To install click the Add extension button. That's it.

The source code for the WIKI 2 extension is being checked by specialists of the Mozilla Foundation, Google, and Apple. You could also do it yourself at any point in time.

4,5
Kelly Slayton
Congratulations on this excellent venture… what a great idea!
Alexander Grigorievskiy
I use WIKI 2 every day and almost forgot how the original Wikipedia looks like.
Live Statistics
English Articles
Improved in 24 Hours
Added in 24 Hours
What we do. Every page goes through several hundred of perfecting techniques; in live mode. Quite the same Wikipedia. Just better.
.
Leo
Newton
Brights
Milds

List of California ballot propositions 1990–99

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

This is a list of California ballot propositions from 1990–1999.

YouTube Encyclopedic

  • 1/5
    Views:
    13 535
    96 316
    3 399
    2 541
    24 847
  • ✪ Wall Street Greed: Financial Crises Since 3500 BCE (CC)
  • ✪ Bill Clinton Gives First of Lecture Series at Georgetown
  • ✪ Freedman's Bank 150th Anniversary Celebration
  • ✪ Who Belongs? | 1 of 4 | Rights, Duties, and Responsibilities || Radcliffe Institute
  • ✪ A World in Revolution: The Inevitable Backlash against Global Elites

Transcription

In this video, we will explore the economic history of financial crises, events that continue to occur and reoccur. Throughout history, both rich and poor countries have muddled their way through a vast range of crises. These crises have included sovereign-government defaults on both domestic and foreign national debts, banking and financial market panics, and collapses due to piracy on the high seas and subprime mortgage meltdowns. In addition, there has been monetary inflation, due to everything from species-currency debasement, which reduced the gold and silver content of coins in favor of more base metals in recent centuries, to the modern corollary of printing more paper money within a network of sovereign fractional-reserve central banks. Apart from a handful of octogenarians with sharp memories who can remember the Crash of 1929 and the subsequent Great Depression first-hand, most of our present generation has little recollection of such matters. Therefore, when the Subprime Mortgage-Backed Securities Bubble burst in 2008, we felt that we had encountered something unheard of in human history. In response to this episode, many Americans denied any connection to past crises. We stood around chanting “This time is different.” However, in their book of the same name, This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly, Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff produce evidence that refutes our belief, evidence that is almost a millennium old. The authors cover sixty-six countries across five continents and eight centuries to create their argument that financial disasters are universal behaviors, rites of passage for all countries and nations. Earlier in the Twentieth Century, Sidney Homer published his first edition of A History of Interest Rates. Homer presents a readable account of interest-rate trends and lending practices that span more than four millennia of economic history. By including evidence from ancient Mesopotamia, Greece, and Rome, the Medieval Times, and Renaissance Europe, he offers a big-picture view of the rise and fall of empires against the backdrop of the fall and rise of their long-run average interest rates. Homer concludes that these rates move inversely to the rise and fall of empires. Many people consider economists a gloomy lot. Other less kindly critics view this field as one that attracts the chronically depressed. This may be true. However, we are not bereft of our colorful characters. For example, the nineteenth-century English author, jurist, philosopher, utilitarian economist, and legal and social reformer Jeremy Bentham could not have gone to his reward without some sense of humor. Leaving a large endowment to University College London, Bentham set forth in his will that his remains be wheeled solemnly into the Council Room of the school so that he may take his place at all regular meetings of the College Council. Since his earthly demise in 1832, the meeting minutes have recorded him as “present but not voting.” When not in attendance at meetings, Bentham resides as an Auto-Icon framed by a wood and glass case positioned in a main lobby of the college. He intended that his head should be part of his Auto-Icon, which includes his fully dressed and padded skeleton. However, when the time came to preserve Bentham’s head for posterity through a method of desiccation practiced by the Maori Tribe of New Zealand, the process went disastrously wrong. It robbed the face of most of its expression and left it decidedly unattractive. The college then substituted a wax head atop the body with Bentham’s real head reposing on the floor between his feet, both in his display cabinet and at meetings. Unfortunately, the real head of Jeremy Bentham became a target for a roving band of Economics students from King’s College London. These rogues stole the head and held it for ransom. The final thread of tolerance by University College broke when officials discovered the head being used for soccer practice on their front quadrangle lawn. After this incident, the powers that be removed Bentham’s noggin and placed it in more secure storage. Today, Bentham’s fully attired skeleton, surmounted with the wax head, can be seen as he sits in his lobby cabinet. However, let us turn to Jeremy Bentham the person as social reformer, utilitarian economist, and philosopher. Bentham is remembered best as a leading advocate for social reform and the reform of the British prison system, which had degenerated into inhumane work houses and hellholes. In searching for a solution, he designed the Panopticon, an institutional building in the round. Though Bentham conceived the basic plan as being equally applicable to hospitals, schools, poorhouses, daycares, and madhouses, he devoted most of his efforts to developing a design for a Panopticon prison, which he described as a new mode of obtaining “power of mind over mind.” The design concept consisted of a circular structure with an inspection house at the center. From this vantage point, the staff of the institution could watch the inmates housed around the perimeter without their knowledge of being watched. A real prison based on Bentham’s design was never built. However, there are twenty-five prisons internationally that are Panopticon-inspired, including one in Illinois. As a leader of the intellectual movement in Europe and America during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Bentham was joined by contemporary polymaths such as Johann Wolfgang von Goethe of Germany and John Ruskin of the Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood in England. Furthermore, Bentham allied himself with fellow Unitarians, including Joseph Priestley, Harriet and James Martineau, and economist John Stuart Mill, all of whom were leaders in the movements for factory reform, prison reform, public health, temperance, rights of women, and the abolition of slavery. In accord with their beliefs, Bentham and many of his entourage crossed over into the Fabian Socialist organization that ultimately included Florence Nightingale, the founder of modern nursing; Prince Otto Bismarck, chancellor of the German Reich; Helena Petrovna Blavatsky, founder of the Theosophic Movement; Fabian essayist Annie Besant, who succeeded Madame Blavatsky as president of the Theosophical Society; Sir Neville Chamberlain, British statesman; scientist Charles Darwin; economists David Ricardo, John Stuart Mill, and John Maynard Keynes; writer Karl Marx; Benjamin Disraeli, the Prime Minister of England; and authors/philosophers Aldous Huxley and Bertrand Russell. The underlying common beliefs of this most influential group included an early rejection of the concept and philosophy of Materialism, perceived as the fundamental spirit of the current cultural epoch. This spirit of time grew throughout the Industrial Age of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to permeate the global society and economy in which we now find ourselves. In addition to the above tenets, members of this complex intelligentsia sought and embraced ancient teachings from Asia and disseminated the lessons of Buddha and other religious figures from India and Asia. For example, Madame Blavatsky traveled to India and remained there, gathering and studying ancient teachings, for a number of years. Upon her return from the east, she brought a new wealth of ideas to Europe and America and shared much of what she had learned through the Theosophical Society. All of these events beg these questions: Why did this intellectual enlightenment from the east to the western world throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries occur at that time in history? How does it affect the nature of and our perception of the complex system of economic cycles that periodically erupt into financial crises? The answer to the first question is simple. The trade that brought this intellectual enlightenment was economic in nature. Therefore, it forms the basis for our continuing story. The pivotal event was the creation of the British East India Trading Company in 1600 CE. The Company reopened the Asian sub-continent to the west after two millennia of very limited contact. In 1608, ships from the Company first arrived in India at the port of Surat. Two centuries of communication and trade with the west already had been established before Blavatsky and other Westerners traveled there. German polymath philosopher and teacher Rudolf Steiner brought much of the older esoteric knowledge forward into the Twentieth Century; his writings continue to influence scholars to this day. In 1904, he started to break away from the spiritualist faction because he claimed that they had gotten into objectionable practices. For example, this faction was attempting to bring back the dead in order to use them to impersonate the relatives of clients at seances. Also, President Annie Besant began to present the child Jiddu Krishnamurti as the reincarnated Christ. Steiner formed the Anthroposophical Movement around 1909. Important to our current discussion, Steiner dates and names the cultural epochs that began with Ancient India in the eighth millennium BCE. These epochs include Persian, Egypto-Chaldean, Greco-Roman, and Anglo-German, among others. All of these epochs are of equal length, approximately 2,200 years. Unfortunately for our present purposes, reliable data on Economics that is currently available dates only to the Sumerian civilization of the Uruk period of the fourth millennium BCE, the middle of the Persian cultural epoch. historian Michael Hudson tells us that readable, detailed data in Sumerian economic records only began to appear around 2500 BCE. At this time, which was during the Bronze Age, certain professionals, skilled tradespersons, and managers began to pay a recorded fee to the temples or to the palace. As this system of tithing promulgated throughout the ancient world, the recording of credits of advance payments made and debits of accrued obligations owed needed to be made. As a result, written contracts, pledges of collateral, affidavits of witnesses and sureties were recorded along with publicly regulated rates of interest. Our takeaway from the observations made by Sidney Homer, Rudolf Steiner, Jeremy Bentham, and others is that mega-cyclic economic changes move in lock-step with the development and decay of empires, across the ages of our human past. Overarching observations of previous economies read as follows: Sweeping economic change reflects the skills and knowledge of a population, its production of goods and services, the behavior of markets and trade, and a myriad of other factors. These float atop an undercurrent of massive and lengthy cyclic changes in agriculture, planetary fluctuations, and our relationship to the sun and companion planets of our solar system against the backdrop of a universe in constant motion. Prices and quantities of product, labor and wages, and money and interest rates form simple markers by which we may gauge fluctuations over lengthy periods of time. Though we may not yet possess the tools to measure the economic fluctuation of cultural epochs accurately, at least we have sufficient methods and data to measure the rise and fall of individual empires. In his History of Interest Rates, Sidney Homer offers evidence and explanation in the form of long-run interest rates over the lifespan of these empires. Dr. Homer measures interest rates, ranging from the Sumerian empire through more recent ones. He explains that, though interest rates remain in constant flux, they follow a long-run trend downward as an empire builds to its point of maturity—its golden age. Then, as an empire begins its process of slow decay into the abyss of history, interest rates begin to follow a long-run trend upward. The simple explanation for this phenomenon in economic terms is risk. Risk is associated with uncertainty—uncertainty over time and at a given point of time. The greater the uncertainty, the greater the perceived level of risk. In order to undertake increasing risk, the potential reward must grow correspondingly greater. Hence, the interest rate must be higher than it would be under conditions of greater certainty. The cycle of empires remains the longest fluctuation that we can measure in meaningful economic terms. The major financial crisis that we observe within the empire cycle is tied to the deterioration of the empire itself. The final phase of collapse often comes in the form of siege and sacking from without after the empire already has been destroyed from within. Nevertheless, most of us are more interested in understanding fluctuations and the occurrence of crises within a smaller window of time. However, given an understanding of cultural-epoch cycles and the shorter empire cycles within each of the former, we can begin to understand the nature of the temporal cycles that we experience within our own lifetimes. In our discussion of economic cycles, the debate continues as to whether or not shorter cycles are tied to, or, ride upon, longer ones. The Social Science of Economics exists in the space between natural and spiritual sciences. Traditionally, the current permutation of Economics known as Neo-Classical leans heavily upon the concepts borrowed from physics and other natural sciences. The concept known as the Fourier Harmonic Series is one that we use to measure waves upon the ocean, currents of air, and harmonics in music and color. In Economic Cycle Theory, we apply this concept to the apparent periodicity (recurrence at regular intervals) of different economic cycles. We will treat the physics of harmonics as an analogy or metaphor when applied to series of economic fluctuations. The concept of economic cycles is based upon a theory that attempts to explain changes in business against long-run growth and decay trends as observed in market economies. In determining an economic cycle, we include such variables as growth of Gross Domestic Products, aggregate household income, and labor employment rates, in addition to the factors mentioned earlier. Economists divide the cycles into two main phases, booms and recessions. Associated with a strong economy, booms are measured as progressions above the long-run trend In contrast, recessions are characterized by below-trend activity. In the mid-Twentieth Century, Austrian economist Joseph A. Schumpeter and others proposed a typology of business cycles according to their periodicity. Considered by some economists to be components of the harmonic series of economic cycles, the prominent ones include, in descending length: 1) The Nikolai Kondratiev Wave, which reflects a long technological cycle of forty-five to sixty years. His initial Nobel Prize-winning measurements determined a fifty-eight-year cycle based upon long-term agricultural prices and wages; currently, the Wave has been adapted to measure changes in technology. 2) The Simon Kuznets infrastructural (building) investment cycle, which reflects changes that have a frequency of fifteen to twenty-five years. 3) The Joseph Kitchin inventory cycle, which is eight to nine years in length, and 4) The Clement Juglar fixed-investment business cycle, which averages 3.3 years. Jay W. Forrester, the Germeshausen Professor in the Alfred P. Sloan School of Management at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, has spent four decades studying business structure, economic cycles, and national policy. Within the past decade, Dr. Forrester and his colleagues have developed and assembled a system-dynamics model of the national economy. Preliminary studies indicate that production sectors generate three different modes of fluctuation in the economic system of the United States. These are similar to the forty-five-to-sixty-year Kondratieff cycle, the fifteen-to-twenty-five-year Kuznets cycle, and the three-to-seven-year business cycle in long-established Cycle Theory. Forrester’s empirical results support earlier theories of Economic Cycles. Though Forrester’s empirical work focuses on the American economy, his methods can be applied to data from many other countries as well. In simpler terms, Rudolf Steiner discusses complex changes as cycles of nature in his 1924 Agricultural Course lectures. He explains that numerous, harmful pests, such as bugs and weeds, reappear at regular intervals of years. For example, dandelion growth is promulgated by solar rays reflected off of the moon. This year, the moon is closer to the Earth than it has been in three-quarters of a century. Many of us have noticed the large amount and size of the dandelions in our yards. Coincidence? In his lecture, Steiner discusses the travesty of vine plantations that were subjected to the ravages of grape-louses in Austria and Central Europe during the 1880s. Experts were at a loss to find a remedy against the grape-louse. In time, this infestation displaced many peasant vine-tillers, reduced the output of grapes in the market, and led to the migration of numerous agricultural workers to the United States. Today, we have various products such as pesticides to treat such problems. However, the appearance of cicadas (misnamed as locusts) remains a costly threat to agriculture. These cicadas are the Magicicada genus of thirteen- and seventeen-year periodicals of eastern North America. From an economic standpoint, not taking an active defense against the cicadas reduces production, displaces agricultural workers, restricts market supply of foodstuffs, and raises prices. However, active defense adds to the cost of production and also raises food prices in the end. Food costs represent more than 10% of income for the average American family. History tells us that the locust plague of 1915 resulted in the price of potatoes increasing six-fold that year. The Great Eastern Brood of cicadas that appeared in 2004 will appear along the East Coast, leading into the Midwest, in 2021. Perhaps, Nikolai Kondratiev was detecting these and similar agricultural fluctuations when he measured his fifty-eight-year economic cycle in the wave mentioned earlier. These agricultural cycles are important; we tend to ignore them because we have moved away from our agrarian roots in our rapid worldwide urbanization. The German word zeitgeist means the spirit of the times or the spirit of the age. Zeitgeist is the general cultural, intellectual, ethical, spiritual, or political climate along with the general ambiance, morals, mood, and sociocultural direction associated with an era. Nature, or at least that portion of nature that is non-human, contributes greatly to the zeitgeist. However, human beings; our behavior; and our social, political, and economic structures also contribute to the spirit. If we could, we might ask Jeremy Bentham and his compatriots whether they are the protagonists, antagonists, or mentors of the zeitgeist in our current cultural epoch. Perhaps they are all three, perhaps none of them. On the other hand, they might tell us that as collective humanity, all of us are the hero, mentor, and enemy within the mythos of this zeitgeist. We passed out of the former Greco-Roman Epoch and into the present Anglo-German Epoch during the early fifteenth century. Within this age of materialism, we have given birth to a new entity among us. It acts as if it were human. Since the late nineteenth century, it has gained human-like rights under national laws and in the marketplace. In order to understand Economic Cycles and Financial Crises, we first must understand the major protagonist and antagonist—the Incorporated Company. In their book The Company: A Short History of a Revolutionary Idea, business historians John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge trace the development of the modern corporation from the thirteenth century to the present. The authors note that the way we produce, trade, and finance within our epoch increasingly has been a result of the corporate form. Since the development of the Corporation of the City of London a millennium ago, this form of business entity has changed the way that we organize many of our human activities on a global scale. Furthermore, the progression of financial crises throughout recent centuries has attached itself to and conjoined with the development of the modern multi-national corporation. As a result, it is not possible to analyze and to understand the nature and causes of these crises without an understanding of the behavior of this dominant form of business entity. Furthermore, we also must keep in mind that the major growth spurt in the number and size of corporations has occurred only within the past 250 years. At the time that British economist Adam Smith wrote his classic An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, a large company employed only twenty-five people. By contrast, Walmart Corporation currently employs more than two million workers globally. Within the financial sector, the number of banks in the United States has decreased while their average size has increased. In 1920, there were almost 30,000 banks in the U.S. Today, less than 8,000 remain. The four largest institutions, Bank of America, J.P. Morgan Case, Citigroup, and Wells Fargo, control half of all bank assets in the United States. In his book Supercapitalism: The Transformation of Business, Democracy, and Everyday Life, former Secretary of Labor Robert B. Reich explains corporations. He states, “A final truth that needs to be emphasized--the most basic of all--is that corporations are not people. They are legal fictions, nothing more than bundles of contractual agreements.” Reich adds that “[T]he triumph of Supercapitalism has led, indirectly and unwittingly, to the decline of democracy.” Nevertheless, in spite of the myriad views on the subject, we must find adequate tools to analyze the long series of financial crises that we have encountered in our country since the end of Colonial times. Furthermore, we must develop a language with which to discuss the nature and cause of these crises. Calling upon our muses in the forms of Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, David Ricardo, and others, we seek a method of systems analysis and an institutional view—a Chaos Theory that properly is called Dynamic Systems Theory. In addition, a corollary subset of Chaos Theory is Catastrophe Theory. As systems evolve, their various components interact and co-adapt over time. Often, significant events known as Chaotic Attractors occur. These attractors have major evolutionary consequences. For example, an asteroid striking the Earth may cause an Ice Age. This is a case of what evolutionists call Punctuated Equilibrium, meaning that such a catastrophe would have widespread ripple effects, for better or worse. Next, we will explore the nature and causes of the dozen economic crises that have struck the United States from the days of its Constitution in 1789 to the first great contraction that began in 1929, known as the Great Depression. We recognize the importance to understand financial crises and related events that continue to occur. Economic fluctuations come in regular waves, some long and some short. Also, these waves of varying lengths appear to be harmonically related to one another and to cycles of nature. We witness such phenomena at sea during a storm, from within the earth when we feel quakes, through the air whenever the wind blows or we hear music. Regardless of the nature or origin of the waves, they all behave similarly. The Attack occurs as the wave develops and rises to its peak. At its peak, it sustains briefly—a Transient. Then, as it has risen, so the wave Decays. The shapes of waves vary. However, universal constants remain among them. “I understand what you are saying and agree with it. When we know that there is a cause, the variation of the solar activity, which is just of the nature to affect the produce of agriculture, and which does vary in the same period, it becomes almost certain that the two series of phenomena--credit cycles and solar variations--are connected as effect and cause.” Wonderful! With your permission, I would like to approach this subject from the meta-view of cultural ages. Then, I would like to narrow the focus by considering the long economic waves and the shorter business cycles. As the available data collected by Dr. Sidney Homer and others only goes back to ancient Sumeria, let us confine our discussion to the more recent cultural ages, I have asked Dr. Rudolf Steiner to summarize these ages for us. “Let us begin with the third age of our current great epoch. Egypto-Chaldean-Babylonian culture extended from 2907 to 747 BCE. Astrology and geometry arose in Egypt that taught the Egyptians how to treat and cultivate the earth. The next age for which we have data is the Graeco-Latin (Roman) Age, which flourished from 747 BCE to 1413 CE. In this age, individual human essence begins to unfold in Greek art. Humans take hold of his own beings and seek to create it as an image in space. Later, jurisprudence arose as Roman right which governed matters between citizens of Rome. The fifth cycle is the one in which we now live, with our materialistic civilization. It is the time in which man has descended most profoundly into the external world. We know how to apply the forces of the spiritual world to our physical environment to produce modern natural science with its technical appliances. Yet these complicated technical means are used to satisfy the same needs, after all.” Thank you, Dr. Steiner. We recognize that during each of these ages, culture developed with the pattern of a wave, evolving slowly for a millennium, reaching an apex, and then declining. “We consider that civilization is the making of civil persons. Isn’t that correct, Mr. Disraeli?” “Yes. Increased means and increased leisure are the two civilizers of man. Furthermore, the health of the people is really the foundation upon which all their happiness and all their powers as a state depend. Finally, the best security for civilization is the dwelling. Upon properly appointed and becoming dwellings depends the improvement of mankind.” “Ladies and gentlemen, before we become too immersed in the material realities of these ages, let us remember that it is ideas that shape the course of history. It is ideas, not vested interests, which are dangerous for good or evil.” Thank you. Your observations provide us with an excellent framework for our discussion. Let’s look at the long waves discovered by Kondratiev in 1922. These waves each extend a length of fifty to sixty years on average. Given these estimates, each cultural age contains forty Kondratiev Waves. The difference in wave length depends on whatever we are measuring-- industrial or agricultural data. Originally, Kondratiev measured his agricultural wave as 58 years. However, the industrial-based wave is approximately 50 years. We suggest that the average cycle has shortened gradually over the past century due to rapid urbanization. In the United States, 80% of the population grew its own food in 1900. However, after the First World War, farm failures and a growing demand for manufacturing labor led to a massive migration to cities. Over the decades, agricultural production became mechanized. Now, less than 5% of the labor force grows the food for the entire population. Furthermore, economic and social changes have occurred concurrently with expansion of sovereign governments as they attempt to redefine their roles. “Have governments changed in their basic purpose? It has always been that the business of government is to promote the happiness of the society by punishing and rewarding.” “I agree. The first duty of government is to see that people have food, fuel, and clothes. The second, that they have means of moral and intellectual education. However, as we look at the 20th and 21st centuries, I would add that the role of government in respect to property rights must be emphasized again.” It has long been known and declared that the poor have no right to the property of the rich, I wish it also to be known and declared that the rich have no right to the property of the poor.” “In respect to the jurisprudence of natural and civil law as well as the law of nations, secrecy, being an instrument of conspiracy, ought never to be the system of a regular government.” As we narrow our focus, let’s look at the five long waves that have occurred over the history of the United States. If we project measurements backward from the 20th century, we find that the industrial-based and agricultural-based calculations coincide fairly well until the mid-nineteenth century. Let’s begin with the first three waves leading up to the Great Depression of the 1930s. The first wave began at the time of the American Revolutionary War and reached its peak during the early decades of the United States. We identify this wave by economic prosperity due to maritime trade along with the development and proliferation of Eli Whitney’s cotton gin. In addition, the development of the steam engine by James Watt and its application to water transportation by Robert Fulton furthered this prosperity. The second wave began throughout the Era of Good Feeling during the 1820s, a period in which Americans were united in purpose. This wave reached its peak about a decade before the War Between the States. We identify the prosperity in this wave by the acquisition of California from Mexico and the subsequent Gold Rush of the 1850s. In addition, the development of the steel industry, which enabled the rapid growth of railroads in the East, added more prosperity. The third economic wave began around 1880, when the United States went to freer silver and gold standards. This wave ended when President Franklin D. Roosevelt took the country off of the gold standard in 1933. The economic surge of this wave came from a series of events. These included the period of Gold Resumption Prosperity; the completion of, and trade along, the First Transcontinental Railroad; Corporate Mergers as well as Corporate Growth; and urban growth of the Roaring Twenties. During this wave, education and engineering led to massive developments in the fields of electricity and chemicals. We also used the math and science of the time to measure economic change. “Yes. The work of science is to substitute facts for appearances and demonstrations for impressions.” “John Maynard Keynes, David Ricardo, and I, English economists all, have just finished a side conversation. We would like to contribute a brief summary for the benefit of moving along the discussion. Keynes has suggested, ‘The importance of money flows from it being a link between the present and the future.’ He also says, ‘The social object of skilled investment should be to defeat the dark forces of time and ignorance that envelop our future. By continuing the process of inflation, a government can confiscate, secretly and unobserved, an important part of the wealth of its citizens.’ Ricardo tells us, ‘In the same manner, if any nation wasted part of its wealth or lost part of its trade, it could not retain the same quantity of circulating medium which it before possessed.’ In respect to class divisions, Ricardo says, ‘It is not by the absolute quantity of produce obtained by either class that we can correctly judge the rate of profit, rent, and wages but by the quantity of labor required to obtain that produce.’ As for my own views on the subject, I humbly ask Dr. Sase and his contemporaries to remember that, in many eras, ignorance of the principle of population among the poor serves the interests of the rich by provoking cutthroat competition among laborers, bidding down wages, and extending working hours. Consequently, the poor are too exhausted to learn and are trapped in a cycle of ignorance and exhaustion. Education is not compatible with extreme poverty. It is impossible effectually to teach an indigent population. As a result, the poor are disqualified from any but a low grade of intelligent labor. In summary, with every boom and bust, with every crisis within history, tension and conflict between increasingly polarized classes heightens. In recent centuries, we have seen smaller firms being gobbled up by larger ones during every business cycle, as power concentrates in the hands of the few and away from the many.” Let’s follow the economic timeline from 1787 into the 1930s. In assessment, a few attributes become apparent in all three Kondratiev Waves. During each one, the number of prosperous years exceeds the not-so-prosperous ones. If we count the years of prosperity as those above trend, the ratio is two-thirds above and one-third below trend. The second attribute is the sequence of fluctuations between major wars and their subsequent recessions. Each of the first three waves had a major war, The War of 1812, The War Between the States, and the First World War, respectively. Each period of prosperity, either during or immediately after a major war, is followed first by a Post-War Recession/Depression and, later, by a second one. Also, there are two to three more post-war recession years than there were years of war-related prosperity. This fact challenges the old adage that war is good for the economy. Also, periods of extended prosperity tend to be more stable than sudden boom/busts. Two boom/bust cycles occurred back to back during the expansionary phase of the second economic wave. The Bank Credit Land Boom of 1835-37 preceded the banking Panic of 1837 with after-effects that lasted through 1838. Why did this happen? The answer is that President Andrew Jackson won office on the platform of eliminating the National Debt. During his second term as President, he took advantage of a huge real-estate bubble that raged in the Western Territories. The federal government owned vast tracts of Western land. Jackson sold public lands and used the proceeds in order to pay off the National Debt. Unfortunately, this venture resulted in a real estate bubble that led to a banking panic when the real-estate bubble burst. Subsequently, the Cotton Boom of 1838-39 preceded the Debt Repudiation Depression that lasted until 1845. In the Antebellum South, cotton was king. As the railways expanded in the South, construction of new textile mills along the rail lines drove an increased demand for raw cotton. In addition, demand for baled cotton continued to remain high in Britain due of its flourishing mill system in Greater Manchester and beyond. However, the Panic of 1837 in America wreaked havoc on the state-based banking system that had gone on a money-creation binge. In response, the states implored the U.S. Congress to bail them out as it had in 1789. Congress declined. In turn, many states repudiated their debts to the federal government: a six-year depression followed. Of more than a dozen significant boom/bust cycles preceding the 1930s, the best known was the Bull Market Boom of 1928-29 that preceded the Crash of 1929. This resulted in a depression that lingered until the beginning of the Second World War in Europe. Taking office during the first recession that followed World War I, President Warren G. Harding and Vice-President Calvin Coolidge pushed Congress for the economic plan called “A Return to Normalcy” with a national budget program, tax reduction, emergency tariffs, farm bankruptcy relief, and immigration restrictions. As a result, the Gross Domestic Product grew by an average of 7% per annum from 1924 to 1929. High wages and surplus savings created an investment vacuum. Wall Street responded. The Crash of 1929 remains our best lesson of a manipulated financial bubble. During the 1920s, the United States experienced unrivaled prosperity. The businessman was exalted! By March 1928, market speculation had grown into a national pastime. During the following year and a half, market gains exceeded those of the previous five years. Unscrupulous manipulation had slithered into the market. Brokers banded together in trading pools to manipulate specific stocks. Over a period of months, the pool managers quietly accumulated shares of the target stock. Next, the pools enlisted the help of the stock’s specialist, the person who worked on the floor of the exchange and kept a private book of buy/sell orders. Using insider information, the pool members traded with one another, allowing their trades to be recorded on the public stock-ticker. Repeating this action again and again produced the illusion of a “Hot Stock.” The members continued to trade the same shares back and forth. By increasing volume and price throughout successive trades, the pools created the impression of speculative activity. As the pools heated up, they enlisted the support of loyal tip-sheet writers to fan the flames. These tip-sheet writers were the 1920s equivalent of CNN Money and the Bloomberg Channel. Attracted by ticker activity and managed news, millions of non-savvy investors thronged to purchase shares. As the market price reached its apex, the pools sold their inventory of shares to a waiting and willing public, a soon to be wiser public. Pool members reaped enormous profits while the public found itself holding stocks that suddenly deflated. The Chief Financial Officers (the CFOs) and other insiders were selling stock in their own companies—selling it “short.” This means that they were selling shares of their own stock that they had borrowed, expecting to buy them back later at a lower price. In March 1929, Herbert Hoover took office as President. By the Labor Day weekend, the financial goose was cooked. The market peaked on September 3rd and subsequently declined sharply on September 9th. The market faltered for the next month and a half, much like the bobbing stern of the HMS Titanic before it went under, so that by October 21st gradual price declines wiped out the equity of many investors. In turn, this led to margin calls in which brokers demanded that investors contribute more equity to cover the fall as they went “below water” on their stocks. Most customers either sold low or lost their investment as they failed to meet margin call. These events led to further market-price declines. Finally, on “Black Thursday” (October 24th), prices plummeted as thirteen million shares were traded. During the following weekend, attempts were made to stabilize the markets by both the government and bankers. However, on “Black Tuesday” (October 29th), more than sixteen million shares were traded as the stock market began its long-term descent. At the end of the year, President Hoover tried to fight the ensuing Depression by instituting Public Work projects, the Smoot-Halley tariff, and increased corporate taxes. In 1930, there was a short-lived economic recovery, but afterwards, the market and economy ratcheted downward through six additional episodes of bleak, brief hope before bottoming out in July 1932. After a slight recovery during the election season of 1932, the economy backslid during the winter of 1933 as banks failed and closed. That year, the Great Depression reached its depth. On February 28th, depositors ran on banks, which in turn closed their doors very quickly. Four days later, Franklin Delano Roosevelt took office as President. Five days after that, his administration passed the Emergency Banking Act. Finally, FDR convinced Congress to enact the “New Deal” program for economic recovery. Later that year, the economy began to recover. However, sustained recovery only occurred after the war in Europe commenced in September 1939 as Allied nations demanded armaments and food from U.S. producers. To understand what continues to happen today, let’s look at the more distant past. One of the most famous bubbles in history is the Dutch Tulip-Bulb Craze of the early seventeenth century. The Tulip Craze reflects simple idiocy coupled with the stupidity of crowd mentality. Though most of us identify tulips with Holland, they were not indigenous to that country. Originally, tulips came to Holland from Turkey in 1593, imported as a luxury good. However, given their new environment, many bulbs succumbed to a disease a color-breaking virus that is transferred by feeding insects. It causes the petal pigmentation to break into flame-like multi-colored stripes. The Dutch prized these patterns. Since tulip bulbs are perennials, the bulbs preserved their uniqueness and perceived value due to a scarcity of the patterns that were the most prized. As with any rare product of fixed supply, increased demand caused a rise in the market price. Bulb merchants stockpiled the most popular patterns and held them back from the market artificially. In effect, the phenomenon of “Tulip Mania” resulted from hoarding, which led to an escalation in prices. To invest in bulbs, Dutch citizens liquidated good stores of value. Purchasing frenzy caused bulb prices to reach astronomical levels. As market demand outran investment capital, speculators developed a method of call options. These required only a down-payment of the purchase price. In January 1637, margin-buying spurred bulb prices to rise twenty-fold. However, the bubble finally burst: During the following month, prices plummeted twenty-fold. As the market tumbled, the market equity positions of investors evaporated. Panic ensued. Investment funds fell into bankruptcy as they failed to honor their call options. Faced with a collapsing financial market, the Dutch government intervened and attempted to settle contracts at 10% of their purchase price. Unfortunately, market prices continued to fall, dropping below the government price-floor until bulb prices settled to that of a common onion. The Tulip Craze mimicked the behavior of other bubbles that have occurred in the present day. First, market speculation built slowly with a gradual ascent in prices. Second, the number of investors increased. That fueled progressive speculation. Third, speculators introduced margin-buying that helped the market to grow exponentially. Fourth, as the bubble developed, the market rose rapidly to spiked prices. Fifth, that bubble burst and market price collapsed rapidly due to a contemporaneous failure to meet margin calls. Next, we will look at the British crisis known as the South Seas Bubble, a crisis that stands as the first major manipulation of financial markets. Until the Crash of 1929, this bubble endured as the classic example of opportunistic self-enhancement. The South Seas Company was formed by Parliament as a British trade concession in 1711. This was a monopoly for areas of the Pacific that were under British rule. The company was a startup firm with no sales and no earnings, only with great prospects. The real prospects centered on market manipulation and insider trading. In the early eighteenth century, Britain had entered its period of imperial prosperity. However, stock ownership remained a matter of privilege that was limited mostly to the aristocracy. Furthermore, women could not inherit land, although females could own stock at that time. A pent-up demand for stock developed because of wide accessibility along with the added benefit that dividends that were paid out of profits went untaxed. Parliament granted the enterprise a monopoly concession along with loaned capitalization of ₤10 million pounds sterling. Publicly unknown at the time, members of Parliament had bought capitalization bonds for South Seas at ₤55. Once the company went public, these investors exchanged each unit for ₤100 of stock in the South Seas Company. However, its inexperienced directors quickly entered into the slave trade, a venture at which they failed. South Seas maintained its stock price in the market despite this misfortune as well as a war with Spain, shipments of goods that were misrouted and lost, and bonuses paid to the directors in a form that diluted the value of shares. Nevertheless, the situation improved in 1719. Britain signed the Peace of Utrecht, a treaty with Spain that enabled British trade with Mexico. Given this newfound prosperity, the directors of South Seas offered to fund the entire British national debt of ₤31 million. Stock prices doubled. Five days after the bill became law, South Seas offered a new issue of stock at ₤300 per share. The company offered a second issue at ₤400. This one rose to ₤550 per share within a month. The directors offered yet another at 10% down, with no payments for one year. Share price continued to rise to ₤1,000. The feasibility of the scheme became secondary as the Greater-Fool Theory took over—speculators would purchase shares, prices would rise, secondary buyers would appear, and the speculators would profit in the after-market. In the summer of 1720, the directors liquidated their own shares. The news of their divestiture leaked out quickly. Share price collapsed and a market panic ensued. The British government narrowly averted the complete erosion of public credit. In response to this threat, Parliament passed the Bubble Act that forbade issuance of stock certificates in any company. In addition, Britain implemented other measures in order to restore confidence. The government confiscated the estates of company directors in an attempt to remunerate South Seas Company investors. Other propositions put forth in Parliament included placing bankers in sacks filled with snakes and throwing them into the Thames River! In summarizing this bubble, let us analyze the events. First, there was a pent-up demand for investment opportunities. Second, the government sponsored a trade-concession monopoly. Third, inexperienced management failed to create any real value for the company. Fourth, war and the entry of new competition exerted external pressures on the firm. Fifth, graft occurred, which involved members of Parliament in an effort to pass legislation that was advantageous to a private company. Sixth, dilutive stock dividends and new (dilutive) stock issues were sold on generous terms and margins while insiders manipulated trading that included the dumping of shares. Following the Wall Street Crash of 1929, the United States and its major trading partners experienced a decade of severe economic downturn that led to the Second World War. Though production surged during the War, a full recovery of the stock market was prolonged. While it took Wall Street over twenty years to regain its level of 1929, it is unfair to look at the Great Crash as any single event. Following World War II, Wall Street held a widespread belief that institutions had risen above the madness of the crowd. However, professional investors participated subsequently in several distinct speculative movements from the 1960s through the 1990s. The Soaring Sixties marked a return to the former depths of market depravity. From 1959 to 1962, the market saw more new issues than in any previous period. Often, we refer to this period as the “Tronics” Boom as it was marked by electronic and silicon names. During these years, a simple name change by even a shoelace company to something like Powertron Ultrasonics could double its share price in respect to its actual earnings within a matter of days. During this era, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) uncovered extensive market manipulation and fraud. The underwriting investment banks withheld shares to keep the market “thin,” thus generating rapid price increases in the after-market. This situation evolved into financial debauchery. To avoid ensnarement by the SEC, issuers distributed adequate prospectus with warning labels resembling the ones present on cigarette packs. In response, the SEC took the position that, though it could warn fools, the commission could not prevent neophyte investors from handing over their money. By 1962, the boom had gone bust as the merry-go-round broke down. The SEC suspended brokerage firms that soured the sixties. The third great merger trend struck from the 1950s to the early 1970s. Many companies sought to combine horizontally with firms that were involved in the same business or vertically with suppliers or customers. However, a new wave of conglomerate mergers occurred as firms combined with companies in completely unrelated industries that enjoyed sales curves that ran countercyclical to one another. In compliance with anti-trust laws, most large firms are restricted from acquiring or merging with other companies within the same industry. The firm seeking an acquisition could do so more easily across industries. However, executives discovered that the acquisition process could produce growth in the Earnings per Share of a company. They discovered too late that a bubble driven by conglomerate mergers would develop during the late 1960s. When the acquisitions stop, someone got burned. The Conglemerate Bubble proceeded like a chain letter. Such tactics worked for awhile as investors in the 1960s tended to be more interested in steady rapidly rising earnings and less concerned with how the sausage was made during the bubble that reeked of the public-relation messages of promoters. However, the beginning of the end of the Conglomerate Bubble occurred when electronics-producer/defense-contractor Litton Industries announced lower-than-expected quarterly earnings in January 1968. Next, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) launched an investigation of conglomerate mergers in July of that year. Market prices fell again. During this aftermath, the SEC and the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) called for clarification of reporting methods and standards for conglomerates. This call triggered another large sell-off that resembled the collapse of the South Seas Company. In summary, let us review the characteristics of the Conglomerate Bubble. First, there were management difficulties in attempts to juggle diverse product lines. Secondly, the new financial math of conglomeration was far from transparent and led to expressions of viable concerns by regulators and other parties. Third, acquiring companies needed to have larger earnings multiples than those firms in the shrinking supply of target companies. Fourth, conglomeration eventually resulted in lower earnings and flat Price-to-Earnings ratios. Fifth, in turn, lower earnings led to the shedding of unrelated, poor-performing acquisitions. Throughout the next few decades, a series of relatively minor bubbles occurred. However, the core of the Conglomerate and other bubbles continued to follow a slow build followed by a rapid ascent to an unsustainable peak before a sudden collapse. In the late 1960s and beyond, we have experienced crises fueled by Concept Stocks, ones whose current valuation appears out of line with traditional valuation metrics. Mutual funds proliferated. Furthermore, the fund holdings tended to be stocks that possessed an exciting concept and generated great near-term performance. As many of these funds soured in the seventies, investment wisdom returned to sound principle. Solid Blue Chip stocks came into vogue as investor expectation turned toward long-term benefits. The enticement of a one-time decision for Large-Caps (large-capitalization stocks) attracted conservative institutional investors who had strict fiduciary duties for the management of the savings of others. Unfortunately, well-packaged stupidity sounded like wisdom as a wave of institutional speculation occurred that focused on the Blue Chips. Nevertheless, these actions seemed reasonable at a time in which inflation was under control, the Vietnam War was ending, and Richard Nixon had been elected President. Investors pondered “What is OPEC?” and “Who are these new upstart competitors posing a threat to American manufacturing?” The Nifty Fifty (the largest of the S&P 500) had begun to decline, even though their share prices held steady due to the madness of crowds. Soon, investors realized that stocks were overpriced and that it was the market--not the companies--that constituted the problem. Subsequently, fund managers began to sell their holdings in the four dozen Blue Chips. The 1980s roared in like a lion as investors hungered for new castles in the air. New stock issues made a triumphant re-entry as the hottest game in town. However, after a stampede toward small-capitalization stocks, their value plummeted 90%. Biotechnology stocks festered into a new bubble. The poster children of this biotech movement included Genentech, which watched its share price triple in the first twenty minutes of trading. However, Product Asset Valuation posed potential problems in the form of allusive approval by the Federal Drug Administration, unitary patent rights, and the siphoning of profits by large firms that quickly acquired the biotech start-ups. The large firms had no need to offset their now-declining older products. As a result, the industry often considered positive sales and earnings to be drawbacks rather than a benefit. In the end, biotech stocks had lost 75% of their value. What does all of this mean? Under the Castle-in-the-Air Theory, the evaluations of securities affect their pricing. Therefore, investors should remain wary of hot new issues because they tend to underperform the market, though their stock prices increase abruptly during trading. At the turn of the millennium, we experienced the largest bubble that ever had occurred up to that time. What distinguished the Internet Bubble from others was its association with both new technologies and new trade opportunities. Also exceptional is the fact that this bubble set new records. It emerged simultaneously as the greatest creator and the greatest destroyer of wealth: During this economic episode, Goldman Sachs proclaimed that investor sentiment was not a long-term risk. Unfortunately, this sentiment proved to be a short-term risk with dire consequences for many investors and companies. The NASDAQ Stock Exchange listed the lion’s share of Internet and related technology stocks. This is significant because during the boom Internet Price-to-Earnings ratios climbed to over 100 to 1. By 2000, investor expectation for the future reached 25% or higher. However, even though Cisco surpassed a Price-to-Earnings ratio of greater than 100:1. The earnings of Cisco grew at a rate of 15% per year. Unfortunately, Cisco lost 90% of its value when the bubble burst. Other companies, such as Amazon, Lucent Technologies, and Yahoo, lost between 93% and 99% + of their value from the high-water mark of 2000 to the low tide of 2001-02. Security analysts at Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, and Salomon Smith Barney provided much of the hot air for the bubble. They based their success on their ability to steer lucrative investment banking business to their firms by promising ongoing, favorable research coverage that would support the Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) in the aftermarket. Analysts pushed the line that traditional valuation metrics lose relevance during the big-bang stage of an industry, which is a time to be reckless, though rational. Individual stock prices soared while security analysts refrained from biting the hands that fed them. Traditionally, analysts rated ten “buys” for every one “sell.” However, during this bubble, the ratio of buys-to-sell neared 100:1. “Investment gurus” marching in lockstep helped to convince the public that investing was easy. When the bubble burst, celebrity analysts or others in their firms faced lawsuits, investigations, and SEC fines. By 2001, the United States Secret Service and the SEC had commenced prosecution of more than 5,000 cases in respect to the market structures and conducts that led to the collapse. Sadly, most of their original files were destroyed along with their Manhattan offices in Building 7 of the World Trade Center when it collapsed in the late afternoon of 11 September 2001. As a result, we never may know the extent of the fraud and market manipulation that accompanied fee-based underwriting, cheerleading research and analysis, and the infectious greed that contributed to this very destructive bubble. Today, we struggle through the end-game/aftermath of the most recent bubble fueled by Mortgage-Backed Securities, Collateralized Debt Obligations, and other inventions of the best and the brightest “quants” (quantitative analysts) of Wall Street. As we search to understand the causes, let us take away a few lessons that history has provided. We have traced the causes and effects of financial crises from the days of the Sumerian Empire through the present. We have stood back and observed the grand progression of time through the three most recent cultural ages. With the assistance of a group of nineteenth- and twentieth-century polymaths, we have uncovered the nitty-gritty of events in economic history. We have learned the lesson that human behavior runs contrary to rational and efficient behavior during economic crises. More and more credulous investors must be found to keep the merry-go-round turning. However, though markets occasionally can be irrational, we must not abandon our age-old sense of firm-foundation values. In every economy throughout history, the market eventually corrects itself, albeit slowly and inexorably. Throughout the ages, anomalies have arisen and markets have become irrational, attracting unwary neophyte investors who get bloodied. However, everything comes out in the wash as true values are recognized again by the human participants, eventually. As we conclude “This Time Is NOT Different,” let us draw a bit of wisdom from Benjamin Graham, the English-born American author, economist, and professional investor. In his book Security Analysis (1933), Graham explains that 1. Financial markets are not voting booths but weighing instruments 2. The ways and means of valuation have not changed over time 3. Every piece of real, personal, and intellectual property is worth only the benefit that flows from it 4. Like any other economic crisis, this time is NOT different What do Financial Crises mean to us? The potential negative impact on incomes that result from both major and minor affects the survival of many businesses and institutions. When we understand Financial Crises, we prepare ourselves to survive and prosper. We hope that our readers and our listeners and viewers possess the common sense to avoid the madness of crowds and the grasping for castles in the air. Finally, we hope that our journey through economic history has been a revelatory and enjoyable for our entire audience.

Contents

Elections

June 5, 1990

  • 107 – Passed – Housing And Homeless Bond Act Of 1990.
  • 108 – Passed – Passenger Rail And Clean Air Bond Act Of 1990
  • 109 – Passed – Governor's Review Of Legislation. Legislative Deadlines.
  • 110 – Passed – Property Tax Exemption For Severely Disabled Persons.
  • 111 – Passed – The Traffic Congestion Relief And Spending Limitation Act Of 1990.
  • 112 – Passed – State Officials, Ethics, Salaries. Open Meetings.
  • 113 – Passed – Practice Of Chiropractic. Legislative Initiative Amendment.
  • 114 – Passed – Murder Of A Peace Officer. Criminal Penalties. Special Circumstance. Peace Officer Definition.
  • 115 – Passed – Criminal Law.
  • 116 – Passed – Rail Transportation. Bond Act.
  • 117 – Passed – Wildlife Protection.
  • 118 – Failed – Legislature. Reapportionment. Ethics.
  • 119 – Failed – Reapportionment By Commission. Initiative. Constitutional Amendment And Statute.
  • 120 – Passed – New Prison Construction Bond Act Of 1990.
  • 121 – Passed – Higher Education Facilities Bond Act Of June 1990.
  • 122 – Passed – Earthquake Safety And Public Buildings Rehabilitation Bond Act Of 1990.
  • 123 – Passed – 1990 School Facilities Bond Act.

November 6, 1990

  • 124 – Failed – Local Hospital Districts.
  • 125 – Failed – Motor Vehicle Tax. Rail Transit Funding.
  • 126 – Failed – Alcoholic Beverages. Taxes.
  • 127 – Passed – Earthquake Safety. Property Tax Exclusion.
  • 128 – Failed – Environment. Public Health. Bonds.
  • 129 – Failed – Drug Enforcement, Prevention, Treatment, Prisons. Bonds.
  • 130 – Failed – Forest Acquisition. Timber Harvesting Practices. Bond Act.
  • 131 – Failed – Limits On Terms Of Office. Ethics. Campaign Financing.
  • 132 – Passed – Marine Resources. Initiative Constitutional Amendment.
  • 133 – Failed – Drug Enforcement And Prevention. Taxes. Prison Terms.
  • 134 – Failed – Alcohol Surtax.
  • 135 – Failed – Pesticide Regulation.
  • 136 – Failed – State, Local Taxation.
  • 137 – Failed – Initiative And Referendum Process.
  • 138 – Failed – Forestry Programs. Timber Harvesting Practices.
  • 139 – Passed – Prison Inmate Labor. Tax Credit.
  • 140 – Passed – Limits On Terms Of Office, Legislators' Retirement, Legislative Operating Costs.
  • 141 – Failed – Toxic Chemical Discharge. Public Agencies. Legislative Statute.
  • 142 – Passed – Veterans' Bond Act Of 1990.
  • 143 – Failed – Higher Education Facilities Bond Act Of November 1990.
  • 144 – Failed – New Prison Construction Bond Act Of 1990-B.
  • 145 – Failed – California Housing Bond Act Of 1990.
  • 146 – Passed – School Facilities Bond Act Of 1990.
  • 147 – Failed – County Correctional Facility Capital Expenditure And Juvenile Facility Bond Act Of 1990.
  • 148 – Failed – Water Resources Bond Act Of 1990.
  • 149 – Failed – California Park, Recreation, And Wildlife Enhancement Act Of 1990.
  • 150 – Failed – County Courthouse Facility Capital Expenditure Bond Act Of 1990.
  • 151 – Failed – Child Care Facilities Financing Act Of 1990.

June 2, 1992

  • 152 – Passed – School Facilities Bond Act of 1992
  • 153 – Passed – Higher Education Facilities Bond Act of June 1992
  • 154 – Failed – Property Tax Postponement.

November 3, 1992

  • 155 – Passed – 1992 School Facilities Bond Act.
  • 156 – Failed – Passenger Rail and Clean Air Bond Act of 1992.
  • 157 – Failed – Toll Roads and Highways.
  • 158 – Failed – Office of California Analyst.
  • 159 – Failed – Office of the Auditor General.
  • 160 – Passed – Property Tax Exemption.
  • 161 – Failed – Physician-Assisted Death. Terminal Condition.
  • 162 – Passed – Public Employees' Retirement Systems.
  • 163 – Passed – Ends Taxation of Certain Food Products.
  • 164 – Passed – Congressional Term Limits.
  • 165 – Failed – Budget Process. Welfare. Procedural and Substantive Changes.
  • 166 – Failed – Basic Health Care Coverage.
  • 167 – Failed – State Taxes.

November 2, 1993

  • 168 – Failed – Low Rent Housing Projects.
  • 169 – Failed – Budget Implementation.
  • 170 – Failed – Property Taxes. Schools. Development-Fee Limits.
  • 171 – Passed – Property Taxation. Transfer of Base Year Value.
  • 172 – Passed – Local Public Safety Protection and Improvement Act of 1993.
  • 173 – Failed – California Housing and Jobs Investment Bond Act. $185 Million Legislative Bond Act.
  • 174 – Failed – Education. Vouchers.

June 7, 1994

  • 1A – FailedEarthquake Relief and Seismic Retrofit Bond Act of 1994.
  • 1B – Failed – Safe Schools Act of 1994.
  • 1C – Failed – Higher Education Facilities Bond Act of June 1994.
  • 175 – Failed – Renters' Income Tax Credit.
  • 176 – Passed – Taxation: Nonprofit Organizations.
  • 177 – Passed – Property Tax Exemption. Disabled Persons' Access.
  • 178 – Failed – Property Tax Exclusion. Water Conservation Equipment.
  • 179 – Passed – Murder: Punishment.
  • 180 – Failed – Park Lands, Historic Sites, Wildlife and Forest Conservation Bond Act.

November 8, 1994

  • 181 – Failed – Passenger Rail and Clean Air Bond Act of 1994.
  • 182 – Passed by voters, but courts struck it down.
  • 183 – Passed – Recall Elections. State Officers.
  • 184 – Passed – Increased Sentences. Repeat Offenders (Three Strikes)
  • 185 – Failed – Public Transportation Trust Funds. Gasoline Sales Tax. Initiative Statute.
  • 186 – Failed – Health Services. Taxes.
  • 187Passed – Illegal Aliens. Ineligibility for Public Services. Verification and Reporting.
  • 188 – Failed – Smoking and Tobacco Products. Local Preemption. Statewide Regulation.
  • 189 – Passed – Bail Exception. Felony Sexual Assault.
  • 190 – Passed – Commission on Judicial Performance.
  • 191 – Passed – Abolish Justice Courts

March 26, 1996

  • 192 – Passed – Seismic Retrofit Bond Act of 1996.
  • 193 – Passed – Property Appraisal. Exception. Grandparent-Grandchild Transfer.
  • 194 – Passed – Prisoners. Joint Venture Program. Unemployment Benefits. Parole.
  • 195 – Passed – Punishment. Special Circumstances. Carjacking. Murder of Juror.
  • 196Passed – Punishment for Murder. Special Circumstances. Drive-By Shootings.
  • 197 – Failed – Amendment of the California Wildlife Protection Act of 1990 (Proposition 117). Mountain Lions.
  • 198 – Passed – Elections. Open Primary.
  • 199 – Failed – Limits on Mobilehome Rent Control. Low-Income Rental Assistance. Initiative Statute.
  • 200 – Failed – No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance. Initiative Statute.
  • 201 – Failed – Attorneys' Fees. Shareholder Actions. Class Actions.
  • 202 – Failed – Attorneys' Contingent Fees. Limits.
  • 203 – Passed – Public Education Facilities Bond Act of 1996.

November 5, 1996

  • 204 – Passed – Safe, Clean, Reliable Water Supply Act.
  • 205 – Failed – Youthful and Adult Offender Local Facilities Bond Act of 1996.
  • 206 – Passed – Veterans' Bond Act of 1996.
  • 207 – Failed – Attorneys. Fees. Right to Negotiate. Frivolous Lawsuits.
  • 208 – Passed – Campaign Contributions and Spending Limits. Restricts Lobbyists.
  • 209Passed – Prohibition Against Discrimination or Preferential Treatment by State and Other Public Entities.
  • 210 – Passed – Minimum Wage Increase.
  • 211 – Failed – Attorney-Client Fee Arrangements. Securities Fraud. Lawsuits.
  • 212 – Failed – Campaign Contributions and Spending Limits. Repeals Gift and Honoraria Limits. Restricts Lobbyists.
  • 213 – Passed – Limitation on Recovery to Felons, Uninsured Motorists, Drunk Drivers.
  • 214 – Failed – Health Care. Consumer Protection. Initiative Statute.
  • 215Passed – Compassionate Use Act of 1996. Medical Use of Marijuana.
  • 216 – Failed – Health Care. Consumer Protection. Taxes on Corporate Restructuring.
  • 217 – Failed – Top Income Tax Brackets. Reinstatement. Revenues to Local Agencies.
  • 218Passed – Voter Approval for Local Government Taxes. Limitations on Fees, Assessments, and Charges.

June 2, 1998

  • 219 – Passed – Ballot Measures. Application.
  • 220 – Passed – Courts. Superior and Municipal Court Consolidation.
  • 221 – Passed – Subordinate Judicial Officers. Discipline.
  • 222 – Passed – Murder. Peace Officer Victim. Sentence Credits.
  • 223 – Failed – Schools. Spending Limits on Administration.
  • 224 – Failed – State-Funded Design and Engineering Services. Initiative Constitutional Amendment.
  • 225 – Passed – Limiting Congressional Terms. Proposed U.S. Constitutional Amendment.
  • 226 – Failed – Political Contributions by Employees, Union Members, Foreign Entities.
  • 227Passed – English Language in Public Schools.

November 3, 1998

  • 1A – Passed – Class Size Reduction Kindergarten-University Public Education Facilities Bond Act of 1998.
  • 1 – Passed – Property Taxes: Contaminated Property.
  • 2 – Passed – Transportation: Funding.
  • 3 – Failed – Partisan Presidential Primary Elections.
  • 4 – Passed – Trapping Practices. Bans Use of Specified Traps and Animal Poisons.
  • 5 – Passed – Tribal-State Gaming Compacts. Tribal Casinos.
  • 6Passed – Criminal Law. Prohibition on Slaughter of Horses and Sale of Law. Prohibition on Slaughter of Horses and Sale of Horsemeat for Human Consumption.
  • 7 – Failed – Air Quality Improvement. Tax Credits.
  • 8 – Failed – Public Schools. Permanent Class Size Reduction. Parent- Teacher Councils. Teacher Credentialing. Pupil Suspension for Drug Possession. Chief Inspector's Office.
  • 9 – Failed – Electric Utilities. Assessments. Bonds.
  • 10Passed – State and County Early Childhood Development Programs. Additional Tobacco Surtax.
  • 11 – Passed – Local Sales and Use Taxes—Revenue Sharing.

See also

This page was last edited on 2 October 2018, at 09:20
Basis of this page is in Wikipedia. Text is available under the CC BY-SA 3.0 Unported License. Non-text media are available under their specified licenses. Wikipedia® is a registered trademark of the Wikimedia Foundation, Inc. WIKI 2 is an independent company and has no affiliation with Wikimedia Foundation.