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John J. McCloy

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

John J. McCloy
John J. McCloy - Project Gutenberg etext 20587.jpg
2nd President of the World Bank Group
In office
March 17, 1947 – July 1, 1949
President Harry Truman
Preceded by Eugene Meyer
Succeeded by Gene Black
American High Commissioner for Occupied Germany
In office
September 21, 1949 – August 1, 1952
Preceded by Position established
Succeeded by James Conant
Personal details
Born John Snader McCloy
(1895-03-31)March 31, 1895
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.
Died March 11, 1989(1989-03-11) (aged 93)
Stamford, Connecticut, U.S.
Political party Republican[1]
Spouse(s) Ellen Zinsser (1930–1986)
Children 2
Education Peddie School
Amherst College (BA)
Harvard University (LLB)

John Jay McCloy (born John Snader McCloy; March 31, 1895 – March 11, 1989) was an American lawyer and banker who served as Assistant Secretary of War during World War II.

After the war he served as president of the World Bank, U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, chairman of Chase Manhattan Bank, and chairman of the Council on Foreign Relations. He later became a prominent United States presidential adviser, served on the Warren Commission, and was a member of the foreign policy establishment group of elders called "The Wise Men".

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  • Resistance and Opposition During World War II: Germany, France and the United States
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This is a Class of 1962 panel, but I'm the only member of that class. Those of us who were in the Class of 1962 were only five years old or so when the Second World War ended in 1945. And many of us have memories of that time. And all of us, of course, were influenced by the war. As a writer about those years, I became aware of two outstanding professors at Amherst. They're scholars who have written and taught and broken new ground about resistance movements during the Second World War. [INAUDIBLE] Can you move the microphone a little closer? OK, yeah. Thank you, Jay. How is that? [AUDIENCE MURMURS] How is that? All right. The presence of these two professors and our endless fascination with what drives individuals to resist and oppose or not, caused me to suggest this program that we're about to hear. So without any further introductions, I want to just get started. I do want to just tell you about Katherine Epstein. She's the Dean of Faculty. Many of you saw her this morning. The Winkley Professor of History. She's an expert in German. She's going to lead off. All right. Hi there. It's great to see so many of you. Is this working? You hearing me? OK, good. When David [? Rolle ?] first suggested this panel, we had a very lively debate among the panelists about what constitutes resistance. In particular, could opposition in democratic regimes be construed as resistance? This is, of course, very topical. Can individuals working today in federal bureaucracies who oppose Trump be viewed as resistors? Now this whole issue may be a matter of semantics. But I do want to sort of lay this out a little bit, in that I place actually a quite high bar on what constitutes resistance. For me, it's a form of opposition that involves moral, ethical concerns and that involves very significant personal risk. So for me, at least, losing a job, like losing a job in the federal bureaucracy, doesn't really cut it. But others may well feel differently. So for me, those challenging Trump from within the government are, I would say, engaged in spirited and perhaps courageous opposition, but I would not give them the halo term resistors. So what I am going to do now is talk a little bit about how I think about resistance based on my field of specialization, which is 20th century Germany and the Nazi regime. And from that we'll sort of continue this conversation of what is resistance. So what sort of resistance was there in Nazi Germany? Many of you will have heard about the most famous incidents of resistance. The July 20, 1944 assassination attempt against Hitler perhaps comes immediately to mind. This was when Claus von Stauffenberg tried to kill Hitler at his East Prussian headquarters. Due to various miscalculations, not least that Stauffenberg had been maimed in a war injury, this assassination attempt was not successful. Besides von Stauffenberg, the resistance movement actually involved hundreds of individuals, many within the Nazi elite. And they had very detailed plans for taking over the government after Hitler's death. Once it was known, however, that Hitler had survived the assassination attempt, the conspiracy unraveled very quickly. And von Stauffenberg and many, many others, were executed. Stauffenberg that evening already, the evening of July 20th, and many others over the next-- about a year that remained in the Nazi-- or 10 months that remained in the Nazi regime. So that seems to me really clearly resistance. Many of you may also have heard of the White Rose. This was a group of students in Munich, headed up by two siblings Hans and Sophie Scholl. In 1942 and 1943, the group wrote pamphlets and distributed them throughout the university as well as around Munich. The pamphlets urged Germans to engage in ethical opposition to the Nazis. At a certain point, the students were discovered. They were tried in a very fast judicial proceedings, and they were executed relatively quickly. It's interesting that today if you ask Germans who are among the most admired women in German history, Sophie Scholl always rises to the very top of that list. I don't think that any of us would say that those two actions were not resistance. I think that sort of sets a very high bar. But that those two incidents clearly strike me as resistance. There are, though, many different ways that one could define this term. Some historians believe that the term should have a very narrow definition or quite narrow definition. Again, the one that I sort of gave at the outset, something along the lines of moral, ethical opposition that involves organized action intended to bring down a regime and that involves pretty significant consequences for those who are involved. Such resistance, if uncovered, would bring almost certain arrest and very often death sentences. It's interesting in that such resistance tends to bring little reward other than moral reward. In other words, one did the right thing. But one actually may not gain very much else. And again, I think there's no question that Stauffenberg and the Scholls would fall into that category. So what is definitely resistance? To me, assassination attempts against Hitler, if they're actually serious ones. Hiding Jews-- hiding Jews was always a very dangerous prospect for Germans and others. Engaging in sabotage at a munitions factory, that strikes me as pretty clearly resistance. In each case, were it discovered, it would lead to serious consequences-- arrest and sometimes even a death sentence. So as you can tell, there's a pretty high bar here. The action has to be quite heroic. Then the consequences, if discovered, quite dire. Now during the Nazi years, this sort of resistance was actually remarkably rare. It is true that in the first two years of the regime, from 1933 to 1935, communists, socialists, and other leftists put up some very serious resistance to the Nazi regime. They did lots of leafletting, lots of agitating, lots of trying to get people to see what was wrong with the Nazis. But these resistance movements were essentially all wiped out by the spring of 1935. Virtually everyone involved in them had either been arrested, had fled abroad, or was simply too terrified to act. Then there was sort of a period of quiet around the period of the 1936 Olympics, not a lot of resistance in the mid-1930s. In 1938 and 1939, there was an important resistance movement that hoped to thwart Germany's rush towards the war. This took place within pretty high levels of the Nazi elite, particularly among the Foreign Ministry and the intelligence bureaus. Also in 1939, there was a very significant attempt against Hitler's life that had Hitler decided not to cut short a speech, we probably wouldn't have had World War II. In the wake of Germany's stunning victories in 1939 and 1940, there was virtually no resistance once again in Nazi Germany. And resistance really only picked up after it was clear that Germany's war efforts were not going well. But even then, there was surprisingly little resistance. And of course, as many of you know, there was shockingly little resistance to the Holocaust. So there could be different explanations for why there was so little resistance. One reason, which I think for a long time was sort of the popular reason, was the Nazi regime essentially terrified the population. And therefore, very few were willing to resist because the act was so dire. The consequences were so dire. But there's another reason why there may not have been so much resistance to the Nazis. And this is actually the reason that I tend to favor. And it is that, by and large, Germans were not so unhappy with the Nazi regime. This became the new normal. And it was not-- the sorts of things that the Nazi regime was doing, many of them were extremely popular. All the sort of taking on of conquering lands in Europe-- that was actually very popular in Germany. So I think a major reason for why there was so little resistance of any kind in Nazi Germany was, in fact, that most Germans supported the regime. Nazi Germany was actually under policed, if you look at the numbers of policemen per population, it's relatively few policemen-- and it was all men-- as opposed to the population at large. So this was not a heavily policed country in any way at all. And in fact, the Nazis, what they relied on was people telling the police about things. So this became more a nation of telling the police sort of-- the word's not coming to my mind right now-- but basically-- Informers. Informers, thank you! That's the word I was looking for-- a nation of informers. Thank you. OK. Now there is, though, a whole other and perhaps more capacious way to think about resistance. And that is any conduct that thwarts the regime's aim to infiltrate and control all aspects of society. So I want to think about this latter category. And I'm going to ask you, but you don't need to answer them, or answer them in your head, the questions that I pose to my students. So in Nazi Germany, was grumbling at work resistance? One might think, I don't know, not really. You could say, that's just whining. But it does threaten morale. And in a society totally organized for the war effort, maintaining morale is actually crucial. In Nazi Germany, was driving a private car, when it is forbidden by law, resistance? Well, it uses up, resources, gas, necessary for the war effort. In Nazi Germany, was writing a diary resistance? We are not actually doing anything right there to undermine the regime. But on the other hand, you are documenting crimes for posterity that could ruin the reputation of the Nazis. In Nazi Germany, was listening to foreign broadcasts, an act forbidden by law, resistance? Again, you're not necessarily hurting or undermining the regime per se, but you are questioning the regime's version of truth, and you get yourself into the position to give information to others. Another question in Nazi Germany-- was apathy resistance? Again, you don't really think of apathy as resistance, but it does threaten morale, and it means that you're probably not helping the war effort. In Nazi Germany, was dancing to jazz or swing music resistance? The problem is, the Nazi regime didn't like youth engaging in degenerate pastimes, in their view, and corrupting the youth was actually corrupting the future, right? Because the Nazis put extraordinary hope into the youth of the regime. OK, in Nazi Germany, when women chose-- excuse me-- not to participate in war production, was that resistance? Women were supposed to work. Actually, all women were required to work at a certain point. And so women staying at home meant that less war material was produced, and she was also flaunting the laws, although the Nazis didn't go after middle class women who didn't work. In Nazi Germany, was black market activity resistance? Again, threatens morale and the economy. Individuals were actually arrested for virtually all of these actions. I suppose not writing a diary, unless it was known. But listening to foreign broadcasts, dancing at jazz or swing clubs, black market activity, all of those things were things that people were arrested for in Nazi Germany. And I think that most of us would probably not categorize those actions as resistance. And again, to me, resistance is heroic, it bears severe consequences, and it is aimed at undermining the regime. That having been said, what I've described could in fact have quite significant negative implications for the Nazi regime, especially since this was a regime that demanded loyalty from citizens, and all of these actions undermined individual and collective loyalty to the Nazis. So are these actions resistance or not? I'm going to let you ponder that one as I let my students ponder that one. But what I would say is that, if such actions are considered resistance, Nazi Germany all of a sudden becomes a nation of resistors rather than a nation of collaborators or informers, which is another good term here. And I think a nation of collaborators may actually be the more accurate term. Indeed, I think it's clear that Germans combined discontent of the whining sort with fundamental support of the Nazi regime. By and large, this was a reasonably popular regime with reasonable levels of public support. In turn, that meant that dissenting behavior never really posed a significant challenge to the Nazi dictatorship. Still, the existence of widespread dissenting behavior suggests the limits of Nazi popularity. While some Germans fanatically supported the regime, most Germans merely accepted it. Finally, I asked you to think a bit about the significance of resistance in Nazi Germany. During the Nazi years, the very existence of some resistance movements gave heart to others who were either involved or considering being involved in resistance. That is the more narrow definition of resistance. For some, simply getting a White Rose brochure suggested that they were not alone and that others felt as they did. And that alone could be a very comforting experience. After 1945, past resistance played a totally different role. Past resistance served both to accuse and to excuse Germans. The few who prized ethical commitment posed a moral indictment of the many. If some could find it in themselves to condemn wrong, why didn't more do so? But the harsh punishments that such individuals endured explained and even justified most Germans' refusal to resist Nazism. And so I'm going to return now to my opening comments. I think it's actually valuable to keep a high bar on what we define as resistance. Those who sacrificed so much for ethical, moral imperatives deserve our recognition and our respect. Confounding that sort of behavior with more ordinary actions I think blurs ethical and moral lines. We need our heroes, and we should continue to celebrate them. At the same time, lesser actions also have their value. It is truly important that some listen to foreign radio broadcasts, that some wrote diaries, that some danced to swing, and that some even grumbled. And I hope we will all, actually, all of us in this room-- I think it's a high bar to ask for all of you to engage in resistance, but I would hope that all of us would engage in more of these lower level sorts of actions. But the many should not feel self-satisfied nor should they be celebrated by others. And as for resistance today, I think that happens in many regimes around the world. But I don't think that it's happening in the United States today of the sort that I was talking about. Healthy democracies enjoy opposition, and they do not turn their citizens into resisters. And I think that we are-- my own view is-- we're still in the healthy democracy category. Of course, I hope it stays that way. [APPLAUSE] Our next speaker is going to be Ron Rosbottom, Ronald Rosbottom, author of When Paris Went Dark, a very well-received book that's out in the lobby today, of the City of Light under German occupation. Ron's a former dean of the faculty, and a Winifred Arms Professor in Arts and Humanities. Well, thank you. Dean Epstein, I know I grumble from time to time. [LAUGHTER] But I'm not resisting, OK? There you go. That's good. I have some of my students, former students are here, so you can go to sleep like you used to in my class. Right? [LAUGHTER] Yep. Looks fine to me. A different direction-- in doing research for my previous book, When Paris Went Dark, about the occupation of Paris-- I noticed-- I encountered a phenomenon that was so prevalent and so obvious that I ignored it for a while, just thought it as a truism that didn't need much comment. Put simply, in the time of war, we are brought suddenly to consider youth. And my research then showed that youth, though at first spontaneous and disorganized, were among the earliest to resist the fact of the occupation in France. In fact, it's been estimated that between 1939 and 1945 as much as 70% of those in France who actively resisted the Germans-- and actively in the sense that Catherine said-- and their Vichy collaborators were under the age of 30. 70%-- that's an estimation, under the age of 30. Why? Well, there too many reasons. There are a lot of reasons. That's why I am writing the book. And I'm only going to tell you one, so you'll buy the book and learn all the others. [LAUGHTER] The one I want to talk about is the after effects of War I. In France after 1918, the casualties of that murderous war had been brought home in photographs, in newsreels, with the public listing of thousands of names of the wounded, the missing, the dead, often with their ages attached. Shattered bodies roam the streets and byways of a mourning nation, and monuments to the dead were raised in every village of France. All of this prevented survivors from ignoring how much promise, innocence, and yes, virility, had disappeared in the space of a few years. These memories created a major cultural shift in the formal and informal education of youth after 1918-- all over Europe, not specifically in France. Beginning in the 1920s, every sociopolitical regime in Europe-- fascist, conservative, communist, socialist, religious-- showed concern about and attention to the indoctrination, control, and motivation of their youth. It was taken for granted that young people would not go, again, sheeplike to slaughter, or at least not without searing justification. For those under draft age, organizations were set up to keep them occupied during the summer months, indoctrination performed in a massive adoption of summer camping all over Europe, physical activity characterized by dozens of scouting organizations, religious service to the needy, to the multitudes of refugees that were beginning to move across Europe, and to the incorporation of immigrant youth into these groups. All such preoccupations led to the establishment of governmental ministries of youth and to the addition of youth organizations every major adult membership group from the Freemasons to the brownshirts of fascism. The insistence on controlling youthful energy, the establishment of hierarchical organizations, the search for leaders among adolescents, and in fact, the very process of indoctrination not only serve the purposes of governments, but gave youngsters the structures that would make coordinated resistance possible. This phenomenon offers an excellent example of what sociologists call the law of unintended consequences, when carefully planned actions have unexpected results. After the brief battle of France in May-June 1940, with the capture and permanent imprisonment of nearly two million young, mostly young soldiers-- and they stayed for the most part in Germany during the war-- at the end of the war, I think there were a million and a half still in German camps. French youth still not in uniform became even more a target for those trying to establish quickly a new regime. Suddenly, there were choices that adolescents had to make and quickly-- to run away, to hide, to join a clandestine group, to fight, to resist only morally, in place, or to support the authorities. All demanded reasoning that many adolescents were still only partially capable of doing. The keystone of my new book outlines reasons why teenagers, some as young as 13 and 14, began-- even before the Battle of France was over-- what would become a vigorous and sustained resistance to both the German occupier and the Vichy state. The Vichy government and the occupiers were at first lenient toward juvenile miscreants. Those who wrote on the walls or who hooted at Germans whenever they saw a group of Germans in a uniform, they would hoot at them. They ignored him for a while, but that soon changed. Within a year, more and more youngsters were arrested for distributing tracts, interfering with smooth police order, minor sabotage, and more serious mischief. And eventually, they became hostages to be shot when more serious resistance actions killed Germans. There was a rule, at first, for every German killed, it would be 10 hostages shot in France. It went up to 50 at one point, then it fell back down to 10. And they did it. In October 1941, that is just a little more over a year of the occupation, a young boy, Guy Moquet, barely 17, was shot with 26 other young communists. This was the first major case of such a youngster being shot. Later others were, some of the youngest 14 and 15. The wages of youthful resistance had definitely become higher. What makes this subject so fascinating to me, and so complicated, is that I focus on five years, '39 to '45. And five years is a long time in the physical and psychological maturation of youngsters. Someone only 12 in 1939 would be 16 by D-Day. So the coincidence of physical maturation and the progress of the war is a complex one for a narrative history on this subject. I'd just like to bring that to your attention about the complexity. When you talk about adolescence, you have to realize they're still growing. And that no one knew when the war was going to end. We know now. But they didn't know. In my current research, which defines adolescence as roughly between 15 and 25, I write a great deal on the memoirs of participants and the contemporary letters of youngsters who were involved in an activity whose ultimate aims many only barely understood in 1940 and '41. Now let me end by telling you the story of just one of these youngsters. Jacques Lusseyran was a member of upper bourgeois class, Catholic, living in Paris, born in 1924. So that means in 1939 he was 15 years old. At the age of eight, he had a terrible accident. He fell on his glasses, and the arm of the glass pierced his left eyeball. And that always gets a groan. When you say anything about piercing an eyeball, I always get a groan. Two days later his right eye sympathetically stopped working as well. So he was totally blind at eight. His parents refused to educate him with the blind. He was educated with the sighted, one of the first kids to use Braille typewriters in French classrooms. He was an intellectual. He loved Germany and everything about Germany. His father had worked in Germany, and he even visited Germany in 1938. Coming back a little worried about Hitler, but still impressed that German learning and education was continuing to perform as well as it had before the war. And so he was very dismayed at the outbreak of the war in '39, and then when the Germans invaded France in 1940. He felt that the Germans had betrayed their traditions. So he immediately began, remember he's 15 years old. He immediately began to listen to Charles de Gaulle and to the free French who were saying do something. The war is not over. We have a battle to fight. We'll fight it here from London, and you do what you can to fight it from France, something that de Gaulle regretted having said later. Because he never really trusted the resistance, the armed resistance in France. But I'm getting off the subject. In May 1941, he decided to invite some of his friends. They said we have to do something. What can we do? We're only kids. They were all in the same lycee. We're only kids, what can we do? So he said, come over to the house, and let's talk about what we can do. And invite anyone you know, but be very careful. Invite anyone you know who might be interested. Well, 50 or 60 boys showed up at his apartment. His parents, by the way, were very lenient. Other parents would have killed him and locked him up and sent him home to the grandmother, because many parents were petrified about what their adolescents were going to be doing during this occupation. And soon he began to organize a group called the Volontaires de la Liberte, and it was a group of boys, it went as high as four to 500 that he ran through Paris for two years, roughly two years, distributing tracts. Not doing any violence, but distributing tracts, helping allied fliers to be rescued, hiding people that were in danger of being arrested, that sort of thing. And he became the leader. All the boys trusted him. Totally blind-- because of his blindness, he had an extraordinary memory. He knew up to 1,000 phone numbers and never had to write them down. He knew the names of everybody, never had to write anything down. And one of his greatest talents was interviewing people. And no one could join their group without having spent a half hour with the blind guy. That's what they called him, the blind guy. Go see the blind guy. And the blind guy would, and he discusses this extensively in his memoir, would interview people. And because of his blindness, and because of his intuition, because of this use of his other senses, he could evaluate, and it worked, the seriousness, the depths of young people's willingness to participate in a dangerous activity. Because by then, the Germans were arresting young people who were doing this kind of stuff. And in fact, it was just a few months after he started that Guy Moquet was executed. So for two years they ran an extraordinarily efficient campaign of publishing a two page newspaper, which they passed out, the boys would spread out all over the city. And they'd pass out as many as 40,000 copies of that paper, everywhere. They went to churches. They ran through metros giving them. They put them on cafe terraces. They ran into apartment buildings and stuffed them under doors. It was very, very effective. So effective that a larger group of resistors led by older people, that is people in their 30s, or late 20s, they were always talking about the older people that they were working under, coincided with him. And just when he was about to take-- he became more and more of a leader-- he was betrayed. He made one mistake in all of these interviews, and he was betrayed by a French boy who turned in the-- she just held up the time sign, so that immediately intimidated me-- [LAUGHTER] --who turned him in. He spent two years in jail. And they sent him to Buchenwald. What probably saved him at Buchenwald was his knowledge of German and his blindness. They didn't know what to do with him. So they put him in with those who were deathly ill. He survived that, came home, became a college French professor in the United States and was killed in 1972, I think, in an automobile accident. One friend said, was he driving? [LAUGHTER] There are many stories like this one, perhaps not as dramatic, but they reveal a passionate, youthful connection to political liberty and to human solidarity by some of the most courageous adolescents of the 20th century. Thank you. [APPLAUSE] Boy, listening to these two is why we went to Amherst. I remember we had, in our day, we had Bucky Salmon and Henry Steele Commager. I'm Henry Steele Commager. [LAUGHTER] Let me know if you can hear me or not hear me, OK? So I'm going to talk about opposition during World War II in the United States. And that's difference-- I'm not sure I have the same definitions as Catherine. But to me, opposition is like a continuum. It can range from mild disagreement to intense hostility. And I'm going to talk about three influential Americans that I contend that opposed the rescue of the Jews during the Holocaust. And I believe, or I will contend, that they engaged in one form or another of opposition. The first individual, the Harry Hopkins-- and I wrote a book about him-- a spectral figure in the administration of President Franklin Roosevelt. He was a man who came to dinner and never left. For 3 and 1/2 years, he lived, he worked, he even was married upstairs, second floor of the White House in the Lincoln suite. He wasn't married in the Lincoln suite. But he was married on the second floor. And it was just a few doors down from the president's own bedroom. He was the closest friend, adviser, and confidant that Franklin Roosevelt had. In the summer of 1943, Hopkins' knowledge of the Holocaust became well-documented. And that's when he received a letter from a close friend about a Polish underground guy named Jan Karski. Jan Karski disguised himself as a guard, got inside a Nazi death camp called Belzec, escaped. He was brought back to Washington. And he had a meeting with Roosevelt. Hopkins may have set up that meeting. He wasn't there. And they begged Roosevelt to do something about the Holocaust. They had eyewitness testimony and Jewish leaders were in the office at the same time. Roosevelt was noncommittal. He said tell your nation we shall win the war, and that was his response. Hopkins knew all about this. It was talked about throughout Washington. What did he do? He was silent. He had an intimate relationship with Roosevelt. He could have pushed for relaxation of the immigration policies. By that time, they were really trying to get the State Department to change them. But Hopkins was not involved. He could have encouraged rescue efforts. He could have sought to publicize the plight of the Jews. There's no evidence that Hopkins did or said anything after July 1943. So I would submit, and I have a much lower bar at least as far as opposition is concerned, that a person with his background, and I'll get to that background in a minute, and his knowledge of what was going on through his many friends who did know, and his influence with Roosevelt, amounted to a form of passive opposition. A personal note on Jan Karski. I did my research on the Hopkins book at Georgetown University, just down the street from where I live. And I used to go in the campus, and there was a bronze sculpture of a man sitting on a park bench that I used to pass by every day. One time I looked down at the plaque, and it was John Karski. After the war, he came to Georgetown, got a PhD, and taught history there until his death. For the past three years, I've been working on a new treatment of George Marshall. Aside from the president during the war, Marshall was the most powerful and influential US leader during the entire war. His honorary degree from Harvard reads-- "A soldier and statesman whose ability and character brook only one comparison in the history of the nation," an obvious reference to George Washington. Yet Marshall opposed the use of the military to rescue European Jews. And this part of his long story has not been told. Now Marshall was Chief of Staff at the US Army. His single-minded concern throughout the Army was winning the war-- his overriding priority, winning the war as quickly as possible. He opposed any and all attempts to engage the Army and its Air Force-- at that time, the Air Force was part of the Army-- and any operation to rescue Jews. He regarded these operations as just as diversionary. So more than a year after the world, everyone knew about the Holocaust, in January 1944, Roosevelt reluctantly created the War Refugee Board. And its executive order specified that the War Department, along with Treasury and State, had a legal duty to cooperate in rescuing the Jews with all possible speed. Now Assistant Secretary John Jay McCloy, who was Assistant Secretary of the War Department, he was really a civilian boss of Marshall's. More about him later-- he was Amherst Class of 1916, John Jay McCloy. He sent a note to Marshall's office. This was right after the War Refugee Board was set up. And the note said, I'm very chary of getting Army involved in this while the war is going on. Marshall did not push back. He did not acquiesce. He could have said the Army would help consistent with the prosecution of the war, which he was able to do under that executive order. Instead, an internal memorandum was issued within the War Department, which said the most effective way to help the Jews was to ensure the speedy defeat of the Axis, certainly a priority. Policy was used by Marshall's army of eight million, for the rest of the war, to avoid rescue efforts. Even if a bomber squadron or a combat unit was available to conduct a rescue operation, or even if the army had excess funds to use for ransom, which was one way of getting the Jews out of various countries in Eastern Europe, or paying for transportation, they wouldn't do it. Or even if they had excess food or facilities to help with the Jews. So the question is, did anti-Semitism play a role? Henry Morgenthau who was the Treasury Secretary for Roosevelt, a Jew. He thought it did. His target, though, was not Marshall, but it was this barrel-chested John Jay McCloy, a son of Amherst, a former chair of the board of trustees here. At a cabinet meeting in the spring of 1944, Morgenthau labeled McCloy an oppressor of the Jews. He said that at a cabinet meeting. McCloy wasn't there. He found out about it later. And the reason he did that was because McCloy refused to allow an unused Army base up in upstate New York, in Oswego, to house Jewish refugees from Italy. But he heard about this comment. He was deeply offended. He eventually gave up on resisting the use of the camp, and the camp became the one and only haven during the war for Jewish refugees from Europe. McCloy continued to believe, as did Marshall after this incident-- and Henry Stimson, who was head of the War Department-- that the Army should not be used to rescue Jews. Unfortunately for McCloy, he became the public face of opposition, because that was part of his job. They assigned him the task of dealing with the War Refugee Board. So in June of 1944, the head of the War Refugee Board, a guy named John Paley, asked McCloy to consider bombing the rail lines leading into Auschwitz. McCloy said such an operation, his words, would be of doubtful efficacy, could be accomplished only by diversion of considerable air support needed for decisive operations. None of that was true. Bombers based in Italy had been flying over Auschwitz for weeks. And this was the first of many refusals that McCloy, pursuant to his job, declined to permit the bombing of rail lines, and then later, even the bombing of the camps themselves because the Jews were doomed anyway. It would have saved thousands of lives if they had been able to do that. So after the war, when the full horror of the Holocaust became apparent, McCloy was, of course, the subject of criticism. Because even if the rail lines could be quickly repaired, or even if they had been able to bomb the death camps, it was argued that at least some lives would have been saved. In 1983 he was 88 years old, McCloy. And he gave an interview to "The Washington Post." And at that point he either revealed the whole truth or he spread the blame. What he said then was that Harry Hopkins told him back in '44 that the boss, that is Roosevelt, would not approve the bombing of rail lines or the camps around Auschwitz. And then he gave an interview three years later when he was 92 to another person who recorded it. And he said that he actually discussed the matter with the president. And the president took it out of his hands. The president said no. We don't know, you know, whether his memory was accurate at that point, or whether it was Roosevelt who actually made the decision. It could have been. It's clear from my research that all three of these individuals-- Marshall, McCloy, Hopkins-- one way or the other, from the mild disagreement to the more forceful, opposed efforts to rescue the Jews. So again what was the role of anti-Semitism? And we all know anti-Semitism in America reached its peak in the late 1930s and continued throughout the war. And there's no doubt that it was a factor in Washington, Washington writ large, refusal to help out with the plight of the Jews. Plus, mass media was playing it down. So Hopkins, Marshall, McCloy-- all Gentiles-- they grew up in America. They worked in Washington. They could not help but be affected. But the question I wanted to look to in my research was whether any of them had-- whether there's a record of hostility. And I found that Hopkins was the least likely, because he'd married a Jew. He was friends with Jews. He had been a social worker. And then the record with regard to Marshall-- I found two pejorative references in 50 years of his correspondence. None of them suggested hostility. And so again, you're sort of left wondering. And McCloy's biographer basically said he was not an anti-Semite. And then a couple of sentences later, essentially backed off of that. So we're left wondering. In the last analysis, you can't judge, as a writer, what their inner prejudices and thoughts might have been concerning hostility or the extent of anti-Semitism that they had. All you can look at are their actions. Let me just-- a light word at the end that has nothing to do with opposition. But it has to do with McCloy and Marshall. In May of 1947, Marshall, who was then Secretary of State, was considering where to give his Marshall Plan speech, the most famous speech in foreign policy since the Monroe Doctrine. Believe it or not, it was scheduled to be at Amherst. [LAUGHTER] This is documented now, June 15, 1947. It would have put Amherst on the map, like you know, nobody's business. So some things happened though. In Europe, there was a Hungarian-- the Soviets were taking over Hungary. And also Marshall's speech, the planned speech was being leaked to "The New York Times." Reston got hold of it. So he moved it up. He had committed to go to Amherst. He moved it up to June 5th. It was given at Harvard on June 5. And next week, there'll be the 70th anniversary of that speech. You all always go to the safety school, don't you? And I told this story to a guy at Yale the other day, and he said, well, you know, you're just trying to build up Amherst. But it's true. But then, I found out from the archives here, Marshall wanted to keep his commitment at Amherst. He had told-- then it was President Cole-- that he was going to come to accept an honorary degree. So McCloy and Marshall went to Amherst June 15, 1947. It was a Sunday. And this is where it gets kind of weird, but it's true. They got up to Amherst and the commencement was at five o'clock. So they went over to the Dean's house. And the Dean at the time was Scott Porter, and some of us remember him. And the Dean's wife, and Marshall is very specific about this, they decided to have refreshments before the commencement. And Marshall said, I had three scotches. And I was laughing at all the great discussion we were having. Now for him to admit that he had three scotches-- first of all. he didn't drink scotch-- but it's just incredible. Because he was very abstemious and very rigid. But he had three scotches. So they went off to the commencement, and they were sitting in the front row with Cole and McCloy. And McCloy had assured Marshall before he came up there that he wouldn't have to talk. So I was very-- but someone handed him the program. I have that program. Handed him the program, and he was listed as the first speaker. [LAUGHTER] So with three scotches, with a snootful of scotch, he faced 400. At this time, it was veterans who were graduating. So it was 400 veterans. And he gave a speech, and he actually spoke to them from the heart. I have a copy of the transcript of the speech. He didn't say anything about the Marshall Plan. He just talked to them as their wartime leader. And he said I need you now in this time of new challenges, because at this point the Cold War was getting hot. So true story-- Marshall recalled years later that it was one of the best talks he ever gave-- [LAUGHTER] --with those three scotches aboard. Thanks very much. Now questions? [APPLAUSE] Does anybody have any questions? Who's going to call on them? Yeah, go ahead. Well, first, on behalf of everybody here, I want to for letting us know how Harvard got on the map. [LAUGHTER] That's Harvard got on the map. OK, yeah. [? In ?] Epstein's definition of resistance, requires both that there be dire consequences for the action, that means that both the resistor and the oppressor are involved. And Professor Rosbottom has made it clear that there could be, was evolution of the reactions that could be expected from the oppressor. And what I'm curious about is whether that evolution is sometimes the result of top down dictate and sometimes the result of bottom up emulation and evolutions. And that brings me to Montana. I saw that coming. [LAUGHTER] I'm wondering if what is interpreted as bottom up emulation with physical consequences potentially for [INAUDIBLE] whether that kind of evolution in your historical view has created resistance where it wasn't before? Are you asking me? [LAUGHTER] I'm not. I think that's a good question. It's an interesting question. I'm going to-- don't you love it when people say it's interesting. It means-- I say that to my students when I mean, really, I don't understand it, or you obviously haven't done the reading. But that's an interesting question. It's a good question. This idea of emulation is something I hadn't really thought of. And so I'm going to think about that. There was emulation. I'm talking about the youngsters. You have to realize, too, that the country I'm talking about is totally different from the country Catherine's talking about. Because France had visible presence of occupiers who didn't belong there. And so that immediately raised anger, frustration, that kind of stuff. But the idea of younger people trying to emulate-- yes. Many of them emulated what their fathers and uncles and grandfathers had not done. They were really-- many of them were ticked off that France had surrendered in six weeks. That an armistice had been signed that split France right into two. They were really, really ticked off. That's a polite way of putting it. And they would talk to each other about that. And I think older, more visible aspects of resistance-- there is an element of emulation. That's true. If you have that kind of core, you're going to just have more resistors. Germany didn't have that kind of visible core. But don't forget-- it wasn't occupied. Would you agree with that? Yes. Thank you very, very much. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Thank you very much. There you go. [LAUGHTER] The beginning of the knowledge of the Holocaust in the first few months of 1942, some Polish [INAUDIBLE], some Swiss Red Cross people reported it, because obviously not much publicization [INAUDIBLE] governments, not much by the press. The chief spreaders of knowledge of the beginning of it, long before the end of the war, were pamphleteers. And let me mention just two, the first one-- Great Britain. Victor Gollancz, of East European Jewish origin. Say that again? Victor Gollancz, G-O-L-L-A-N-C-Z, Laborite, wrote a pamphlet published March 1942, giving pretty much what was known then of the Holocaust. The first one in Britain. [? Soon ?] much interest, some pressure [INAUDIBLE] First one in America some months later, June 1942. The Voice Of Thy Brother's Blood was written by a daughter of German Jewish immigrants into America. Mercedes Irene Moritz. That was my mother. This gentleman's had his hand up. Where? [INAUDIBLE] German resistance, the way you put it, I think, is exactly right. Because all the other [INAUDIBLE] you describe are irrelevant in what was essentially a corrupt state. I am a specialist in Russia-- well, originally the Soviet Union and its death now, and Russia. That is exactly the kind of thing that went on. That low level, cheating, et cetera. The problem is you could get arrested and shot for that. That's a different story. One of the things that struck me, and this goes back to Paris, was there were a lot of nightclubs in Paris playing jazz. It's a very famous story. And this is where even Nazis didn't pay attention to everything, where Django Reinhardt tried to flee. They said it was getting too dangerous. For those who don't know, Django Reinhardt was a gypsy guitarist, jazz guitarist. And Reinhardt tried to flee. He gets to, I think, the border with Switzerland. And there's a Nazi officer who stops him. But instead of arresting him, he gets his autograph, because he think's he's great. That's not-- I wouldn't even call that resistance. In other words, what Hitler wanted and others around him wanted something else. The other issue is that there was a lot of fighting, infighting and resistance within different portions of the German high command, the various elements of the Gestapo, et cetera. So and in Paris, that I found absolutely fascinating-- and I actually agree with you that they were different, they were fighting a foreign force. And the fact that these kids did it. But also, if you look at the Soviet Union did the same thing with kids in terms of trying to mold them in the post-revolution period, because they understood what was going on. And one other comment on Hopkins and Marshall and McCloy. Two things. One, we actually bombed the [INAUDIBLE], which was creating synthetic oil right next to Auschwitz. We actually bombed it. Auschwitz was five, ten miles away. We could have bombed Auschwitz. When was that? It was, I think in '43, '44. Primo Levi talked about that in his memoir. It was literally bombed, and they did nothing to Auschwitz. So it was completely [INAUDIBLE] on it. And I've long believed that one of the people involved in the States who was pushing for not having any help to any Jews was a guy with the wonderful name of Breckenridge Long. State Department. To think of the [INAUDIBLE] conference. It was all BS. Nothing happened. And one of the other things about McCloy, which we cannot forget, is when he was high commissioner in Germany, right after the war, he freed a lot of Nazis, really disgusting characters who ran slave labor camps, basically, slave camps, to produce German goods, because they [INAUDIBLE]. And out of that came a wonderful book by a guy named Ferencz called Less Than Slaves. He was one of the prosecutors at Nuremberg and was incensed about what was happening to people after the war trial received compensation, as opposed to the [INAUDIBLE] Nazis now living big lives all over Germany. Just one comment on-- there were three lawyers in the Treasury Department who really were the heroes that got Morganthau to press for the war refugee board, because Breckenridge Long stood against this thing. He was the main guy until 1943. But three lawyers basically outed him. They showed that what he was doing was erecting false reasons why they could not open up the borders for refugees. And so they outed him in front of Morganthau. And Breckenridge Long got pushed to the side. And that's when they finally got the war refugee board. But even that. The war refugee board they say saved maybe 200,000 Jewish lives. Given the scale of it, it was good, great thing, but it was not all that significant. We need to stop. [INAUDIBLE] Where was Eleanor? Eleanor Roosevelt? I don't know where Eleanor was. No, she was where Hopkins was. They were both-- actually, Hopkins kind of fell out of favor with her. But she was she was making a lot of noise about things going on in the United States, lynchings and so forth. But we need to close. We do, unfortunately, yes. Thank you, everyone, for coming.


Early years

McCloy was born in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, the son of John J. McCloy (1862-1901) and Anna (née Snader) McCloy (1866-1959). His father was an insurance man who died when McCloy was five. His mother was a hairdresser in Philadelphia, with many high-society clients. McCloy's family was poor; he would later often say he grew up on the "wrong side of the tracks," and describe himself as being an outsider of the establishment circles in which he would later move.[2][3] His original name was "John Snader McCloy." It was later changed to "John Jay McCloy", probably to sound more aristocratic.[4]

McCloy was educated at the Peddie School in New Jersey, and Amherst College from which he graduated in 1916. He was an average student who excelled at tennis and moved smoothly among the sons of the nation's elite.[5] McCloy was a brother of Beta Theta Pi Fraternity at Amherst.

First World War

McCloy enrolled in Harvard Law School in 1916, and he was an average student. He was profoundly influenced by his experience at the Plattsburg Preparedness camps. When the US entered the war in 1917, he joined the Army in May and was trained at Plattsburg, New York and was commissioned as a second lieutenant in the Artillery on August 15, 1917. He was promoted to first lieutenant on December 29. In May 1918 he was assigned as an aide to Brigadier General G. H. Preston - commander of the 160th Field Artillery Brigade of the 85th Division. He sailed for France for service with the American Expeditionary Force in France on July 29, 1918. He saw combat service in the last weeks of the war, as commander of an artillery battery during the Meuse-Argonne Offensive.[4]

After the armistice of November 1918, he was transferred to General Headquarters of the AEF in Chaumont, Haute-Marne, France, on March 1, 1919. He was then sent to the Advance General Headquarters in Trier, Germany and was promoted to captain on June 29. McCloy returned to the US on July 20 and resigned from the Army on August 15, 1919. He then returned to Harvard where he received his LL.B. degree in 1921.[4]

Wall Street lawyer

McCloy went to New York to become an associate in the firm of Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, which was then one of the nation's most prestigious law firms. He moved to Cravath, Henderson, & de Gersdorff in 1924, where he worked with many wealthy clients, such as the St. Paul Railroad. In 1934 McCloy found new evidence allowing him to re-open an action for damages against Germany for the destruction caused by the 1916 Black Tom explosion.[6]

He did a great deal of work for corporations in Nazi Germany and advised the major German chemical combine I. G. Farben, later notorious for manufacturing Zyklon B. By the time he left for government service in 1940, McCloy earned about $45,000 a year and had savings of $106,000. His involvement in litigation over a World War I sabotage case gave him a strong interest in intelligence issues and in German affairs.[7]

Second World War

McCloy arriving at RAF Gatow in Berlin to attend the Potsdam Conference in 1945
McCloy arriving at RAF Gatow in Berlin to attend the Potsdam Conference in 1945

US Secretary of War Henry Stimson hired McCloy as a consultant in September 1940, who became immersed in war planning even though he was a Republican Party supporter and opposed Franklin Roosevelt for the upcoming November 1940 presidential election.[8]

On April 22, 1941, he was made Assistant Secretary of War but held only civilian responsibilities, especially the purchase of war materials for the Army, Lend Lease, the draft, and issues of intelligence and sabotage.[9]

Once the war started, McCloy was a crucial voice in setting US military priorities and played a key role in several notable decisions.[citation needed]

Internment of Japanese-Americans

In February 1942, his involvement in combating sabotage made McCloy heavily involved in the decision to forcibly remove Japanese-Americans from their homes on the US West Coast to inland internment camps. Kai Bird wrote in his biography of McCloy:

More than any individual, McCloy was responsible for the decision, since the (U.S.) President had delegated the matter to him through (U.S. Secretary of War) Stimson.

The generals on the scene had insisted on mass relocation to prevent sabotage, and the Army's G-2 (intelligence division) concluded that it was needed. A key document was a Magic-decrypted interception of a Japanese diplomat in Los Angeles, who reported, "We also have connections with our second generations working in airplane plants for intelligence purposes."[10]

The Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), however, disagreed with the Army; in a concurrent report prepared by Commander Kenneth Ringle, ONI had argued against mass internment because most of the Japanese-American citizens suspected of espionage or sabotage were already under surveillance or in FBI custody.[11] He was responsible for supervising the evacuations to the camps, but the camps were run by a civilian agency.[12]

The actions were unanimously upheld by a US Supreme Court.[13] By 1945, the judicial consensus had eroded considerably. Three justices dissented in a similar internment challenge brought by Fred Korematsu.The dissenters were led by Justice Frank Murphy's reversal of his reluctant concurrence in the earlier Hirabayashi case.[14]

Historian Roger Daniels says McCloy was strongly opposed to reopening the judicial verdicts on the constitutionality of the internment.[15] The dissent eventually led to judicial reversal of the criminal convictions of Hirabayashi, Korematsu, and others on the basis of government misconduct including the deliberate suppression of the ONI's Ringle report during the Supreme Court's deliberations in 1943.[16]

Edward Ennis, a former colleague and Justice Department lawyer tasked with the preparation of the government's briefs to the Supreme Court in the Hirabayashi case, would directly accuse McCloy of personal deception in testimony before the Seattle Federal Court's 1985 coram nobis review.[17]

That led directly to the final resolution, in 1987, of the internment cases before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which fully exonerated Gordon Hirabayashi and other Japanese-American citizens, who fought the wartime curfews and forced relocations resulting from Army orders which the three-judge panel unanimously held were "based upon racism rather than military necessity."[18]

Bombing of Auschwitz

The War Department was petitioned throughout late 1944 to help save Nazi l-held prisoners by ordering the bombing of the railroad lines leading to Auschwitz and the gas chambers in the camp. McCloy responded in a letter dated 4 July 1944 to John W. Pehle of the War Refugee Board, "The War Department is of the opinion that the suggested air operation is impracticable. It could be executed only by the diversion of considerable air support essential to the success of our forces now engaged in decisive operations and would in any case be of such doubtful efficacy that it would not amount to a practical project." McCloy had no direct authority over the Army Air Forces and could not overrule its choice of targets; the Army Air Forces, led by General Hap Arnold was adamantly opposed to any outside civilian group choosing its targets. Roosevelt himself rejected any such proposals.[19]

Ending war with Japan

McCloy was interviewed for the British television documentary The World at War about the decision to send a peace overture to Japan in mid-1945. According to McCloy, he convinced President Truman that an invasion of Japan was not sensible, and Truman should instead offer terms of surrender but with the implied threat of using the atomic bomb against Japan.[20]

Involvement in other key decisions

An indefatigable committee member, McCloy during the war served on the government task forces that built the Pentagon, created the Office of Strategic Services, which eventually became the Central Intelligence Agency, and he proposed both the United Nations and the war crimes tribunals. He chaired the predecessor to the National Security Council. As chairman of the Army's Advisory Committee on Negro Troop Policy, at first he opposed the civil rights spokesman who wanted the Army to end segregation.

However, he changed his mind and in late 1945, just before leaving the government to return to Wall Street, he proposed ending segregation in the military. In 1945, he and Stimson convinced President Truman to reject the Morgenthau Plan and to avoid stripping Germany of its industrial capacity.[21]

In March 1945 he played a key role in preserving the German walled city of Rothenburg ob der Tauber. Recognizing its historic importance he ordered the U.S. Army to negotiate a German withdrawal to avoid its destruction by Allied artillery. In 1948, he was named Honorable Patron (German: Ehrenbürger) of Rothenburg.

President of World Bank

From March 1947 to June 1949, McCloy served as the second president of the World Bank.

Ulm School of Design (Hochschule für Gestaltung - HfG Ulm) 1953-68
Ulm School of Design (Hochschule für Gestaltung - HfG Ulm) 1953-68

On March 17, 1949, McCloy and General Alvan Cullom Gillem, Jr. testified before the President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services.[citation needed]

US High Commissioner for Germany

On September 2, 1949, McCloy replaced the previous five successive military governors for the US Zone in Germany as the first US High Commissioner for Germany and held the position until August 1, 1952. He oversaw the further creation of the Federal Republic of Germany after May 23 of 1949. At the strong urging of the German government, he approved recommendations for pardoning and commutation of sentences of Nazi criminals including those of the prominent industrialists Friedrich Flick, Alfried Krupp, and Einsatzgruppe commander Martin Sandberger.[22] McCloy granted the restitution of Krupp's and Flick's entire property. He pardoned Ernst von Weizsäcker as well as Josef Dietrich and Joachim Peiper, convicted of mass murder for their roles in the Malmedy massacre.[22]

Nuremberg judge William J. Wilkins wrote,

Imagine my surprise one day in February 1951 to read in the newspaper that John J. McCloy, the high commissioner to Germany, had restored all the Krupp properties that had been ordered confiscated.[23]

Some of the less notable figures were retried and convicted by the government of the newly independent West Germany.[citation needed]

McCloy supported the initiative of Inge Aicher-Scholl (the sister of Sophie Scholl), Otl Aicher and Max Bill to found the Ulm School of Design.[24] HfG Ulm is considered to be the most influential design school in the world after the Bauhaus. The founders sought and received support in the USA (via Walter Gropius) and within the American High Command in Germany. McCloy saw the endeavor as Project No. 1 and supported a college and campus combination along US examples. In 1952 Scholl received from McCloy a cheque for one million Deutschmarks.[25]

McCloy had served as the first US High Commissioner. His final successor as commissioner was the fourth US High Commissioner, James B. Conant; the office was terminated on May 5, 1955.[citation needed]

Later career

Following his service in Germany, he served as chairman of the Chase Manhattan Bank from 1953–60, and as chairman of the Ford Foundation from 1958–65; he was also a trustee of the Rockefeller Foundation from 1946–49, and then again from 1953 to 1958, before he took up the position at Ford.

From 1954-70, he was chairman of the prestigious Council on Foreign Relations in New York, to be succeeded by David Rockefeller, who had worked closely with him at the Chase Bank. McCloy had a long association with the Rockefeller family, going back to his early Harvard days when he taught the young Rockefeller brothers how to sail. He was also a member of the Draper Committee, formed in 1958 by Eisenhower.

He later served as adviser to John F. Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon, Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan, and was the primary negotiator on the Presidential Disarmament Committee.

In 1963, he was awarded the Sylvanus Thayer Award by the United States Military Academy for his service to the country. On December 6, 1963, he was presented with the Presidential Medal of Freedom, with Special Distinction, by President Lyndon B. Johnson

In late 1967 McCloy was considered by US President Lyndon Johnson for the position of US Ambassador to the United Nations and was approached by Secretary of State Dean Rusk on this matter, however McCloy turned down the offer.[26]

Warren Commission

McCloy was selected by President Lyndon Johnson to serve on the Warren Commission in late November 1963. Notably, he was initially skeptical of the lone gunman theory, but a trip to Dallas with CIA veteran Allen Dulles, an old friend also serving on the Commission, convinced him of the case against Oswald. To avoid a minority dissenting report, McCloy brokered the final consensus and the crucial wording of the primary conclusion of the final report. He stated that any possible evidence of a conspiracy was "beyond the reach" of all of America's investigatory agencies, principally the FBI and the CIA as well as the Commission itself.[27] In a 1975 interview with Eric Sevareid of CBS, McCloy stated, "I never saw a case that I thought was more completely proven than... the assassination."[28]

He described writings that propagated assassination conspiracies theories as "just nonsense."[28]

Atlantic Institute

From 1966 to 1968, he was Honorary Chairman of the Paris-based Atlantic Institute.[29]

Law firm background

Originally a partner of the Cravath firm in New York City, New York, in 1924-1940, after the war, when McCloy left his job as the U.S. Assistant Secretary of War around November or December 1945, McCloy became a name partner in the Rockefeller-associated prominent New York law firm Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy. In that capacity, he acted for the "Seven Sisters", the leading multinational oil companies, including Exxon, in their initial confrontations with the nationalization movement in Libya as well as negotiations with Saudi Arabia and OPEC. Because of his stature in the legal world and his long association with the Rockefellers and as a presidential adviser, he was sometimes referred to as the "Chairman of the American Establishment."[citation needed]


McCloy was a recipient of the Association Medal of the New York City Bar Association in recognition of exceptional contributions to the honor and standing of the Bar in the community.[citation needed] He received an honorary Doctor of Laws degree from Wilmington College (Ohio) in 1963.[citation needed]

See also


  1. ^ See John Jay McCloy 2nd World Bank President, 1947 - 1949
  2. ^ Thomas, Evan (1986). The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They Made. Simon & Schuster. pp. 65–66. ISBN 978-0-671-50465-6.
  3. ^ Finder, Joseph (April 12, 1992). "Ultimate Insider, Ultimate Outsider". New York Times. Retrieved July 12, 2017.
  4. ^ a b c Frederick S. Mead. Harvard's Military Record in the World War, Harvard Alumni Association (1921). pg. 606.
  5. ^ Bird (1992), pp 24-41
  6. ^ New York Observer article (July 2006),; accessed March 14, 2018.
  7. ^ Kai Bird, The Chairman (1992), chapters 5-6.
  8. ^ Bird. The Chairman (1992), pg. 113.
  9. ^ Bird. The Chairman (1992), pp. 117-268.
  10. ^ Bird, Kai. The Chairman (1992), pp. 155-56.
  11. ^ Irons. The Courage of Their Convictions (1988), p. 44
  12. ^ Bird. The Chairman (1992) pp 147-74
  13. ^ Gordon Hirabayashi v. United States 320 U.S. 81 (1943)
  14. ^ Irons. The Courage of Their Convictions (1988), pp 45-46.
  15. ^ Roger Daniels, Unfinished Business: The Japanese-American Internment Cases (1986)[1]
  16. ^ Irons. The Courage of Their Convictions (1988) pp. 44-48.
  17. ^ Irons. The Courage of Their Convictions (1988) pg. 48
  18. ^ Irons. The Courage of Their Convictions (1988) pg. 49; quoting 46 F. Supp. 657 (9th Cir. 1987) (per Schroeder, J.)
  19. ^ Beschloss, Michael R. (2003). The Conquerors: Roosevelt, Truman and the Destruction of Hitler's Germany, 1941-1945. Simon and Schuster. p. 66.
  20. ^ Jeremy Isaacs, The World At War: The Bomb: February–September 1945 (1974)
  21. ^ Wolf, 2000.
  22. ^ a b Martin A. Lee (23 October 2013). The Beast Reawakens: Fascism's Resurgence from Hitler's Spymasters to Today's Neo-Nazi Groups and Right-Wing Extremists. Routledge. pp. 69–71. ISBN 978-1-135-28124-3.
  23. ^
  24. ^ See Ulm School of Design HfG Ulm: Archive
  25. ^ Background of HFG,; accessed 14 March 2018. (in German)
  26. ^
  27. ^ Bird, The Chairman p 565
  28. ^ a b Staff (July 21, 1975). "McCloy Still Feels Oswald Acted Alone". Observer-Reporter. Washington, Pennsylvania. AP. p. D3. Retrieved April 11, 2015.
  29. ^ Who Was Who. A&C Black. 2007.

Further reading

Additional sources

External links

Diplomatic posts
Preceded by
Eugene Meyer
President of the World Bank Group
Succeeded by
Gene Black
New office American High Commissioner for Occupied Germany
Succeeded by
James Conant
Business positions
Preceded by
Winthrop Aldrich
Chief Executive Officer of Chase
Succeeded by
George Champion
Preceded by
Douglas MacArthur
Recipient of the Sylvanus Thayer Award
Succeeded by
Robert Lovett
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