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This article lists the heads of state of Iran since the establishment of the modern Iranian nation-state[1] in 1501 AD.
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Transcription
Hi, I’m John Green and this is Crash Course World History and today we’re talking about Iran. Oh, Mr. Green? Mr. Green? I know that country. It’s in the Middle East. It’s with Egypt. No, Me from the Past, we’re going to talk about Iran. Now, I used to be you so I remember when you would look at this part of the world and you would be like, “oh yeah, that’s a thing.” And in your case that “thing” extended more or less from I guess, like, western China to, like, uh, Poland. Then you’d make a bunch of broad generalizations about that area and no doubt use the terms Arab and Muslim interchangeably. But as usual Me From the Past the truth resists simplicity. So today we are going to talk about Iran and just Iran. Specifically, the 1979 Iranian Revolution. So the 1979 Iranian Revolution and its aftermath are often seen by detractors as the first step in the creation of an isolated, fundamentalist state that supports terrorism, and, you might be surprised to hear me say, that there is some truth to that interpretation. That said, the way you think about the Iranian Revolution depends a lot of which part of it you are looking at. And regardless, it’s very important because it represents a different kind of revolution from the ones that we usually talk about. So the 1979 uprisings were aimed at getting rid of the Pahlavi Dynasty, which sounds, like, impressive, but this dynasty had only had two kings, Reza Shah and Mohammed Reza Shah. Before the Pahlavis, Iran was ruled by the Qajar dynasty, and before that the Safavids. The Safavids and Qajars were responsible for two of the most important aspects of Iran: The Safavids made Shia Islam the official state religion in Iran, starting with Ismail I in 1501, and the Qajars gave the Muslim clergy – the ulema – political power. So most of the world’s Muslims are Sunnis but the Shia, or Shiites are an important sect that began very early on – around 680 CE and today form the majority of Muslims in Iran and Iraq. Now within both Sunni and Shia there are further divisions and many sects, but we’re just going to talk about, like, the historical difference between the two. Shia Muslims believe that Ali should’ve been the first Caliph, Sunni Muslims think that Abu Bakr, who was the first Caliph, was rightly chosen. Since that disagreement, there have been many others, many doctrinal differences but what’s more important is that from the very beginning, Shia Muslims saw themselves as the party of the oppressed standing up against the wealthy and powerful and harkening back to the social justice standard that was set by the prophet. And this connection between religious faith and social justice was extremely important to the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and also to previous revolutions in Iran. This is really crucial to understand because many historians argue that the Iranian revolution represents what the journalist Christian Caryl called an “odd fusion of Islam and late-twentieth century revolutionary politics.” But actually, in the scheme of Iranian history, its not so odd. Because 1979 was not Iran’s first revolution. The first major one was in 1906. It forced the ruling Qajars to accept a constitution. It created a parliament and supposedly some limits on the king, and made Shia Islam the official state religion, but it also protected the rights of minorities in Iran. It ultimately failed partly because the clergy withdrew their support, partly because the shah worked very actively against it, and maybe most importantly, because the Russians and the British worked to keep Persia weak so they could continue to try to dominate the region. Which reminds me that most people in Iran are not Arabs, they are Persian. And most people in Iran don’t speak Arabic, they speak Farsi, or as we often call it in English, Persian. So after WWI European rivalries really heated up because of the discovery of oil in the Middle East. The British established the Anglo Iranian Oil Company – which would later come to be known as BP. They also extracted a bunch of concessions from the Iranian government in addition to extracting lots of oil. And they helped to engineer a change in dynasty by supporting military commander Reza Khan in his coup in February 1921. Reza Khan became Reza Shah and then he attempted to turn Persia, which he re-named Iran in 1935, into a modern, secular, western-style state kind of like Turkey was under Ataturk. But Reza Shah is perhaps best remembered for his over the top dictatorial repression, which turned the clergy against him. Okay, so during World War II Reza Shah abdicated and his young son Mohammad Reza Shah became the leader of Iran. Which he remained, mostly, until 1979 when he definitely stopped being the leader of Iran. So after World War II, the British allowed greater popular participation in Iran’s government. The main party to benefit from this openness was Tudeh, the Iranian communist party. Mohammed Mosaddegh was elected prime minister in 1951 and led the parliament to nationalize Iran’s oil industry, and that was the end of the democratic experiment. Now most history books say that in 1953 the British and the CIA engineered a coup to remove Mosaddegh from office. And that is quite possibly true. It is definitely true that we tried to engineer a coup. It’s also true that Mosaddegh quit and fled Iran following demonstrations against him. But we also know that the Shia clergy encouraged those demonstrations. That’s a bit of a weird decision for the Clergy, considering that Shia Islam traditionally takes a radical stance against oppression. But it’s important to remember that Mosaddegh was supported by the Tudeh party and they were communists. Nationalization of the oil industry was one thing, but a further shift toward communism might mean appropriation of the land that supported the clergy, maybe even a rejection of religion altogether. So now we’ve seen two occasions where the Shia clergy support helped facilitate change. Right, in 1906 and again in 1953. So, let’s flash ahead to 1979. The Shah was definitely an autocrat, and he employed a ruthless secret police called the SAVAK to stifle dissent. In 1975, the Shah abolished Iran’s two political parties and replaced them with one party the Resurgence party. You’ll never guess who was resurging - the Shah. There was a huge round of censorship and arrests and torture of political prisoners signaling that autocracy was in Iran to stay. But before those events in 1975, say between 1962 and 1975, by most economic and social measures Iran saw huge improvements. In 1963, the Shah had tried to institute what he called a White Revolution – top-down modernization led by the monarchy, and in many ways he was successful, especially in improving industry and education. Oil revenues rose from $555 million in 1964 to $20 billion in 1976. And the Shah’s government invested a lot of that money in infrastructure and education. The population grew and infant mortality fell. A new professional middle class arose. But the White Revolution wasn’t universally popular. For instance, it was opposed by one particular Shia cleric - the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Khomeini spoke out against the White Revolution from the religious center of Iran, Qom. One of his main complaints was that the reforms would grant more rights to women, including the right to vote, but he also attacked the government for, quote: “the rigging of elections and other constitutional abuses, neglect of the poor and the sale of oil to Israel.” And in general, Khomeini felt that a king’s power was inherently un-Islamic and that Shia tradition was to fight that power. That noted about Khomeini, the 1979 revolution didn’t start out to create an Islamic state. At first it was a pretty typical uprising by dissatisfied Iranians to overthrow a government that they perceived as corrupt and unresponsive to their needs. In spite of, or arguably because of, oil-fueled economic growth, many Iranians weren’t enjoying economic success. The universities were turning out more graduates than there were jobs and the mechanization of agriculture had the predictable result of displacing farmers who moved to cities. Especially the capital city of Tehran where there weren’t nearly enough jobs for the number of people. So, I think it’s unfair to say that a majority of the demonstrators who took to the streets in late 1978 were motivated by a fundamentalist vision of Islam. They were dissatisfied with economic inequality and political repression and a corrupt regime. So why do we generally remember the 1979 revolution as having been motivated by Shia Islam. Well, Let’s go to the Thought Bubble. So the initial demonstrations did begin after an Iranian newspaper on January 7, 1978 published an article that was critical of Khomeini. By the way, at the time he was living in Paris. These initial demonstrations were pretty small, but when the government police and army forces starting firing on demonstrators, killing some of them, the protests grew. Each time marchers protested against the violent treatment of demonstrators, the government would crack down, and their violent reaction would spur more demonstrations. There was also a lot of criticism of the west tied up in the revolution. According to one woman who participated: “American lifestyles had come to be imposed as an ideal, the ultimate goal. Americanism was the model. American popular culture – books, magazines, film – had swept over our country like a flood...We found ourselves wondering ‘Is there any room for our own culture?’” The Shah never understood why so many people were protesting against him; he thought that they were communists, or being supported by the British. He also thought that merely bringing prosperity would be enough to keep him in power. It wasn’t. On January 16, 1979 he left Iran. He eventually ended up in the U.S., which had unfortunate consequences for diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Iran. But the point here is that the first part of the Iranian revolution was relatively peaceful protests followed by a government crackdown, more protests that eventually led to the collapse of the monarchy, and that looks kind of familiar, especially if you’ve studied, like, the French or Russian or even the American Revolutions. And most historians argue these protests weren’t about Islam, but rather, “The discontent over living conditions, pay cuts, and the threat of unemployment fused with the general disillusionment and anger with the regime.” The government that eventually replaced the monarchy was the second, and in many ways much more revolutionary revolution. Thanks Thought Bubble. So the new Islamic Republic of Iran was based on Khomeini’s idea about what an Islamic government should be, a principle he called velayat-e faqih. Mainly it was that a sharia law scholar, would have ultimate authority, because he was more knowledgeable than anyone about law and justice. There would be a legislature and a president and a prime minister, but any of their decisions could be overturned by the supreme ruler who from 1979 until his death was Khomeini. Now, if democracy is only about holding elections, then the new Iran was a democracy. I mean, Iran has elections, both for president and for the parliament. And for the record, despite what Khomeini might have thought in the ‘60s, women can vote in Iran and they do. They also serve in the parliament and the president’s cabinet. And in the referendum on whether to create an Islamic Republic of Iran, the vast majority of Iranians in a free and open vote, voted “yes.” Now governance in Iran is extremely complicated, too complicated for one Crash Course video. But in once sense at least, Iran is definitely not a democracy. The ultimate authority, written into the constitution, is not the will of the people but god, who is represented by the supreme religious leader. And the actions of the Islamic Republic, especially in the early chaotic days of 1979 but also many times since, don’t conform to most ideas of effective democracy. Like one of the first things that Khomeini did to shore up his support was to create the Islamic Revolutionary Guards and Hezbollah to defend the revolution against coup attempts. Although initially there were opposition parties, their activities were curtailed by the new “revolutionary courts” that applied sharia law in a particularly harsh fashion. Like it’s estimated that by October 1979, several hundred people had been executed. And under the new constitution, Khomeini was given extensive power. I mean, he could appoint the heads of the armed services, and the Revolutionary Guard and the national TV and radio stations. He also approved the candidates for presidential elections and appointed six of the twelve members of the Guardian Council that approved legislation from the parliament before it became law. So structurally Iran’s government looked kind of like other governments, but as Michael Axworthy points out it was different because, quote, “above and beyond stood the faqih, with the power and the responsibility to intervene directly in the name of Islam; indeed with powers greater than those given to most monarchs in constitutional monarchies.” By 1979, Iran already had a long history of clerical involvement in protest and dynamic change, but it also had a long history of pushing for constitutions and liberty. The current end result is the Islamic Republic of Iran, but it’s worth remembering that both those threads of history are still part of Iranian life. Like we saw that in 2009 and 2010 with the so-called Green Revolution where there were huge protests after an Iranian election. Those protests involved young people arguing for more rights and liberties.. But they were also led by, and encouraged by, reformist Shia clerics. In the U.S. we mostly remember the 1979 Iranian Revolution for its burning of American flags and taking of hostages in the American Embassy. That belonged more to the second phase of the revolution, the chaotic period when the Islamic republic was being born. Life in the Islamic Republic of Iran remains highly repressive. I mean, for instance, Iran still executes a very high percentage of criminals. But it’s inaccurate to say that Iran is merely a dictatorship, or that it’s merely repressive. And one of the challenges for people in the West trying to understand Iran is that we have to disentangle the various aspects of the revolution rather than simply relying on the images that have defined it for us. I hope this episode can help a little. You can find more resources in the links below. Thanks for watching. Crash Course is filmed here in the Chad and Stacey Emigholz studio in Indianapolis and it’s made possible because of the hard worth of all of these people. Thank you for watching and as we say in my hometown, “don’t forget to be awesome.”
Heads of State of Iran
The Expansive Realm of Iran (1501–1736)Safavid dynasty | |||||||
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No. | Name | Birth–Death | Reign start | Reign end | Dynasty | ||
Shah of Persia | |||||||
1 | Shah Ismail I | 1487–1524 | July 1501[a] | 23 May 1524 | Safavid | ||
. | |||||||
2 | Shah Tahmasp I | 1514–1576 | 23 May 1524 | 14 May 1576 | Safavid | ||
Regency:
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3 | Shah Ismail II | 1537–1577 | 23 May 1576 | 24 November 1577 | Safavid | ||
. | |||||||
4 | Shah Mohammad Khodabanda | 1532–1595/96 | 11 February 1578 | 1 October 1588 | Safavid | ||
. | |||||||
5 | Shah Abbas I | 1571–1629 | 1 October 1588 | 19 January 1629 | Safavid | ||
. | |||||||
6 | Shah Safi | 1611–1642 | 28 January 1629 | 12 May 1642 | Safavid | ||
. | |||||||
7 | Shah Abbas II | 1632–1666 | 12 May 1642 | 25 September 1666 | Safavid | ||
. | |||||||
8 | Shah Suleiman I | 1648–1694 | 1 November 1666 | 29 July 1694 | Safavid | ||
. | |||||||
9 | Shah Sultan Husayn | 1668–1726 | 6 August 1694 | 23 October 1722 | Safavid | ||
. | |||||||
Ghilji rebellion | |||||||
10 | Mahmud Shah | 1699–1725 | 23 October 1722 | 25 April 1725 | Hotak | ||
. | |||||||
11 | Ashraf Shah | 1700–1730 | 26 April 1725 | 13 November 1729 | Hotak | ||
. | |||||||
Safavid restoration | |||||||
12 | Shah Tahmasp II | 1704–1740 | 10 November 1722 | 2 September 1732 | Safavid | ||
He was crowned on 9 December 1729 after liberation of the Safavid Capital.
Reigned at exile:
| |||||||
13 | Shah Abbas III | 1732–1740 | 2 September 1732 | 8 March 1736 | Safavid | ||
Realm of Iran (1736–1796)Afsharid dynasty | |||||||
14 | Nader Shah | 1688–1747 | 8 March 1736 | 20 June 1747 | Afsharid | ||
. | |||||||
15 | Adil Shah | 1719–1749 | 6 July 1747 | 29 September 1748 | Afsharid | ||
. | |||||||
16 | Ebrahim Shah | 1724–1749 | 29 September 1748 | May 1749 | Afsharid | ||
. | |||||||
17 | Shahrokh Shah | 1734–1796 | May 1749 | 30 December 1749 | Afsharid | ||
Proclaimed as Shah at 30 September 1748 and one day later crowned at Mashhad. | |||||||
Second Safavid restoration | |||||||
18 | Suleiman II | 1714–1763 | 13 January 1750 | 20 March 1750 | Safavid | ||
Proclaimed after deposing and blinding of Shahrokh Shah and crowned at 14 January 1750. | |||||||
19 | Ismail III | 1733–1773 | 29 June 1750 | 1773 | Safavid | ||
He was a Puppet ruler who raised to the throne by Ali Mardan Khan Bakhtiari and Karim Khan Zand as a front to legitimize their rule.[7]
Regency:
| |||||||
Afsharid restoration | |||||||
(17) | Shahrokh Shah | 1734–1796 | 9 May 1755 | 14 May 1796 | Afsharid | ||
. | |||||||
Zand dynasty | |||||||
Wakil-al Raʿāyā | |||||||
20 | Karim Khan | 1705–1779 | 1773 | 1 March 1779 | Zand | ||
. | |||||||
21 | Abol-Fath Khan | 1755–1787 | 6 March 1779 | May/June 1779 | Zand | ||
He and his younger brother Mohammad Ali Khan were Co-rulers. | |||||||
22 | Mohammad Ali Khan | 1760–1779 | 6 March 1779 | 19 June 1779 | Zand | ||
He and his elder brother Abol-Fath Khan were Co-rulers until May/June 1779. | |||||||
(21) | Abol-Fath Khan | 1755–1787 | 19 June 1779 | 22 August 1779 | Zand | ||
. | |||||||
23 | Sadeq Khan | ?–1781 | 22 August 1779 | 14 March 1781 | Zand | ||
. | |||||||
24 | Ali-Morad Khan | c. 1720–1785 | 15 March 1781 | 11 February 1785 | Zand | ||
. | |||||||
– | Bagher Shah | ?–1786 | 12 February 1785 | 17 February 1785 | — | ||
After the death of Ali-Morad Khan, Bagher Khan Khorasgani Governor of Isfahan proclaimed himself as Shah and mentioned himself in the Khutbah and on coins. He was defeated from the corps of Jafar Khan.[9] | |||||||
25 | Jafar Khan | ?–1789 | 18 February 1785 | 23 January 1789 | Zand | ||
. | |||||||
26 | Seyd Morad Khan | ?–1789 | 23 January 1789 | 10 May 1789 | Zand | ||
. | |||||||
27 | Lotf Ali Khan | c. 1769–1794 | 10 May 1789 | 20 March 1794 | Zand | ||
. | |||||||
Shah of Iran | |||||||
(27) | Lotf Ali Shah | c. 1769–1794 | 21 March 1794 | 30 October 1794 | Zand | ||
. | |||||||
Sublime State of Persia (1796–1925) | |||||||
28 | Agha Mohammad Shah | 1742–1797 | 14 May 1796 | 17 June 1797 | Qajar | ||
Agha Mohammad decided to move his capital to the small town of Tehran on 1786.[10] He was formally crowned as Shah during spring 1796 at the Mugan plain, on his return after the conquest of Tbilisi.[11][12] | |||||||
29 | Fath-Ali Shah | 1772–1834 | 17 June 1797 | 23 October 1834 | Qajar | ||
. | |||||||
30 | Mohammad Shah | 1808–1848 | 9 November 1834 | 5 September 1848 | Qajar | ||
. | |||||||
31 | Naser al-Din Shah | 1831–1896 | 13 September 1848 | 1 May 1896 | Qajar | ||
Queen-mother Mahd-e Olia: 5 September 1848 – 1 October 1848. | |||||||
32 | Mozaffar ad-Din Shah | 1853–1907 | 2 May 1896 | 8 January 1907 | Qajar | ||
. | |||||||
33 | Mohammad Ali Shah | 1872–1925 | 8 January 1907 | 16 July 1909 | Qajar | ||
. | |||||||
34 | Ahmad Shah | 1898–1930 | 16 July 1909 | 31 October 1925 | Qajar | ||
Reigned in exile: from 2 December 1923
Regency:
| |||||||
Imperial State of Iran (1925–1979) | |||||||
No. | Name | Birth–Death | Took office | Left office | Political Affiliation | ||
Provisional Head of State | |||||||
35 | Reza Khan | 1878–1944 | 31 October 1925 | 15 December 1925 | Military | ||
. | |||||||
No. | Name | Birth–Death | Took office | Left office | Dynasty | ||
Shah of Iran | |||||||
(35) | Reza Shah | 1878–1944 | 15 December 1925 | 16 September 1941 | Pahlavi | ||
. | |||||||
36 | Mohammad Reza Shah | 1919–1980 | 16 September 1941 | 11 February 1979 | Pahlavi | ||
No. | Name | Birth–Death | Took office | Left office | Political Affiliation | ||
Islamic Republic of Iran (1979–present) | |||||||
Leader of the Revolution | |||||||
37 | Ruhollah Khomeini | 1900-1989 | 5 February 1979 | 3 December 1979 | Independent | ||
. | |||||||
Supreme Leader of Iran | |||||||
(37) | Ruhollah Khomeini | 1900-1989 | 3 December 1979 | 3 June 1989 | Independent | ||
. | |||||||
38 | Ali Khamenei | 1939–present | 4 June 1989 | Incumbent | Independent[b] | ||
. |
Timeline
See also
- List of monarchs of Persia
- List of premiers of Iran (1699–1907)
- List of prime ministers of Iran
- List of presidents of Iran
Notes
- ^ Is equivalent to Muharram 907 AH.
- ^ Resigned from Combatant Clergy Association after selection as Supreme Leader.[15]
References
- ^ Mikaberidze 2011, p. 432.
- ^ a b c Potts 2014, p. 230: "During the first nine years of his reign Shah Tahmasp was advised, in succession, by a Rumlu regent (Div Sultan Rumlu); a Triumvirate including a Takkalu (Chuha Soltan Takkalu) and an Ustajlu (Köpek Sultan Ustajlu) chief; a Takkalu (Chuha Sultan) who distributed land widely to members of his own tribe during his four years in office and was ruler of Iran in all but name; and a Shamlu (Husayn Khan Shamlu) who held his post for three years before being put to death in 1533 in alleged complicity with the Ottoman regime."
- ^ Mitchell 2009: "Ṭahmāsp's puppet status continued with his accession to the throne on 23 May 1524, and the self-appointed status of Div Solṭān Rumlu as the Shah's Vicegerent and the Empire's De facto ruler.."
- ^ Savory 1995: "Dīv Solṭān, by virtue of a testamentory disposition of the late Shah, retained the office of Amīr al-Omarā and was made Atābeg (Guardian) of the young prince Ṭahmāsb, who succeeded his father at the age of ten and a half. Dīv Solṭān thus became the De facto ruler of the state... After a period of negotiation, a Triumvirate was formed consisting of Dīv Solṭān Rūmlū, Čūha Solṭān Takkalū, and Kopek Ostājlū, but civil war broke out between rival Qezelbāš factions in 932 AH / 1526 AD. Kopek Solṭān was killed in 933 AH / 1526 or 1527 AD, and Čūha Solṭān succeeded in persuading Shah Ṭahmāsb that Dīv Solṭān was the cause of the discord."
- ^ Savory 2004: "Ḥosayn Khan, however, did not draw the obvious conclusions from the fate of Čuha Sultan, but proceeded to repeat the latter's mistakes, appointing members of the Šāmlu tribe to provincial governorships and fatally underestimating the Shah's new determination to rule De facto as well as De jure."
- ^ Savory 1982: "After the deposition of his father by Nāder Khan Afšār in Rabīʿ I 1145 AH / August 1732 AD, the eight-month-old Abbas was invested as ʿAbbās III on 7 September 1732. Nader Khan, who was the real ruler of the country, dropped his own now obviously inappropriate style of Ṭahmāsp-qolī Khan and assumed the titles of Vakīl-Al-dawla (Deputy of the state) and Nāʾeb-al-salṭana (Viceroy)."
- ^ a b Perry 1998.
- ^ Perry 1991, pp. 68: "The early months of 1751 thus mark the beginning of Karim Khan's rule as Viceroy of the nominal King Ismaʿil III, a position to be hotly disputed for twelve more years but never wrested from him."
- ^ Bamdad 2005, p. 177.
- ^ Gharipour 2012, p. 204.
- ^ Axworthy 2008, p. 192.
- ^ Hambly 1963, p. 169.
- ^ Mahbubi Ardakani 1988: "After the deposition of Mohammad Ali Shah on 16 July 1909, a regent had to be appointed because Ahmad Shah was a Minor. The choice fell on ʿAżod-al-molk. As a senior dignitary and the chief of the Qajar tribe, he enjoyed the respect of the constitutionalists and was in good relationship with the olamā. He served as regent for one year and three months until his death."
- ^ Bakhash 2015: "Citing the disordered state of affairs in Iran, the divisions in parliament, the lack of parliamentary unanimity over his own election, he left France for Iran only in December, arriving home two months later. He did not take the Oath of office until March 1911."
- ^ "جامعه روحانيت مبارز جوان ميشود" [Combatant Clergy Association gets younger] (in Persian). Fararu. 8 July 2012. 118101. Archived from the original on 2 September 2016. Retrieved 25 June 2016.
Bibliography
- Axworthy, Michael (2008). Iran: Empire of the Mind: A History from Zoroaster to the Present Day. Penguin Books. ISBN 978-0141903415.
- Gharipour, Mohammad (2012). The Bazaar in the Islamic City: Design, Culture, and History. Cairo: American University in Cairo Press. ISBN 978-9774165290.
- Mikaberidze, Alexander (2011). Conflict and Conquest in the Islamic World: A Historical Encyclopedia. ABC-CLIO. ISBN 978-1-59884-337-8.
- Perry, John R. [in Persian] (1991). "The Zand dynasty". In Avery, Peter; Hambly, Gavin R. G. [in Persian]; Melville, Charles P. (eds.). The Cambridge History of Iran. Vol. 7: From Nadir Shah to the Islamic Republic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 63–103. ISBN 978-0-52120-095-0.
- Potts, Daniel T. (2014). Nomadism in Iran: From Antiquity to the Modern Era. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0199330799.
- Zabir, Sepehr (2011). The Iranian Military in Revolution and War (RLE Iran D). Routledge. ISBN 978-1-136-81270-5.
- Bāmdād, Mahdī [in Persian] (2005). ʻAlīʹzādah Ishkavarī, D̲abīḥallāh (ed.). Šarḥ-i ḥāl-i riǧāl-i Īrān dar qarn-i 12 wa 13 wa 14 hiǧrī (in Persian). Tehran: Ferdows. ISBN 978-9643201395.
- Hambly, G. R. G. [in Persian] (1963). "Aqa Mohammad Khan and the establishment of the Qajar dynasty". Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society. 50 (2): 161–174. doi:10.1080/03068376308731821.
- Bakhash, Shaul (16 May 2016) [3 December 2015]. "NĀṢER-AL-MOLK, ABU'L-QĀSEM". In Yarshater, Ehsan (ed.). Encyclopædia Iranica. New York City: Bibliotheca Persica Press. Retrieved 1 January 2018.
- Mahbubi Ardakani, H. [in Persian] (18 August 2011) [15 December 1988]. "ʿAŻOD-AL-MOLK, ʿALĪ REŻĀ KHAN". In Yarshater, Ehsan (ed.). Encyclopædia Iranica. Fasc. 3. Vol. III. New York City: Bibliotheca Persica Press. pp. 271–272. Retrieved 1 January 2018.
- Mitchell, Colin P. (15 July 2009) [15 July 2009]. "ṬAHMĀSP I". In Yarshater, Ehsan (ed.). Encyclopædia Iranica. New York City: Bibliotheca Persica Press. Retrieved 1 January 2018.
- Perry, John R. [in Persian] (19 January 2012) [15 December 1998]. "ESMĀʿĪL III ṢAFAWĪ". In Yarshater, Ehsan (ed.). Encyclopædia Iranica. Fasc. 6. Vol. VIII. New York City: Bibliotheca Persica Press. p. 636. Retrieved 1 January 2018.
- Savory, Roger M. (13 July 2011) [15 December 1982]. "ʿABBĀS III". In Yarshater, Ehsan (ed.). Encyclopædia Iranica. Fasc. 1. Vol. I. New York City: Bibliotheca Persica Press. p. 76. Retrieved 1 January 2018.
- Savory, Roger M. (28 November 2011) [15 December 1995]. "DĪV SOLṬĀN". In Yarshater, Ehsan (ed.). Encyclopædia Iranica. Fasc. 4. Vol. VII. New York City: Bibliotheca Persica Press. p. 431. Retrieved 1 January 2018.
- Savory, Roger M. (23 March 2012) [15 December 2004]. "ḤOSAYN KHAN ŠĀMLU". In Yarshater, Ehsan (ed.). Encyclopædia Iranica. Fasc. 5. Vol. XII. New York City: Bibliotheca Persica Press. pp. 514–515. Retrieved 1 January 2018.
External links