To install click the Add extension button. That's it.

The source code for the WIKI 2 extension is being checked by specialists of the Mozilla Foundation, Google, and Apple. You could also do it yourself at any point in time.

Kelly Slayton
Congratulations on this excellent venture… what a great idea!
Alexander Grigorievskiy
I use WIKI 2 every day and almost forgot how the original Wikipedia looks like.
Live Statistics
English Articles
Improved in 24 Hours
Added in 24 Hours
What we do. Every page goes through several hundred of perfecting techniques; in live mode. Quite the same Wikipedia. Just better.

John G. Carlisle

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

John Carlisle
John Griffin Carlisle, Brady-Handy photo portrait, ca1870-1880.jpg
41st United States Secretary of the Treasury
In office
March 7, 1893 – March 5, 1897
PresidentGrover Cleveland
Preceded byCharles Foster
Succeeded byLyman J. Gage
United States Senator
from Kentucky
In office
May 26, 1890 – February 4, 1893
Preceded byJames B. Beck
Succeeded byWilliam Lindsay
31st Speaker of the United States House of Representatives
In office
December 3, 1883 – March 4, 1889
Preceded byJ. Warren Keifer
Succeeded byThomas Reed
Member of the U.S. House of Representatives
from Kentucky's 6th district
In office
March 4, 1877 – May 26, 1890
Preceded byThomas Jones
Succeeded byWilliam Dickerson
20th Lieutenant Governor of Kentucky
In office
September 5, 1871 – August 31, 1875
GovernorPreston Leslie
Preceded byPreston Leslie
Succeeded byJohn C. Underwood
Personal details
John Griffin Carlisle

(1834-09-05)September 5, 1834
Campbell County, Kentucky, U.S. (now Kenton County)
DiedJuly 31, 1910(1910-07-31) (aged 75)
New York City, New York, U.S.
Resting placeLinden Grove Cemetery
Political partyDemocratic
Spouse(s)Mary Goodson

John Griffin Carlisle (September 5, 1834 – July 31, 1910) was a prominent American politician in the Democratic Party during the last quarter of the 19th century. He served as the Speaker of the United States House of Representatives, from 1883 to 1889 and afterward served as Secretary of the Treasury, from 1893 to 1897, during the Panic of 1893. As a Bourbon Democrat he was a leader of the conservative, pro-business wing of the party, along with President Grover Cleveland.

YouTube Encyclopedic

  • 1/5
    2 549
    6 027
    1 105
    476 533
    87 312
  • ✪ Tobias Carlisle "How to Pocket Exceptional Results using Minimal Effort" | BidAndAsk
  • ✪ Richmond Redeemed: Opportunities Won and Lost in the Siege of Petersburg
  • ✪ Small Value: Eric Cinnamond talks small cap value with Tobias Carlisle on The Acquirers Podcast
  • ✪ Battle of Gettysburg: why J.E.B. Stuart ends up in Carlisle
  • ✪ Naval Heritage | Jonathan Parshall: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway


You probably want exceptional investment returns with minimum effort. Here's the man who says that his strategy can. Today we have with us Tobias Carlisle, the man behind this investment strategy known as the “Acquirer’s Multiple”. He is the fund manager of Carbon Beach Management and he has also authored a series of best-selling books, including the latest book, "The Acquirer’s Multiple". So Tobias, can you explain to our audience what this “Acquirer’s Multiple” is all about? Sure. So many people are familiar with Warren Buffett. He's perhaps the most famous investor—famous value investor–of the last few generations. In 2006, Joel Greenblatt wrote a book called "The Little Book that Beats the Market" and he described an investment strategy in that called “The Magic Formula”. “The Magic Formula” is this simple quantitative application of Warren Buffett's investment strategy. And basically the idea is that you look for, Warren Buffett says that he looks for, wonderful companies at fair prices. And what he means by that is very profitable companies very high returns on invested capital. And fair prices means fair prices based on an operating earnings to enterprise value ratio. So Greenblatt wrote the book. He talks about how that metric works. I read it and I had been trying to apply Buffett's investment methodology without much success. I just sort of found that the stocks that I've bought, the profitability would disappear after I bought the stocks and they wouldn't perform as well as Warren Buffett did. And it was just something in my mind that I wanted to test it and see whether you were buying these stocks right at the very top of their business cycle and they were sort of cheap for a good reason. So I got an opportunity to test it in 2012. I partnered with a PhD student from the Byrd School of Business, which is probably the best quantitative business school in the States. And we tested “The Magic Formula” and we found even if you apply really rigorous testing rules that you do in academia you know you make it buy very large companies that are very liquid and you did various other things to make sure that there's enough stock to actually invest into, you find that it does in fact beat the market and pretty comprehensively. So “The Magic Formula” is a good strategy. But then when you break down the returns to it, what you find is that the return on invested capital actually drags the return down and the return on invested capital by itself, would underperform the market. But the value factor, the operating income on enterprise value factor, generates all of the returns and more. So just getting rid of the quality factor leads to even better returns. So that value factor by itself is what I call the “Acquirer’s Multiple”. Thank you for your explanation. I've actually read something along the line, that you've just mentioned about Warren Buffett, you are saying that his strategy is very difficult to quantify and he somehow has this knack of identifying investments with moats such that their long-term return on equity doesn't really get eroded. But it's very tough for the individual investors to do it, right? Well, investor strategist Michael Mauboussin, has looked at that question and said: "what are the properties that would lead a company to maintain profitability over a 10-year period?" So he's been doing so quite a while now and he looks at these rolling 10-year periods and starts. He goes back to 2008. So for this year, he'll look at the 2008 companies and then he uses a “DuPont Analysis” to sort of break them down and see whether its capital is being turned over or profit margin or what it is that's driving the returns. So basically he's been unable to find any scientific method of identifying which stocks will outperform over the following 10 years. All that he's able to say is that, we do find at the end of the 10 years that there is this very small proportion of stocks, about 4% that do maintain their profitability over the full period. So the question is “are you able to identify that 4%?” and it turns out that it's basically random chance. You're flipping a coin if you're working out whether any given stock it's going to do that. So all I'm saying, in my method, is that if you ignore the return on invested capital, which might indicate a moat or it might indicate the company at the top of its business cycle. What you tend to find is that just removing that error leads to better return so over portfolio of 20 to 30 or more stocks. Those stocks as a group if you buy them cheaply enough will beat the market and will beat the magic formula. So in other words, just saying, that it's easier for an individual investor to do value, because he can quantify it and he'll probably do a lot better with it. Exactly right! And, in addition to that, we’ve looked at some of the criteria that indicate. So there are things that do lead to better performance. And so those things are the things that you would expect. You don't want to buy fraud. You don't want to buy earnings manipulation, which might be the first step down the road to fraud and you want to avoid companies and financial distress and so there are there are statistical methods for finding those things and you often find them all together. There's no reason for a company that's not in financial distress to do any earnings manipulation. After all they’re already very profitable. They don't need to do that. And you know fraud is sort of the end of that road with it trying to hide. And it's often not in the bull market when we find the fraud. It's in after the collapse. They go back and look at some of these companies and they say: “oh they didn't actually make all that money that they said they’re making at the time”. So all of these methods are trying to do is to avoid companies. And they are the sort of things that identifies Worldcom, Enron—famous frauds. And you know a lot of these companies, if as a fundamental investor, if you look at their financial statements, you see problems with them. The things you see are they're not making the cash flow, it doesn't match the accounting earnings because accounting earnings can be manipulated in various ways, so can the cash flow. But ultimately the cash flow has to show up somewhere—well it has to show up in a bank account, it has to show up as an asset somewhere— until to the extent that it doesn't do that. You want to avoid those companies. So the sort of companies that I like to buy: they're cheap. They're not particularly great businesses at the time that they're being bought but they're generating lots of cash flow. They've got cash in the bank. That means they can survive and get to another period of time where conditions might be better and they can make more money. So that's the sort of thing that I'm trying to do: buy them really cheap, at the bottom of their business cycle, and then hold on through the really bad period the next two or three years. Know that that's a power that value investors have that investors who are much more focused on the short term don't have. If you can seat out one year, two years, three years and not worry about what happens to it in between, and you often find that the problem goes away, and they look much healthier, at which time they become the sort of companies that value that you know the franchise guys want to buy and companies we want to sell to them. I read the foreword of your latest book, The Acquirer’s Multiple. And you mentioned that it was targeted for beginners. I just wanted to ask if you think that this kind of quantitative deep value investing strategy is suitable for beginners? I do. And the reason that I think that's very hard to learn all the intricacies of financial statements without having a lot of experience. You can be taught at university or you can do a CFA or one of those sort of courses to understand financial statements. But it takes a long time to sort of really understand how they breathe and how they kind of live and how one industry varies from another industry. The nice thing about a quantitative method is a lot of that effort has already been done. The thing that hurts investors when they first start out is they don't understand that you can invest to not beat the market by buying a cheap index fund. That should be the first step as an investor. But if you want to beat the market, you should know that it's very very hard to do. But the only way that you're going to be able to do it is by doing something different from the market. And so that means doing something different from the crowd and that is going to mean buying you know —you don't buy the hot stock, you don't get to buy Tesla, you don't get to buy Netflix, you won't own Amazon, you won't own Bitcoin probably, you may have bought a bitcoin a long time ago, but you wouldn't buy it now. What the sort of stuff that you're buying is something that nobody's ever heard of or they think it's a disaster. Those kind of companies that you're buying. And the reason is that you're hoping that you're proven right that that they’ve become popular companies but later down the road. You have mentioned that usually the famous companies would not appear in the deep value screen. And some people are just unable to buy those less familiar stocks. They somehow have a group of sorts that they always wanted to buy and probably they hope to see in the screen. Do you see this as one of the major issues with a quantitative method? It's a very well known issue in the social sciences in anywhere you're attempting to make a prediction based on sort of the incomplete information that you have in front of you, on a future uncertain state. And it can be applied to sort of picking which vintages of wine that will lead to the best bottles down the road, determining whether a criminal will be a recidivist or not when they're released back into society, when somebody is presented to the hospital whether they’re psychotic or just depressed. And so they've found that there are these simple statistical rules, simple algorithms, which is basically just a questionnaire—could be five or six questions in a row. And you pick yes or no and that leads you down to the answer. They've found on sort of hundreds and hundreds of these surveys that they lead to better results and even experts can achieve. And the reason that they find that these things tend to work— though I should say, first of all, they work. If the expert is given access to the simple statistical model and allowed to answer the questions and get to the bottom and then make a decision whether to follow it or not, if they do that and they decide not to follow it but they find that they underperformed the simple statistical model by itself. And the reason is this idea called “The Broken Leg Phenomenon”. The idea is basically, you've got a model that tells you whether somebody will go to the cinema on a Friday night and it might have in the model whether it's raining or not; the type of movie that's on, is it action or is it a comedy or is it romance; and all these other factors that might go into whether the person goes or not. And you learn one day that I have a broken leg. So that's not information that the model has considered. That's sort of outside the model. And so the the question is: should you be allowed to then override the model by including that information in the model. And everybody says well of course you should because now you know he's got a broken leg. That must affect your decision about whether he goes to the cinema or not. And the answer is you shouldn't. And the reason that you shouldn't over override the model is we find too many reasons to override the model. There are too many broken legs. That's particularly apt when you're looking at deep value companies which is what I do. If you're looking at these companies they've all got broken legs. So the broken leg is the reason why they're cheap and so once you know that, you said: "That's the reason why it's cheap." It's got a cash-rich balance sheet. It's generating free cash flow. I can buy this company knowing that it's got what looks like a broken leg. And if that broken leg goes away or gets fixed then this company should be trading much much higher and that's sort of the reason that I like to apply a pretty quantitative approach to deep value investing. That means you must be quite a Zen master to overcome some of your biases. Always. Beside this problem, do you see any other issues or have you ever even gotten into any argument with readers who disagree with your points? Of course, all the time. It's very confronting to hear that a model that is as simple as this one seems to do very very well over long periods of time—seems to beat the market over long periods of time. And you have to remember like 80% of professional money managers can't beat the market. So there's something confronting about learning that there is this very very simple model—it's even simpler than the magic formula which is a very very simple model. The wrinkle to that is that it does get through periods of under performance. And when it's underperforming, it's this sort of metaphysical question, philosophical question: will this ever recover; will this start working again? And I'm as shocked as anybody. I look at the portfolio all the time. I think this is crazy that we own some of this stuff. And now I know why retail in the States is beaten up, because Amazon is such a convenient way to shop. Why would you go to a mall ever again to go and buy something from the mall? But then if I look at those stocks individually, often they have a lot of cash on the balance sheet that are generating lots of free cash flow, lots of operating income, and they're very very cheap. And so all they really have to do is survive for another 12 months and it should be much more valuable stocks. And that’s what's happened over the last 12 months. A lot of these companies that you would have written off, completely knowing the strength of Amazon that had a very good run over 12 months. And it happens every year. It's a different industry every year. Last year I think it was Airlines and it had a very good run. So I was buying Airlines before Buffett announced that he was buying Airlines and I felt like an idiot because he has written, and I've read what he's written for years and years about hating Airlines, and yet here they all were. There were six or seven of them at one time in the screen. And so I bought them. And then shortly thereafter, they announced that Buffet bought them and yea, that was a good one. Do you have any memorable rebuttals from anyone regarding your investing style? Well the argument is always that Buffet is a multi-billionaire and he has described this investment strategy pretty comprehensively in his letters. And if you have read the letters, really what he's talking about all the time is how to find a moat. That's the thing that he spends the most time doing. But I think that what Buffett's doing is exactly right. And if I was a genius at Buffett's level, I would be doing that too. But unfortunately I'm not, so I have to find something that is for my own sort of level of intellect and ability that helps me invest. So for me, it's “The Acquirer’s Multiple” if you buy stuff cheaply enough. But here's the funny thing. So Apple came into my screen a few years ago and once again it was one of the cheapest 10% of large-cap stocks. It's happened a few times, happened in 2013, happened in 2016, because people get concerned that the iPhone is getting boring or there's other competition for the Apple TV or something like that and it gets very very cheap. And so I've sorted the screen again and I tweeted out about it and told everybody about it. It was in the top 30 cheapest socks in the States at the time in the large cap sector. And Buffett bought it. So I think... Buffett bought it afterwards. I think what Buffett does is he's actually buying stuff really really cheap where it doesn't actually matter that much if the moat is there or not. But then he's also using 60-70 years of investment experience to look at these things and say; so that's got a pretty good chance of surviving, maintaining its moat, and it's very very cheap. So I don't think he's really paying up for a lot of these companies. Since The Acquirer’s Multiple is a quantitative method, you will require a lot of financial data. I see that you have developed the, a site where you deliver such financial data to individual investors. And I also notice that they are mainly for US companies. How does The Acquirer’s Multiple work in other countries? Would it be the same principles or do you foresee any other things that investors should take note of when they apply this strategy outside of the US? I have seen research on the application of the ratio to every developed market and every sort of large stock market in the world. And in every single market, it generates. It's very good at identifying the cheap stocks. It's very good at identifying the overvalued stocks; and it's very good at finding the spread between the two—which is sort of, as a quantitative investor, that's also what you're interested in because you might be long and short. That the bigger the spread between the cheap stocks and the expensive stocks, the better the return. So in every sort of developed market in Asia, in Europe, the U.S., the UK, Australia, New Zealand the research seems to show that it is pretty good at finding undervalued stocks; that if you buy them as a portfolio and you have enough time, they will tend to beat the market. I hold the view that financial data outside the US is of lower quality and running a quantitative investment strategy; the quality of data becomes very important. Do you think this is one of the major issues that we would have when we invest in foreign countries? I think that most countries have a pretty good financial data. The issue is often in back-testing how far back can you go with the financial, though that's the main problem. In terms of screening and finding companies today that are cheap, there are lots of good services to do that. They tend to be very expensive if you want all them. So CapIQ or Bloomberg offer that data bits sort of US$30,000 a year. It's too expensive for most individual investors. So you can hand calculate these things. You can find the financial statements and calculate the operating earnings, calculate the enterprise value. Work out whether it's sort of cheap or not. The challenge is often tracking down the data. But in Singapore, the data should be pretty good. Yep it is. And there's always this comparison between Asian companies and US companies. That Asian companies, being more family-dominated, the management tend to sit on your hands and not unlock value. Which means when we buy a value stock it could become a value trap for a long time. Do you agree to this kind of assessment? To the extent that value has worked in developed market. I mean it's hard to say in any given situation whether it's going to impact or not. But value has worked in Singapore. Value has work throughout Asia. I think if you're buying a portfolio of companies and you have 20 to 30 companies and you continue to monitor them over the course of a year, then you get a pretty good idea if the management or the major shareholder is sort of abusing their position. and that might be when you might want to screen out. You know, that problem is not unique to Asia though. You find that problem in the US. You find that problem in Australia where I started investing. You see it there and you find that everywhere. And sometimes that's the broken leg. That's the reason that the stock is so cheap. And if you hold it knowing that your shareholder rights are somewhat curtailed because there's a major shareholder who might not respect the minorities as much as you might want them to; if it gets cheap enough, it might be worth holding on to just for the reason that that is a broken leg. You can reassess it in 12 months or two years or three years. Personally, I believe that it is a broken leg issue because I have invested in companies that are controlled by families and yet that did very well over a two to three years period. That is a pretty well known strategy. I think I’ve only seen and tested it in the US but you invest behind family control companies because they do tend to have very good corporate governance because they're watching the management making sure they're doing the right things. Because it's all family. You have also co-authored the "Concentrated Investing" whereby you talked about holding lesser stocks in a portfolio to boost investment returns. And in Acquirer’s Multiple, it is understandable that you should own 20 to 30 stocks, correct me if I'm wrong. While concentrated portfolio says otherwise, would you be able marry these together? Say an individual investor using Acquirer’s Multiple but only hold very little stock—let's say five to ten of them. What do you think about this? The problem that you have when you get down to five stocks is its enormously volatile. So your performance of any given stock is 20% of the performance of the portfolio. So if one of those companies goes to zero, you've torn up 20% of your capital. So that's the risk. I think that in backtest, it does seem to work okay. You know the more concentrated you get, provided that your metric is a good one and value tends to be a pretty good metric, you find that it leads to better performance but it's also much more volatile. So if you go into a crash and the markets down 50%, you might be down 80% But that's the price you paid for when the market goes up 30%, you go up 50%. So you get better performance doing that. But there's a lot of risk in it and it's not something that I would recommend for most investors. You need to be a pretty experienced investor and know what you're doing, when you're doing them. Let's say someone really wants to run a concentrated portfolio using Acquirer’s Multiple. How would he do it? Does he select the top five or he would look through the screen by having more qualitative analysis to fish out the five? You can do both. So in "Concentrated Investing" we sort of talked about two ideas. There is "diversification" or how diversified do you need to be in order to be protected from any individual stock getting too big. And there's “concentration”, which is the way that you generate better returns. And the method that they talked about is the “Kelly Criterion” as being a way of sizing up a bet. So the idea is basically the “Kelly Criterion”, as it’s defined as its edge over odds— so edge is your idea about what things are going to do that the market doesn't know; and the odds is what the market valuation is offering you. So there is a way that you can turn a valuation and a market price into an "edge over odds" type analysis. That would indicate how much of your portfolio you might want to put into an individual stock. So the one wrinkle to that is that when you go to do these analyses, you have to understand that there's always a risk that there's a black swan that you don't know is out there. That could send the company to zero; that's why it's cheap and there are other things you could possibly be invested in— you can invest in bonds, you can invest in sovereign bonds, invest in commodities. And that would necessarily size any position. So that all of that analysis, I think, sort of tends to indicate that you should probably be doing it on a qualitative basis. You should be going in and finding other things that would be able to sharpen up your analyses of whether this thing is good value and can survive or not. But you've always got to bear in mind, when you're doing that, that you might be finding broken legs as reasons for not doing things. I think five is a pretty concentrated portfolio. You got to see some volatility with a five stock portfolio. Definitely! Interestingly, Joel Greenblatt has also talked about “The Magic Formula” implementation and a lot of people who try to cherry-pick from the list, in fact, did worse than the index. Right. Which means that for diversified portfolio, one would do better by just blindly following the screen results. If you are going to do that, then you might want to buy that five cheapest. But I think you have to be careful with that level of concentration because, as I said before, you can lose a lot of money and there's a lot of volatility in it. It's a portfolio that won't track the market. You're better off at 20 - 30 positions. 20's sort of concentrated, you get lots of performance out of 20. And 30, that means if any one of them goes to zero you've lost 3.3% of capital. You have probably heard a lot of advices given in the investment field. What is one of the worst advice that you have heard? Advices people shouldn't follow? There’s a lot of bad advice out there. It’s not hard to find bad advice. The bad advice is always the received wisdom about the stock market. Bad advice is efficient market hypothesis. You know that's bad advice. And that makes you think in the wrong way. But the funny thing is that if you don't want to spend a lot of time thinking about your investments, it's probably not a bad way to go. That you know that the bad advice, the efficient market hypothesis, is a bad philosophical background for actually a pretty good idea of just buying the market index. But if you buy the market index in times like this, and you look at the index it's filled up with very expensive probably overvalued stocks. That's what the index does, you know. It's a market capitalization weighted. So the more expensive the stock is, the bigger proportion of the portfolio it takes up. So if you're buying the market index now, I think that the risk reward isn't very good at all. But that's the predominant advice that people are given: "buy the market index." The argument against that is always you know value has underperformed for a long time. It looked like a smart bet to be in the market index for a long time. It's a dumb to be a value investor for seven years eight years which is a very long period of time to underperform. So I think it's bad advice to just blindly buy the index, but that's the advice out there. I think you're better off finding value— doing the value investing yourself or finding managers who have a good process that's clearly articulated and then they adhere that to that process, finding them at a reasonable fee and then investing behind those guys knowing that you can underperform for long periods of time. It is the period of underperformance that make investors anxious and probably has less conviction about investment strategy that they're following. So which makes index investing a lot easier and probably that's why the idea predominate. Right You run a fund yourself, Carbon Beach Asset Management. Could you tell us a little bit more about this fund and what kind of investment style do you use? We have 2. We have basically what I've just described to you, deep value, long - short. So it's buy is long, the cheap stuff is short stuff that is financially distressed and might have some fraud in it, earnings manipulation, ugly balance sheet, deteriorating financials, like that's the sort of stuff you want to be short. You don't necessarily want to be short stuff that's expensive because stuff that’s expensive can get more expensive. So we don't short [that way].. The short book is not the opposite of the long book. The long book is just undervalue, cash generative, that sort of stuff, and hedges as well. So if the market looks like it's falling, market goes into a downtrend, it would hedge in an effort to sort of generate returns that don't match the market. And so that's one strategy that we run. The other strategy that we run is what is known as “Special Situations”. So our special situation is something that turns on a corporate act, so there's a board level decision made, sell an asset or buy an asset, buy back stock, pay a special dividend, return capital, liquidate, buy another company. And when those decisions are made, sometimes there's a difference between where the stock is trading in the stock market and where there's an implied valuation when the event closes. So we look for all of those different types of trades. The attraction to that is that it's not it's investments that you find on the stock market but it's not really subject to what the stock market does because most of them are long short. If you see a company getting taken over, this is merger arbitrage. The companies getting taken over and the bid might be at ten dollars and the stock might be trading at $9.75. This is traditional merger arbitrage and so you might buy the company that's being taken over and so short the company that's doing the acquisition and then you're trying to get that arbitrage of 25 cents between two. We don't do that traditional merger arbitrage, we wait until the deal gets into trouble. And so the takeover bid is $10, the stock is trading at $6. There's some risk that the transaction doesn't go through or it looks like the transactions not going to go through. But we think that the that the company that's being acquired is very cheap. And so then we would look at our downside as being, if the company doesn't get acquired, we've already bought this cheap stock. If it does get acquired, which we might put it, maybe there's a one in five chance that it actually does go through this transaction. then you just factor that into the analysis. So there's a chance that you get a very good return. There is one in five chance that you get a very good return. There's a four and five chance you end up holding a very undervalued stock—that should be worth more down the line anyway. So that's the sort of stuff we're doing. We'll look at a position and sort of make a decision whether we: do we want to own the equity, do we want to own on a leap, doing on a long-term call option on the stock, do we want to sell a put together into the stock. So we look at the risk-reward of each security that might be involved in it and then we try to invest on the basis on the way that gives us the best expression of the risk reward for the situation. That‘s “Special Situation Investing”. I believe that Special Situation will require a lot of active management. How about the long short side strategy? Is it active or is it more quantitative in nature? It's what might be called “quantimental”. So we use, I personally hate that term, which is just sort of a blend between quantitative and fundamental. I just don’t trust the data so I always want to dig in and just make sure the data is correct. So we go through that process and we look for other things that you just can’t screen for now because the natural language of recognition is not as good as it probably will be in the future. If it gets to that point in the future, it will be wholly quantitative but at the moment we go through and read M&A—mergers and acquisitions—over almost a decade So I go through and look at those documents and try to find things that might affect the valuation. Once we decide on the valuation, then we'll basically its quantitative from that point on. And we buy and sell where And we buy and sell based on that valuation we calculated previously. It looks to the outside world like it is very traditional sort of looking value portfolio but it's just...we're systematic as much as we possibly can be. We're very aware of all the issues that you can have by avoiding particular stocks for certain reasons. So in other words, you will use the Acquirer’s Multiple as a first screen and you'll run through the list to see what stocks are probably worth investing in. We’re not doing a business analyses at all. So we’re not looking at “will this business survive” because it's just sort of an analysis that I can't do. I don't think very many people can do it at all. I mean I'm a lawyer. I'm not a consultant or an investment banker. They might have a better idea about that sort of stuff. But what we're doing is we're looking at: are the economic earnings of this company, are they what the financial statements are reflecting. And if they are, then that's great and we just proceed on the way we're planning to. If they're not, we want to know why there's a big discrepancy between what the company is showing on its financial statements and what's actually going on in the business of the company. Sometimes that indicates that there's some fraud or some earnings manipulation and that's a company that we would avoid. Sometimes it's just it's a timing issue because of the way that the business: it's a funny business, might be an insurance business that has difficulty matching assets and liabilities, might be a bank that has a different style or they'll have a different kind of balance sheet, or just a traditional industrial. So that's sort of stuff that we're doing. We're not kicking it out because we don't like the business. We're just trying to be worth thinking about the nature of the business and how it's reflected in the financial statements. So essentially it is about detecting fraud rather than business analysis, which might end up in a broken leg analysis, which we have just discussed. Right. Exactly right. So thank you Tobias! It was a wonderful interview. I believe the audience has learned a lot from you and this has been our honor to have you on the show. Thanks very much for having me, Alvin. If anybody wants to get in touch on Twitter, @greenbackd. And the book that I have out right now is The Acquirer’s Multiple, which is available on Amazon and wherever else you buy books. And the website is It has a free screener, which has got the cheapest 30 of the top thousand stocks in the US at any given time.



Ladies of the Cabinet: Mrs. Lamont, Mrs. Olney, Mrs. Bissell, Mrs. Gresham, Mrs. Cleveland, Mrs. Carlisle, Mrs. Herbert, Mrs. Smith, Miss Morton
Ladies of the Cabinet: Mrs. Lamont, Mrs. Olney, Mrs. Bissell, Mrs. Gresham, Mrs. Cleveland, Mrs. Carlisle, Mrs. Herbert, Mrs. Smith, Miss Morton
John G. Carlisle's grandchildren (Jane middle, Laura right)
John G. Carlisle's grandchildren (Jane middle, Laura right)

Carlisle was born in what is now Kenton County, Kentucky, and began his public life as a lawyer in Covington, Kentucky, under John W. Stevenson. Carlisle married Mary Jane Goodson on January 15, 1857, and they had two sons: William Kinkead Carlisle and Logan Griffin Carlisle.

Mary Jane Goodson was born in Covington, Kentucky, August 2, 1835. Her father, Major John Adam Goodson, served in the war of 1812, and for several terms represented his district in the House of Representatives. Both William Kinkead Carlisle and Logan Griffin Carlisle were lawyers by profession. William Carlisle was married and had three children.[1]

Despite the political difficulties that taking a neutral position during the American Civil War caused him, Carlisle spent most of the 1860s in the Kentucky General Assembly, serving in the Kentucky House of Representatives and two terms in the Kentucky State Senate, and was elected Lieutenant Governor of Kentucky in 1871, succeeding his former law mentor Stevenson.

After Carlisle's term as Lieutenant Governor ended in 1875, he ran for and won a seat in the United States House of Representatives for Kentucky's 6th district. On the main issues of the day, Carlisle was in favor of coining silver, but not for free coinage, and favored lower tariffs. He became a leader of the low-tariff wing of the Democratic Party, and was chosen by House Democrats to become Speaker in 1883 over Samuel J. Randall, a leader of the party's protectionist wing.

Bureau of Engraving and Printing portrait of Carlisle as Secretary of the Treasury.
Bureau of Engraving and Printing portrait of Carlisle as Secretary of the Treasury.

Carlisle became a leader of the conservative Bourbon Democrats and was mentioned as a presidential candidate but the Democrats passed him over at their conventions for Winfield S. Hancock in 1880 and Grover Cleveland in 1884. Discomfort with nominating a southerner after the Civil War played a role in Carlisle's failure to win either nomination. In 1892 Carlisle was again proposed as a candidate for president at the Democratic convention, but this time Carlisle asked that he not be considered. It was reported at the time that Carlisle dropped out with the understanding that Cleveland, once nominated, would appoint him to his Cabinet.

In 1890, Carlisle was appointed to the United States Senate to fill the unexpired term of James B. Beck. When Cleveland was again elected to the Presidency in 1892, he chose Carlisle as his Secretary of the Treasury.

Carlisle's tenure as Secretary was marred by the Panic of 1893, a financial and economic disaster so severe that it ended Carlisle's political career. In response to a run on the American gold supply, Carlisle felt forced to end silver coinage. He also felt compelled to oppose the 1894 Wilson-Gorman Tariff bill. These two stands were widely unpopular among agrarian Democrats. In 1896 Carlisle strenuously opposed Democratic presidential nominee William Jennings Bryan, supporting a splinter Gold Democrat candidate, once-Illinois Governor Palmer, instead.[2]

By 1896, the once remarkably popular Carlisle was so disliked due to his stewardship of the currency that he was forced to leave the stage in the middle of a speech in his home town of Covington due to a barrage of rotten eggs.[citation needed]

By May 1899, the North American Trust Company had directors such as John G. Carlisle, Adlai E. Stevenson, and Wager Swayne.[3]

He moved to New York City, where he practiced law, and died on July 31, 1910, at age 75, and is buried in Linden Grove Cemetery in Covington, Kentucky.[4]


Carlisle County, Kentucky was established in 1886.[5]


  1. ^ Hinman, Ida (1895). The Washington Sketch Book.
  2. ^ David T. Beito and Linda Royster Beito, "Gold Democrats and the Decline of Classical Liberalism, 1896-1900," Independent Review 4 (Spring 2000), 555-75
  3. ^ "Trust Company Election; The North American Chooses Alvah Trowbridge as Its Leader. He Succeeds Col. Trenholdm - The New Head Brings to the Corporation Important Financial Interests -- No Friction". The New York Times. New York City, United States. May 27, 1899. p. 3. Retrieved July 16, 2017.
  4. ^ Federal Writers' Project (1996). The WPA Guide to Kentucky. University Press of Kentucky. p. 154. ISBN 0813108659. Retrieved 24 November 2013.
  5. ^ The Register of the Kentucky State Historical Society, Volume 1. Kentucky State Historical Society. 1903. p. 34.

External links

Political offices
Preceded by
Preston Leslie
Lieutenant Governor of Kentucky
Succeeded by
John C. Underwood
Preceded by
J. Warren Keifer
Speaker of the United States House of Representatives
Succeeded by
Thomas Reed
Preceded by
Charles Foster
United States Secretary of the Treasury
Succeeded by
Lyman J. Gage
U.S. House of Representatives
Preceded by
Thomas Jones
Member of the U.S. House of Representatives
from Kentucky's 6th congressional district

Succeeded by
William Dickerson
Preceded by
J. Warren Keifer
Chair of the House Rules Committee
Succeeded by
Thomas Reed
U.S. Senate
Preceded by
James B. Beck
U.S. Senator (Class 2) from Kentucky
Served alongside: Joseph Blackburn
Succeeded by
William Lindsay
This page was last edited on 2 August 2019, at 04:25
Basis of this page is in Wikipedia. Text is available under the CC BY-SA 3.0 Unported License. Non-text media are available under their specified licenses. Wikipedia® is a registered trademark of the Wikimedia Foundation, Inc. WIKI 2 is an independent company and has no affiliation with Wikimedia Foundation.