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2003 term per curiam opinions of the Supreme Court of the United States

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The Supreme Court of the United States handed down seven per curiam opinions during its 2003 term, which began October 6, 2003 and concluded October 3, 2004.

Because per curiam decisions are issued from the Court as an institution, these opinions all lack the attribution of authorship or joining votes to specific justices. All justices on the Court at the time the decision was handed down are assumed to have participated and concurred unless otherwise noted.

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  • ✪ Supreme Court: The Term in Review (2015–2016) Part 1 of 2
  • ✪ Supreme Court: The Term in Review (2011-2012)
  • ✪ Supreme Court: The Term in Review (2012-2013) Part 1 of 2

Transcription

ANNOUNCER: "SUPREME COURT: THE TERM IN REVIEW," A FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER PROGRAM FOR JUDGES, STAFF ATTORNEYS, AND LAW CLERKS. NOW FROM OUR STUDIO IN WASHINGTON, DC, HERE'S JOHN COOKE. COOKE: HELLO. I'M JOHN COOKE, DEPUTY DIRECTOR AT THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER. WELCOME TO THIS YEAR'S EDITION OF "SUPREME COURT: THE TERM IN REVIEW," OUR ANNUAL LOOK AT THE COURT'S DECISIONS MOST LIKELY TO AFFECT THE DAY-TO-DAY WORK OF FEDERAL JUDGES. SADLY, THE MOST SIGNIFICANT EVENT AT THE COURT THIS TERM WAS NOT AN ARGUMENT OR DECISION, BUT THE DEATH IN FEBRUARY OF ASSOCIATE JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA. JUSTICE SCALIA'S TENURE ON THE COURT SPANNED NEARLY 3 DECADES, DURING WHICH HE LEFT A LASTING MARK ON THE COURT'S JURISPRUDENCE. HIS PASSING WAS AND WILL BE FELT IN MANY WAYS. MOST IMMEDIATELY, IT LEFT THE COURT WITH ONLY 8 JUSTICES FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE TERM. THAT LED TO 4 CASES IN WHICH NO MAJORITY COULD BE FORMED, AND THE LOWER COURT DECISION WAS AFFIRMED BY AN EQUALLY DIVIDED COURT. THIS VACANCY'S EFFECT ON OTHER DECISIONS AND DELIBERATIONS CAN ONLY BE GUESSED AT. IN ANY EVENT, THE COURT DID RESOLVE QUESTIONS INVOLVING EQUAL PROTECTION, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, CRIMINAL LAW, AND ABORTION RIGHTS. WE'LL DISCUSS THESE AND MANY OTHERS WITH OUR FACULTY TODAY. WE'RE FORTUNATE AGAIN TO BE JOINED BY ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, DEAN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT IRVINE SCHOOL OF LAW; EVAN LEE OF THE HASTINGS COLLEGE OF LAW IN SAN FRANCISCO; LAURIE LEVENSON OF LOYOLA LAW SCHOOL IN LOS ANGELES; AND SUZANNA SHERRY OF THE VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL. WE'LL ALSO HEAR FROM MICHELLE HARNER FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND SCHOOL OF LAW ABOUT TWO BANKRUPTCY DECISIONS AND JOHN THOMAS OF THE GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER REGARDING PATENT LAW CASES. BETH WIGGINS OF OUR RESEARCH DIVISION AND JIM CHANCE FROM OUR EDUCATION DIVISION WILL MODERATE THE PROGRAM. IN THE FIRST PART OF THE PROGRAM, WE'LL EXAMINE CASES INVOLVING THE FIRST AND 14th AMENDMENTS, FEDERAL COURTS AND CIVIL PROCEDURE, FEDERALISM, SEPARATION OF POWERS, FEDERAL STATUTES, REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, AND BANKRUPTCY. AFTER A SHORT BREAK, WE'LL LOOK AT PATENT LAW, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE, AND THE SIXTH AMENDMENT. THE WRITTEN MATERIALS THAT ACCOMPANY THIS PROGRAM AT FJC ONLINE INCLUDE AN OUTLINE WITH A SUMMARY OF EACH OF THE DECISIONS WE WILL DISCUSS ALONG WITH AN APPENDIX WITH SUMMARIES OF THE REMAINING CASES DECIDED BY THE COURT THIS TERM. THE ONLINE OUTLINE ALSO CONTAINS LINKS TO THE FULL OPINIONS. WE BEGIN WITH A LOOK AT AN IMPORTANT FIRST AMENDMENT DECISION. WIGGINS: HEFFERNAN VERSUS CITY OF PATTERSON ASKED WHETHER A PERSON CAN SUE TO RECOVER FROM THE VIOLATION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT, EVEN WHEN HE DIDN'T EXERCISE THAT RIGHT. HEFFERNAN WORKED FOR PATTERSON POLICE CHIEF JAMES WITTIG, WHO'D BEEN APPOINTED BY MAYOR JOSE TORRES. TORRES WAS RUNNING FOR RE-ELECTION AGAINST GA--JAMES SPAGNOLA. HEFFERNAN'S MOTHER ASKED HIM TO PICK UP A LAWN SIGN FOR HER AT SPAGNOLA'S HEADQUARTERS. WELL, IT GOT BACK TO POLICE CHIEF WITTIG THAT HEFFERNAN HAD BEEN SEEN HOLDING THE LAWN SIGN AND TALKING TO SPAGNOLA'S CAMPAIGN STAFF, AND THEN HEFFERNAN WAS DEMOTED FOR WHAT HIS SUPERVISORS PERCEIVED AS HIS ACTIVE INVOLVEMENT IN SPAGNOLA'S CAMPAIGN. THAT JUST WASN'T TRUE. HEFFERNAN WAS ONLY THERE TO DO HIS MOTHER A FAVOR. HEFFERNAN SUED, SAYING THE DEMOTION VIOLATED HIS FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS, BUT BOTH THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS REJECTED HIS ARGUMENT BECAUSE HEFFERNAN WAS NOT ACTUALLY ENGAGED IN FIRST AMENDMENT ACTIVITY. THE COURT OF APPEALS SAID THAT A FREE SPEECH RETALIATION CLAIM WAS ONLY ACTIONABLE WHEN THE ADVERSE ACTION WAS IN RESPONSE TO AN EMPLOYEE'S ACTUAL, NOT PERCEIVED, EXERCISE OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, SO, LAURIE, WHAT DID THE SUPREME COURT SAY? LEVENSON: WELL, THE SUPREME COURT RULED 6-2 IN HEFFERNAN'S FAVOR. THE MAJORITY SAID THAT, EVEN THOUGH PRIOR CASE LAW DID NOT RESOLVE THIS ISSUE, THE GOVERNMENT HAD ACTED PURSUANT TO A CONSTITUTIONALLY HARMFUL POLICY WHETHER OR NOT HEFFERNAN WAS INVOLVED IN THE POLITICAL ACTIVITY, AND ALSO HEFFERNAN WAS DIRECTLY HARMED BY THIS POLICY. THE REAL HARM HERE, THE COURT SAID, WAS IN DISCOURAGING PRO-- EMPLOYEES FROM ENGAGING IN PROTECTED ACTIVITY. CHEMERINSKY: I THINK THAT THE CASE IS MOST IMPORTANT HOLDING THAT MOTIVE MATTERS IN FREE SPEECH ANALYSIS. THE SUPREME COURT'S BEEN INCONSISTENT ABOUT THAT IN THE PAST, FIRST MOST FAMOUSLY IN UNITED STATES VERSUS O'BRIEN IN 1969. THE COURT UPHELD A FEDERAL STATUTE THAT MADE IT A FEDERAL CRIME FOR MEN TO BURN OR DESTROY THEIR DRAFT CARDS. THE LAW WAS CLEARLY MOTIVATED BY A DESIRE TO PUNISH THAT FORM OF EXPRESSION, BUT THE SUPREME COURT UPHELD THE STATUTE, SAYING, THE MOTIVE OF THE GOVERNMENT DOESN'T MATTER. HEFFERNAN CLEARLY ESTABLISHES THAT THE GOVERNMENT VIOLATES THE FIRST AMENDMENT IF ITS MOTIVE IS TO PUNISH SPEECH. WIGGINS: THANK YOU. OUR DISCUSSION OF 14th AMENDMENT CASES ARE NEXT. CHANCE: OUR DISCUSSION OF 14th AMENDMENT CASES BEGINS WITH WHAT IS SURELY ONE OF THE MOST WIDELY ANTICIPATED DECISIONS OF THE TERM--FISHER VERSUS UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS. WE MIGHT MORE PROPERLY CALL THIS, UH, DECISION FISHER II BECAUSE THE CASE WAS ALREADY BEFORE THE COURT IN 2013, BUT TO UNDERSTAND THIS DECISION, WE NEED TO GO BACK EVEN FURTHER. IN 2003, THE COURT HELD IN GRUTTER VERSUS BOLLINGER THAT COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES HAVE A COMPELLING INTEREST IN HAVING A D--DIVERSE STUDENT BODY AND MAY USE RACE AS ONE CONSIDERATION AMONG MANY IN ADMISSIONS DECISIONS. TEXAS STATE LAW GRANTED ADMISSION TO THE UNIVERSITY TO EVERY STUDENT WHO GRADUATED IN THE TOP 10% OF THEIR HIGH-SCHOOL CLASS ANYWHERE IN THE STATE. THAT WOULD FILL ABOUT 75% OF THE AVAILABLE FRESHMEN SLOTS, BUT IT STILL WOULDN'T PROVIDE AS DIVERSE A STUDENT BODY AS THE UNIVERSITY FELT IT NEEDED, SO IN 2004, THE REGENTS AT UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS INITIATED A NEW ADMISSIONS POLICY AIMED AT DEVELOPING A MORE DIVERSE AND-- UH, UNDERGRADUATE POPULATION, OR, THAT MEANT, THE REMAINING 25% OF THE CLASS WOULD BE ADMITTED BASED ON AN INDIVIDUALIZED REVIEW OF APPLICATIONS-- ESSAYS, HIGH-SCHOOL GRADES, TEST SCORES. UH, 7 OTHER FACTORS WERE CONSIDERED. ONE OF THESE WAS THAT THE STUDENT'S PRESENCE ON CAMPUS WOULD CON--WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO RACIAL DIVERSITY. NOW, ABIGAIL FISHER, A WHITE WOMAN WHO HAD BEEN DENIED ADMISSION TO THE UNIVERSITY IN 2008, BROUGHT SUIT, CLAIMING THAT THE USE OF RACE IN ADMISSIONS VIOLATED HER FOURTH-- 14th AMENDMENT RIGHTS UNDER THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE. THE DISTRICT COURT RULED IN HER FAV-- RULED--I'M SORRY--RULED IN FAVOR OF THE UNIVERSITY, AND THE FIFTH CIRCUIT AFFIRMED, BUT THE SUPREME COURT REVERSED AND REMANDED. IT HELD THAT A COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY MUST PROVE THAT THERE--THERE IS NO RACE-NEUTRAL WAY TO ACCOMPLISH DIVERSITY BEFORE IT CAN USE RACE AS A FACTOR. THE COURT IMPOSED ITS HIGHEST STANDARD OF REVIEW, STRICT SCRUTINY, AND-- AND REMANDED THE CASE TO THE FIFTH CIRCUIT FOR REHEARING BASED ON THEIR DECISION. THE FIFTH CIRCUIT RULED THAT TEXAS HAD MET THE STRICT SCRUTINY BURDEN AND THAT--AND FISHER APPEALED TO THE, UH, SUPREME COURT, SO AT THAT TIME, HOW DID THE JUSTICES HANDLE THIS, SUZANNA? SHERRY: WELL, SURPRISING MOST PEOPLE THEY RULED 5-- 4-3 THAT THE UNIVERSITY HAD MET ITS BURDEN OF SHOWING THAT THEY HAD A COMPELLING INTEREST IN MORE DIVERSITY AND THAT THERE WAS NO RACE-NEUTRAL WAY TO ACCOMPLISH THAT GOAL, AND, THEREFORE, THAT, UH, ABIGAIL FISHER'S EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHTS WEREN'T VIOLATED. NOW, IT WAS 4-3 BECAUSE JUSTICE KAGAN HAD RECUSED HERSELF BECAUSE SHE'D DEALT WITH THE CASE EARLIER WHEN SHE WAS SOLICITOR GENERAL. WHAT MADE IT SURPRISING WAS THAT THE DECISION WAS WRITTEN BY JUSTICE KENNEDY, WHO HAD NEVER BEFORE VOTED TO UPHOLD AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PROGRAM, SO HE RELIED ON SEVERAL THINGS TO CONCLUDE THAT THIS AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PROGRAM WAS CONSTITUTIONAL. UH, FIRST, THE UNIVERSITY HAD STUDIED THE PROBLEM FOR MONTHS AND THEN HAD ADOPTED THE PROGRAM IN GOOD FAITH, AND THAT'S SOMETHING WE'LL RETURN TO IN A MINUTE. UH, THE COURT ALSO SAID THAT THERE WAS EVIDENCE THAT MINORITY STUDENTS ON CAMPUS EXPERIENCED FEELINGS OF ISOLATION AND LONE-- LONELINESS BECAUSE OF THE LOW NUMBERS, UH, AND THAT THE PERCENTAGE OF MINORITY STUDENTS HAD STAGNATED UNDER THE TOP 10% PLAN ALONE, AND THEN, FINALLY, THE COURT POINTED OUT THAT THERE WERE MANY UNDERGRADUATE CLASSES THAT HAD FEW OR NO MINORITIES IN THE CLASS. CHEMERINSKY: JUSTICE KENNEDY'S MAJORITY OPINION STRESSED THAT COLLEGE UNIVERSITIES HAD A COMPELLING INTEREST IN HAVING A CRITICAL MASS OF DIVERSE STUDENTS, BUT, HE SAID, COLLEGE UNIVERSITIES DON'T NEED TO QUANTIFY WHAT'S NECESSARY FOR A CRITICAL MASS. HE ALSO SAID THE FACT THAT A COLLEGE UNIVERSITY HAS ONE MECHANISM TO ACHIEVE DIVERSITY, LIKE A TOP 10% PLAN, DOESN'T KEEP THEM FROM HAVING OTHER MECHANISMS TO OBTAIN DIVERSITY. I THINK THE MOST IMPORTANT PART OF JUSTICE KENNEDY'S OPINION IS AT THE END WHERE HE TALKED ABOUT THE NEED FOR DEFERENCE TO COLLEGE UNIVERSITIES IN MAKING ACADEMIC JUDGMENTS WITH REGARD TO DIVERSITY. HE TALKED ABOUT STATES CAN BE LABORATORIES FOR EXPERIMENTATION. THIS WAS SO DIFFERENT IN TONE FROM HIS OPINION 3 YEARS AGO WHERE HE SAID, THERE IS TO BE NO DEFERENCE TO COLLEGE UNIVERSITIES IN DECIDING WHETHER OR NOT AFFIRMATIVE ACTION WAS NECESSARY TO YOUR DIVERSITY, BUT I DO THINK IT'S IMPORTANT TO EMPHASIZE THAT HE SAID THAT A COLLEGE UNIVERSITY HAS TO PROVE A COMPELLING NEED FOR IT TO HAVE DIVERSITY. IT HAS TO PROVE THAT THERE'S NO OTHER WAY TO ACHIEVE DIVERSITY, AND IT HAS TO GO THROUGH PERIODIC EXAMINATION TO SHOW THAT THE PROGRAM CONTINUES TO BE NECESSARY AND IS NEWLY TAILORED. CHANCE: NOW, THERE WAS SOME PRETTY VIGOROUS DESCENTS IN THIS CASE, WEREN'T THERE? SHERRY: YES. THERE WERE TWO. JUSTICE THOMAS, UH, AGAIN DECLARED HIS VIEW THAT ANY USE OF RACE IN COLLEGE ADMISSIONS VIOLATES THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE, UH, BUT HE ALSO JOINED THE CHIEF JUSTICE IN A DESCENT WRITTEN BY JUSTICE ALITO, THAT, BY THE WAY, RAN 50 PAGES, MORE THAN TWICE WHAT THE MAJORITY OPINION WAS, UH, AND JUSTICE ALITO'S OPINION, UH, QUESTIONED QUITE A FEW OF THE MAJORITY'S, UH, ARGUMENTS AND ASSERTIONS, FOR EXAMPLE, ABOUT HOW IT WAS THAT THE UNIVERSITY CAME TO USE RACE IN ITS ADMISSIONS PRO--UH, PROCESS, ABOUT THE ROLE THAT RACE DID PLAY IN THE ADMISSIONS PROCESS, UH, AND ABOUT THE RELATIVE BALANCE OF--OF VARIOUS MINORITY GROUPS THAT WERE REPRESENTED, UH, IN THE UNDERGRADUATE CLASSES. CHEMERINSKY: BUT THE BOTTOM LINE IS THAT THIS DECISION IS A HUGE VICTORY FOR COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITIES THAT WANT TO ENGAGE IN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION. SHERRY: I AGREE. IT IS A VERY BIG VICTORY FOR THOSE SCHOOLS. I THINK THE BOTTOM LINE IS THAT THERE'S ESSENTIALLY NO AFFIRMATIVE ACTION POLICY SHORT OF RACIAL QUOTAS THAT WILL BE HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL, AND I THINK THIS DECISION TELL SCHOOLS THAT THE MORE OPAQUE THEY MAKE THEIR ADMISSIONS PROGRAM, UH, THE--THE, UH, MORE LIKELY THEY ARE TO WITHSTAND CONSTITUTIONAL SCRUTINY. CHEMERINSKY: I DISAGREE WITH YOU HERE. I DON'T THINK THE MESSAGE IS THAT AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PROGRAMS HAVE HELD, SO LONG AS THEY'RE NOT RACIAL QUOTAS. JUSTICE KENNEDY'S VERY CAREFUL TO SAY THAT A COLLEGE UNIVERSITY MUST PROVE ITS NEED FOR A DIVERSE STUDENT BODY, AND IT WAS PROVED THERE'S NO OTHER WAY TO ACHIEVE DIVERSITY EXCEPT AFFIRMATIVE ACTION. HE POINTED OUT TEXAS HAD GONE THROUGH A YEARLONG STUDY AND PUBLISHED A REPORT DOCUMENTING THIS. HE ALSO EMPHASIZES THAT THE NEED FOR COLLEGE UNIVERSITIES TO GO THROUGH PERIODIC RE-EXAMINATION TO CONTINUALLY RE-ESTABLISH THE NEED FOR THEIR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PROGRAMS. SHERRY: THAT IS INDEED WHAT THE MAJORITY SAYS, BUT, AS THE DISSENTS POINT OUT, THE COURT DOESN'T EXAMINE THE UNIVERSITY'S CLAIMS VERY CLOSELY. IT'S A MORE DEFERENTIAL REVIEW THAN HE SAYS IT IS, AND SO I THINK ULTIMATELY, THE LOWER COURTS ARE GONNA BE FACED WITH A CHOICE BETWEEN FOLLOWING WHAT THE SUPREME COURT SAYS AND FOLLOWING WHAT THE SUPREME COURT HAS DONE. CHANCE: THANKS. OUR NEXT TWO DECISIONS ARE ALSO ABOUT THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE, BUT THIS TIME AS IT APPLIES TO REDISTRICTING PLANS. IN THE EARLY 1960s, THE COURT ANNOUNCED THE PRINCIPLE OF ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE, MEANING THAT ALL LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS, BOTH STATE AND FEDERAL, HAD TO BE ABOUT THE SAME SIZE AND POPU--UH, POPULATION, BUT WHAT THE COURT HAS BEEN LESS CLEAR ABOUT OVER THE YEARS IS WHETHER THAT CALCULATION SHOULD MEASURE TOTAL NUMBERS OF PERSONS OR TOTAL NUMBERS OF VOTERS IN THE PERSPECTIVE DISTRICT. THE CHALLENGERS IN OUR NEXT DECISION, EVENWEL VERSUS ABBOTT, ARGUED THAT TEXAS STATE LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS SHOULD BE BASED ON THE NUMBER OF ELIGIBLE VOTERS, NOT TOTAL POPULATION. THEY CONTEND THAT EVERY VOTER SHOULD HAVE EQUAL REPRESENTATION IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS. RIGHT NOW, TEXAS USES-- ER, THE TEXAS USES THE TOTAL POPULATION IN ITS CALCULATION. NOW, THIS WAS AN 8-0 DECISION. ERWIN, WILL YOU TELL US ABOUT IT? CHEMERINSKY: JUSTICE GINSBURG WROTE THE OPINION FOR THE COURT. THE COURT HELD THAT IT IS CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE TO DISTRICT ON THE BASIS OF TOTAL POPULATION. SHE LOOKED AT CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY. SHE FOCUSED ON OUR ARTICLE I OF THE CONSTITUTION AND SECTION TWO OF THE 14th AMENDMENT. BOTH SAY THAT THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES WILL REDISTRICT BASED ON POPULATION. SHE FOCUSED ON PRECEDENT, HOW PRIOR SUPREME COURT DECISIONS HAD ALWAYS ASSUMED THAT DISTRICTING WOULD BE BASED ON TOTAL POPULATION. SHE FOCUSED ON PRACTICE, HOW IN ALL 50 STATES, DISTRICTING'S DONE BASED ON TOTAL POPULATION. SHERRY: UH, SO, AS ERWIN SAID, THE COURT REJECTED THE CHALLENGER'S ASSERTION THAT IT HAD TO BE BASED ON VOTER POPULATION, UM, BUT THE SOLICITOR GENERAL HAD ARGUED, UH, THAT IT SHOULD-- THAT THE COURT SHOULD HOLD THAT STATES WERE REQUIRED TO USE TOTAL POPULATION RATHER THAN V--VOTER POPULATION, AND ON THAT QUESTION, THE COURT SPLIT. THE MAJORITY RULED THAT TOTAL POPULATION WAS A PROPER METHOD BUT THEN SAID IT WAS, UH, NOT GOING TO DECIDE WHETHER IT WAS THE ONLY PROPER METHOD, ALTHOUGH SOME OF THE REASONING IN THE CASE SUGGESTS THAT MAYBE IT IS THE ONLY PROPER METHOD. JUSTICE THOMAS CONCURRED IN THE JUDGMENT ONLY BECAUSE HE WANTED TO MAKE THE CHOICE TOTALLY UP TO THE STATES AS BETWEEN VOTER POPULATION AND TOTAL POPULATION, AND JUSTICE ALITO CONCURRED IN THE JUDGMENT ONLY I--IN ORDER TO CRITICIZE THE MAJORITY'S RELIANCE ON ALLOCATION OF CONGRESSIONAL SEATS, WHICH HE DID NOT THINK WAS APPROPRIATE, AND ALSO TO-- TO STRESS THAT THE COURT HAD NOT AND SHOULD NOT DECIDE QUESTION-- THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE STATES COULD USE DIFFERENT POPULATIONS IN THEIR CALCULATIONS, SO I THINK THAT QUESTION IS GOING TO COME BACK TO THE COURT, UH, AS SOON AS SOME STATE DECIDES TO USE VOTER POPULATION INSTEAD OF TOTAL POPULATION. CHEMERINSKY: I AGREE WITH YOU ON THAT. I THINK IT'S INTERESTING THE COURT DID NOT ADDRESS WHETHER IT'D BE CONSTITUTIONAL TO DISTRICT ON THE BASIS OF NUMBER OF ELIGIBLE VOTERS. THERE'S A PRIOR SUPREME COURT CASE, BURNS VERSUS RICHARDSON IN 1966, THAT APPROVED DISTRICTING ON THE BASIS OF ELIGIBLE VOTERS. EVEN THOUGH THIS CASE DID NOT CHANGE THE LAW, I THINK IT'S ENORMOUSLY IMPORTANT FOR PRACTICAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE. IT'S PARTICULARLY SIGNIFICANT REGARDING THE VOTING STRENGTH OF MINORITY COMMUNITIES WHERE THERE'D BE A NUMBER OF NONCITIZENS, BOTH DOCUMENTED AND UNDOCUMENTED. HAD THE COURT HELD OTHERWISE, THERE'D BE REDISTRICTING IN CITIES AND STATES ACROSS THE COUNTRY. MAYBE WHAT'S MOST IMPORTANT IS AT THE END OF JUSTICE GINSBURG'S OPINION WHERE SHE STRESSES THAT ELECTED OFFICIALS REPRESENT ALL CONSTITUENTS-- CITIZEN AND NONCITIZEN, ADULT AND CHILDREN. CHANCE: OUR SECOND "ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE," EQUAL-PROTECTION DECISION IS HARRIS VERSUS ARIZONA INDEPENDENT REDISTRICTING COMMISSION. THIS ONE IS MORE STRAIGHTFORWARD. LAST TERM, THE SUPREME COURT UPHELD AN ARIZONA CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION GIVING REDISTRICTING DECISIONS TO AN INDEPENDENT COMMISSION MADE UP OF TWO DEMOCRATS, TWO REPUBLICANS, AND AN INDEPENDENT. THAT COMMISSION ADOPTED A REDISTRICTING PLAN BY A VOTE OF 3-2 WITH THE TWO REPUBLICANS DISSENTING. A GROUP OF VOTERS SUED, CHALLENGING THE PLAN, AND A 3-JUDGE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT UPHELD IT. THE CHALLENGERS' ARGUMENT WAS THAT, BECAUSE THERE WAS A 4.07 DEVIATION BETWEEN THE POPULATIONS OF THE LARGEST AND SMALLEST DISTRICTS, UH, THAT THE PLAN VIOLATED THE "ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE" PRINCIPLE AND THEIR EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHTS UNDER THE 14th AMENDMENT. JUSTICE BREYER WROTE FOR A UNANIMOUS COURT THAT THE REDISTRICTING PLAN WAS CONSTITUTIONAL. HE WROTE THAT THE CONSTITUTION DOES NOT DEMAND MATHEMATICAL PERFECTION AND THAT, GENERALLY, DE--DEVIATIONS OF LESS THAN 10% ARE UPHELD. THE COURT REJECTED THE ARGUMENT THAT THE REDISTRICTING WAS DONE TO HELP DEMOCRATIC CANDIDATES AND SAID THAT THE DEVIATIONS PREDOMINANTLY REFLECTED THAT THE COMMISSION ATTEMPTED TO COMPLY WITH THE FEDERAL VOTING RIGHTS ACT. JUSTICE BREYER ALSO WROTE THAT, EVEN THOUGH THE SUPREME COURT HAD EFFECTIVE INVALIDATED THE PRECOMPLIANCE REQUIREMENT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN SHELBY COUNTY VERSUS HOLDER IN 2013, THAT IS WAS STILL IN EFFECT IN 20-- UH, 2010, UH, WHEN THE COMMISSION TOOK ITS ACTIONS. SUZANNA, ANY THOUGHTS ON THIS DECISION? SHERRY: I'D ONLY POINT OUT THAT THE COURT DIDN'T DECIDE WHETHER PARTISANSHIP WAS AN ILLEGITIMATE FACTOR IN REDISTRICTING DECISIONS. IT JUST HELD THAT PARTISANSHIP DIDN'T PLAY A SUBSTANTIAL ROLE IN THIS REDISTRICTING DECISION. CHEMERINSKY: IT'S A REALLY GOOD POINT. I ALSO THINK IT'S IMPORTANT TO EMPHASIZE THAT JUSTICE BREYER SAID, FOR DEVIATIONS THAT ARE LESS THAN 10%, THE BURDEN IS ON THE CHALLENGER TO PROVE AN IMPERMISSIBLE MOTIVE. CHANCE: IN OUR FINAL 14th AMENDMENT DECISION, WE SHIFT OUR FOCUS FROM THE EQUAL PROTECTION TO THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE. THIS IS WILLIAMS VERSUS PENNSYLVANIA. TERRANCE WILLIAMS WAS CONVICTED OF MURDER IN 1984 AND SENTENCED TO DEATH. FOR THE PROSECUTOR IN THAT CASE TO SEEK THE DEATH PENALTY, SHE NEEDED TO GET PERMISSION FROM THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY, WHO WAS THEN RONALD CASTILLE. 30 YEARS LATER, WITH WILLIAMS STILL ON DEATH ROW, IT CAME TO LIGHT THAT THE PROSECUTION HAD WITHHELD POSSIBLE EXCULPATORY INFORMATION IN VIOLATION OF BRADY VERSUS MARYLAND DURING WILLIAMS' FIRST TRIAL. WILLIAMS FILED A STATE HABEAS PETITION, AND HIS EXECUTION WAS DELAYED-- WAS STAYED, AND A SENTENCING HEARING, NEW ONE, WAS SCHEDULED. UH, THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA ASKED IT'S OWN SUPREME COURT TO VACATE THE STAY, WHICH IT DID, AND THAT'S HOW THIS CASE GOT TO THE SUPREME COURT. CAN YOU TELL US WHY, SUZANNA? SHERRY: BECAUSE BY THEN, RONALD CASTILLE, WHO HAD BEEN THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY WHEN THE STATE HAD DECIDED TO SEEK THE DEATH PENAL--DEATH PENALTY, WAS THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT. WILLIAMS ASKED CASTILLE TO RECUSE HIMSELF FROM THE DECISION OR, AT THE VERY LEAST, TO REFER THE RECUSAL MOTION TO THE FULL COURT. CASTILLE DID NEITHER. HE PARTICIPATED IN THE DECISION IN WHICH THE STATE SUPREME COURT UNANIMOUSLY REVERSED THE TRIAL COURT'S GRANT OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, AND SO THE QUESTION BEFORE THE U.S. SUPREME-- U.S. SUPREME COURT WAS WHETHER CHIEF JUSTICE CASTILLE'S PARTICIPATION IN THE DECISION VIOLATED WILLIAMS' DUE PROCESS RIGHTS. CHEMERINSKY: AND THE SUPREME COURT RULED 5-3 THAT IT DID VIOLATE DUE PROCESS FOR CASTILLE TO PARTICIPATE. JUSTICE KENNEDY WROTE THE OPINION FOR THE COURT. JUSTICE KENNEDY STRESSED THAT THE CORE OF DUE PROCESS IS A REQUIREMENT FOR AN IMPARTIAL DECISION MAKER. THE COURT SAID, FOR CASTILLE TO PARTICIPATE AND BE INVOLVED IN THE CASE AS DISTRICT ATTORNEY HAD TOO GREAT A RISK OF ACTUAL BIAS. SHERRY: AND THE QUESTION OF INVOLVEMENT, THE-- THE MAJORITY SAID, WAS-- WAS WHETHER, UH, HE PLAYED A DIRECT ROLE OR, UH, MADE A CRITICAL DECISION, AND WHAT COUNTS AS PLAYING A DIRECT ROLE OR MAKING A CRITICAL DECISION, THE COURT SAID, IS A VERY FACTBOUND DETERMINATION, BUT THE DECISION TO SEEK THE DEATH PENALTY IS THAT KIND OF A DECISION FOR EVERY RESPONSIBLE PROSECUTOR, AND, IN ADDITION, AS THE COURT POINTED OUT, CASTILLE, WHEN HE RAN FOR JUDICIAL OFFICE, HAD RUN A CAMPAIGN BASED IN PART ON HOW MANY PEOPLE HE HAD SENTENCED-- HE'D SENT TO DEATH ROW, SO CLEARLY, FOR HIM, IT WAS A SIGNIFICANT, NOT CASUAL DECISION. CHEMERINSKY: JUSTICE KENNEDY'S OPINION STRESSES THAT IT'S AN OBJECTIVE TEST AS WHETHER DUE PROCESS IS VIOLATED BY LETTING SOMEBODY PARTICIPATE IN THE DECISION WHO WAS INVOLVED IN THE CASE IN ANOTHER WAY, AND HERE, YOU FOCUS ON THERE WAS JUST TOO GREAT A RISK OF ACTUAL BIAS TO COMPLY WITH DUE PROCESS. SHERRY: WE SHOULD ALSO POINT OUT THAT THE MAJORITY SAID THAT AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL FAILURE TO RECUSE IS A STRUCTURAL ERROR THAT IS NOT AMENABLE TO HARMLESS ERROR ANALYSIS, SO, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THE PARTICULAR JUDGE'S DECISION WAS DISPOSITIVE, IT IS STILL ERROR, SO THE COURT REMANDED TO THE STATE COURT FOR A NEW REVIEW, UH, OF THE STATE'S APPEAL, AND WE SHOULD ALSO NOTE THAT CHIEF JUSTICE CASTILLE ACTUALLY RESIGNED FROM THE COURT TWO WEEKS AFTER THE DECISION. CHANCE: HMM. ERWIN, UH, SUZANNA, THANK YOU. I UNDERSTAND WE HAVE A QUESTION. WIGGINS: WE DO, UM, AND THE QUESTION IS--IS, "HOW DOES WILLIAMS RELATE TO THE COURT'S EARLIER DECISION "IN CAPERTON VERSUS MASSEY COAL ABOUT DUE PROCESS AND THE DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES?" CHEMERINSKY: IN BOTH CASES, THE SUPREME COURT FOUND A VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS. BOTH OPINIONS WERE WRITTEN BY JUSTICE KENNEDY. BOTH STRESSED THERE'S AN OBJECTIVE TEST IN DUE PROCESS, AND BOTH FOCUSED WHETHER THERE'S TOO GREAT A RISK OF ACTUAL BIAS. CHANCE: ALL RIGHT. NEXT, SOME FEDERAL COURT AND CIVIL PROCEDURE DECISIONS. THE COURT ISSUED A NUMBER OF DECISIONS THIS TERM THAT SPOKE TO THE POWERS OF THE LOWER FEDERAL COURTS IN TRYING CASES AND HEARING APPEALS. THE FIRST TWO WE'RE GONNA LOOK AT INVOLVED CLASS ACTIONS. FIRST, IN CAMPBELL VERSUS E-- UM, CAMPBELL-EWALD VERSUS GOMEZ, THE ORIGINAL PLAINTIFF JOSE GOMEZ SUED THE CAMPBELL-EWALD COMPANY FOR VIOLATING THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT BY SENDING HIM A TEXT MESSAGE THAT HE HAD NEVER CONSENTED TO RECEIVE. GOMEZ FILED A CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT ON BEHALF OF A NATIONWIDE CLASS OF PEOPLE WHO HAD ALSO NOT CONSENTED TO RECEIVE THE TEXT. GOMEZ SOUGHT TREBLE STATUTORY DAMAGES AS WELL AS AN INJUNCTION AGAINST CAMPBELL'S SENDING UNSOLICITED MESSAGES. NOW, WHAT DID CAMPBELL-EWALD DO, EVAN? LEE: WELL, BEFORE, UH, THE DEADLINE FOR GOMEZ TO FILE A MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION HAD PASSED, UH, CAMPBELL-EWALD OFFERED TO SATISFY HIS, UH, PERSONAL TREBLE DAMAGES CLAIM. IT ALSO PROPOSED, UH, AN INJUNCTION THAT WOULD'VE BARRED IT FROM, UH, SENDING TEXT MESSAGES IN VIOLATION OF THE TPCA, UH, BUT CAMPBELL-EWALD DENIED LIABILITY AND DENIED THE ALLEGATIONS, UH, THAT WERE MADE IN THE COMPLAINT. GOMEZ TURNED DOWN THE OFFER. CHANCE: SO WHAT WAS THE ISSUE BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT? LEE: UH, THERE WERE TWO ISSUES BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, AND WE'LL GET TO THE SECOND ONE, UH, IN A MINUTE. IN TERMS OF THE CLASS ACTION QUESTION, CAMPBELL-EWALD ARGUED THAT THERE WAS NOT FEDERAL JURISDICTION TO, UH, CERTIFY THE CLASS BECAUSE IT HAD OFFERED TO SATISFY ALL OF GOMEZ'S, UH, DEMANDS FOR RELIEF, THUS MOOTING THE CASE, UM, THE NAMED PLAINTIFF'S CASE. CHANCE: SO WHAT DID THE COURT DO, SUZANNA? SHERRY: WELL, JUSTICE GINSBURG WROTE FOR THE COURT, AND IT HELD THAT UNDER RULE 68 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, AND UNACCEPTED SETTLEMENT OFFER HAS NO FORCE-- IN OTHER WORDS, IT CANNOT MOOT THE CASE-- AND SHE LIKENED IT TO AN UNACCEPTED CONTRACT OFFER IN THAT IT CREATES NO LASTING RIGHTS OR OBLIGATIONS OF ANY KIND. CHEMERINSKY: WAS THIS AN ISSUE THAT WAS BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT JUST A FEW YEARS AGO? SHERRY: IT WAS, IN A CASE CALLED GENESIS HEALTHCARE VERSUS SYMCZYK, BUT IN THAT CASE, UNLIKE THIS ONE--THIS ONE-- SYMCZYK HAD AGREED THAT HER CASE WAS MOOT, AND THE ONLY QUESTION WAS WHAT THAT DID TO THE CLASS ACTION. IN THIS CASE, OF COURSE, GOMEZ DID NOT AGREE THAT HIS WAS MOOT. UM, IN SYMCZYK, THOUGH, JUSTICE KAGAN WROTE A DISSENT THAT THE COURT ESSENTIALLY ADOPTED IN THIS CASE. UH, KAGAN WROTE THAT-- JUSTICE KAGAN WROTE THAT AN UNACCEPTED SETTLEMENT OFFER WAS A LEGAL NULLITY WITH NO OPERATIVE EFFECT, AND IN CAMPBELL-EWALD, THAT'S WHAT JUSTICE GINSBURG ADOPTED. CHANCE: OK, BUT THERE WERE A COUPLE OF DISSENTS IN THIS CASE AND ANOTHER ISSUE THAT YOU MENTIONED, EVAN. LEE: RIGHT. FIRST, THE COURT RESERVED THE QUESTION OF WHETHER, UH, THE CASE, WOULD BE MOOT IF THE DEFENDANT HAD NOT ONLY MADE THE OFFER, BUT HAD ACTUALLY DEPOSITED THE FULL AMOUNT OF, UH, THE PLAINTIFF'S INDIVIDUAL CLAIM IN AN ACCOUNT PAYABLE TO THE PLAINTIFF, UH, AND IF THE COURT HAD ENTERED JUDGMENT FOR THE PLAINTIFF IN THAT AMOUNT. THE DISSENTS MADE A LOT OUT OF THAT RESERVATION IN THE MAJORITY OPINION. UH, THE CHIEF JUSTICE ALONG WITH JUSTICES SCALIA AND ALITO, UH, OPINED THAT THE QUESTION ISN'T WHETHER AN UNACCEPTED OFFER CREATES A CONTRACT, BUT INSTEAD WHETHER THERE REMAINS A CASE OR CONTROVERSY, UH, BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES WHEN ONE PARTY OFFERS TO FULLY MEET THE OTHER PARTY'S DEMANDS. SHERRY: I DON'T THINK WE'VE SEEN THE LAST OF THESE QUESTIONS. FOR EXAMPLE, THE NINTH CIRCUIT HAS ALREADY HELD THAT DEPOSITING THE FULL AMOUNT INTO AN ESCROW ACCOUNT FOR THE PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENOUGH TO MOOT, AT LEAST NOT BEFORE THE PLAINTIFF HAS A-- AN OPPORTUNITY FOR A FULL HEARING ON THE CLASS CERTIFICATION MOTION. CHANCE: HMM, AND WHAT ABOUT THE SECOND ISSUE THAT YOU MENTIONED, EVAN? LEE: UM, CAMPBELL-EWALD HAD ALSO ARGUED THAT, BECAUSE ITS CLIENT AT THE TIME WAS THE UNITED STATES-- AT THE TIME THAT IT HAS SENT OUT THOSE ORIGINAL TEXTS WAS THE UNITED STATES NAVY, UH, THAT CAMPBELL-EWALD COULDN'T BE SUED BECAUSE IT SHARED IN THE GOVERNMENT'S, UH, SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY. THE MAJORITY REJECTED THAT ARGUMENT, UH, HOLDING THAT THE COMPANY'S STATUS AS A GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR DID NOT ENTITLE IT TO DERIVATIVE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY. FEDERAL CONTRACTORS CAN INVOKE, UH, IMMUNITY FROM SUITS FOR THEIR FEDERAL WORK, BUT NOT WHEN THEY VIOLATE FEDERAL LAW OR VIOLATE THE GOVERNMENT'S EXPLICIT INSTRUCTIONS. CHANCE: THANKS. OUR SECOND CLASS ACTION DECISION IS TYSON'S FOOD VERSUS BOUAPHAKEO. THE CLASS IN THIS CASE WAS MADE UP OF WORKERS AT A TYSON'S PORK PROCESSING PLANT WHO HAD-- UH, THEY HAD TO SPEND TIME BEFORE AND AFTER WORK DONNING AND DOFFING PROTECTIVE CLOTHING. THE WORKERS FILED A COMPLAINT UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT, OR FLSA, THAT THEY WERE NOT RECEIVING STATUTORILY MANDATED OVERTIME PAY FOR TIME SPENT DOING THESE ACTIVITIES. TYSON CALLED THE DONNING AND DOFFING TIME K-CODE TIME, AND IN 1998, IT STARTED PAYING WORKERS FOR 4 MINUTES OF K-CODE TIME, THE ESTIMATED TIME THAT IT TOOK WORKERS TO PUT ON AND TAKE OFF THE PROTECTIVE CLOTHING. IN 2007, IT STOPPED PAYING ALL WORKERS THE UNIFORM K-CODE TIME AND INSTEAD PAID SOME WORKERS BETWEEN 4 AND 8 MINUTES AND OTHER WORKERS NOTHING. WELL, TYSON'S KEPT NO RECORDS OF THE TIME THAT EACH EMPLOYEE ACTUALLY SPENT DONNING AND DOFFING, AND THE WORKERS FILED SUIT UNDER THE FLSA AND A SIMILAR IOWA STATE LAW. THE SUIT ASKED THAT THE IOWA STATE CLAIMS BE CERTIFIED AS A CLASS UNDER RULE 23 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, AND, BECAUSE TYSON KEPT NO RECORDS OF ACTUAL TIME SPENT DONNING AND DOFFING, THE WORKERS HAD TO RELY ON AN EXPERT STUDY USING REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLES OF THIS DONNING AND DOFFING TIME, AND THAT WAS THE SOURCE OF THE MAJOR ISSUE BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, WASN'T IT, SUZANNA? SHERRY: THAT'S EXACTLY RIGHT. ONE OF THE EXPERTS HAD VIDEOTAPED OVER 700 EMPLOYEES IN DIFFERENT DEPARTMENTS DONNING AND DOFFING THE PROTECTIVE GEAR AND CAME UP WITH AN AVERAGE AMOUNT OF TIME FOR EACH OF THE DEPARTMENTS. THEN A SECOND EXPERT USED THAT-- THOSE AVERAGES PLUS THE WORKERS' ACTUAL TIME RECORDS OF-- OF THEIR NON-K-TIME WORK, UH, AND FIGURED OUT, UH, HW MUCH TIME EACH EMPLOYEE HAD WORKED, INCLUDING THE DONNING AND DOFFING, TO DETERMINED WHETHER THEY'D WORKED OVERTIME, UH, BUT TYSON ARGUED THAT NO CLASS SHOULD BE CERTIFIED BECAUSE THE DIFFERENT WORKERS IN DIFFERENT DEPARTMENTS TOOK DIFFERENT TIMES TO DON AND DOFF AND THAT THE EXPERTS' STATISTICAL EVIDENCE COULD NOT MAKE UP FOR THOSE DIFFERENCES AND, THEREFORE, TYSON SAID, INDIVIDUAL ISSUES WOULD PREDOMINATE OVER THE COMMON ISSUES THAT WERE NEEDED FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION. CHANCE: AND WHAT DID THE COURT DECIDE? LEE: THE MAJORITY REJECTED TYSON'S ARGUMENT. IT, UH, REJECTED A CATEGORICAL PROHIBITION ON REPRESENTATIVE EVIDENCE IN CLASS ACTIONS AND HELD THAT THE PROPRIETY OF, UH, SUCH EVIDENCE DEPENDED ON THE, UH--I'M QUOTING HERE-- "THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE EVIDENCE IS RELIABLE "IN PROVING OR DISPROVING THE ELEMENTS OF THE CAUSE OF ACTION." THE COURT, UM, SAID THAT REPRESENTATIVE EVIDENCE WAS PARTICULARLY APPROPRIATE IN THIS CASE, UH, BECAUSE TYSON HAD FAILED TO KEEP, UH, ANY RECORDS OF THE TIME THAT EMPLOYEES SPENT DONNING AND DOFFING THE PROTECTIVE GEAR, UH, AND THE MAJORITY DISTINGUISHED, UH, BETWEEN THIS CASE AND ITS EARLIER DECISION IN, UH, WAL-MART VERSUS DUKES, WHERE IT HAD RULED THAT, UH, WORKERS COULDN'T USE REPRESENTATIVE EVIDENCE, UH, TO CERTIFY CLASS. IN THIS CASE, UNLIKE IN WAL-MART, UM, THE REPRESENTATIVE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENTLY PROBATIVE FOR, UM, INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYEES TO USE THAT REPRESENTATIVE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THEIR INDIVIDUAL CLAIMS. SHERRY: I THINK THAT CLASS ACTION PLAINTIFFS ARE GOING TO RELY ON THIS DECISION IN THE FUTURE TO TRY AND INTRODUCE STATISTICAL OR REPRESENTATIVE EVIDENCE, BUT I THINK WE SHOULD KEEP IN MIND TWO CAVEATS. UM, FIRST, JUSTICE KENNEDY WROTE THAT THE USE OF REPRESENTATIVE EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH CLASSWIDE LIABILITY IS NEITHER ALWAYS BANNED NOR ALWAYS PERMITTED. IT DEPENDS ON-- AND HERE, I'M QUOTING-- "THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH THE SAMPLE IS BEING INTRODUCED AND ON THE UNDERLYING CAUSE OF ACTION." THE KEY, I THINK, WILL BE TO ESTABLISH WHETHER THE PARTICULAR REPRESENTATIVE OR SAMPLE EVIDENCE COULD BE USED TO ESTABLISH LIABILITY IN INDIVIDUAL CASES, IN WHICH CASE, IT CAN BE USED IN THE CLASS ACTION, UM, AND THE OTHER CAVEAT IS THAT THE COURT DIDN'T DECIDE WHETHER A CLASS CAN BE CERTIFIED IF IT CONTAINS MEMBERS WHO ARE UNINJURED AND, THEREFORE, HAVE NO RIGHT TO RELIEF. LEE: YEAH. THE MAJORITY REFUSED TO REACH THAT QUESTION BECAUSE THE DISTRICT JUDGE HADN'T YET APPORTIONED, UH, THE DAMAGES FOR PURPOSES OF DISTRIBUTION. UH, IN THEIR DISSENT, UH, JUSTICES THOMAS AND ALITO WROTE THAT THEY WOULD HAVE HELD THAT UNINJURED CLASS MEMBERS MAY NEVER, UH, RECOVER. CHEMERINSKY: CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS WROTE A CONCURRING OPINION THAT COULD BE IMPORTANT ON THAT. HE SAID, IT'S AN UNRESOLVED QUESTION WHETHER A CLASS CAN BE CERTIFIED IF THERE'S MEMBERS WHO DIDN'T SUFFER THE INJURY AND DON'T HAVE MONEY DAMAGES. THAT'S AN ISSUE THAT'S NOW SPLITTING THE LOWER COURTS. CHANCE: THANK YOU. OUR THIRD DECISION, AMERICOLD REALTY TRUST VERSUS CONAGRA FOODS, ASKED HOW TO DETERMINE THE CITIZENSHIP OF A TRUST FOR PURPOSES OF DIVERSITY JURISDICTION. AMERICOLD WAS A REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUST, OR REIT, THAT OWNED A WAREHOUSE THAT BURNED DOWN. CONAGRA LOST FOOD IN THE FIRE AND SUED AMERICOLD IN FEDERAL COURT UNDER DIVERSITY JURISDICTION. AMERICOLD ARGUED THAT DIVERSITY WAS INCOMPLETE BECAUSE THE CITIZENSHIP OF A REIT WAS BASED ON THE RESIDENCES OF ALL ITS SHAREHOLDERS. CONAGRA ARGUED THAT AMERICOLD'S CITIZENSHIP SHOULD BE BASED ON THE RESIDENCES OF ITS TRUSTEES ONLY. THE COURT AGREED WITH AMERICOLD. THE CONTROLLING PRINCIPLE IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CORPORATIONS AND UNINCORPORATED ENTITIES. A CORPORATION IS CONSIDERED A CITIZEN OF THE STATE WHERE IT IS INCORPORATED AND WHERE IT HAS A PRINCIPAL PLACE OF BUSINESS. UNINCORPORATED ENTITIES LIKE AN REIT ARE CONSIDERED CITIZENS OF THE STATES OF ALL ITS MEMBERS. NOW SHAPIRO VERSUS McMANUS. 28 USC, SECTION 2284(b)(1), PROVIDES THAT, "UPON THE FILING "OF A REQUEST FOR 3 JUDGES, THE JUDGE TO WHOM THE REQUEST "IS PRESENTED SHALL, UNLESS HE DETERMINES "THAT 3 JUDGES ARE NOT REQUIRED, IMMEDIATELY NOTIFY "THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE CIRCUIT, WHO SHALL DESIGNATE THE 3 JUDGES." NOW, THE QUESTION BEFORE THE COURT IN SHAPIRO CONCERNS THE INTERPRETATION OF THE PHRASE "UNLESS HE DETERMINES THAT 3 JUDGES ARE NOT REQUIRED." HOW DID THIS ONE COME BEFORE THE COURT, SUZANNA? SHERRY: WELL, IT STARTED WHEN A BIPARTISAN GROUP OF MARYLAND CITIZENS OBJECTED TO THE RESULTS OF THEIR STATE'S 2011 REDISTRICTING. UM, THEY SAID IT WAS GERRYMANDERING, AND THEY BROUGHT A PRO SE ACTION IN FEDERAL COURT ALLEGING THAT THE REDISTRICTING BURDENED THEIR FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF ASSOCIATION, UH, AND THEY ASKED FOR A 3-JUDGE COURT TO HEAR-- TO HEAR THE COMPLAINT, BUT THE DISTRICT JUDGE, INSTEAD OF NOTIFYING THE, UH, CHIEF JUDGE OF THE CIRCUIT, INSTEAD THE DISTRICT JUDGE DISMISSED THE CASE ON THE GROUND THAT IT DIDN'T STATE A CLAIM, UH, FOR RELIEF, UH, UNDER TWOMBLEY AND IQBAL. CHANCE: AND WHAT DID THE COURT DO, EVAN? LEE: THE COURT HELD THAT THE LANGUAGE IN THE STATUTE WAS MANDATORY, UH, THAT THE ORIGINAL JUDGE, THEREFORE, WAS REQUIRED TO NOTIFY THE CHIEF CIRCUIT JUDGE AND--AND DIDN'T HAVE ANY DISCRETION TO DISMISS THE CASE. JUSTICE, UH, SCALIA WROTE FOR A UNANIMOUS COURT HERE AND SAID THAT THE PHRASE "UNLESS HE DETERMINES THAT 3 JUDGES ARE NOT REQUIRED" DID NOT MEAN, UH, THAT THE JUDGE HAD DISCRETION TO DISMISS THE ACTION ON ITS MERITS. INSTEAD, THE COURT SAID THAT THE JUDGE MUST READ THE COMPLAINT SIMPLY TO DETERMINE THAT IT PRESENTS THE KIND OF CASE THAT'S COVERED BY THE 3-JUDGE STATUTE, AND HERE, THE QUESTION, UH, WAS THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF APPORTIONMENT, WHICH CLEARLY WAS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE STATUTE. SHERRY: I THINK THAT MAIN PART OF THE HOLDING IS GONNA BE OF SOMEWHAT LIMITED PRECEDENTIAL VALUE BECAUSE IT'S ONLY GOING TO APPLY TO CASES THAT REQUIRE A 3-JUDGE COURT, BUT THERE MAY BE ONE PART OF THE CASE THAT'S OF BROADER RELEVANCE. THE COURT REJECTED A SEPARATE ARGUMENT BY THE DEFENDANTS. THEY HAD ARGUED THAT THE CLAIM RAISED WHAT'S CALLED AN INSUBSTANTIAL FEDERAL QUESTION AND THAT, THEREFORE, THERE WAS NO FEDERAL-- THERE WAS NO FEDERAL JURISDICTION, UH, AND, THEREFORE, THE DISMISSAL WAS PROPER, AND THE COURT SAID NO. THE COURT REITERATED THAT THERE'S A BIG DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM FOR RELIEF UNDER TWOMBLEY AND IQBAL ON THE ONE HAND AND FAILING TO RAISE A SUBSTANTIAL FEDERAL QUESTION AT ALL ON THE OTHER. THE COURT WROTE THAT THE CASE LACKS A SUBSTANTIAL FEDERAL QUESTION ONLY IF THE FEDERAL CLAIMS ARE--AND I QUOTE--"WHOLLY INSUBSTANTIAL AND FRIVOLOUS," BUT UNDER TWOMBLEY AND IQBAL, THE CASE CAN BE DISMISSED IF THE FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS DON'T PLAUSIBLY ESTABLISH AN ENTITLEMENT TO RELIEF. CHANCE: POSSIBLY FRIVOLOUS LAWSI--SUITS WERE ALSO AT THE HEART OF OUR NEXT DECISION-- BRUCE VERSUS SAMUELS. UNDER THE PRI--PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT, PRISONERS FILING CASES IN FEDERAL COURT MUST PAY FILING FEES, EVEN IF THEY QUALIFY FOR IN FORMA PAUPERIS STATUS. THE PURPOSE OF THE LAW IS TO KEEP PRISONERS FROM FILING FRIVOLOUS LAWSUITS AND CLOGGING UP THE COURTS. THE PRISONER WHO BRINGS A CASE MUST PAY AN INITIAL FEE WHICH VARIED DEPENDING ON HOW MUCH MONEY HE OR SHE HAS IN THEIR PRISON ACCOUNT. THEN THE PRISONER CAN PAY THE BALANCE OF THE FEE IN MONTHLY INSTALLMENTS LIMITED TO 20% OF THE PRISONER'S PRECEDING MONTH'S INCOME. MORE THAN A FEW PRISONERS BRING MULTIPLE CASES IN FEDERAL COURT, AND THE QUESTION BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT IN THIS CASE WAS WHETHER THE 20% INSTALLMENT PAYMENTS SHOULD BE CALCULATED PER CASE OR PER PRISONER. THE COURT DECIDED THAT THE FEES WERE TO BE ASSESSED PER CASE, NOT PER PRIS--PER PRISONER. THE COURT WROTE THAT, SINCE ALL THE PARTIES AGREE THAT THE INITIAL FEE SHOULD BE ASSESSED ON A PER-CASE BASIS, THE REMAINING INSTALLMENTS SHOULD ALSO BE ASSESSED THAT WAY. ALSO, THE PLRA's GOAL IN DISCOURAGING FRIVOLOUS LAWSUITS WOULD BE UNDERMINED, AND FINALLY, DIETZ VERSUS BOULDON, THE COURT ADDRESSED THE QUESTION OF WHETHER A JUDGE CAN RESCIND A JURY DISCHARGE ORDER AND RECALL THE JURY IN A CIVIL TRIAL IF THE JUDGE DISCOVERS THAT THE VERDICT CONTAINS LEGAL ERROR. IN THIS CASE, A JURY RETURNED A LEGALLY IMPERMISSIBLE VERDICT, BUT THE JUDGE DIDN'T REALIZE THE ERROR UNTIL SHORTLY AFTER HE HAD EXCUSED THE JURY, SO HE BROUGHT THE JURY BACK AGAIN AND ORDERED THEM TO DELIBERATE AGAIN TO CORRECT THE MISTAKE. THE QUESTION BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT WAS WHETHER A JUDGE COULD RECALL A JURY THAT HAD BEEN DISCHARGED OR WHETHER THE COURT CAN REMEDY THE ERROR BY JUST ORDERING A NEW TRIAL, SO, SUZANNA, HOW DID THE COURT ANSWER THAT QUESTION? SHERRY: THE COURT SAID THAT THE JUD--THAT, UH, THE JUDGE COULD RECALL A DISMISSED JURY BUT ONLY WITHIN CERTAIN LIMITATIONS. UH, JUDGES HAVE INHERENT POWER TO ACHIEVE THE EFFICIENT DISPOSITION OF CASES, BUT THEY CAN ONLY DO SO, UH, IN A WAY THAT'S REASONABLE AND THAT'S NOT CONTRARY TO ANY RULE OR STATUTE, SO THE RECALL ORDER IS WITHIN THE JUDGE'S POWER, BUT IT HAS TO BE CAREFULLY CIRCUMSCRIBED TO MAKE SURE THAT THE, UH, PARTIES HAVE AN IMPARTIAL JURY. LEE: YEAH, AND IN ORDER TO MAKE SURE THAT NO JUROR HAS BEEN TAINTED, UH, BETWEEN THE TIME OF DISMISSAL AND THE TIME OF RECALL THEN, THE COURT SAID THAT THE JUDGE HAS TO CONSIDER A NUMBER OF FACTORS. ONE IS THE LENGTH OF TIME BETWEEN THE DISMISSAL AND THE RECALL. A SECOND WOULD BE, UH, WHETHER JURORS HAD SPOKEN TO ANYBODY ABOUT THE CASE, UH, AFTER BEING DISMISSED AND BEFORE BEING RECALLED. A THIRD IS THE PUBLIC REACTION TO THE VERDICT. WAS IT EMOTIONAL, OR WAS IT SUBDUED. UH, FOURTH, UH, FACTOR IS WHETHER ANY JURORS ACCESSED ON--ANY ONLINE RESOURCES, UH, RELATED TO THE CASE BETWEEN DISMISSAL AND RECALL, AND THE COURT SAID THAT THE JUDGES SHOULD CONSIDER ANY OTHER FACTORS THAT IT FINDS TO BE RELEVANT, AS WELL. SHERRY: I THINK WE SHOULD POINT OUT THAT THE COURT ALSO RECOGNIZED THIS INHERENT POWER ONLY IN CIVIL CASES. IT DID NOT ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THERE WAS SUCH A POWER IN CRIMINAL CASES. LEE: YEAH. YOU KNOW, I THINK THAT THERE'S GONNA BE QUESTIONS, UH, IN THE FUTURE, UH, REGARDING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS. FOR EXAMPLE, I MEAN, WHAT IF A JUROR, UH, SPOKE TO SOMEBODY ON THEIR CELL PHONE, UH, IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE VERDICT CAME IN, UH, BUT ALL THEY SAID WAS, "WE'RE FINISHED. I'M COMING HOME"? UM, I WOULDN'T THINK THAT THAT WOULD PRECLUDE A JURY RECALL, BUT I THINK WE'RE GONNA HAVE TO SEE. CHANCE: THANKS, EVAN, SUZANNA. NEXT UP, FEDERALISM AND SEPARATION OF POWERS. STANDING TO SUE, THE RIGHT TO BRING AN ACTION IN FEDERAL COURT, HAS 3 PRONGS. THE PLAINTIFF MAST HAVE SUFFERED AN INJURY-IN-FACT, THAT INJURY MUST BE TRACEABLE TO THE DEFENDANT, AND THE IN--INJURY MUST BE LIKELY TO BE ADDRESSED BY THE REQUESTED RELIEF. IN SPOKEO VERSUS ROBINS, THE QUESTION IS, WHAT CONSTITUTES INJURY-IN-FACT? SPOKEO'S WEBSITE THAT PROVIDES IN-DEPTH REPORTS CONTAINING A GREAT DEAL OF PERSONAL INFORMATION ABOUT PEOPLE, IN THE CASE OF THOMAS ROBINS, MOST OF THAT INFORMATION WAS WRONG. SPOKEO'S PROFILE OF ROBINS SAID HE HAD A GRADUATE DEGREE, WAS EMPLOYED IN A TECHNICAL OR PROFESSIONAL FIELD, AND WAS MARRIED WITH CHILDREN. NONE OF THAT WAS TRUE. ROBINS SUED SPOKEO FOR VIOLATION OF THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT WHICH ALLOWS VICTIMS OF SO-CALLED WILLFUL VIOLATIONS TO RECOVER STATUTORY DAMAGES OF BETWEEN $100 AND $1,000. A FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT DISMISSED ROBINS' SUIT FOR LACK OF STANDING IN NOT PLEADING A SUFFICIENT INJURY-IN-FACT, BUT THE NINTH CIRCUIT REVERSED THAT DECISION AND ALLOWED THE CASE TO GO FORWARD. ERWIN, WHAT DID THE SUPREME COURT DO? CHEMERINSKY: THE SUPREME COURT IN A 6-2 DECISION REVERSED THE NINTH CIRCUIT AND REMANDED THE CASE FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION. JUSTICE ALITO WROTE THE OPINION FOR THE COURT. HE SAID IN ORDER TO MEET THE INJURY REQUIREMENT OF ARTICLE 3, THE INJURY HAS TO BE BOTH PARTICULARIZED AND CONCRETE. HE FOUND THAT ROBINS MET THE REQUIREMENT FOR PARTICULARIZED INJURY BECAUSE HE HAD PERSONALLY SUFFERED THE HARM. SHERRY: BUT THE COURT HELD THAT THE NINTH CIRCUIT HAD FAILED TO CONSIDER WHETHER HE ACTUALLY MET THE REQUIREMENT OF A CONCRETE INJURY. A CONCRETE INJURY, THE COURT SAID, IS AN INJURY THAT'S DE FACTO. IT ACTUALLY EXISTS. IT HAS TO BE REAL. IT CAN'T BE ABSTRACT. AND THE COURT SAID IT'S DIFFERENT--CONCRETENESS IS DIFFERENT FROM PARTICULARIZATION, BUT THE COURT ALSO SAYS THAT IT'S NOT NECESSARILY SYNONYMOUS WITH--WITH TANGIBLE. THERE CAN BE INTANGIBLE BUT CONCRETE INJURIES. SO THE QUESTION WAS, SPOKEO'S FAILURE TO FOLLOW PROPER PROCEDURES IN OBTAINING THE INFORMATION MIGHT OR MIGHT NOT HAVE CAUSED A REAL OR CONCRETE HARM, UH, AND SO THE COURT REMANDED TO THE NINTH CIRCUIT FOR A DETERMINATION OF WHETHER THE ALLEGED HARMS WERE IN FACT SUFFICIENTLY CONCRETE. CHEMERINSKY: I THINK THIS IS A DECISION THAT'S GONNA CREATE A GREAT DEAL OF CONFUSION IN THE LOWER COURTS. THIS IS THE FIRST TIME THE SUPREME COURT HAS EVER SAID THAT PARTICULARIZED AND CONCRETE ARE DISTINCT REQUIREMENTS, EACH WHICH MUST BE MET. BUT THE COURT, AS SUZANNE JUST SAID, DIDN'T OFFER A CLEAR DEFINITION WHAT IT MEANS FOR AN INJURY TO BE CONCRETE. I DO THINK IT'S IMPORTANT THAT THE SUPREME COURT REAFFIRMED THAT CONGRESS BY [INDISTINCT] RIGHTS, EVEN RIGHTS THAT WOULD OTHERWISE EXIST, THE INFRINGEMENT OF THOSE RIGHTS ARE AN INJURY SUFFICIENT FOR STANDING. CHANCE: AMERICAN NATIONALS CAN SUE STATE SPONSORS OF TERRORISM IN THE U.S. COURTS, BUT EVEN IF THEY WIN, THEY OFTEN FACE PRACTICAL AND LEGAL DIFFICULTIES ENFORCING THEIR JUDGMENTS. IN OTHER WORDS, THEY CAN WIN MONEY DAMAGES FOR THEIR INJURIES, BUT THEY OFTEN HAVE A HARD TIME GETTING PAID. SO TO HELP MORE THAN 100 OR-- I'M SORRY, MORE THAN 1,000 PLAINTIFFS WHO SUED IRAN AND PREVAILED, CONGRESS ENACTED THE IRAN THREAT REDUCTION AND SYRIA HUMAN RIGHTS ACT OF 2012. THE LAW MAKES A DESIGNATED SET OF ASSETS THAT ARE FROZEN IN U.S. BANKS AVAILABLE TO SATISFY JUDGMENTS IN THAT SPECIFIC CASE IDENTIFIED BY NAME AND DOCKET NUMBER IN THE LAW. THESE ASSETS AND THIS LAW WERE THE FOCUS OF OUR FINAL DECISION-- BANK MARKAZI VERSUS PETERSON. BANK MARKAZI IS THE CENTRAL BANK OF IRAN. IT ARGUED THAT THE LAW VIOLATED SEPARATION OF POWERS BECAUSE IT USURPED THE ROLE OF THE COURTS BY DIRECTING A PARTICULAR RESULT IN THE PENDING ENFORCEMENT PROCEEDING. SO WHAT WAS THE ACTUAL QUESTION BEFORE THE COURT? CHEMERINSKY: THE ISSUE HERE IS WHETHER THIS STATUTE IS A PROSPECTIVE CHANGE IN THE LAW, IN WHICH CASE IT'S CONSTITUTIONAL, OR IF IT'S CONGRESS DIRECTING THE FEDERAL COURTS HOW TO DECIDE A SPECIFIC CASE, IN WHICH CASE IT'S UNCONSTITUTIONAL. THE SUPREME COURT, IN A 6-2 DECISION, WITH THE MAJORITY OPINION BY JUSTICE GINSBURG, UPHELD THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE STATUTE. SHERRY: THAT'S RIGHT, AND JUSTICE GINSBURG WROTE THAT THIS--THAT ALTHOUGH THE CONSTITUTION BARS CONGRESS FROM TELLING COURTS HOW TO APPLY PRE-EXISTING LAW TO SPECIFIC CASES, CONGRESS CAN AMEND THAT LAW AND THEN MAKE IT RETROACTIVE, AND THAT'S EXACTLY WHAT THIS STATUTE DID. IT DIRECTED THE COURT TO APPLY A NEW STANDARD TO A PENDING CASE, AND SHE WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE STATUTE IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL EVEN THOUGH THE NEW LEGAL STANDARD APPLIED TO VIRTUALLY UNDISPUTED FACTS AND IT WASN'T UNCONSTITUTIONAL EVEN THOUGH IT PRESCRIBED A RULE FOR AN IDENTIFIED SPECIFIC CASE. CHEMERINSKY: BUT THE DISSENT SAW THIS AS CONGRESS DIRECTING THE FEDERAL COURTS AS HOW TO DECIDE A SPECIFIC CASE, AND THAT VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTION. SHERRY: I ACTUALLY THINK THE DISSENT WAS RIGHT IN THIS CASE. I THINK THE STATUTE IS EQUIVALENT TO A LAW THAT SAYS IN A LAWSUIT BETWEEN A AND B, B WINS. WHAT THIS DECISION MEANS IS THAT LITIGANTS--DISAPPOINTED LITIGANTS CAN NOW PETITION CONGRESS TO CHANGE THE RESULTS IN THEIR CASES AS LONG AS THEY DO SO DURING THE PENDENCY OF THEIR APPEALS. CHEMERINSKY: WE DISAGREE ON THIS ONE. I THINK CONGRESS ALWAYS CAN CHANGE THE LAW AND THE NEW LAW WILL APPLY TO ALL FUTURE CASES. THAT'S WHAT HAPPENED HERE. CHANCE: THANKS. AND NOW, HOW THE COURT VIEWED SOME FEDERAL STATUTES. WIGGINS: TWO DECISIONS NOW INTERPRETING FEDERAL STATUTES, BOTH INVOLVING THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, OR THE EEOC. IN CSRT VAN EXPEDITED VERSUS EEOC, THE QUESTION WAS WHEN CAN A DEFENDANT RECOVER ATTORNEY'S FEES AS A PREVAILING PARTY UNDER TITLE VII. THE EEOC HAD FILED A CLASS ACTION SUIT AGAINST CSRT, CHARGING SEXUAL HARASSMENT ON BEHALF OF MORE THAN 250 FEMALE EMPLOYEES OF THE COMPANY. THE DISTRICT COURT DISMISSED ALL BUT TWO OF THE CLAIMS ON A VARIETY OF PROCEDURAL GROUNDS, INCLUDING THE EEOC'S FAILURE TO PROPERLY INVESTIGATE ALL THE CLAIMS. THE DISTRICT COURT THEN AWARDED CSRT $4 MILLION IN ATTORNEY'S FEES AS THE PREVAILING PARTY. THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS REVERSED THAT JUDGMENT, HOLDING THAT A DEFENDANT CAN ONLY BE CONSIDERED A PREVAILING PARTY BY OBTAINING A RULING ON THE MERITS. SO, ERWIN, HOW DID THE JUSTICES COME DOWN ON THIS QUESTION? CHEMERINSKY: THE SUPREME COURT UNANIMOUSLY REVERSED THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT. JUSTICE KENNEDY WROTE FOR THE COURT. HE NOTED THE COURT PREVIOUSLY HAD HELD THAT A DEFENDANT CAN RECEIVE ATTORNEY'S FEES IN A TITLE VII CASE. THE STANDARD IS THE DEFENDANT CAN GET ATTORNEY'S FEES IF THE PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM IS FRIVOLOUS, UNREASONABLE, OR GROUNDLESS, OR THE PLAINTIFF CONTINUES TO PURSUE THE LITIGATION AFTER IT'S SHOWN THAT THE CLAIM IS FRIVOLOUS, UNREASONABLE, OR GROUNDLESS. JUSTICE KENNEDY SAID THERE'S MANY WAYS THAT A DEFENDANT CAN WIN IN A LAWSUIT. IT DOESN'T TAKE A JUDGMENT ON THE MERITS. HERE, WHERE ALL OF THE CLAIMS HAD BEEN DISMISSED AGAINST THE DEFENDANT, IT WAS OBVIOUSLY THE DEFENDANT PREVAILING. LEE: I THINK IT OUGHT TO BE NOTED THE COURT HERE DIDN'T ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THERE HAD TO BE A PRECLUSIVE JUDGMENT IN ORDER FOR THE DEFENDANT TO PREVAIL. THE COURT SAID THAT THAT ISSUE HAD NOT BEEN PROPERLY RAISED BELOW. BUT I DO THINK WE CAN EXPECT IT TO COME UP AGAIN IN FUTURE LITIGATION. WIGGINS: HOW IMPORTANT DO YOU THINK THIS CASE WILL BE TO THOSE FUTURE CASES? CHEMERINSKY: I DON'T THINK THIS CASE CHANGES THE LEGAL STANDARD BUT IT IS AN IMPORTANT VICTORY FOR DEFENDANTS. IT CLEARLY HOLDS DEFENDANTS CAN BE AWARDED ATTORNEY'S FEES UNDER TITLE VII OR SIMILAR STATUTES EVEN WITHOUT A JUDGMENT ON THE MERITS. WIGGINS: OK. OUR NEXT DECISION, GREEN VERSUS BRENNAN, ASKED THE COURT TO DECIDE WHEN THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS BEGINS TO RUN IN CONSTRUCTIVE DISCHARGE CASES UNDER TITLE VII. MARVIN GREEN WAS A 35-YEAR-OLD BLACK POSTAL SERVICE EMPLOYEE WHO BROUGHT A CLAIM OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION WHEN HE WAS PASSED OVER FOR PROMOTION TO POSTMASTER IN BOULDER, COLORADO. NOT LONG AFTER HE BROUGHT THAT CLAIM, HIS SUPERVISORS ACCUSED HIM OF INTENTIONALLY DELAYING THE MAILS, WHICH IS A FEDERAL OFFENSE. EVEN THOUGH THE INSPECTOR GENERAL TERMINATED ITS INVESTIGATION OF THE MATTER FOR INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE, GREEN'S SUPERVISORS CONTINUED TO THREATEN TO PROSECUTE HIM CRIMINALLY. FINALLY, GREEN SIGNED A SETTLEMENT IN WHICH HIS SUPERVISORS AGREED TO DROP THEIR EFFORTS TO PROSECUTE HIM, AND HE AGREED EITHER TO TAKE A DEMOTION OR RESIGN, AND HE EVENTUALLY RESIGNED. EVAN, WHERE DOES THE STORY GO FROM HERE? LEE: WELL, 41 DAYS AFTER RESIGNING, BUT 96 DAYS AFTER SIGNING THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT, GREEN CONTACTED AN EEO COUNSELOR TO REPORT AN UNLAWFUL CONSTRUCTIVE DISCHARGE. HE EVENTUALLY BROUGHT SUIT IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT, WHICH WAS DISMISSED ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT WAS UNTIMELY. THE COURT SAID THAT UNDER THE STATUTE, THE EEOC HAD TO BE CONTACTED WITHIN 45 DAYS, QUOTE, OF THE MATTER ALLEGED TO BE DISCRIMINATORY, END QUOTE. AND ON THE MERITS, THE SUPREME COURT RULED 7-1 THAT IN A TITLE VII CONSTRUCTIVE DISCHARGE CASE, THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DOES NOT BEGIN TO RUN UNTIL THE EMPLOYEE RESIGNS, AND I THINK ALSO VERY IMPORTANTLY, THAT RESIGNATION OCCURS FOR PURPOSES OF THIS STATUTE WHEN THE EMPLOYEE GIVES A FORMAL NOTICE OF RESIGNATION. CHEMERINSKY: JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR WROTE THE OPINION FOR THE COURT, AND SHE SAYS THAT ACTUALLY QUITTING IS AN ELEMENT OF THE CAUSE OF ACTION FOR CONSTRUCTIVE DISCHARGE. SAID NOTHING IN TITLE VII WAS MEANT TO CHANGE THAT. SAID HAVING THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS COUNT IN THIS WAY FURTHERS THE REMEDIAL SCHEME OF TITLE VII. I THINK IT'S AN IMPORTANT VICTORY FOR PLAINTIFFS IN TERMS OF GIVING A STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS THAT'S MOST FAVORABLE TO THEM. LEE: I AGREE, AND I THINK THIS CASE CREATES A BRIGHT LINE WHERE THERE PREVIOUSLY DID NOT EXIST ONE. WIGGINS: THANKS, EVAN. THANKS, ERWIN. OUR NEXT PANEL WILL BE REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM. WHOLE WOMAN'S HEALTH VERSUS HELLERSTEDT WAS ARGUABLY THE MOST SWEEPING ABORTION RIGHTS DECISION BY THE COURT SINCE 1992's PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA VERSUS CASEY. WHOLE WOMAN'S HEALTH WAS A CHALLENGE TO A TEXAS STATUTE THAT IMPOSED SEVERAL NEW REQUIREMENTS ON ABORTION CLINICS IN THE NAME OF PROTECTING WOMEN'S HEALTH AND SAFETY. AMONG OTHER THINGS, THE LAW REQUIRED THE CLINICS TO MEET THE SAME STANDARDS REQUIRED FOR AMBULATORY SURGICAL CENTERS AND REQUIRED DOCTORS PERFORMING ABORTIONS AT THE CLINICS TO HAVE ADMITTING PRIVILEGES AT A HOSPITAL LOCATED NO MORE THAN 30 MILES FROM THE CLINIC. WHAT DID THE COURT DECIDE ABOUT THIS STATUTE AND WHAT WAS ITS REASONING, LAURIE? LEVENSON: WELL, BETH, THE COURT DECIDED IN A 5-3 DECISION THAT THE TEXAS LAW WAS UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT PUT AN UNDUE BURDEN ON A WOMAN'S RIGHT TO HAVE AN ABORTION. BUT PERHAPS THE MOST IMPORTANT THING ABOUT THE COURT'S RULING IS THAT IT IDENTIFIED AND DETAILED THE COURT'S ROLE IN DETERMINING WHETHER THIS IS AN UNDUE BURDEN ON A WOMAN'S RIGHT. JUSTICE BREYER WENT POINT BY POINT THROUGH THE DISTRICT COURT RECORD, SHOWING WHY HE BELIEVED THAT THESE RESTRICTIONS DID NOT HELP AND SERVE WOMEN'S NEEDS. HE POINTED OUT HOW THE RISKS OF AN ABORTION ARE MUCH LOWER THAN THE RISKS OF COMMON MEDICAL PROCEDURES THAT CAN BE DONE IN A DOCTOR'S OFFICE OR EVEN IN A HOME. HE EVEN POINTED OUT THAT AT ORAL ARGUMENT, TEXAS COULD NOT IDENTIFY ONE WOMAN WHO ACTUALLY BENEFITED FROM THE REQUIREMENTS IMPOSED BY THIS LAW. AND BY CONTRAST, HE POINTED OUT THAT THE COSTS OF THIS NEW REQUIREMENT HAD LED TO THE CLOSURE OF DOZENS OF ABORTION CLINICS IN TEXAS, MAKING IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR WOMEN TO GET SAFE, LEGAL ABORTIONS. SHERRY: THIS CASE DEFINITELY CLARIFIED THE UNDUE BURDEN STANDARD LAID DOWN BY THE COURT AND CLARIFIED THAT WHAT IT REQUIRES IS A COURT MUST BALANCE THE BURDENS THAT A LAW IMPOSES ON ABORTION ACCESS AGAINST THE BENEFIT THAT THE LAW PROVIDES FOR WOMEN'S HEALTH, AND IMPORTANTLY, AS LAURIE SAID, THE COURTS SHOULDN'T DEFER TO LEGISLATURES ON THESE QUESTIONS BUT INSTEAD SHOULD LOOK AT THE EVIDENCE THAT'S PRESENTED TO THE COURT. AND IN ADDITION TO BEING AN IMPORTANT CLARIFICATION OF THE UNDUE BURDEN STANDARD AND OF THE COURT'S OWN RESPONSIBILITIES, IT ALSO, I THINK, SENDS A MESSAGE THAT THERE ARE 5 JUSTICES ON THE CURRENT COURT WHO BELIEVE THAT WHILE STATES DO HAVE A LEGITIMATE INTEREST IN SEEING THAT ABORTIONS ARE PERMITTED--ARE DONE SAFELY, STATES CAN'T IMPOSE RESTRICTIONS THAT ARE PRETEXTUAL AND THAT IMPOSE A SUBSTANTIAL OBSTACLE IN THE WAY OF WOMEN'S ACCESS TO ABORTION. THERE ARE SEVERAL STATES WITH SIMILAR LAWS AND CHALLENGES HAVE BEEN PENDING, WAITING THIS DECISION, AND I THINK IN MOST OF THOSE, WE'LL NOW NEED A DETAILED FINDING OF FACTS THAT EXAMINE THE BENEFITS AND THE BURDENS. CHEMERINSKY: JUSTICE GINSBURG WROTE A SHORT CONCURRING OPINION WHICH EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT THESE MANY RECENTLY ADOPTED STATE LAWS, THE SO-CALLED TARGETED RESTRICTION OF ABORTION PROVIDER STATUTES, ARE ALL UNCONSTITUTIONAL. WIGGINS: OK. OTHER THAN THE 4-4 DECISIONS RESULTING FROM JUSTICE SCALIA'S DEATH THAT JOHN COOKE MENTIONED EARLIER, IT'S HARD TO KNOW WHAT THE EFFECTS HIS PASSING HAD ON THE WORK OF THE COURT THIS TERM. BUT IN ZUBIK VERSUS BURWELL, IT ARGUABLY LED TO A UNANIMOUS PER CURIAM OPINION REMANDING THE CASES COLLECTIVELY HEARD UNDER ZUBIK FOR RECONSIDERATION. ZUBIK WAS A CHALLENGE, OF COURSE, TO THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT'S REQUIREMENT THAT SOME RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS MUST SUBMIT A FORM TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF AN EXEMPTION FOR PROVIDING CONTRACEPTIVE COVERAGE. THE RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS PROTESTED THAT EVEN SIGNING THE FORM SUBSTANTIALLY BURDENED THEIR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN VIOLATION OF THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT. AFTER ORAL ARGUMENT, THE COURT ASKED FOR ADDITIONAL BRIEFING ON POSSIBLE WAYS THAT THE CONTRACEPTIVE COVERAGE COULD BE PROVIDED SEAMLESSLY WITHOUT VIOLATING THE ORGANIZATION'S RELIGIOUS FREEDOM WHILE STILL SATISFYING THE GOVERNMENT'S INTEREST. IN THEIR RESPONSES, THE PARTIES CONCEDED THAT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE. IN THE DECISION IN ZUBIK, THE COURT VACATED ALL THE JUDGMENTS BELOW AND REMANDED THEM TO GIVE THE PARTIES A CHANCE TO FIND A SOLUTION BASED ON THE NEW FACTS CONTAINED IN THE ADDITIONAL BRIEFING. THE COURT WROTE THAT IT WAS EXPRESSING NO VIEW ON THE MERITS OF THE CASES AND IN PARTICULAR NOT DECIDING WHETHER THE ORGANIZATION'S RELIGIOUS EXERCISE HAD BEEN SUBSTANTIALLY BURDENED, WHETHER THE GOVERNMENT HAS A COMPELLING INTEREST, OR WHETHER THE CURRENT REGULATIONS ARE THE LEAST RESTRICTIVE MEANS OF SATISFYING THAT INTEREST. THAT ASSURANCE NOTWITHSTANDING, JUSTICES SOTOMAYOR AND GINSBURG WROTE A CONCURRING OPINION TO WARN LOWER COURTS NOT TO CONSTRUE THE PER CURIAM DECISION AS A SIGNAL ON WHERE THE COURT STANDS. THEY NOTED THAT THE COURT HAD ISSUED SIMILAR EXPLICIT DISCLAIMERS BEFORE, BUT THAT SOME LOWER COURTS HAD IGNORED THOSE INSTRUCTIONS. SO THEY ADMONISHED THE COURTS OF APPEALS ON REMAND NOT TO MAKE THAT SAME MISTAKE. NEXT WE'RE GOING TO BRING YOU A CONVERSATION I HAD RECENTLY WITH MICHELLE HARNER OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND SCHOOL OF LAW ABOUT SOME OF THIS TERM'S BANKRUPTCY DECISIONS. AFTER THAT, WE'RE GOING TO TAKE A 5-MINUTE BREAK, AND THEN WHEN WE COME BACK, WE'LL HAVE A CONVERSATION JIM HAD WITH JOHN THOMAS OF GEORGETOWN LAW CENTER ABOUT TWO PATENT DECISIONS THIS TERM. BUT FIRST, HERE'S MY CONVERSATION WITH MICHELLE. HI, MICHELLE. THANKS FOR BEING HERE AGAIN THIS YEAR TO TALK ABOUT THE TERM'S BANKRUPTCY CASES. WE'RE GONNA BE COVERING SPOKEO VERSUS ROBINS IN ANOTHER PANEL, SO LET'S MOVE RIGHT INTO HUSKY INTERNATIONAL ELECTRONICS VERSUS RITZ. THAT CASE, OF COURSE, CONCERNED THE EXCEPTIONS TO DISCHARGE UNDER 523(A)(2) FOR DEBTS ARISING OUT OF FALSE PRETENSES, A FALSE MISREPRESENTATION, OR ACTUAL FRAUD. SO CAN YOU TELL US A LITTLE BIT ABOUT THIS CASE AND WHAT THE ISSUE WAS? HARNER: ABSOLUTELY, AND THANK YOU FOR HAVING ME AGAIN. SO THE HUSKY CASE DEALS WITH A FACT PATTERN THAT'S VERY FAMILIAR TO US. BASICALLY, HUSKY SUPPLIED GOODS TO CHRYSALIS. CHRYSALIS FAILED TO PAY FOR THE GOODS. HUSKY ENDED UP WITH A CLAIM OF $164,000. THEN MR. RITZ ENTERS THE PICTURE. MR. RITZ ALLEGEDLY THROUGH HIS CONTROL AND/OR OWNERSHIP OF CHRYSALIS, TRANSFERRED CHRYSALIS'-- CHRYSALIS'--THAT'S A TONGUE-TIER-- TO--ASSETS TO OTHER COMPANIES OWNED AND/OR CONTROLLED BY MR. RITZ, LEAVING CHRYSALIS WITH NO ASSETS TO PAY HUSKY'S CLAIM. HUSKY, THEN, NOT TOO HAPPY, SUES MR. RITZ USING TEXAS LAW, AMONG OTHER THINGS, ALTER EGO CLAIM TO TRY TO COLLECT $164,000 FROM MR. RITZ. MR. RITZ THEN FILES BANKRUPTCY. THIS IS LIKE, YOU KNOW, CHESS HERE. AND THEN HUSKY SAYS, "FINE, "BUT OUR CLAIM IS NON-DISCHARGEABLE "UNDER SECTION 523(A)(2)(A) OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE BECAUSE YOU'VE COMMITTED ACTUAL FRAUD." WIGGINS: SO WHAT DID THE COURT DECIDE ABOUT THAT? AND WHAT DID THEY--I MEAN, HOW DID THEY COME TO THEIR DECISION? HARNER: IT'S INTERESTING, BECAUSE BOTH THE MAJORITY AND THE DISSENT USED STATUTORY INTERPRETATION TOOLS TO GET TO THEIR RESPECTIVE PLACES. AND I THINK THE MAJORITY OPINION WRITTEN BY JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR REALLY TAKES A STRAIGHTFORWARD APPROACH, LOOKING AT THE STATUTE'S EVOLUTION, AND THE MAJORITY SAID ACTUAL FRAUD WAS ADDED TO THE TERMS "FALSE PRETENSES" AND "FALSE REPRESENTATIONS" IN THE 1978 CODE. SO ACTUAL FRAUD HAS TO MEAN SOMETHING DIFFERENT THAN THOSE OTHER TWO TERMS. AND THE MAJORITY THEN LOOKS TO COMMON LAW TO SAY, WELL, OF COURSE, WE'VE ALWAYS INTERPRETED ACTUAL FRAUD TO MEAN FRAUDULENT TRANSFER KINDS OF SCHEMES LIKE WE HAVE HERE. SO FOR THE MAJORITY, THE BOTTOM LINE WAS A VERY NARROW HOLDING, REALLY, IN THAT 523(A)(2)(A) IS BROADER THAN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT INTERPRETED IT, AND SIMPLY MEANS THAT ACTUAL FRAUD CAN BE SOMETHING MORE THAN A MISREPRESENTATION. WIGGINS: SO WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? DO YOU THINK THE COURT'S GONNA BROADEN EXCEPTIONS TO THE DISCHARGE? HARNER: IT'S INTERESTING. YOU KNOW, AND HERE I WOULD POINT US TO THE DISSENT TO THINK ABOUT HOW FAR THE MAJORITY'S OPINION REACHES, BECAUSE THE DISSENT AUTHORED BY JUSTICE THOMAS AGAIN LOOKS AT THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE BUT USES MORE OF A CONTEXTUAL APPROACH IN SAYING THAT I AGREE, WE SHOULD THINK ABOUT THE COMMON LAW MEANING OF TERMS IN A STATUTE, BUT NOT IF THEY DON'T FIT IN TERMS OF THE CONTEXT OF THE ENTIRE STATUTORY LANGUAGE. AND FOR JUSTICE THOMAS, THE PREAMBLE IN SECTION 523, WHICH SPEAKS TO MONEY, PROPERTY, OR SERVICES OBTAINED BY ACTUAL FRAUD, POSED A PROBLEM TO THE INTERPRETATION GIVEN ACTUAL FRAUD BY THE MAJORITY. JUSTICE THOMAS SAYS IT WAS NONSENSICAL TO THINK THAT FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACTS COULD CONSTITUTE ACTUAL FRAUD FOR PURPOSES OF 523(A)(2)(A). INTERESTINGLY, IN FOOTNOTE 3, THE MAJORITY RECOGNIZES THIS ISSUE, BUT PUNTS, SAYING THERE MAY BE SOME FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS THAT DON'T CONSTITUTE ACTUAL FRAUD WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF 523(A)(2)(A), BUT WE THINK THERE ARE SOME THAT COULD. SO THERE ARE GOING TO BE A LOT OF ISSUES FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT ON REMAND AND LOWER COURTS TO THINK ABOUT IN DETERMINING ACTUAL FRAUD UNDER ITS COMMON LAW MEANING BUT WITHIN THE CONFINES IN THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE OF 523(A)(2)(A). WIGGINS: OK. THANK YOU. WELL, AT LEAST IT GIVES THE LOWER COURT SOME DIRECTION, KNOW WHERE TO GO NOW BETWEEN THE FIFTH AND THE SEVENTH'S ANALYSIS OF THE CASE AND THE ISSUE. HARNER: ABSOLUTELY. WIGGINS: WE'RE GONNA BE REMISS IF WE DON'T TALK SOME ABOUT PUERTO RICO VERSUS FRANKLIN TRUST. AS YOU KNOW, THAT CASE REALLY LEFT THE SOLUTION TO THE INSOLVENCY CRISIS IN PUERTO RICO IN THE HANDS OF CONGRESS. CAN YOU TELL US A LITTLE BIT ABOUT THAT CASE AND WHERE WE ARE NOW? HARNER: CERTAINLY. SO IT'S INTERESTING YOU MENTION THE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS FACING THE 3.2 MILLION PEOPLE IN PUERTO RICO. THE DECISION BEFORE THE COURT WAS REALLY ABOUT THE ECONOMIC CRISIS, ALTHOUGH THE TWO, I THINK, ARE INTEGRATED, AND HERE WE HAVE THE JUSTICES, AT LEAST THE AUTHORING JUSTICES, FLIPPING PLACES. SO JUSTICE THOMAS AUTHORS THE MAJORITY OPINION IN PUERTO RICO. JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR AUTHORS THE DISSENT. AND FOR JUSTICE THOMAS AGAIN, A VERY PLAIN-MEANING APPROACH TO THE STATUTE AND IN THINKING ABOUT WHETHER PUERTO RICO'S RECOVERY ACT, WHICH IT ADOPTED IN 2014, COULD STAND, OR WAS IT PREEMPTED BY SECTION 903 OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE. AND JUSTICE THOMAS SAYS IN 1984, CONGRESS AMENDED SECTION 101.52 OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE, WHICH DEFINES THE TERM "STATE," AND IN THAT AMENDMENT, JUSTICE THOMAS SAYS CONGRESS REMOVED PUERTO RICO AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA FROM ONLY A SMALL SLIVER OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE, RIGHT? IT'S A STATE FOR EVERYTHING BUT DEFINING WHO IS A DEBTOR FOR CHAPTER 9 PURPOSES, OR FOR PURPOSES OF THE GATEWAY PROVISION, AS HE CALLS IT, IN SECTION 109(C). SO, GIVEN THAT VERY NARROW APPROACH TO THE AMENDMENT IN 1984 TO THE DEFINITION OF "STATE," JUSTICE THOMAS SAYS PUERTO RICO'S A, QUOTE, CAPITAL-S STATE FOR ALL OTHER PURPOSES UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY CODE, INCLUDING THE CHAPTER 9 PREEMPTION LANGUAGE IN SECTION 903. AND ONCE YOU TAKE THAT APPROACH AND SAY IT'S A NARROW EXTRAPOLATION OF PUERTO RICO FROM THE DEFINITION OF "STATE," IT'S SOMEWHAT A PROBLEM FOR PUERTO RICO, BECAUSE THE RECOVERY ACT IS PREEMPTED BY 903, AND THAT MEANS IT'S CONGRESS' ISSUE TO DEAL WITH THE ECONOMIC CRISIS CURRENTLY FACING PUERTO RICO. AND THAT WAS PROBLEMATIC FOR THE DISSENT. JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, I THINK, WAS INFLUENCED BY THE CRISIS FACING PUERTO RICO AND TOOK MORE OF A CONTEXTUAL APPROACH, SAYING YOU HAVE TO LOOK AT THE CODE AS A HOLISTIC STATUTORY BODY, AND SAID IF WE'RE TAKING PUERTO RICO OUT OF THE OPERATIVE PROVISION OF CHAPTER 9 THROUGH THE DEFINITIONAL SECTIONS, THEN NONE OF CHAPTER 9 APPLIES, AND SHE WOULD HAVE ALLOWED THE LAW TO STAND. WIGGINS: OK. WELL, THANK YOU. I THINK THAT'LL DO IT FOR THIS YEAR AND HOPE TO SEE YOU AGAIN NEXT YEAR. HARNER: THANK YOU SO MUCH.

Contents

Court membership

Chief Justice: William Rehnquist

Associate Justices: John Paul Stevens, Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, David Souter, Clarence Thomas, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer

Yarborough v. Gentry

Full caption:Michael Yarborough, Warden v. Lionel E. Gentry
Citations:540 U.S. 1; 124 S. Ct. 1; 157 L. Ed. 2d 1; 2003 U.S. LEXIS 7701; 72 U.S.L.W. 3278; 2003 Cal. Daily Op. Service 9167; 2003 Daily Journal DAR 11517; 16 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 479
Prior history:Petition denied, sub nom., Gentry v. Roe, C.D. Cal.; reversed, conviction vacated, 320 F.3d 891 (9th Cir. 2002)
Subsequent history:On remand, affirmed, sub nom., Gentry v. Roe, 381 F.3d 1219 (9th Cir. 2004)
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Full text of the opinion:official slip opinion

540 U.S. 1
Decided October 20, 2003.
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed

Mitchell v. Esparza

Full caption:Betty Mitchell, Warden v. Gregory Esparza
Citations:540 U.S. 12; 124 S. Ct. 7; 157 L. Ed. 2d 263; 2003 U.S. LEXIS 8191; 72 U.S.L.W. 3305; 2003 Cal. Daily Op. Service 9574; 17 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 1
Prior history:Petition granted, N.D. Ohio; affirmed, 310 F.3d 414 (6th Cir. 2002)
Subsequent history:Rehearing denied, 540 U.S. 1142 (2004)
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Full text of the opinion:official slip opinion

540 U.S. 12
Decided November 3, 2003.
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded

Illinois v. Fisher

Full caption:Illinois v. Gregory Fisher
Citations:540 U.S. 544; 124 S. Ct. 1200; 157 L. Ed. 2d 1060; 2004 U.S. LEXIS 1412; 72 U.S.L.W. 3533; 17 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 144
Prior history:Defendant convicted, Cook County Circuit Court; reversed, Ill. App.; leave to appeal denied, 792 N.E.2d 310 (Ill. 2003)
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Full text of the opinion:official slip opinion

540 U.S. 544
Decided February 23, 2004.
Illinois Appellate Court reversed and remanded.

Stevens filed a concurring opinion.

Muhammad v. Close

Full caption:Shakur Muhammad, aka John E. Mease v. Mark Close
Citations:540 U.S. 749; 124 S. Ct. 1303; 158 L. Ed. 2d 32; 2004 U.S. LEXIS 1627; 72 U.S.L.W. 4216; 17 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 171
Prior history:Judgment for defendant, E.D. Mich.; affirmed, 47 Fed. Appx. 738 (6th Cir.); cert. granted, 539 U.S. 925 (2003)
Subsequent history:On remand, reversed, 379 F.3d 413 (6th Cir. 2004)
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Full text of the opinion:official slip opinion

540 U.S. 749
Argued December 1, 2003.
Decided February 25, 2004.
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded

Johnson v. California

Full caption:Jay Shawn Johnson v. California
Citations:541 U.S. 428; 124 S. Ct. 1833; 158 L. Ed. 2d 696; 2004 U.S. LEXIS 3380; 72 U.S.L.W. 4348; 17 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 264
Prior history:Defendant convicted, No. 96-0691-4, Contra Costa County Superior Court, California; reversed, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 727 (Cal. App. 2001); review granted, 26 P.3d 1039 (Cal. 2001); reversed, 71 P.3d 270 (Cal. 2003); cert. granted, 540 U.S. 1045
Subsequent history:On remand, review denied, No. S127602, 2004 Cal. LEXIS 10226 (Cal. Oct. 20, 2004); cert. granted, 543 U.S. 1042 (2005); reversed and remanded, 545 U.S. 162 (2005); on remand, remanded, 38 Cal. 4th 1096 (Cal. App. 2006)
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Full text of the opinion:official slip opinion

541 U.S. 428
Argued March 30, 2004.
Decided May 3, 2004.
The Court took the unusual step of dismissing the case per curiam for want of jurisdiction after it had already been briefed and argued.

Middleton v. McNeil

Full caption:Raymond L. Middleton, Warden v. Sallie Marie McNeil
Citations:541 U.S. 433; 124 S. Ct. 1830; 158 L. Ed. 2d 701; 2004 U.S. LEXIS 3381; 72 U.S.L.W. 3687; 17 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 265
Prior history:Petition denied, C.D. Cal.; reversed, 344 F.3d 988 (9th Cir. 2003)
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Full text of the opinion:official slip opinion

541 U.S. 433
Decided May 3, 2004.
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded.

Holland v. Jackson

Full caption:Flora Holland, Warden v. Jessie L. Jackson
Citations:542 U.S. 649; 124 S. Ct. 2736; 159 L. Ed. 2d 683; 2004 U.S. LEXIS 4758; 72 U.S.L.W. 3766; 2004 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 474
Prior history:Habeas petition denied, M.D. Tenn.; reversed, 80 Fed. Appx. 392 (6th Cir. 2003)
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Full text of the opinion:official slip opinion

542 U.S. 649
Decided June 28, 2004.
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded.

Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer would have denied certiorari.

References

  • "2003 Term Opinions of the Court". Supreme Court of the United States. Retrieved 2010-07-07.
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