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Kurdish separatism in Iran

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Kurdish separatism in Iran

PJAK fighters in 2012
Date1918 (1918)present
(106 years)[9][10]
(main phase 1943[11]present[12])
Location
Iran, Iran-Iraqi Kurdistan border areas
For a map, see here
Status

Ongoing

  • Several tribal revolts during 1918–1943
  • 1946 failed attempt to establish the Republic of Mahabad
  • Political crackdown on Kurdish political associations in Iran[13]
  • Ceasefire between Iran and PJAK established in September 2011, but fighting resumed in 2013
  • Renewed clashes between KDPI and Iranian military erupt in 2015
  • In 2022, after the merger of the two democratic parties and the two Komale parties, and at the same time as the Kurdish opposition parties supported Iran's nationwide protests, a new round of conflicts began, which led to the bombing of the bases of the Kurdish parties by the Iranian government.
Belligerents
Shekak tribesmen
Supported by:
 Ottoman Empire[1]
Iran Imperial State of Iran (1925–79)
Supported by:
 Soviet Union[2]

Interim Government and

Council of the Islamic Revolution (1979)


Supported by:

1979–96

Supported by:


2004–11


2016–22


2022–

Supported by:

Commanders and leaders

Ahmad Shah Qajar (1918−25)


Iran Reza Shah Pahlavi (1925−41)
Iran Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (MIA) (1941−79)


Iran Ruhollah Khomeini # (1979−89)
Iran Ali Khamenei (1981−present)
Iran Ebrahim Raisi (2021−)
Iran Hassan Rouhani (2013−2021)
Iran Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005−2013)
Iran Mohammad Khatami (1997−2005)
Iran Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (1989−1997) Iran Mohammad-Ali Rajai  (1981−1981)
Iran Abolhassan Banisadr (MIA) (1980−1981)

Iran Qasem Soleimani  (2020)

Simko Shikak (1918–1930)


Qazi Muhammad Executed
Mustafa Barzani
Jafar Sultan
Ahmed Barzani
Soviet Union Salahuddin Kazimov


Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou
Foad Mostafa Soltani
Sedigh Kamangar
Abdullah Mohtadi


Haji Ahmadi (2004–2011)
Majid Kavian 


Mustafa Hijri
Siamand Moeini
Zilan Vejin
Hussein Yazdanpanah


Mustafa Hijri
Khalid Azizi
Abdullah Mohtadi
Omar Ilkhanizade
Ibrahim Alizade
Siamand Moeini
Zilan Vejin
Hussein Yazdanpanah
Casualties and losses
23,000 killed (1979–1996)[14](according to the KDPI) 5,000 killed (1979–1996)[14](according to the KDPI)
30,000 civilians killed (1980–2000)(according to the KDPI)[15]
15,000+ individuals killed (1946–present)[16]

Kurdish separatism in Iran[17] or the Kurdish–Iranian conflict[18][19] is an ongoing,[9][12][17][20] long-running, separatist dispute between the Kurdish opposition in Western Iran and the governments of Iran,[17] lasting since the emergence of Reza Shah Pahlavi in 1918.[9]

The earliest Kurdish separatist activities in modern times refer to tribal revolts in today's West Azerbaijan Province of the Imperial State of Iran, which began between the two World Wars – the largest of these were led by Simko Shikak, Jafar Sultan and Hama Rashid. Many however, put the starting point of the organized Kurdish political-nationalist separatism at 1943,[12] when Komala (shortly afterwards the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) began their political activities in Iran, aiming to gain partial or complete self-rule in the Kurdish regions. Transformation from tribal to Kurdish political struggle in Iran took place in the aftermath of World War II, with the KDPI establishing the Republic of Mahabad during the 1946 Iran crisis.[12] The USSR-supported attempt to establish a Kurdish state in Western Iran failed.[12][21] More than a decade later, peripheral tribal uprisings,[12] launched with KDPI support through 1966–7. In the most violent episode of the conflict, more than 30,000 Kurds died in the 1979 rebellion and the consequent KDPI insurgency.[15] Though the KDPI's armed struggle ended in late 1996, another Kurdish armed organization emerged in Iran by the early 2000s. The ongoing Iran-PJAK conflict started in 2004.[22]

Iran never employed the same level of brutality against its own Kurdish population, but has always been staunchly opposed to Kurdish separatism.[23]

YouTube Encyclopedic

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  • Iran's Revolutions: Crash Course World History 226
  • IRAQ | Is Kurdistan Collapsing?
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  • Cultural Awareness Session on Kurdish Culture and Language

Transcription

Hi, I’m John Green and this is Crash Course World History and today we’re talking about Iran. Oh, Mr. Green? Mr. Green? I know that country. It’s in the Middle East. It’s with Egypt. No, Me from the Past, we’re going to talk about Iran. Now, I used to be you so I remember when you would look at this part of the world and you would be like, “oh yeah, that’s a thing.” And in your case that “thing” extended more or less from I guess, like, western China to, like, uh, Poland. Then you’d make a bunch of broad generalizations about that area and no doubt use the terms Arab and Muslim interchangeably. But as usual Me From the Past the truth resists simplicity. So today we are going to talk about Iran and just Iran. Specifically, the 1979 Iranian Revolution. So the 1979 Iranian Revolution and its aftermath are often seen by detractors as the first step in the creation of an isolated, fundamentalist state that supports terrorism, and, you might be surprised to hear me say, that there is some truth to that interpretation. That said, the way you think about the Iranian Revolution depends a lot of which part of it you are looking at. And regardless, it’s very important because it represents a different kind of revolution from the ones that we usually talk about. So the 1979 uprisings were aimed at getting rid of the Pahlavi Dynasty, which sounds, like, impressive, but this dynasty had only had two kings, Reza Shah and Mohammed Reza Shah. Before the Pahlavis, Iran was ruled by the Qajar dynasty, and before that the Safavids. The Safavids and Qajars were responsible for two of the most important aspects of Iran: The Safavids made Shia Islam the official state religion in Iran, starting with Ismail I in 1501, and the Qajars gave the Muslim clergy – the ulema – political power. So most of the world’s Muslims are Sunnis but the Shia, or Shiites are an important sect that began very early on – around 680 CE and today form the majority of Muslims in Iran and Iraq. Now within both Sunni and Shia there are further divisions and many sects, but we’re just going to talk about, like, the historical difference between the two. Shia Muslims believe that Ali should’ve been the first Caliph, Sunni Muslims think that Abu Bakr, who was the first Caliph, was rightly chosen. Since that disagreement, there have been many others, many doctrinal differences but what’s more important is that from the very beginning, Shia Muslims saw themselves as the party of the oppressed standing up against the wealthy and powerful and harkening back to the social justice standard that was set by the prophet. And this connection between religious faith and social justice was extremely important to the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and also to previous revolutions in Iran. This is really crucial to understand because many historians argue that the Iranian revolution represents what the journalist Christian Caryl called an “odd fusion of Islam and late-twentieth century revolutionary politics.” But actually, in the scheme of Iranian history, its not so odd. Because 1979 was not Iran’s first revolution. The first major one was in 1906. It forced the ruling Qajars to accept a constitution. It created a parliament and supposedly some limits on the king, and made Shia Islam the official state religion, but it also protected the rights of minorities in Iran. It ultimately failed partly because the clergy withdrew their support, partly because the shah worked very actively against it, and maybe most importantly, because the Russians and the British worked to keep Persia weak so they could continue to try to dominate the region. Which reminds me that most people in Iran are not Arabs, they are Persian. And most people in Iran don’t speak Arabic, they speak Farsi, or as we often call it in English, Persian. So after WWI European rivalries really heated up because of the discovery of oil in the Middle East. The British established the Anglo Iranian Oil Company – which would later come to be known as BP. They also extracted a bunch of concessions from the Iranian government in addition to extracting lots of oil. And they helped to engineer a change in dynasty by supporting military commander Reza Khan in his coup in February 1921. Reza Khan became Reza Shah and then he attempted to turn Persia, which he re-named Iran in 1935, into a modern, secular, western-style state kind of like Turkey was under Ataturk. But Reza Shah is perhaps best remembered for his over the top dictatorial repression, which turned the clergy against him. Okay, so during World War II Reza Shah abdicated and his young son Mohammad Reza Shah became the leader of Iran. Which he remained, mostly, until 1979 when he definitely stopped being the leader of Iran. So after World War II, the British allowed greater popular participation in Iran’s government. The main party to benefit from this openness was Tudeh, the Iranian communist party. Mohammed Mosaddegh was elected prime minister in 1951 and led the parliament to nationalize Iran’s oil industry, and that was the end of the democratic experiment. Now most history books say that in 1953 the British and the CIA engineered a coup to remove Mosaddegh from office. And that is quite possibly true. It is definitely true that we tried to engineer a coup. It’s also true that Mosaddegh quit and fled Iran following demonstrations against him. But we also know that the Shia clergy encouraged those demonstrations. That’s a bit of a weird decision for the Clergy, considering that Shia Islam traditionally takes a radical stance against oppression. But it’s important to remember that Mosaddegh was supported by the Tudeh party and they were communists. Nationalization of the oil industry was one thing, but a further shift toward communism might mean appropriation of the land that supported the clergy, maybe even a rejection of religion altogether. So now we’ve seen two occasions where the Shia clergy support helped facilitate change. Right, in 1906 and again in 1953. So, let’s flash ahead to 1979. The Shah was definitely an autocrat, and he employed a ruthless secret police called the SAVAK to stifle dissent. In 1975, the Shah abolished Iran’s two political parties and replaced them with one party the Resurgence party. You’ll never guess who was resurging - the Shah. There was a huge round of censorship and arrests and torture of political prisoners signaling that autocracy was in Iran to stay. But before those events in 1975, say between 1962 and 1975, by most economic and social measures Iran saw huge improvements. In 1963, the Shah had tried to institute what he called a White Revolution – top-down modernization led by the monarchy, and in many ways he was successful, especially in improving industry and education. Oil revenues rose from $555 million in 1964 to $20 billion in 1976. And the Shah’s government invested a lot of that money in infrastructure and education. The population grew and infant mortality fell. A new professional middle class arose. But the White Revolution wasn’t universally popular. For instance, it was opposed by one particular Shia cleric - the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Khomeini spoke out against the White Revolution from the religious center of Iran, Qom. One of his main complaints was that the reforms would grant more rights to women, including the right to vote, but he also attacked the government for, quote: “the rigging of elections and other constitutional abuses, neglect of the poor and the sale of oil to Israel.” And in general, Khomeini felt that a king’s power was inherently un-Islamic and that Shia tradition was to fight that power. That noted about Khomeini, the 1979 revolution didn’t start out to create an Islamic state. At first it was a pretty typical uprising by dissatisfied Iranians to overthrow a government that they perceived as corrupt and unresponsive to their needs. In spite of, or arguably because of, oil-fueled economic growth, many Iranians weren’t enjoying economic success. The universities were turning out more graduates than there were jobs and the mechanization of agriculture had the predictable result of displacing farmers who moved to cities. Especially the capital city of Tehran where there weren’t nearly enough jobs for the number of people. So, I think it’s unfair to say that a majority of the demonstrators who took to the streets in late 1978 were motivated by a fundamentalist vision of Islam. They were dissatisfied with economic inequality and political repression and a corrupt regime. So why do we generally remember the 1979 revolution as having been motivated by Shia Islam. Well, Let’s go to the Thought Bubble. So the initial demonstrations did begin after an Iranian newspaper on January 7, 1978 published an article that was critical of Khomeini. By the way, at the time he was living in Paris. These initial demonstrations were pretty small, but when the government police and army forces starting firing on demonstrators, killing some of them, the protests grew. Each time marchers protested against the violent treatment of demonstrators, the government would crack down, and their violent reaction would spur more demonstrations. There was also a lot of criticism of the west tied up in the revolution. According to one woman who participated: “American lifestyles had come to be imposed as an ideal, the ultimate goal. Americanism was the model. American popular culture – books, magazines, film – had swept over our country like a flood...We found ourselves wondering ‘Is there any room for our own culture?’” The Shah never understood why so many people were protesting against him; he thought that they were communists, or being supported by the British. He also thought that merely bringing prosperity would be enough to keep him in power. It wasn’t. On January 16, 1979 he left Iran. He eventually ended up in the U.S., which had unfortunate consequences for diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Iran. But the point here is that the first part of the Iranian revolution was relatively peaceful protests followed by a government crackdown, more protests that eventually led to the collapse of the monarchy, and that looks kind of familiar, especially if you’ve studied, like, the French or Russian or even the American Revolutions. And most historians argue these protests weren’t about Islam, but rather, “The discontent over living conditions, pay cuts, and the threat of unemployment fused with the general disillusionment and anger with the regime.” The government that eventually replaced the monarchy was the second, and in many ways much more revolutionary revolution. Thanks Thought Bubble. So the new Islamic Republic of Iran was based on Khomeini’s idea about what an Islamic government should be, a principle he called velayat-e faqih. Mainly it was that a sharia law scholar, would have ultimate authority, because he was more knowledgeable than anyone about law and justice. There would be a legislature and a president and a prime minister, but any of their decisions could be overturned by the supreme ruler who from 1979 until his death was Khomeini. Now, if democracy is only about holding elections, then the new Iran was a democracy. I mean, Iran has elections, both for president and for the parliament. And for the record, despite what Khomeini might have thought in the ‘60s, women can vote in Iran and they do. They also serve in the parliament and the president’s cabinet. And in the referendum on whether to create an Islamic Republic of Iran, the vast majority of Iranians in a free and open vote, voted “yes.” Now governance in Iran is extremely complicated, too complicated for one Crash Course video. But in once sense at least, Iran is definitely not a democracy. The ultimate authority, written into the constitution, is not the will of the people but god, who is represented by the supreme religious leader. And the actions of the Islamic Republic, especially in the early chaotic days of 1979 but also many times since, don’t conform to most ideas of effective democracy. Like one of the first things that Khomeini did to shore up his support was to create the Islamic Revolutionary Guards and Hezbollah to defend the revolution against coup attempts. Although initially there were opposition parties, their activities were curtailed by the new “revolutionary courts” that applied sharia law in a particularly harsh fashion. Like it’s estimated that by October 1979, several hundred people had been executed. And under the new constitution, Khomeini was given extensive power. I mean, he could appoint the heads of the armed services, and the Revolutionary Guard and the national TV and radio stations. He also approved the candidates for presidential elections and appointed six of the twelve members of the Guardian Council that approved legislation from the parliament before it became law. So structurally Iran’s government looked kind of like other governments, but as Michael Axworthy points out it was different because, quote, “above and beyond stood the faqih, with the power and the responsibility to intervene directly in the name of Islam; indeed with powers greater than those given to most monarchs in constitutional monarchies.” By 1979, Iran already had a long history of clerical involvement in protest and dynamic change, but it also had a long history of pushing for constitutions and liberty. The current end result is the Islamic Republic of Iran, but it’s worth remembering that both those threads of history are still part of Iranian life. Like we saw that in 2009 and 2010 with the so-called Green Revolution where there were huge protests after an Iranian election. Those protests involved young people arguing for more rights and liberties.. But they were also led by, and encouraged by, reformist Shia clerics. In the U.S. we mostly remember the 1979 Iranian Revolution for its burning of American flags and taking of hostages in the American Embassy. That belonged more to the second phase of the revolution, the chaotic period when the Islamic republic was being born. Life in the Islamic Republic of Iran remains highly repressive. I mean, for instance, Iran still executes a very high percentage of criminals. But it’s inaccurate to say that Iran is merely a dictatorship, or that it’s merely repressive. And one of the challenges for people in the West trying to understand Iran is that we have to disentangle the various aspects of the revolution rather than simply relying on the images that have defined it for us. I hope this episode can help a little. You can find more resources in the links below. Thanks for watching. Crash Course is filmed here in the Chad and Stacey Emigholz studio in Indianapolis and it’s made possible because of the hard worth of all of these people. Thank you for watching and as we say in my hometown, “don’t forget to be awesome.”

Background

History

Tribalism and early nationalism

Simko's first revolt (1918–1922)

The Simko Shikak revolt was an armed Ottoman-backed[24][25] tribal Kurdish uprising against the Qajar dynasty of Persia (Iran) from 1918 to 1922, led by Kurdish chieftain Simko Shikak. This tribal rebellion is sometimes regarded as the first major bid for establishing an independent Kurdish state in Persia,[26] but scholars view the revolt as an attempt by a powerful tribal chief to establish his personal authority vis-à-vis the central government throughout the region.[27] While elements of Kurdish nationalism were present in this movement, historians agree these were hardly articulate enough to justify a claim that recognition of Kurdish identity was a major issue in Simko's movement, and he had to rely heavily on conventional tribal motives.[27] It lacked any kind of administrative organization and Simko was primarily interested in plunder.[26] Government forces and non-Kurds were not the only ones to suffer in the attacks, as the Kurdish population was also robbed and assaulted.[27] Simko's men don't appear to have felt any sense of unity or solidarity with fellow Kurds.[27] Historian Ervand Abrahamian describes Simko as "notorious" for massacring thousands of Assyrians and "harassing" democrats.[28] Still, some Kurds today revere Simko as a hero of the independence movement.[20]

1926 Simko rebellion in Persia

By 1926, Simko had regained control of his tribe and begun another outright rebellion against the state.[29] When the army engaged him, half of his troops defected to the tribe's previous leader and Simqu fled to Iraq.[29]

Jafar Sultan revolt

Jafar Sultan of Hewraman region took control of the region between Marivan and north of Halabja and remained independent until 1925. After four years under Persian rule, the tribal leader revolted in 1929, but was effectively crushed.

Hama Rashid revolt

Hama Rashid revolt refers to a tribal uprising in Pahlavi Iran, during the Second World War, following the Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran.[30] The tribal revolt erupted in the general atmosphere of anarchy throughout Iran and its main faction was led by Muhammed Rashid, lasting from late 1941 until April 1942 and then re-erupted in 1944, resulting in Rashid's defeat. It is considered one of the factors to lead to the establishment of the Kurdish political independence movement in 1945–6.

Political separatism

Mahabad crisis

Qazi Muhammad and Mustafa Barzani during the 1946 events

The danger of fragmentation in modern Iran became evident shortly after Second World War when Soviet Union's refused to relinquish occupied North Western Iranian territory.[23] Iran crisis of 1946 included a separatist attempt of KDP-I and communist groups[31] to establish the Soviet puppet government,[32][33][34] and declare the Republic of Mahabad in Iranian Kurdistan (today's southern part of West Azerbaijan Province). It arose along with Azerbaijan People's Government, another Soviet puppet state.[23][35] The state itself encompassed a very small territory, including Mahabad and the adjacent cities, unable to incorporate the southern Iranian Kurdistan, which fell inside the Anglo-American zone, and unable to attract the tribes outside Mahabad itself to the nationalist cause.[23] As a result, when the Soviets withdrew from Iran in December 1946, government forces were able to enter Mahabad unopposed.[23] Some 1,000 died during the crisis.[12]

Iran crisis of 1946 included an attempt of the KDPI to establish an independent Kurdish-dominated Republic of Mahabad in Iranian Kurdistan.[12] Though later several Marxist insurgencies continued for decades, led by KDP-I and Komala, but those two organization have never advocated a separate Kurdish state or greater Kurdistan as did the PKK in Turkey.[36][27][37][38]

1967 Kurdish revolt

In mid-1960s a series of Kurdish tribal disturbances erupted in Western Iran, fed up by the revival of the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDP-I).[9] In 1967-8 Iranian government troops suppressed a Kurdish revolt in Western Iran,[12] consolidating the previous Kurdish uprisings in Mahabad-Urumiya region.

1979 rebellion

1979 Kurdish rebellion in Iran was an insurrection led by the KDPI and Komala in Iranian Kurdistan, which became the most serious rebellion against the new Iranian regime, following the Islamic Revolution. The rebellion ended in December 1982, with 10,000 killed and 200,000 displaced.[12]

KDPI insurgency

Insurrection by the KDPI took place in Iranian Kurdistan through early and mid-90s, initiated by assassination of its leader in exile in July 1989. The KDPI insurrection ended in 1996, following a successful Iranian campaign of targeted assassinations of KDPI leaders and crackdown on its support bases in Western Iran. In 1996, KDPI announced a unilateral cease fire, and has since acted at low profile before renewed clashes in 2015.[39]

PJAK insurrection

Iran–PJAK conflict is an ongoing rebellion of PJAK in which hundreds Kurdish militants and Iranian forces as well as civilians have died, officially lasting since April 2004.[12] PJAK is based in the border area with Iraqi Kurdistan and is affiliated with the Marxist PKK from Turkey,[40] though PJAK themselves tend to neglect this alleged relation. Although sometimes described as organization demanding more human rights for Kurds in Iran, it is regarded as separatist by Iranian media and various Western analysts.[17][40][41] The PJAK goal is an establishment of a Kurdish autonomy and according to Habeeb they do not pose any serious threat to the regime of the Islamic Republic.[17]

In one of the first actions of the Obama administration, PJAK was declared a "terrorist organization".[40][41] PJAK and Iranian government agreed on cease-fire, following the 2011 Iranian offensive on PJAK bases. After the cease fire agreement, a number of clashes between PJAK and IRGC took place in 2012,[20] and by mid-2013, the fighting resumed in sporadic incidents, escalating in 2016.

Renewed tensions 2014–present

Escalation and unrest

PDKI fighters.

In January 2014, Iranian forces killed a KDPI party member, while he was disseminating leaflets.[42]

In September 2014, in a number of clashes, the KDPI engaged Iranian security for the first time in many years, killing at least 6 Iranian soldiers.[43] It was unclear whether this was a result of change of policy by the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (which evaded violence since 1996) or an isolated sequence of incidents.

In May 2015, a suspected Iranian attack (allegedly disguised as PKK fighters) on PJAK force on Iranian–Iraqi Kurdistan border resulted in 6 killed—2 KDPI and 4 PKK[44] (or allegedly Iranian agents).

On 7 May 2015, ethnic Kurds rioted in Mahabad, Iran, following the unexplained death on 4 May 2015 of Farinaz Khosravani, a 25-year-old Kurdish hotel chambermaid. Unrest and violence spread to other Kurdish cities in Iran, such as Sardasht, where police clashed with hundreds of protesters on 9 May 2015.[45] One protester has been reportedly killed in the clashes, and that additionally, Kurdish insurgent group PJAK had attacked an Iranian checkpoint killing two Iranian personnel, according to PJAK.[46] According to ARA sources, as of May 11, the death toll climbed to 6 protesters killed.[47] The incidents prompted harsh responses also from other Kurdish opposition parties, including the Kurdistan Freedom Party and the PDKI.

In June 2015, a KDPI attack on Revolutionary Guard forces reportedly left 6 people killed.[48]

Low-level insurgency (2016–present)

Military clashes in West Iran[49] refers to the ongoing military clashes between Kurdish insurgent party Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI) and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, which began in April 2016. Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK) and Komalah expressed their support to the Kurdish cause of PDKI as well, with both clashing with Iranian security forces in 2016 and 2017 respectively. In parallel, a leftist Iranian Kurdish rebel group PJAK resumed military activities against Iran in 2016, following a long period of stalemate.

The 2016 clashes came following a background of what PDKI described as "growing discontent in Rojhelat".[50] The commander of the PAK military wing described their engagement and declaration of hostilities against the Iranian government were due to the fact that "the situation in eastern Kurdistan (Iranian Kurdistan) has become unbearable, especially with the daily arbitrary executions against the Kurds [in Iran]".[51]

Iran has periodically launched strikes against the KDPI and other Iranian Kurdish dissident groups based in the frontier of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. In March 2023, Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' Al Sudani, who came to power via a coalition of Iranian-backed parties, signed a border security agreement with Iran to tighten up the frontier between the two countries. On 28 August, Iraq agreed to disarm and relocate these groups to camps near Mosul by 19 September.[52][53] However, according to the New Arab, these groups have not been disarmed, nor does Iraq seem to have the capability to do so.[54]

See also

References

  1. ^ Bruinessen, Martin (2006). "Chapter 5: A Kurdish warlord on the Turkish-Persian frontier in the early Twentieth century: Isma'il Aqa Simko". In Atabaki, Touraj (ed.). Iran and the First World War: Battleground of the Great Powers. Library of modern Middle East studies, 43. London; New York: I.B. Tauris. pp. 18–21. ISBN 9781860649646. OCLC 56455579.
  2. ^ a b Belgin San-Akca (2016). States in Disguise: Causes of State Support for Rebel. Oxford University Press. p. 95. ISBN 9780190250904.
  3. ^ Entessar, Nader (2010). Kurdish Politics in the Middle East. Lanham: Lexington Books. p. 48. ISBN 9780739140390. OCLC 430736528.
  4. ^ Shireen Hunter (2010). Iran's Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Era: Resisting the New International Order. ABC-CLIO. p. 276. ISBN 9780313381942.
  5. ^ "Iranian Kurds Return to Arms". Stratfor. 29 July 2016. Archived from the original on 30 July 2016. Retrieved 29 September 2016.
  6. ^ Reese Erlich, Robert Scheer (2016). Iran Agenda: The Real Story of U.S. Policy and the Middle East Crisis. Routledge. p. 133. ISBN 978-1317257370. Morteza Esfandiari, the KDPI representative in the U.S., told me that KDPI had applied to get some of the 85 million dollars allocated to "promote democracy" in Iran in order to improve its satellite TV station. "We are friends with the United States. What other friends can we find in the world, other than the United States?"
  7. ^ "Iran Says Busted 'Mossad-Linked' Sabotage Team Are Kurdish Separatists". Iran International. 27 July 2022. Retrieved 17 May 2023.
  8. ^ "Iran Blasts Iraq Over Kurdish Opposition Groups At Ceremony". Iran International. 14 May 2023. Retrieved 17 May 2023.
  9. ^ a b c d Smith, Benjamin, "The Kurds of Iran: Opportunistic and Failed Resistance, 1918-" (PDF), Land and Rebellion: Kurdish Separatism in Comparative Perspective, Cornell, p. 10, archived from the original (PDF) on 15 June 2012
  10. ^ AYLIN ÜNVER NOI. The Arab Spring – its effects on the Kurds and the approaches of Turkey, Iran, Syria and Iraq on the Kurdish issue. Gloria Center. 1 July 2012. "There is a long history of tension between the Kurds and the government in Iran. This began with Reza Shah Pahlavi recapturing the lands that Kurdish leaders had gained control of between 1918 and 1922."; "Iran fears that the creation of a semi-autonomous state in northern Iraq might motivate its own Kurdish minority to press for greater independence. However, Iran’s concern about Kurdish separatism does not approach the level of Turkey’s concern. Still, there have been repeated clashes between Kurds and Iranian security forces" [1] Archived 17 September 2012 at the Wayback Machine
  11. ^ "Database - Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)". Archived from the original on 19 July 2014. Retrieved 26 January 2014.
  12. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k University of Arkansas. Political Science department. Iran/Kurds (1943–present). Retrieved 9 September 2012. [2] Archived 25 January 2016 at the Wayback Machine
  13. ^ Iran: Freedom of Expression and Association in the Kurdish Regions. 2009. "This 42 page report documents how Iranian authorities use security laws, press laws, and other legislation to arrest and prosecute Iranian Kurds solely for trying to exercise their right to freedom of expression and association. The use of these laws to suppress basic rights, while not new, has greatly intensified since President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad came to power in August 2005." [3] Archived 26 August 2014 at the Wayback Machine
  14. ^ a b "KDPI leadership urges support for 'mountain struggle'". Rudaw. Archived from the original on 7 October 2016. Retrieved 14 February 2017.
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