Moscow patriarchate, the Ukrainian Orthodox church Moscow patriarchate is somehow going to be abolished. No one is necessarily advocating for that. What they're really advocating for is really the integrity of a Ukrainian Orthodox church itself is nOt under the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate. And even Nicholas Denesenko and others who are really Sarah Habarun and others who are really sort of really experts on this issue are kind of what they're basically saying is that there's going to be a lot of logistical issues but as they move through those logistical issues, forced coercion, should not be used. Dialogue, listening, conversation, compromise, negotiation, all those things which to some extent are kind of like a ascetical practices in a way. In the political realm and he's really advocating for that particular kind of movement through this process. I think the biggest fear is that that's not gonna happen, but that theoretically, theologically there's a vision that can happen. It's just a question of whether people are going to draw on those particular kinds of theological impulses and move in that direction. - To the front. - I'm Christine Warbeck and I'm from northern Illinois University and a colleague and Nadieszda, thank you very much for your last comment because of the thing that strikes me and I'm Canadian. So two key players in these negotiations are Canadians. That means I'm representative of what was considered schimatic church, never recognized and it predates the 1921 church. So what I think we're talking about as well is the experience that individuals who strongly believe in multiculturalism, not in an American sense but in pluralism, in ethnic diversities, but are also within that ecumenical framework very committed to democratic functioning institutions and not authoritarianism. And so I'm wondering if you see that as sort of... but has the diaspora made a difference in this or is it muddling the context here? I wonder what you might react to my comments. - For all I would say, the diaspora may have created some influence at the beginning but it has not really the dynamics today I wouldn't say that the diaspora has any big. We must recognize that Ukraine was the center of baptism, the largest Baptist church in Europe in the 19th century. You have to recognize these facts. You cannot call these people heretics because we are not Christian like us. So the question is, do we recognize these people as Christians, as part of the body of Christ or not? Or do we call them uniatists, schismatics, heretics? As long as we are maintained these principles, obviously there is no solution to it and then the state has to intervene and represses the deed and it will happen again. I have no expectations that 50 years from now we're not going to have repressive states again doing what they've done in past history. - Let's go to Walt and then we'll come here. You've been very patient. - Hi, Walt Racer. I don't belong to any prestigious institutions but I wanted to ask because these three orthodox expressions in Ukraine all shared the same faith, sacraments, everything's the same, what's larger impacts with the split between the patriarch Bartholomew and so forth and a Correll. I'm wondering in a larger sense of the church's mission. In other words, when protestants and Roman catholic split, that's a tremendous impact it seems to me and so forth over the centuries. So I'm just wondering what's the larger impact or should we view it as, okay, this is spewed internally In Ukraine. It certainly can be manipulated by Russia as government and this kind of thing, and you can have some other impacts with a conflict going on, but I'm wondering in terms of church, which is kind of wider impact. And how is that going to be different or the same as it was for Protestant Roman Catholic? - It's interesting because it both is and isn't similar to the Catholic Protestant one. So it's similar to the Catholic Protestant one in the sense that these communities no longer share the Eucharist with one another. They are no longer like in communion with one another. They do not form the same body of Christ and so forth. What's different speaking in generalization to the Catholic Protestant model? What's different from that is that while it's true that they are not part of the same body of Christ, their reason for separation really has no theological content. There is not a different dogmatic or doctrinal claim. It is a kind of historically and politically conditioned dispute over jurisdiction and authority. Going forward, I think it's hard. It's hard to say it's kind of, will these groups mold into one, will they not? Nadieszda referenced this and she's right. So some of the other autocephalous churches, they have rebuke might be a strong word, but they basically said we're not going to do what Correll did. We're not breaking coMmunion with Bartholomew over this issue, but they instructed their clergy not to recognize the clerics that Bartholomew has now recognized. That then sets a stage down the road that's going to get complicated and it remains to be seen how it's going to play out. - I'd like to pick up on something very positive that you suggested in your question. And here I'm going to come out as a total booster of Ukraine and the Ukrainian orthodox tradition. I'd actually place my hopes in precisely Ukrainian church history and in the particular situation of Ukraine, Ukraine is for centuries has been the crossroads of east and west, the orthodox and the Catholic hemisphere. It has significant, Jews and muslim traditions in it as well. It has a special relationship to Russia, a special relationship to Lithuania, a special relationship to Poland, and to Belaruz which everybody leaves out. So essentially it's different landscapes, different areas and I actually think the sooner that we leave it to Ukrainians to talk about this, honestly, the better off everybody will be. - The gentleman here in the front row and we may start bundling questions. - Hi, my name is Patrick Therose. So I have two claims to fame. One, I was the American ambassador to Katya which is important for one reason and I also represent the Greek orthodox patriarchate in Jerusalem in the states. Very simply, I was threatened to be declared anathema for bringing a priest from Jerusalem to Katya instead of bringing one from Antioch which is not relevant. My question is actually somewhat more relevant. There are a number of Palestinian parishes in the United States that because of some decision that was made so long ago that I don't even know when it was made that Antioch would have jurisdiction over all the orthodox, Arab orthodox patriarchates to the United States. These parishes, there's about a dozen of them feel that they have been treated badly and worse by the Antioch patriarchate which sees itself as a Lebanese Syrian institution. Has denied them priests, has done all sorts of things to make the Palestinians parishes feel miserable and they've ended up in a rather complex arrangement where Antioch wouldn't let them go back to Jerusalem, but they're now under I think under Constantinople. I'm a little confused over the exact stats. But the question is in this country, you have that way sort of multiple jurisdictions and how does that play out in this story? - With respect to the Palestinians? (mumbles) - How do we get divvied up here? - Yeah, that's a mess. (laughs) We're short on time. I don't know the details of the Palestinian parishes here. So I can't answer that question. The jurisdictional situation here is a mess. There were positive developments over the last couple of decades. I will say the most, perhaps the only tangible way in which this conflict in Ukraine is actually affecting Christians in the United States is it is stalling any kind of Pan-Orthodox integration in the United States. So that dispute there and between Moscow and the ecumenical patriarchate is going to freeze any movement towards integration in the United States. - But if I could make a quick comment, I mean, whereas prior to the fall of communism in the early 90s, there was an enormous movement and talk about this kind of Pan-Orthodox unity within the diaspora, right? Since the fall from the late 90s onward, that momentum has gone completely the other way. And I'm sorry, but this is just sort of descriptive. A lot of it has to do with the fact that again, it's not in the national interests of the Russian Orthodox church or the Russian government to do so. And so they have succeeded in shifting that particular kind of momentum and actually trying to provide theological justification for multiple jurisdictions around that are tied to the mother church. Put in quite in somewhat simpler language, they promote what I would say are theologically unjustifiable positions. And so I think that they have been a certain kind of engine driving certain kinds of particular kinds of things going on in the orthodox world globally. And I think look, there's been a comment like listen to the Ukrainian Orthodox church that is connected with the Moscow patriarchate. Well, I mean, you can't also blame people for not trusting them. You can't also blame them for not necessarily really having the interest of other than sort of the Russian national governments in mind and you can't necessarily blame them. I'm not saying that's a fact, I'm just saying that you can't blame people for thinking that. - Actually, I think you can blame people I mean, listen to what you just said. That the Ukrainian Orthodox church, Moscow Patriarchate has no other interest than advancing Russian national interest. That is what you said? - No, I said that that's their primary interest. - Have you not looked at their website? Sorry, I think not. - So we have to do the speed dating round here. So I've got two people who have... So final question. (mumbles) - You say so. - Can you introduce yourself? - My name is Arlene Kalupha. I'm a journalist and I'm also a schismatic because I'm a uniate and in one of the holies of holies in the Ukrainian religious world, which (mumbles) There's this tree of Orthodoxy and the Uniate church is a withered broken branch. - This is a good question because one of the things that hasn't been discussed at that after the empire, Orthodox church never developed a mechanism. Never, ever developed a mechanism for actually determining autocephaly. They've never ever developed a mechanism. So a way this problem is caused-- (mumbles) Canonicity, but there are no clear ways of interpreting the canons for determining autocephaly because the orthodox church never actually, perhaps never had the time, never had the will, most of the Orthodox were under Ottoman occupation. So I mean there are historical factors but they've never developed a kind of mechanism and they never did look like kind of mechanism that will ultimately withstand a certain kind of identification of autocephaly with ethnic identity, with national identity. And to some extent, it sort of highlights the virtues of having a certain kind of transnational center of power even though I recognize the problems associated with that too. It could, it's sort of recognizes that the idea of a transnational center of power where people can say fine, let's look over there. That seems to be something which ultimately is not necessarily connected to any one particular ethnicity or national identity. - I would only add, it is somewhat theologically pretentious to believe that those who are in communion with me are the body of Christ and those who are not are not the body of Christ, and as long as we maintain such a position, it's a very, very difficuLt. From the beginning, you had many, many bodies of Christ, many local churches. It was only the emperor who imposed these unity and whenever you had freedom, you had multiple churches everywhere. This is the fact, the historical social fact. Only the state, only political authority has imposed unity. Everywhere throughout history and the notion that my body of Christ is the body of Christ and somebody else's is not, I find is totally unchristian. I'm sorry, maybe canonical, but it's totally unchristian. - So we will close on that as the final word. (laughs) Let me just say, to be continued. These issues obviously are not going to be settled in short order, so maybe we will reconvene the panel in the future. Please join me in thanking our panelists tonight. (applause)

Contents

Africa

Asia

Europe

Within the European Union

Elsewhere in Europe

Historical

North America

Between Canada and the United States

This list is ordered from west to east:

Between Mexico and the United States

South America

See also

References

This page was last edited on 6 January 2019, at 09:34
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