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Ideology of the Iranian Revolution

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Main article: Iranian Revolution

The ideology of the Iranian Revolution has been called a "complex combination" of Pan-Islamism, political populism, and Shia Islamic "religious radicalism";[1] "a struggle against paganism, oppression, and empire.[2] Perhaps the most important of the diverse ideological interpretation of Islam within the grand alliance that led to the 1979 revolution were Khomeinism, Ali Shariati’s Islamic-left ideology,[3] Mehdi Bazargan’s liberal-democratic Islam. Less powerful were the socialist guerrilla groups of Islamic and secular variants, and the secular constitutionalism in socialist and nationalist forms.[4] Contributors to the ideology also included Jalal Al-e-Ahmad, who formulated the idea of Gharbzadegi—that Western culture must be rejected and fought as was a plague or an intoxication that alienated Muslims from their roots and identity.[5]

The slogan chanted by demonstrators—"Independence, Freedom, and Islamic Republic" (Estiqlal, Azadi, Jomhuri-ye Eslami!)[6] — has been called the "pivotal yet broad demand" of the revolutionaries.[7] Revolutionaries railed against corruption, extravagance and autocratic nature of Pahlavi rule;[8] policies that helped the rich at the expense of the poor; and the economic and cultural domination/exploitation of Iran by non-Muslim foreigners—particularly Americans.[9]

YouTube Encyclopedic

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Transcription

Hi, I’m John Green and this is Crash Course World History and today we’re talking about Iran. Oh, Mr. Green? Mr. Green? I know that country. It’s in the Middle East. It’s with Egypt. No, Me from the Past, we’re going to talk about Iran. Now, I used to be you so I remember when you would look at this part of the world and you would be like, “oh yeah, that’s a thing.” And in your case that “thing” extended more or less from I guess, like, western China to, like, uh, Poland. Then you’d make a bunch of broad generalizations about that area and no doubt use the terms Arab and Muslim interchangeably. But as usual Me From the Past the truth resists simplicity. So today we are going to talk about Iran and just Iran. Specifically, the 1979 Iranian Revolution. So the 1979 Iranian Revolution and its aftermath are often seen by detractors as the first step in the creation of an isolated, fundamentalist state that supports terrorism, and, you might be surprised to hear me say, that there is some truth to that interpretation. That said, the way you think about the Iranian Revolution depends a lot of which part of it you are looking at. And regardless, it’s very important because it represents a different kind of revolution from the ones that we usually talk about. So the 1979 uprisings were aimed at getting rid of the Pahlavi Dynasty, which sounds, like, impressive, but this dynasty had only had two kings, Reza Shah and Mohammed Reza Shah. Before the Pahlavis, Iran was ruled by the Qajar dynasty, and before that the Safavids. The Safavids and Qajars were responsible for two of the most important aspects of Iran: The Safavids made Shia Islam the official state religion in Iran, starting with Ismail I in 1501, and the Qajars gave the Muslim clergy – the ulema – political power. So most of the world’s Muslims are Sunnis but the Shia, or Shiites are an important sect that began very early on – around 680 CE and today form the majority of Muslims in Iran and Iraq. Now within both Sunni and Shia there are further divisions and many sects, but we’re just going to talk about, like, the historical difference between the two. Shia Muslims believe that Ali should’ve been the first Caliph, Sunni Muslims think that Abu Bakr, who was the first Caliph, was rightly chosen. Since that disagreement, there have been many others, many doctrinal differences but what’s more important is that from the very beginning, Shia Muslims saw themselves as the party of the oppressed standing up against the wealthy and powerful and harkening back to the social justice standard that was set by the prophet. And this connection between religious faith and social justice was extremely important to the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and also to previous revolutions in Iran. This is really crucial to understand because many historians argue that the Iranian revolution represents what the journalist Christian Caryl called an “odd fusion of Islam and late-twentieth century revolutionary politics.” But actually, in the scheme of Iranian history, its not so odd. Because 1979 was not Iran’s first revolution. The first major one was in 1906. It forced the ruling Qajars to accept a constitution. It created a parliament and supposedly some limits on the king, and made Shia Islam the official state religion, but it also protected the rights of minorities in Iran. It ultimately failed partly because the clergy withdrew their support, partly because the shah worked very actively against it, and maybe most importantly, because the Russians and the British worked to keep Persia weak so they could continue to try to dominate the region. Which reminds me that most people in Iran are not Arabs, they are Persian. And most people in Iran don’t speak Arabic, they speak Farsi, or as we often call it in English, Persian. So after WWI European rivalries really heated up because of the discovery of oil in the Middle East. The British established the Anglo Iranian Oil Company – which would later come to be known as BP. They also extracted a bunch of concessions from the Iranian government in addition to extracting lots of oil. And they helped to engineer a change in dynasty by supporting military commander Reza Khan in his coup in February 1921. Reza Khan became Reza Shah and then he attempted to turn Persia, which he re-named Iran in 1935, into a modern, secular, western-style state kind of like Turkey was under Ataturk. But Reza Shah is perhaps best remembered for his over the top dictatorial repression, which turned the clergy against him. Okay, so during World War II Reza Shah abdicated and his young son Mohammad Reza Shah became the leader of Iran. Which he remained, mostly, until 1979 when he definitely stopped being the leader of Iran. So after World War II, the British allowed greater popular participation in Iran’s government. The main party to benefit from this openness was Tudeh, the Iranian communist party. Mohammed Mosaddegh was elected prime minister in 1951 and led the parliament to nationalize Iran’s oil industry, and that was the end of the democratic experiment. Now most history books say that in 1953 the British and the CIA engineered a coup to remove Mosaddegh from office. And that is quite possibly true. It is definitely true that we tried to engineer a coup. It’s also true that Mosaddegh quit and fled Iran following demonstrations against him. But we also know that the Shia clergy encouraged those demonstrations. That’s a bit of a weird decision for the Clergy, considering that Shia Islam traditionally takes a radical stance against oppression. But it’s important to remember that Mosaddegh was supported by the Tudeh party and they were communists. Nationalization of the oil industry was one thing, but a further shift toward communism might mean appropriation of the land that supported the clergy, maybe even a rejection of religion altogether. So now we’ve seen two occasions where the Shia clergy support helped facilitate change. Right, in 1906 and again in 1953. So, let’s flash ahead to 1979. The Shah was definitely an autocrat, and he employed a ruthless secret police called the SAVAK to stifle dissent. In 1975, the Shah abolished Iran’s two political parties and replaced them with one party the Resurgence party. You’ll never guess who was resurging - the Shah. There was a huge round of censorship and arrests and torture of political prisoners signaling that autocracy was in Iran to stay. But before those events in 1975, say between 1962 and 1975, by most economic and social measures Iran saw huge improvements. In 1963, the Shah had tried to institute what he called a White Revolution – top-down modernization led by the monarchy, and in many ways he was successful, especially in improving industry and education. Oil revenues rose from $555 million in 1964 to $20 billion in 1976. And the Shah’s government invested a lot of that money in infrastructure and education. The population grew and infant mortality fell. A new professional middle class arose. But the White Revolution wasn’t universally popular. For instance, it was opposed by one particular Shia cleric - the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Khomeini spoke out against the White Revolution from the religious center of Iran, Qom. One of his main complaints was that the reforms would grant more rights to women, including the right to vote, but he also attacked the government for, quote: “the rigging of elections and other constitutional abuses, neglect of the poor and the sale of oil to Israel.” And in general, Khomeini felt that a king’s power was inherently un-Islamic and that Shia tradition was to fight that power. That noted about Khomeini, the 1979 revolution didn’t start out to create an Islamic state. At first it was a pretty typical uprising by dissatisfied Iranians to overthrow a government that they perceived as corrupt and unresponsive to their needs. In spite of, or arguably because of, oil-fueled economic growth, many Iranians weren’t enjoying economic success. The universities were turning out more graduates than there were jobs and the mechanization of agriculture had the predictable result of displacing farmers who moved to cities. Especially the capital city of Tehran where there weren’t nearly enough jobs for the number of people. So, I think it’s unfair to say that a majority of the demonstrators who took to the streets in late 1978 were motivated by a fundamentalist vision of Islam. They were dissatisfied with economic inequality and political repression and a corrupt regime. So why do we generally remember the 1979 revolution as having been motivated by Shia Islam. Well, Let’s go to the Thought Bubble. So the initial demonstrations did begin after an Iranian newspaper on January 7, 1978 published an article that was critical of Khomeini. By the way, at the time he was living in Paris. These initial demonstrations were pretty small, but when the government police and army forces starting firing on demonstrators, killing some of them, the protests grew. Each time marchers protested against the violent treatment of demonstrators, the government would crack down, and their violent reaction would spur more demonstrations. There was also a lot of criticism of the west tied up in the revolution. According to one woman who participated: “American lifestyles had come to be imposed as an ideal, the ultimate goal. Americanism was the model. American popular culture – books, magazines, film – had swept over our country like a flood...We found ourselves wondering ‘Is there any room for our own culture?’” The Shah never understood why so many people were protesting against him; he thought that they were communists, or being supported by the British. He also thought that merely bringing prosperity would be enough to keep him in power. It wasn’t. On January 16, 1979 he left Iran. He eventually ended up in the U.S., which had unfortunate consequences for diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Iran. But the point here is that the first part of the Iranian revolution was relatively peaceful protests followed by a government crackdown, more protests that eventually led to the collapse of the monarchy, and that looks kind of familiar, especially if you’ve studied, like, the French or Russian or even the American Revolutions. And most historians argue these protests weren’t about Islam, but rather, “The discontent over living conditions, pay cuts, and the threat of unemployment fused with the general disillusionment and anger with the regime.” The government that eventually replaced the monarchy was the second, and in many ways much more revolutionary revolution. Thanks Thought Bubble. So the new Islamic Republic of Iran was based on Khomeini’s idea about what an Islamic government should be, a principle he called velayat-e faqih. Mainly it was that a sharia law scholar, would have ultimate authority, because he was more knowledgeable than anyone about law and justice. There would be a legislature and a president and a prime minister, but any of their decisions could be overturned by the supreme ruler who from 1979 until his death was Khomeini. Now, if democracy is only about holding elections, then the new Iran was a democracy. I mean, Iran has elections, both for president and for the parliament. And for the record, despite what Khomeini might have thought in the ‘60s, women can vote in Iran and they do. They also serve in the parliament and the president’s cabinet. And in the referendum on whether to create an Islamic Republic of Iran, the vast majority of Iranians in a free and open vote, voted “yes.” Now governance in Iran is extremely complicated, too complicated for one Crash Course video. But in once sense at least, Iran is definitely not a democracy. The ultimate authority, written into the constitution, is not the will of the people but god, who is represented by the supreme religious leader. And the actions of the Islamic Republic, especially in the early chaotic days of 1979 but also many times since, don’t conform to most ideas of effective democracy. Like one of the first things that Khomeini did to shore up his support was to create the Islamic Revolutionary Guards and Hezbollah to defend the revolution against coup attempts. Although initially there were opposition parties, their activities were curtailed by the new “revolutionary courts” that applied sharia law in a particularly harsh fashion. Like it’s estimated that by October 1979, several hundred people had been executed. And under the new constitution, Khomeini was given extensive power. I mean, he could appoint the heads of the armed services, and the Revolutionary Guard and the national TV and radio stations. He also approved the candidates for presidential elections and appointed six of the twelve members of the Guardian Council that approved legislation from the parliament before it became law. So structurally Iran’s government looked kind of like other governments, but as Michael Axworthy points out it was different because, quote, “above and beyond stood the faqih, with the power and the responsibility to intervene directly in the name of Islam; indeed with powers greater than those given to most monarchs in constitutional monarchies.” By 1979, Iran already had a long history of clerical involvement in protest and dynamic change, but it also had a long history of pushing for constitutions and liberty. The current end result is the Islamic Republic of Iran, but it’s worth remembering that both those threads of history are still part of Iranian life. Like we saw that in 2009 and 2010 with the so-called Green Revolution where there were huge protests after an Iranian election. Those protests involved young people arguing for more rights and liberties.. But they were also led by, and encouraged by, reformist Shia clerics. In the U.S. we mostly remember the 1979 Iranian Revolution for its burning of American flags and taking of hostages in the American Embassy. That belonged more to the second phase of the revolution, the chaotic period when the Islamic republic was being born. Life in the Islamic Republic of Iran remains highly repressive. I mean, for instance, Iran still executes a very high percentage of criminals. But it’s inaccurate to say that Iran is merely a dictatorship, or that it’s merely repressive. And one of the challenges for people in the West trying to understand Iran is that we have to disentangle the various aspects of the revolution rather than simply relying on the images that have defined it for us. I hope this episode can help a little. You can find more resources in the links below. Thanks for watching. Crash Course is filmed here in the Chad and Stacey Emigholz studio in Indianapolis and it’s made possible because of the hard worth of all of these people. Thank you for watching and as we say in my hometown, “don’t forget to be awesome.”

Khomeini

Main article: Khomeinism
Khomeini in the 1970s

The author who ultimately formulated the ideology of the revolution though, was the man who dominated the revolution itself—the Ayatollah Khomeini. He preached that revolt, and especially martyrdom, against injustice and tyranny was part of Shia Islam,[10] that clerics should mobilize and lead their flocks into action, not just to advise them. He introduced Qur'anic terms—mustazafin ('weak')[11] and mustakbirin ('proud and mighty')[12]—for the Marxist terminology of the oppressors-oppressed distinction.[13] He rejected the influence of both Soviet and American superpowers in Iran with the slogan "not Eastern, nor Western - Islamic Republican" (Persian: نه شرقی نه غربی جمهوری اسلامی).

Historian Ervand Abrahamian argues that the revolution had more than one ideology, not just because the revolution was won by a coalition of forces, but because the ideology evolved over time. One very stark point of evolution was between the ideas promoted by Khomeini while fighting for power (based on class struggle and populism) and those forming the basis of rule after the fall of the shah (rule of the guardian jurist).[14]

Velayat-e faqih

Main article: Islamic Government: Governance of the Jurist

In his famed January–February 1970 lectures to students in Najaf, Khomeini spelled out his system of "Islamic Government" based on the principle of velayat-e faqih. He argued that since Muslims, in fact everyone, required "guardianship," in the form of rule or supervision, true Islamic government must be by the leading Islamic jurist or jurists—such as Khomeini himself.[15] This was necessary because Islam requires obedience to traditional Islamic sharia law alone. Following this law was not only the Islamically correct thing to do, it would prevent poverty, injustice, and the plundering of Muslim land by foreign unbelievers. But for all this to happen, sharia had to be protected from innovation and deviation, and this required putting control of government in the hands of those who were experts in Islamic law -- namely Islamic jurists.[16]

Establishing and obeying this Islamic government was so important it was "actually an expression of obedience to God," ultimately "more necessary even than prayer and fasting" for Islam because without it true Islam will not survive.[17] It was a universal principle, not one confined to Iran. All the world needed and deserved just government, i.e. true Islamic government, and Khomeini "regarded the export of the Islamic revolution as imperative."[18] (His statements on this sensative issue were contradictory. He stated "We shall export our revolution to the whole world. Until the cry 'There is no god but Allah' resounds over the whole world, there will be struggle";[19][20][21][22]: 66 ] yet other times said, "export of revolution ... does not mean interfering in other nation's affairs",[23] but "answering their questions about knowing God".)[24][25][note 1]

However, this plan/ideology was disclosed to his students and the religious community but not widely publicized.[27][note 2]

Populism

Throughout the rest of the 1970s, as he gained ground to become the leader of the revolution, Khomeini made no mention of his theory of Islamic government, little or no mention of any details of religious doctrinal or specific public policies.[note 3] He did reassure the public his government would "be democratic as well as Islamic" and that "neither he nor his clerical supporters harbored any secret desire to `rule` the country",[30] but mainly and stuck to attacking the Iranian monarch (shah) "on a host of highly sensitive socioeconomic issues":

Accused him of widening the gap between rich and poor; favoring cronies, relatives ... wasting oil resources on the ever expanding army and bureaucracy ... condemning the working class to a life of poverty, misery, and drudgery ... neglecting low-income housing", dependency on the west, supporting the US and Israel, undermining Islam and Iran with "cultural imperialism",[31]

often sounding not just populist but leftist ("Oppressed of the world, unite", "The problems of the East come from the West -- especially from American imperialism"),[32] including an emphasis on class struggle. The classes struggling were the oppressed (mostazafin) that he supported, and the oppressors (mostakberin)[33] (made up of the shah's government, the wealthy and well-connected, who would be deposed come the revolution). With this message discipline, Khomeini united a broad coalition movement that hated the shah but included moderates, liberals, and leftists that Khomeini had little else in common with.[34]

Needless to say theocracy of jurists was in conflict with the hopes and plans of Iran's democratic secularists and Islamic leftists. At the same time Khomeini knew a broad revolutionary base was necessary and did not hesitate to encourage these forces to unite with his supporters to overthrow the Shah.[35] Consequently, the ideology of the revolution was known for its "imprecision"[36] or "vague character"[37] prior to its victory, with the specific character of velayat-e faqih/theocratic waiting to be made public when the time was right.[38] Khomeini maintained the opposition to velayat-e faqih/theocratic government by the other revolutionaries was the result of propaganda campaign by foreign imperialists eager to prevent Islam from putting a stop to their plundering. This propaganda was so insidious it had penetrated even Islamic seminaries and made it necessary to "observe the principles of taqiyya" (i.e. dissimulation of the truth in defense of Islam, i.e. lying), when talking about (or not talking about) Islamic government.[39][40]

Ideology in power

With the overthrow of the shah in 1979, the ideology of velayat-e faqih waxed and that of populism waned.

  • Khomeini and his core group commenced establishing Islamic government of a ruling Jurist (Khomeini being the jurist) and purging unwanted allies : liberals, moderate Muslims (the Provisional Government), then leftist Shi'a (like president Abolhassan Banisadr and the MeK guerillas). Eventually, "one faction",[41] one "social group" was left to benefit financially from the revolution -- "bazaar merchants and business operators linked to the political-religious hierarchy".[42]
  • By 1982, having consolidated power, Khomeini also "toned down" his populist language, "watered down" his class rhetoric,"[43] took time to praise the bazaars and their merchants,[44] no longer celebrating the righteous, angry poor -- mostazafin now was used as a political term, covering all those who supported the Islamic Republic;[45]
  • Emphasized how (according to Khomeini) essential Shi'i clerics were to protecting Islam and Iran; they had kept alive "national Consciousness" and stood as a "fortress of independence" against imperialism and royal despotism in the Tobacco protest of 1891, the Persian Constitutional Revolution of 1906, during Reza Shah's reign, rising up against Muhammad Reza Shah in 1963.[46]

In late 1987 and early 1988, Khomeini startled many by declaring that the Islamic Republic had "absolute authority" over everything, including "secondary ordinances", i.e. sharia law such as the Five Pillars of Islam.

"I should state that the government, which is part of the absolute deputyship of the Prophet, is one of the primary injunctions of Islam and has priority over all other secondary injunctions, even prayers, fasting and hajj."[47]

The announcement was attributed to having to deal with a deadlock between populists and conservatives in his government, where Khomeini was attempting to nudge conservatives in the guardian council to not veto an income tax and a "watered-down" labor law (which the council had hitherto opposed as unIslamic).[48]

Non-Khomeini sources of the ideology

Gharbzadegi

Main article: Gharbzadegi
Jalal Al-e-Ahmad

In 1962, Jalal Al-e-Ahmad published a book or pamphlet called of the book Occidentosis (Gharbzadegi): A Plague from the West. Al-e-Ahmad, who was from a deeply religious family but had had a Western education and been a member of the Tudeh (Communist) party,[49] argued that Iran was intoxicated or infatuated (zadegi) with Western (gharb) technology, culture, products, and so had become a victim of the West's "toxins" or disease. The adoption and imitation of Western models and Western criteria in education, the arts, and culture led to the loss of Iranian cultural identity, and a transformation of Iran into a passive market for Western goods and a pawn in Western geopolitics.[50][51] Al-e-Ahmad "spearheaded" the search by Western educated/secular Iranians for "Islamic roots", and although he advocated a return to Islam his works "contained a strong Marxist flavor and analyzed society through a class perspective."[52]

Al-e-Ahmad "was the only contemporary writer ever to obtain favorable comments from Khomeini", who wrote in a 1971 message to Iranian pilgrims on going on Hajj,

"The poisonous culture of imperialism [is] penetrating to the depths of towns and villages throughout the Muslim world, displacing the culture of the Qur'an, recruiting our youth en masse to the service of foreigners and imperialists..."[53]

At least one historian (Ervand Abrahamian) speculates Al-e-Ahmad may have been an influence on Khomeini's turning away from traditional Shi'i thought towards populism, class struggle and revolution.[52] Fighting Gharbzadegi became part of the ideology of the 1979 Iranian Revolution—the emphasis on nationalization of industry, "self-sufficiency" in economics, independence in all areas of life from both the Western (and Soviet) world. He was also one of the main influences of the later Islamic Republic president Ahmadinejad.[54] The Islamic Republic issued a postage stamp honoring Al-e-Ahmad in 1981.[55]

Socialist Shi'ism and Ali Shariati

Ali Shariati (Persian: علی شریعتی مزینانی; 1933 - 1977)

One element of Iran's revolution not found in Sunni Islamist movements was what came to be called "Socialist Shi'ism",[56] (also "red Shiism" as opposed to the "black Shiism" of the clerics).[57]

Iran's education system was "substantially superior" to that of its neighbors, and by 1979 had about 175,000 students, 67, 000 studying abroad away from the supervision of its oppressive security force the SAVAK. The early 1970s saw a "blossoming of Marxist groups" around the world including among Iranian post-secondary students.[56]

After one failed uprising, some of the young revolutionaries, realizing that the religious Iranian masses were not relating to Marxist concepts, began projecting "the Messianic expectations of communist and Third World peoples onto Revolutionary Shi'ism.", i.e. socialist Shi'ism.[56] Ali Shariati was "the most outspoken representative of this group", and a figure without equivalent in "fame or influence" in Sunni Islam.[56] He had come from a "strictly religious family" but had studied in Paris and been influenced by the writings of Jean-Paul Sartre, Frantz Fanon and Che Guevara.[58]

Socialist Shia believed Imam Hussein was not just a holy figure but the original oppressed one (muzloun), and his killer, the Sunni Umayyad Caliphate, the "analog" of the modern Iranian people's "oppression by the shah".[56] His killing at Karbala was not just an "eternal manifestation of the truth but a revolutionary act by a revolutionary hero".[59]

Shariati was also a harsh critic of traditional Usuli clergy (including Ayatullah Hadi al-Milani), who he and other leftist Shia believed were standing in the way of the revolutionary potential of the masses,[60] by focusing on mourning and lamentation for the martyrs, awaiting the return of the messiah, when they should have been fighting "against the state injustice begun by Ali and Hussein".[61]

Shariati not only influenced young Iranians and young clerics,[62] he influenced Khomeini. Shariati popularized a saying from the 19th century, 'Every place should be turned into Karbala, every month into Moharram, and every day into Ashara'.[59] Later Khomeini used it as a slogan.[63]

The "phenomenal popularity" of Shari'ati among the "young intelligentsia"[64][57] helped open up the "modern middle class" to Khomeini. Shari'ati was often anticlerical but Khomeini was able to "win over his followers by being forthright in his denunciations of the monarchy; by refusing to join fellow theologians in criticizing the Husseinieh-i Ershad; by openly attacking the apolitical and the pro-regime `ulama; by stressing such themes as revolution, anti-imperialism, and the radical message of Muharram; and by incorporating into his public declarations such `Fanonist` terms as the `mostazafin will inherit the earth`, `the country needs a cultural revolution,` and the `people will dump the exploiters onto the garbage heap of history.` [64]

Shariati was also influenced by anti-democratic Islamist ideas of Muslim Brotherhood thinkers in Egypt and he tried to meet Muhammad Qutb while visiting Saudi Arabia in 1969.[65] A chain smoker, Shariati died of a heart attack while in self-imposed exile in Southampton, UK on June 18, 1977.[66]

Ayatullah Hadi Milani, the influential Usuli Marja in Mashhad during the 1970s, had issued a fatwa prohibiting his followers from reading Ali Shariati's books and islamist literature produced by young clerics. This fatwa was followed by similar fatwas from Ayatullah Mar'ashi Najafi, Ayatullah Muhammad Rouhani, Ayatullah Hasan Qomi and others. Ayatullah Khomeini refused to comment.[67]

Mahmoud Taleghani

Further information: Mahmoud Taleghani

Mahmoud Taleghani (1911–1979) was another politically active Iranian Shi'i cleric and contemporary of Khomeini and a leader in his own right of the movement against Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. A founding member of the Freedom Movement of Iran, he has been described as a representative of the tendency of many "Shia clerics to blend Shia with Marxist ideals in order to compete with leftist movements for youthful supporters" during the 1960s and 1970s.[68] a veteran in the struggle against the Pahlavi regime, he was imprisoned on several occasions over the decades, "as a young preacher, as a mid-ranking cleric, and as a senior religious leader just before the revolution,"[69] and served a total of a dozen years in prison.[70] In his time in prison he developed connections with leftist political prisoners and the influence of the left on his thinking was reflected in his famous book Islam and Ownership (Islam va Malekiyat) which argued in support of collective ownership "as if it were an article of faith in Islam."[69]

Taleghani was instrumental in "shaping the groundswell movement" that led to the Iranian Revolution and served as the chair of powerful and secret Revolutionary Council during the Islamic Revolution.[70] he was also the first Imam for Friday Prayer in Tehran after the fall of Iran's interim government, In the late July 1979.[71] He clashed with Khomeini in April 1979, warning the leadership against a 'return to despotism.'" After two of his sons were arrested[70] by revolutionary Guards, thousands of his supporters marched in the streets chanting "Taleghani, you are the soul of the revolution! Down with the reactionaries!" Khomeini summoned Taleghani to Qom where he was given a severe criticism after which the press was called and told by Khomeini: "Mr. Taleghani is with us and he is sorry for what happened." Khomeini pointedly did not refer to him as Ayatollah Taleghani.[72]

Ideology in practice

Following the revolution, its ideology became apparent in social, economic and cultural policies.

In terms of dress, western-style neckties for men and uncovered hair, arms, and many other areas for women were banned. But there were non-religious changes as well, such as an emphasis on proletarian dress, manners, and customs, as opposed to Western aristocratic or bourgeois elegance and extravagance of the Shah's era. For example, observers noted in the early days of the revolution the "canteen-like" nature of restaurant meals, meant "to underscore the triumph of the Muslim proletariat." In men's dress, a judge described the "overnight transformation" in February 1979 of the Ministry of Justice in Tehran:

The men were no longer wearing suits and ties but plain slacks and collarless shirts, many of them quite wrinkled, some even stained. Even my nose caught a whiff of the change. The slight scent of cologne or perfume that had lingered in the corridors, especially in the mornings, was absent.[73]

See also

Notes

  1. ^ "In offering an alternative, Khomeini did not publicly refer to his work on Islamic government; on the contrary, his entourage later disclaimed this work, arguing that it was either a SAVAK forgery or the rough notes of an student listener."[26]
  2. ^ "In offering an alternative, Khomeini did not publicly refer to his work on Islamic government; on the contrary, his entourage later disclaimed this work, arguing that it was either a SAVAK forgery or the rough notes of an student listener."[28]
  3. ^ Khomeini did not "commit himself to precise proposals and specific plans; as one journalist later observed, `imprecision was a way of life` for the entourage.[29]

References

  1. ^ Abrahamian, Ervand, A History of Modern Iran, 2008, p.143
  2. ^ Bernard Lewis|Islamic Revolution
  3. ^ Keddie, Modern Iran, (2003) p.201-7
  4. ^ "Iran Analysis Quarterly Volume 1 No". Archived from the original on 2021-09-14. Retrieved 2013-07-06.
  5. ^ Mackay, Iranians (1996) pp. 215, 264–5.
  6. ^ Islamism and education in modern Iran, with special reference to gendered social interactions and relationships Archived 2012-04-06 at the Wayback Machine, H Godazgar:498.
  7. ^ Iran: a green wave for life and liberty, Asef Bayat, 7 - 07 - 2009 Archived 2017-10-10 at the Wayback Machine accessed 14-July-2009
  8. ^ Abrahamian Iran, (1982) p.478-9
  9. ^ Graham, Iran (1980), p.233-4
  10. ^ The Last Great Revolution Turmoil and Transformation in Iran, by Robin WRIGHT.
  11. ^ from Q4:75
  12. ^ Q16:22-23
  13. ^ Dabashi, Theology of Discontent (1993)
  14. ^ Abrahamian, Khomeinism, 1993, chapter 1, pp-13-37
  15. ^ Dabashi, Theology of Discontent (1993), p.419, 443
  16. ^ Khomeini; Algar, Islam and Revolution, p.52, 54, 80
  17. ^ See: Velayat-e faqih (book by Khomeini)#Importance of Islamic Government
  18. ^ Staying the Course: the "Lebanonization" of Hizbullah - Lebanon - Al Mashriq
  19. ^ 11 February 1979 (according to Dilip Hiro in The Longest War p.32) p.108 from Excerpts from Speeches and Messages of Imam Khomeini on the Unity of the Muslims.
  20. ^ Glenn, Cameron; Nada, Garrett (28 August 2015). "Rival Islamic States: ISIS v Iran". Wilson Center. Wilson Center.
  21. ^ Rieffer-Flanagan, Barbara Ann (2009). "Islamic Realpolitik: Two-Level Iranian Foreign Policy". International Journal on World Peace. 26 (4): 19. ISSN 0742-3640. JSTOR 20752904.
  22. ^ Wright, Robin (2010). The Last Great Revolution: Turmoil and Transformation in Iran. Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group. ISBN 978-0-307-76607-6.
  23. ^ صدور انقلاب به معناي دخالت در شئون مردم كشورهاي ديگر نيست.
  24. ^ بلكه به معناي پاسخ دادن به سؤالهاي فكري بشر تشنه معارف الهي است.
  25. ^ "پيام امام (ره) به گورباچف". Archived from the original on 2012-04-15. Retrieved 2013-07-06.
  26. ^ cited by J. Cockroft, `Iran's Khomeini,` Seven Days, 23 February 1979, quoted in Iran Between Two Revolutions by Ervand Abrahamian, Princeton University Press, 1982, pp.17-18
  27. ^ Abrahamian, Iran between two revolutions, 1982: p.478-9
  28. ^ cited by J. Cockroft, `Iran's Khomeini,` Seven Days, 23 February 1979, quoted in Iran Between Two Revolutions by Ervand Abrahamian, Princeton University Press, 1982, pp.17-18
  29. ^ Iran Between Two Revolutions by Ervand Abrahamian, Princeton University Press, 1982, pp.17-18]
  30. ^ source: Committee to End U.S. Intervention in Iran, Excerpts from Ayatollah Khomeini's Interviews, (Mountview, CA, 1978); quoted in Iran Between Two Revolutions by Ervand Abrahamian, (Princeton University Press, 1982), p.14-15
  31. ^ Abrahamian, Khomeinism, 1993: p.30
  32. ^ Abrahamian, Khomeinism, 1993: p.31
  33. ^ Abrahamian, Khomeinism, 1993: p.47
  34. ^ Kepel, Jihad, 2002, pp.112-118
  35. ^ Abrahamian, Iran, (1983), p.478,479, 524
  36. ^ Abrahamian Iran(1982), p.478-9
  37. ^ Amuzegar, Dynamics of the Iranian Revolution (1991), p.10
  38. ^ Schirazi, Constitution of Iran (1997) p.29-32
  39. ^ See: Hokumat-e Islami : Velayat-e faqih (book by Khomeini)#Why Islamic Government has not been established
  40. ^ Khomeini and Algar, Islam and Revolution (1981), p.34
  41. ^ Abbas Djavadi (25 February 2010). "The Difference Between A Marja And A Supreme Leader". RLRFE. Retrieved 5 May 2023.
  42. ^ Kepel, Jihad, 2002, p364
  43. ^ Abrahamian, Khomeinism, 1993: p.51
  44. ^ Abrahamian, Khomeinism, 1993: p.53
  45. ^ Abrahamian, Khomeinism, 1993: p.52
  46. ^ Abrahamian, Khomeinism, 1993: p.25-26
  47. ^ Mavani, Hamid (Spring 2013). "Khomeini's Concept of Governance of the  Jurisconsult ( Wilayat al-Faqih) Revisited: The  Aftermath of Iran's 2009 Presidential Election". Middle East Journal. 67 (2): 209. Retrieved 19 April 2023.
  48. ^ Abrahamian, Khomeinism, 1993: p.56
  49. ^ Abrahamian, Khomeinism, 1994, p.23
  50. ^ Ajayi, Akin (2016-04-05). "'Westoxification' and Worse: Probing Iran's Turbulent History". Haaretz. Retrieved 2020-02-20.
  51. ^ Gershon, Livia (2019-09-05). "Progress Is Not the Same as Westernization". JSTOR Daily. Retrieved 2020-02-20.
  52. ^ a b Abrahamian, Khomeinism, 1993: p.23
  53. ^ "Message to the Pilgrims" (Message sent to Iranian pilgrims on Hajj in Saudi Arabia from Khomeini in exile in Najaf) February 6, 1971, Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini, (1981), p.195
  54. ^ Avideh Mayville, "The Religious Ideology of Reform in Iran" in J. Harold Ellens (ed.), Winning Revolutions: The Psychosocial Dynamics of Revolts for Freedom, Fairness, and Rights [3 volumes], ABC-CLIO (2013), p. 311
  55. ^ Abrahamian, Khomeinism, 1993: p.22, figure 1
  56. ^ a b c d e Kepel, Jihad, 2002, p.107-8
  57. ^ a b Nasr, Vali, The Shia Revival, Norton, (2006), pp. 129
  58. ^ Kepel, Jihad, 2002, p.37
  59. ^ a b Nasr, Vali, The Shia Revival, Norton, (2006), pp. 128
  60. ^ Rahnema 2000, pp. 123–124.
  61. ^ Kepel, Jihad, 2002, p.38
  62. ^ Nasr, Vali, The Shia Revival, Norton, (2006), pp. 129-130
  63. ^ Abrahamian, Khomeinism, 1993, p.29
  64. ^ a b Iran Between Two Revolutions by Ervand Abrahamian, Princeton University Press, 1982, p.534
  65. ^ Bohdan 2020, p. 256.
  66. ^ Rahnema 2000, p. 368.
  67. ^ Rahnema 2000, pp. 274–276.
  68. ^ Nasr, Vali, The Shia Revival, Norton, (2006), pp. 126–7
  69. ^ a b Nasr, Vali, The Shia Revival, Norton, (2006), p. 127
  70. ^ a b c "Milestones, Sep. 24, 1979". 24 September 1979. Archived from the original on 16 October 2007 – via time.com.
  71. ^ "Demise of Ayatollah Taleghani". Islamic Revolution Document Center. Archived from the original on 13 April 2013. Retrieved 21 June 2016.
  72. ^ Mackay, Iranians, (1998), p. 291
  73. ^ Ebadi, Shirin, Iran Awakening by Shirin Ebadi with Azadeh Moaveni, Random House New York, 2006, p. 185, 41

Bibliography

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