To install click the Add extension button. That's it.

The source code for the WIKI 2 extension is being checked by specialists of the Mozilla Foundation, Google, and Apple. You could also do it yourself at any point in time.

4,5
Kelly Slayton
Congratulations on this excellent venture… what a great idea!
Alexander Grigorievskiy
I use WIKI 2 every day and almost forgot how the original Wikipedia looks like.
What we do. Every page goes through several hundred of perfecting techniques; in live mode. Quite the same Wikipedia. Just better.
.
Leo
Newton
Brights
Milds

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Hanan Ashrawi
ASHRAWI.JPG
Ashrawi at the Duisburg Audimax Campus, November 29, 2007
Born
Hanan Daoud Mikhael Ashrawi

(1946-10-08) 8 October 1946 (age 73)
OccupationPolitician
Spouse(s)Emile Ashrawi
ChildrenAmal
Zeina
Parent(s)Daoud Mikhail, Wadi'a Ass'ad

Hanan Daoud Mikhael Ashrawi (Arabic: حنان داوود مخايل عشراوي‎; born October 8, 1946) is a Palestinian leader, legislator, activist, and scholar who served as a member of the Leadership Committee and as an official spokesperson of the Palestinian delegation to the Middle East peace process, beginning with the Madrid Peace Conference of 1991. In 1996, Ashrawi was appointed as the Palestinian Authority Minister of Higher Education and Research. Prior to that, she was Dean of the Faculty of Arts at Birzeit University and head of its Legal Aid Committee since the mid-1970s.

Ashrawi was elected to the Palestinian Legislative Council representing Jerusalem in 1996, and she was re-elected for the “Third Way” bloc ticket in 2006. Making history as the first woman to hold a seat in the highest executive body in Palestine, she was elected as member of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 2009 and in 2018.

As a civil society activist, she founded the Independent Commission for Human Rights in 1994 and served as its Commissioner-General until 1995. In 1998, she also founded MIFTAH, the Palestinian Initiative for the Promotion of Global Dialogue and Democracy and continues to serve as head of its Board of Directors. In 1999, Ashrawi founded the National Coalition for Accountability and Integrity (AMAN).

Ashrawi serves on the advisory and international boards of several global, regional and local organizations dealing with a variety of issues including human rights, women’s rights, policy formation, peacemaking, and nation-building.

Ashrawi is the recipient of numerous awards from all over the world, including the distinguished French decoration, “d'Officier de l'Ordre National de la Légion d'Honneur” in 2016; the 2005 Mahatma Gandhi International Award for Peace and Reconciliation; the 2003 Sydney Peace Prize; the 2002 Olof Palme Prize; the 1999 International Women of Hope “Bread and Roses”; the Defender of Democracy Award – Parliamentarians for Global Action; the 50 Women of the Century; the 1996 Jane Addams International Women’s Leadership Award; the Pearl S. Buck Foundation Women’s Award; the 1994 Pio Manzu Gold Medal Peace Award; and the 1992 Marissa Bellisario International Peace Award.

She is the author of several books, articles, poems and short stories on Palestinian politics, culture and literature. Her book This Side of Peace (Simon & Schuster, 1995) earned worldwide recognition. Ashrawi received both Bachelor of Arts and Master of Arts degrees from the American University of Beirut and a Doctor of Philosophy degree in Medieval and Comparative Literature from the University of Virginia in the United States. Moreover, she is the recipient of eleven honorary doctorates from universities in the U.S., Canada, Europe, and the Arab world.

She is married to Emile Ashrawi and has two daughters, Amal and Zeina.

YouTube Encyclopedic

  • 1/5
    Views:
    520
    770
    333
    2 913
    2 704
  • ✪ Critical Conversations on Palestine and Israel 3/5/2015
  • ✪ The Birth and Evolution of Palestinian Nationalism - FPRI's 2014 Middle East History Institute
  • ✪ National Agenda 2015: Yasser Arafat Payne
  • ✪ Conversations with History: Susan Shirk
  • ✪ Scientific Discovery with Carol Greider - Conversations with History

Transcription

Hello, everyone, and welcome to Critical Conversation Palestine-Israel number four on the theme, "What is to be done?" It's really fantastic to see so many of you here. I really did not think we will have many people here today because of the weather and because there are many high-profile events happening at exactly the same time at Brown, including our very own president, Christina Paxson, who's having an event called "Breaking the Ceiling," along with other female university presidents-- surely an exciting and very important topic. But I'm still glad that you are here. Allow me also to address the audience that's watching us live stream. We've discovered that Middle East Studies events here at Brown may be popular on campus, but they're much more popular online. We usually have 8 to 10 times the number of people watching live online as we do in any room. So there are probably a few hundred people watching online now. And I want to say hello to all of them and thank you very much for joining us. This will also be available as a video on YouTube that you can watch, and others can watch later. My name is Beshara Doumani. I'm Director of Middle East Studies here at Brown University. I would like to thank the Watson Institute for bringing Hanan Ashrawi here for a week-long residency. We have kept her very busy, especially with undergraduates. She's visited many classes and held workshops and broke bread with them over lunch and dinner. And we appreciate her time and her enthusiasm. I would also like to thank the Middle East Studies team, without whom nothing would be possible-- Sarah Tobin, our new incoming associate director, is fantastic. The maestro of all logistical matters having to do with any programming, Barbara Oberkoetter, hiding somewhere in the back, and Robin McGill, who's been working with us as administrative assistant for the past few months, has been absolutely invaluable. What is critical conversation on Palestine-Israel? It's a once-a-semester panel. The idea is to bring together deeply informed people about what's going on in Palestine-Israel, and to engage them in an informal discussion with each other, but mostly with the audience, about the deep structures, the power relations, and the politics of the region. This is not a CNN, let's have a balance of narratives kind of format. It's much more-- "let's deal with the real issues behind the headlines." I will dispense with long introductions, of course, as we usually do. You can find on our website plenty of information on the speakers. But let me say a couple of words about each, beginning, of course, with Hanan Ashrawi, who's visiting us here this week, as I said, from Ramallah, missing some really important meetings of the Central Council of the PLO, of which she is a member. She's also elected representative in the Palestinian Legislative Council, representing Jerusalem. She was elected in 1996 for that position and reelected again in 2006, making her the first woman, Palestinian woman, to hold the seat also in the PLO Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization. And that started in 2009. But she's also a civil society activist-- founded a number of groups I won't go into now. But for most of you. She is well-known, of course, as the most articulate spokesperson on the Palestinian issue. And it's a pleasure to have her here. Steven Roberts has been a tremendous friend of Brown University, and Brown University's Chancellor from 1998 to 2007. I think you all know him very well. And Hani Masri is Director of Masarat. And I think, to my mind, anyway, he's one of the best informed and most insightful Palestinian journalist working today. When it comes to knowing what's really going on inside the Palestinian Authority, what's going on between Hamas and Fatah and what's going on on the Palestinian body politic, I think Hani Masri is a person to read. But he's also very much involved through Masarat in a number of civil society discussions about unity that brought people together in a recent tour. There were enormously important meetings from Lebanon, and Nazareth, and Jerusalem, and Ramallah, and many other cities and countries about the question of Palestinian unity. The theme, "What is to be done?" builds on the fact that our three speakers have something in common. Now I must say here that our fourth speaker, Ilan Pappe, because of the weather, was not able to come here on time. His plane landed about 45 minutes ago in Boston. So he won't be with us, and he apologizes. But he'll be here tomorrow, as well Hanan and others, for our Second Annual Conference-- New Directions in Palestinian Studies, which will be a two-day conference starting tomorrow. So those of you who want to catch Ilan and others, please come to the conference tomorrow. What our three speakers have in common here is that they have their finger on the pulse of what's going on in the political sphere as defined, largely, in the formal sense of the governments of the United States, of Israel, and of course, the Palestinian Authority and the PLO. They're also deeply in touch with ongoing discussions in policy think tanks and civil society organizations. It's difficult to find three more well-informed people on the topics that interest many of you than the ones we have here with us tonight. And they've been given a difficult task to reflect on where the structural and asymmetrical relations underpinning this conflict-- what do they tell us about the situation as it stands now, and what ought to be done in a short to medium term to move towards a long-lasting and just solution? And they have 15 minutes each to do that. We'll start with Hanan Ashrawi, then Steve Robert, and then Hani Masri. They'll speak for 15 minutes each. And then we'll open it up for discussion. May I invite Hanan Ashrawi? [APPLAUSE] Thank you very much. It's wonderful to be here again with you. I thank Sarah, and the Middle East Studies, and Rick, and the Watson Institute, and everybody else. And I don't want to repeat all the names. There's a whole host of people who worked very hard to get us here and to get this program going. So I add my thanks to all the names you've mentioned. And I also thank you for braving the weather. But I guess you're used to it. I was telling Sarah, I don't think anybody will show up here. If this were Ramallah, we'd all stay at home. But now, you're used to this type of weather. And I'm glad that we have this chance to engage. And I hope that this will be a real engagement on the issues. Actually in the overall configuration of Middle East realities-- or some people would like to call it Middle East peace-- Palestine actually is the weakest, though the most focal component. And we are always being asked to think creatively, to think outside the box, to find ways out of an impasse, to try to find strategic options, and so on. Although we know that we are not in control of what's happening around us. And the Palestinian question, as we will be discussing in the conference, has never been an isolated sort of discrete issue. It has always been determined and influenced by several external factors and powers, and so on. And contextually, of course, we know that the most immediate factor is the Israeli occupation itself, the nature of that occupation, acts with full impunity, the increase in settlement activities, the increase in a system of control, in violence itself, annexation of Jerusalem, the withholding of Palestinian funds, the lack of ability to reconstruct Gaza, for example, which is a real disaster area, and so on, and the use of power politics constantly-- challenging international law and getting away with it, and at the same time, introducing a new element of ideology-- particularly with the new pre-conditions of the Palestinians having to accept the Jewishness of the state, or to become suddenly, all Zionists overnight in order to qualify to talk to Israel. So this whole idea of introducing the concept of exclusion and the concept of Jewishness, or defining the state in a unilateral way is something that also feeds ideology on the other side. So that's something we'll be discussing. Along with that, with the ongoing occupation-- I won't go into details. We have an Israeli policies and the shifting of the terrain to the extreme right, and actually legislating racist laws, and so on. You also have the American cover that is given to Israel, and a sense of-- you don't want to say collusion-- you can say full support for Israeli policies-- lack of any critical distance or judgment. But on the contrary, the sense that the US has to constantly support Israel, no matter what, even when the Israeli prime minister comes and lectures here in the US at Congress and tells them he knows better what's good for the US than their own President. But anyway, this issue has always plagued any peacemaking effort, and it has always undermined American standing and credibility in the region. Along with that, we have the Arabs, the Arab world in this array. Some people call it a spring. Some people call it a transition. It certainly is a difficult period which is quite destabilizing. It is quite disturbing in many cases, and quite bloody, and unpredictable. But this Arab transition is signaling new realities. But it has also distracted attention from the Palestinian question in many ways and diverted Arab funding and support. And of course, we see in Palestine a sense of fragmentation internally. But we also see a population that is fragmented, whether within Palestine, or even Palestinians in exile and in refugee camps outside who feel marginalized and excluded. And that's another factor that is difficult. However, there is a consensus among everybody that the latest-- I don't want to see current because there is no peace process-- the latest peace attempt has really run its course. It has come to an end. And it's built in flaws and self-destruct mechanisms have really led to the negation of its very objective, and actually, its own self-negation. It has nearly redefined the Occupation and allowed it to re-entrench itself in ways that made the objective of peace, whether its through state solution or not. That's much more difficult. Does this mean that there is a parallel consensus that the two-state solution has come to an end? We discussed this last time. That was the subject of our first critical conversation. Certainly not by the international community-- I don't hear anybody in any country, any officials say that the two-state solution has come to an end. Everybody is busy trying to convince us that it is still possible. Again, with the PLO, the PNC, the political agenda has not changed. The 1988 PNC resolutions still remain-- the commitment to a two-state solution. However, there is an ongoing debate on whether that is still a possibility or that is still available. Public opinion is in a state of flux, even though the official position has not shifted that drastically. But let's say everybody's caught in the grip of a historical impasse. Given all that, what are the Palestinian options? And in this case, I always say that when it comes to Palestine, the laws of physics do not apply. You cannot say for every action, there is an equal and opposite reaction. Because whatever the action that we may try against tremendous odds, and pressure, and blackmail, and so on, to undertake, there are a series of reactions, numerous reactions, starting with political blackmail, withholding of funds, punitive measures, and so on. So it's not easy to say that we will take one action and it will lead us to other options. All right. The least desirable-- the first option, which is the least desirable, is more of the same, that all we need to do is to continue this exercise in futility by having US-sponsored, direct, bilateral negotiations. This process has actually run its course. And as I said, it has cost us a great deal. It's an exercise in futility. And it is suicide. And many people are telling us, you just wait till the end of the elections in Israel, and then we will restart bilateral negotiations. And everybody is telling us, well, Palestinian statehood is a right, but it can emerge only as a result of direct bilateral negotiations. For the first time in history, you have people under occupation being told that the right to be fee and the right to self-determination and statehood is entirely dependent on the acceptance or acquiescence of the occupier. What's direct bi-lateral negotiations? Occupier and occupied-- there is no parity. There is no symmetry. There is no common language. And of course, Israel, then, has the right to veto all these basic rights, if you think that statehood has to depend on negotiations. The second option-- we can discuss these options later. I'm trying to be concise. I don't want to take everybody's time-- is to look for a new and improved version. If you've listened to the Europeans-- Federica Mogherini was talking about Europe wanting to play a role and to have a new initiative. The European Three, headed by France, they want to start a new option-- international conference, perhaps. Everybody's remembering the Arab Peace Initiative. That should be part of the equation. Let's have these talks based on international law. Let's take concrete steps. And let's find the binding time frame to end the occupation. Now we have nothing against that-- finding a new formulation for serious, substantive, effective, legal negotiations, based on international law. But it's clear to everybody that alone, this is not enough. The third option could include this one or any type of genuine talks if we have a more expensive and inclusive combination of steps, particularly in view of the [INAUDIBLE] symmetry, which involves multilateralism and legal recourse that would empower the Palestinians, empower Palestine-- by the way, we do say Palestine these days. We don't have to say Palestinians or Palestinian authority. There is a Palestine. And to curb Israeli violations-- to provide what I always describe as to provide Israeli accountability and Palestine with protection, including seeking international protection. We've already applied to the Fourth Geneva Convention. We've been accepted as one of the high contracting parties. That would create accountability on the basis of international humanitarian law. We've already applied to the Human Rights Council. And we have a commission of inquiry that is coming, which is very important, even though Israel wouldn't allow it to come in. We have acceded to their own statute, which would give us access to the International Criminal Court. And we have also applied to several and acceded to several international conventions and treaties that would define the nature of our state, but to also enable us to be part of the international community, and empower us. And we will be joining international agencies and organizations that would make the embodiment of statehood something that is not just formalistic or abstract, but actually legal and accepted by the international community and that would define the nature of our system of governance. Because we do want to have a state that is democratic, that respects human rights, safeguards human rights, and women's rights, and children's rights. And so these are the conventions we acceded to. And there are others-- I have a long list if you are interested in them. Because we want to abide by these principles. And we want to define the nature of our state as based on international conventions and that. And of course, we work to increase bilateral recognitions. This would help us also, within the international community, to be if not an equal player, but at least to have some sort of state framework. And we are redefining-- there is a decision to do that-- to redefine the Palestinian Authority, its institutions, and its role because it was a temporary setup or structure. Along with that, redefine our relationship with Israel, including our political relationship, economic relationship, and security coordination. Today the Palestine Central Council took a decision to stop security coordination with Israel. And this I'm sure, will get lots of reactions. We also are committed to reforming, upgrading, and re-activating the PLO and its institutions. When we talk about an economic safety net from the Arab world, which hasn't materialized as a result of Israel's withholding of our money, we are also talking about a political safety net. If Israel succeeds in destroying the PA and its institutions, the PLO has to be in a position to be able to undertake its responsibility vis-a-vis the people of Palestine. And with that, we need to adopt the concepts and mechanisms of actual statehood and sovereignty. We cannot constantly be a mini-state, a substate, a pseudo-state, or whatever. We have to be able to embody this type of statehood by working on these different institutions. And of course, the occupation has to be costly. It has to be costly, morally, economically, politically, legally, so as not to be costly in human terms. I think it's important that the occupation be accountable. And therefore, there are different means of non-violent resistance, popular resistance. We need to support and diversify nonviolent means of resistance, including BDS, and work with various solidarity networks that are emerging and that are being very effective, giving the opportunity for individuals to act and to make a difference. And of course, to have an impact on international public opinion. This, of course, requires sufficient reform and transparency for good governance and a strategic vision to re-gain the confidence and support of the people. And of course, the political system needs to re-form itself in order to gain credibility. And we will discuss this later. Along with that would be the inclusion of the younger generation, and particularly, the women. We have lots of promising people. But they have been excluded from decision-making. And elections is one way of getting the younger people involved and, of course, of rejuvenating and revitalizing and re-legitimizing our political system. We also have to work-- this is absolutely crucial-- on healing the rift, the reunification of the Palestinian political system, and the reconstruction of Gaza, and of course, elections. And this is a real challenge, by the way. Everybody says we must have reunification. We must have reconciliation. But this is extremely difficult. Maybe I won't go into all the details because there are different agendas. Are they irreconcilable or aren't they? What are the common aspects of these two agendas? Can we say that Hamas and Fatah, or Hamas and PLO factions, can have the same agendas? Or can we find ways of managing our differences within a pluralistic, democratic system. But I don't think you will see in Palestine a sort of uniformity or a monolithic political program. You might have strategic targets that are the same. But you might have differences in terms of arriving at these objectives. A joint political program, or an agreed sense of command for military action-- this isn't going to work either. But I believe we need, as I said, to manage our differences without sabotaging our central or national cause. Now the fourth option, which we discussed last time-- I don't want to talk about it in detail-- but abandoning the two-state solution altogether, which means you could either have a de facto one-state solution, which might become a de facto demographic issue. But Israel is going to intervene anyway and change that. Or we adopt a post-nationalist rights agenda, which is a bit difficult now because we haven't even gone through the nationalist phase to get to the post-nationalist phase. Some people say that also gives Israel the upper hand as an occupying power. Others-- the third option under the abandoning the two-state solution is to postpone a solution. Postponing it, by going back to the whole issue of sumud-- steadfastness, remaining on the ground. But again, even if we do that, you need to be able to have the means of maintaining people on the ground despite these tremendous odds. There are other actors, other interventions, and other consequences, including allies and partners. Whatever decision, whatever option we adopt, we do have to bring to the not just discussion, but decision-making, allies partners and those who have a vested interest in genuine peace and a sustainable peace. There are some tactical steps that have been addressed. Dissolving the PA-- again, we can discuss that. If you want to dissolve it, what else would you put in its place? Is there a status quo ante to go back to? What is the principle of organization? Some people say we have to cancel or nullify the agreement-- the declaration of principles and all related agreements, particularly the Paris protocol that created a sense of economic dependency. Again, Israel has violated all agreements and has turned them into a system of control. But as I said, we will redefine the relationship with Israel. However, I don't see Israel waiting in order to take over the West Bank and Gaza and accept the responsibilities of the belligerent occupant, even though this is a decision by the PA. Sorry, by the Central Council today. So how do you maintain your ability to resist, to withstand, to maintain people on the ground, and to revitalize your political system if you are internally fragmented? Again, how do you forge new relationships and galvanize support, particularly within the Arab world and beyond, in Europe, and prepare alternative strategies-- if so, then what? We cannot just say, OK, we will take that step, leap in the dark, and then we will face the consequences when they come up. There are many issues at stake. And there are many actors at work here that cannot be ignored. Now the last thing I would say here that if Israel persists in superimposing Greater Israel on historical Palestine, it will be inviting the Palestinians to reconsider the whole historical agenda in which we accepted Resolutions 242, 338, and the partition of Palestine 181. And people will start asking for historical Palestine. Then the equation becomes either/or. Thank you. [APPLAUSE] Hi. It's a pleasure to be here today. And thank you all for braving the snow and all the inclement weather to come . I think it might help put my remarks in context if I did a self-identification at first, and I'll make it brief. I'm Jewish. I grew up in a typically Jewish family in New England. I was bar Mitzi's. My father was president of the local synagogue. My mother was president of the local Hadassah. My sister, who's here today, until recently went to the Soviet Union to help impoverished Jews in the Soviet Union. I've been a governor of the American Jewish Committee, a founding director of the Memorial to the Holocaust in New York. So I'm there. I am very Jewish. And why do I say that? Because following in the footsteps of my parents, I have a great love for Israel. I think it is important, given the history that you all know very well, to have a Jewish state. But I think it's almost equally as important to have a democratic Jewish state. So you may hear me today be critical of Israel, but it's not out of a lack of love for Israel. It's because, I think, the current government of Israel is leading it in a very, very dangerous direction-- one that really threatens the long-term existence of the state. So where I really am is pro-Israel, anti-the current, right-wing, Netanyahu government. And I'll get into that a little more later, and where it's leading our once democratic Jewish state. Now Hanan alluded to this. But let's look at where we start. The Palestinians have agreed to pre-1967 borders, sometimes called the Green Line, which gave them 22% of the land that was available to divide before the UN partition in 1947. 22%-- now the UN gave them 45% because of various military battles that took place over time. Israel ended up with all but 22%. We ended up with 78%. And the Palestinians have agreed that with land swaps, that Green Line should be the border of the new Palestinian state. In a way, even if the Israelis just accepted that, it would be a very unfair deal to the Palestinians. They started off already with an unfair deal. Some Israeli politicians would like to take away so-called Area C from the West Bank now controlled by Israel. That would leave the Palestinians with 9% of the land to be divided pre-UN petition in 1947. 9%, even though they were about 55% of the population at the time. So point being, the Palestinians-- when we get into these negotiations-- are not starting from a very strong position to start with. And I would think it would therefore be very difficult for them to give up much because they've already given up a very, very great deal. They've been under occupation for almost 50 years. And just a few of the elements of occupation-- I can't name them all. There's at least 500 checkpoints according to the UN. There's no freedom of movement within the territory. They're citizens of nowhere. They're subject to arbitrary arrest without charges and to be held in prison for at least one year. It's very hard for them to get secondary and tertiary medical care. Patients have died in cars or ambulances waiting to get through the checkpoint to get medical care in Jerusalem, where most of the Palestinian secondary and tertiary care takes place. There's constraints on trade, water, farming. The wall is an enormous problem. And by the way, it's interesting to note that the wall is two times the length of the Green Line. So if this wall was just a separation barrier, it would theoretically be about the length of the Green Line. Why is it two times the length? Because it zigs and zags-- there's kind of a land grab involved with the wall as well. It's more than just a security wall. It's more than just a wall so that the Israelis don't have to see the horrors of life on the other side. But it was also a land grab, making it very, very difficult for the Palestinians. So where are we for those of us who love Israel? It's painful to say, but in my view, Israel is no longer a democratic, Jewish state because it's not striving anymore-- I'll elaborate on this-- to create a negotiation for a Palestinian state. It is basically just a bi-national state where 35% of the population have no rights at all. That's what it is. It's a bi-national state. 35% of the population are not citizens, have no rights. And the other 65% have everything. So in reality-- and this is a phrase that will make some people angry. It always does. Israel today, not only isn't a democratic state, it's an apartheid state. Why do I say that? I know that can be a very harsh word. It's an apartheid state by the UN definition. Apartheid is a word with a very specific meaning in the English language. According to the UN definition, it's when one institutionalized racial group deprives another racial group of their rights. So if you have 35% of part of the Arab population having no rights, that fits like a glove to the definition of apartheid. So while people very often don't like to hear that word, it's very tough to deny the facts. OK so why do I say that Israel is no longer even pretending to create, through negotiation, a state for the Palestinians? I say it because they say it. For a long time, even the right wing of Israeli politics claimed that they wanted a Palestinian state. Netanyahu gave a speech at Bar-Ilan University in 2009 in which he purportedly-- although it was highly nuanced-- suggested that there be a Palestinian state, under great pressure from the United States to say that. Although his father, who was a very famous right-wing Israeli, Benzion Netanyahu, gave an interview to Israeli television the next day. And he was asked what do you think of your son favoring a Palestinian state? And the father, Benzion, answered, my son would never give the Palestinians a state they would possibly accept. And I must say, at least up to this point, that has proved to be prophetic. Netanyahu has said in a press conference and on numerous occasions he can no longer agree to a sovereign Palestinian state contiguous to Israel. He says such a state would have to be indefinitely inhabited by Israeli security forces so that it would not be a sovereign state at all. You can't have a sovereign state that more than temporarily, or in small part, is inhabited by a foreign country's security forces. The defense minister, Moshe Ya'alon, in a conversation with a group of us in New York, said that why make an agreement with the Palestinians? We don't have agreements with many, many countries, with scores of countries. We don't need an agreement with the Palestinians. We will just manage the situation as we've done all these years. I love Shimon Peres' response to that when he said, if we could manage this crisis, it wouldn't be a crisis. So that's Ya'alon's position-- very powerful. Naftali Bennett, who many of you have heard of-- minister of the economy, very, very popular right-wing Israeli politician is against a two-state solution at all. And he's the greatest proponent of annexing Area C, leaving the Palestinians with 9% of the pre-petition land. Lieberman, the foreign minister, says that he might be in favor of a two-state solution, but he wants to take a whole group of Israeli Arab villages in what's called The Northern Triangle and give them back to Palestine. So that the people that live in those villages would have a choice of becoming part of Palestine, perhaps moving to some other city. This would be illegal under international law and a horrendous violation of civil liberties. So I could go on and on with the position of various members of this Netanyahu government. But basically, they've taken their mask off. They no longer claim that they want even a Palestinian state. They no longer want to negotiate for a Palestinian state. They just say no Palestinian state except under terribly arduous terms, or just leave things, as Ya'alon says, to be managed over time. One of the great problems has been the expansion of settlements by the Israelis on the West Bank. That has gone on since the '70s, virtually without stop. It even continued to go on through the Kerry peace talks. As a matter of fact, according to Martin Indyk, a special envoy to the peace talks, 8,000 new units, deep into the Palestinian territories, were announced during the course of the nine months of peace talks. These were not settlements on the border that might be, through land swaps, incorporated into Israel in any peace agreement. These were deep into Palestine. And it was a enormous problem during the peace negotiations. There's an analogy somebody made to me that I quite like. He said, you know, negotiating with the Israelis is like negotiating over a slice of pizza with a friend, except while you're negotiating, your friend is holding the slice of pizza and eating it. And this, in fact, is a very good analogy to trying to negotiate a state with a country that is violating international law and establishing settlements on your land, even while the negotiations go on. OK. What needs to change? Well, there's more than needs to change than possibly I have time to talk about. And a lot has to change, by the way, as Hanan says, in Palestine too. But I'm going to leave that to Palestinian representatives on this panel. But clearly, Palestine has some serious issues that they need to address. Israel For Israel's part, there's no chance of peace without a new government. This government will not negotiate a peace. They don't want one. They would just like to leave the situation to fester-- 4 and 1/2 million people deprived of all their rights, and somehow they'll manage their way through this. So we need a new Israeli government. We need another Rabin or somebody of that ilk that would really be serious about creating a Palestinian state. So we need a new Israeli government. There are elections on March 17. If you want me to handicap those elections, I'll be glad to do it during the Q&A. But I won't go through it now. But In my view, if peace talks were to start again, the only sensible way for them to start is with a settlement freeze. Peace talks in the absence of a settlement freeze, in my view, will never succeed. That would be an absolute requirement. Now as to the framework agreement, it's already been written. It's been written several times. You had the Oslo agreement. You had the Quartet outline of a peace plan. You had Clinton's outline of a peace plan. And you had the Geneva Accords. And the State Department has a framework that they developed during the negotiations. But it's locked in a safe in the State Department under presidential orders not to release it. So the work on how you can make this work has been done. And if you look at all these agreements-- Oslo, Quartet, Clinton, Geneva-- you know what? They're all relatively similar. They have nuances of difference. But it's quite clear-- by the way, the Palestinians were very involved in the creation of the Geneva Accords. So they probably need to be fine-tuned. But that work has been done. It's all you need is an Israeli administration that will seriously negotiate peace. And you really need to get rid of the attitude on the part of many Israelis, especially the settlers, that essentially says the Bible becomes the Middle East real estate directory. That just can't prevail. It makes no sense. So if you had peace, in my view, both sides would win. Palestinians would get a state. They'd get full membership in the United Nations. Their economy would be aided by trade and many billions of dollars of investment. They have an educated labor force. The Palestinians are one of the most educated communities, certainly in the Arab world. And Israel, once again, instead of being a pariah rogue state becomes a democratic Jewish state with international acceptance. So just in finishing, for those of you that can't remember anything I just said, I'll tell you in a nutshell a story. And if you just know this story, you'll already have a degree in Middle East. And you can avoid the Middle East studies department. You don't have to do any homework. You don't have to take any exams. You know this story-- you're there. Here's the story. There was a frog and a scorpion sitting on the banks of the Nile. And they were sunning themselves. And the scorpion said to the frog, where are you going? And the frog said, I'm going to swim across the Nile. I want to get to the other side. And the scorpion said, well I want to get to the other side too, but I can't swim. Could I ride on your back? And the frog thought for a minute, and he said, if you promise not to sting me, yes. So the scorpion promised. Scorpion hops on the frog's back. And the frog swims halfway across the Nile, at which point the scorpion stings it. And the frog looks up, and he says to the scorpion, why did you do that? Now we're both going to die. And the scorpion said, this is the Middle East. So thank you very much. [APPLAUSE] Good evening. First of all, let me thank Middle East studies at the Brown University, and especially Dr. [INAUDIBLE] for inviting me to participate in this meeting. In order to answer the question of what it is to be done, we need to answer three questions. Where do we stand now, where we want to go, and how will we get there? The answer about the first question begins with describe the situation, which shows that we are now in the middle of a comprehensive blight. After the ending of the so-called peace process and bilateral negotiation which US sponsored alone, and after more than 20 years from signing Oslo Accord, what we have now the occupation more deepen and strengthen and settlement expansion. And the settlers became more than 700,000 and Israel planning to increase the number to one million settlers in the next few years. Also Israel built a separation racial expansion wall and West Bank separate from the rest of the occupied territories. And Jerusalem also separate from West Bank and we reach the road block so that resumption the negotiation as they were talking taking place for more than 20 years-- not a solution-- and become not only a mistake, but fatal mistake. Unfortunately, the Palestinian leadership is still, despite of what had been believed on the negotiations, and seek for the resume of it. Only in the recent years, the Palestinian leadership tried a combination of negotiations and internationalization of the issue and use international recognition of the Palestinian state and popular dissent and BDS and reconciliation as only tools trying to put pressure on Israel and push it to resume negotiation in order to improve its conditions. The Palestinians need and must adopt a new and radically different track that focuses on the struggle to alter the balance of power, rending the occupation costly for Israel and those who support it, because the Israel occupation is seven [? star ?] occupation. We need to stop this. The first step to achieve that-- to have alternative strategy. The Palestinian need a new strategy to review of their experiences through a comprehensive national dialogue that concentrate about negotiation resistance, and the role of Palestinian authority and PLO. Without rebuilding the institutions, especially inside PLO, in order to represent all Palestinian, taking in our consideration the developments and the new facts and what can unite the Palestinian, and what the differences between them. Without unity, without national institution, and one leadership and one decision-maker, we can't reach any of our goals. So we need a new charter and put a political program, because the negotiation and dialogue between the Palestinians and the reconciliation agreement ignored the importance of political program. So we need this because without unity, we can't change the balance of power. The main issue for the Palestinians to change the situation is to change the balance of power. Because Israel refused all the initiatives to reach peace agreements. So if we wait for Israel to be ready, we lost everything. The importance in this discussion to know that Oslo gave the Palestinians three things, but they paid a high price for that. Oslo gave the Palestinian self-rule authority for an endless period, second, allow the Palestinian leadership and about a quarter million to return back, third, Israel government has recognized the PLO and as it is representative of the Palestinian people. Without the recognition of their rights, the Palestinian recognize Israel as a state, but Israel recognize PLO. And this is a big difference between the two recognitions. The Palestinian leadership gave Israel many things in Oslo Accord-- a golden recognition of the right to exist on almost 80% of historical Palestine, and to live in peace and security. Because of that, I said, golden recognition because we gave Israel a guarantee for the future, not only in these days. Second, stop the resistance and adopt peaceful tools before they achieve their goals. And committed to implement the obligations about security and economic, without nothing written. And it has, I think, not happened in history that you stop your resistance before you achieve your goals. That is a very big mistake. Third, Oslo divided the solution between transitional solution and final solution, and divided between the issues, and the land, and population, and divided each of them to many issues and many peoples. The land was divided into Areas A, and B, and C. The Palestinian issue must looking as it is an issue of right of self-determination for all of the Palestinians and related of the right or routine of refugees. The Palestinian issue, at its origin, is a refugee issue. We can't ignore the refugee issue and said about establish a Palestinian state and ignore the other dimensions. And it is very important the equality inside Israel. Because we can't ignore our people inside Israel. Israel-- not only occupation in state, it is a colonial settler and apartheid project. So we can't ignore this dimension at all. If we speak about one-state solution you or any solution, instead of two-state solution, we need to defeat and dismantle colonial settler projects. Because Israel is not only a normal state. The Palestinians need an alternative to cutting the umbilical cord that constantly provides the fatal elixir for unbalanced negotiations. Even so, all of the facts have proven that Israel itself, and not just one body or another, is not ready to voluntarily agree to any resolutions. The problem is that not only a Likud [INAUDIBLE] in Israel not accept the minimum of the Palestinians rights. The majority of the Israelis and the Israeli parties refuse the minimum of Palestinian rights. So we can't bet on the next election. The Likud or Labor Party, they are married to each other. Someone said before a few days about that. The difference between Likud and Labor, like the difference between Pepsi and Coca-Cola. So it's good to see the facts on the ground to put our new strategy to change the situation. We need to collect our cards-- Palestinians and Arabs, regional and international-- by providing the elements needed to consolidate the Palestinians' steadfastness on the land as well as resulting to resistance boycott that deployment justice and moral superiority of the Palestinians. And all the Arab Islamic regional and international factors-- especially the international solidarity movement, international law, and the UN resolution Palestinian still uphold the basic minimum of Palestinians right. International strategy, alone, which adopted by Palestinian leadership, can't change the situation and the power of balance. It is good, but not enough, alone. So we need many strategies at the same time-- unity between the Palestinians resistance and boycott and international strategy. All this strategy work together. I answered the first question and the third one. What is remained-- the answer of the second question. Where do we want to go? The answer of this question need to take a historical decision from the Palestinians after Israel is destroyed, what's so-called two-Sate solution. And Israel must pay the price for that because of he killed Oslo. She called the peace process, not the Palestinians. So because of that, we don't ask the Palestinian leadership to cancel Oslo, but we ask them to be ready to open the other option. Not to speak about other options, but be ready for that. Take decisions and what we need to be ready for other options because two-state solutions-- I don't think that can apply anymore. But we don't want, again, to cancel it. Because Israel is the party who killed Oslo, not the Palestinian. Israel prevent any initiatives, any peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. Because of that, we need to change our strategy. We need to unite the Palestinian. And someone maybe said, how you can unite Fatah and Hamas? They have different ideology, different alliance, and different interests. I think there's a very important factor will push the Palestinian to unite. It is Israel not offer the Palestinians any solution. And Israel, against Palestinian and Hamas, against all the Palestinians, she arrested them. She killed them. When Israel forces attack Gaza, they don't distinguish between Fatah and Hamas. They don't distinguish between moderate and extremism. They attacked all the Palestinians. So because of that, and because of the Fatah strategy, face a deadlock, and Hamas strategy face a deadlock. So there's no solution from Fatah alone or from Hamas alone. All of the Palestinian, like I mentioned in the beginning, in a big crisis. So they need to cooperate to solve their problems. Because their enemy is very strong and supported from United States and many countries. Without unity between the Palestinian, without a new strategy, we can't achieve our goals. And we can bet on many things-- that 6 million of the Palestinians remain in historical Palestine-- almost the same number of the Jews. So it is very important. And the Palestinian, in spite of all their losses, they continue their struggles and they insist to achieve their goals. Let me say that what happened on the ground. Everyday Israeli soldiers arrest at least ten Palestinians-- at least. It shows us that the Palestinians, despite of what happened, despite of their suffer, they insist to continue their struggle. Because Palestinian cause is justice and moral cause. And there's a solidarity movement all over the world. Support the Palestinian cause so they can bet on that. Because of that, I think there is a hope, especially in this government and when we hear what Netanyahu said, what Netanyahu done, we think that he is a strong enemy for Israel more than to the Palestine. And thank you. [APPLAUSE] Think you all very much. The format is we're going to collect about three or four questions. You should not take more than-- or comment, if you'd like. But not more than a minute, and then we'll turn it to the speakers. There's people with microphones on this side. So it's open for questions. Please-- it's hard to see. Thank you very much for your talk. My name is [? Yara ?]. I'm Palestinian. And I'd like to address my question to Mr. Roberts. You said that you love Israel and that you believe that it is now following a right-wing path and that it's become an apartheid state, and that it's now un-democratic. And so, from this, I take it that you support Zionism and that you supported the establishment of the Zionist regime. In 1948, when the Zionists brutally occupied Palestine in what's generally accepted as an ethnic cleansing, similar to the ethnic cleansings that happened here in the United States of indigenous people, in Australia, and in New Zealand-- so when they occupied the land, nearly all the people were expelled. However, there remained a few hundred thousand left. And they were given nominal citizenship. But they were placed under military rule for nearly two decades. This military rule included curfews. You had to apply for a permit to travel anywhere. You had to go to the police station if you wanted to leave your village, if you wanted to go to the doctor's, if you wanted to trade. And any mention of Palestine or anything to do with the Palestinians landed you in jail. And even after the military rule ended, any form of political activism landed you in jail. My father was put in prison for running a student newspaper. And so, I'm afraid Israel has never been a democratic state. It has never been a state for all its people. It is a state for Jews. And if we are to be even more critical of Israeli society, it is a state for white Jews. So for me, the problem with Israel lies in its founding as a settler colonial state. And therefore, thinking towards the future, we don't need a new Rabin, who may I remind you called for a "breaking bones" policy during the First Intifada, which was literally smashing the bones of Palestinians who demonstrated. What we do need is a move to a post-colonial society, a one-state solution where political regimes on both sides are dismantled and we start again-- one person, one vote. So I ask you is this something you could support-- a state perhaps called Israel and Palestine, but most importantly, a state for all the people who feel a connection to the land. Thank you. Thank you. I think your facts are basically right. There was a terrible ethnic cleansing, particularly in the first half of 1948. At least 600,000 Arabs were driven off the land that Israel felt was theirs under the UN partition. Some were killed. Those 600,000 are now a couple of million refugees in Lebanon, and Syria, and Jordan. There were about 800,000. And now they've become 5 and 1/2 million. 5 and 1/2 million-- OK. That is a number I haven't heard. So to the extent that happened-- and it did happen. I agree with you. That's abhorrent. Of course, I don't support that. I think you asked me if I supported it at the time. I was only eight years old, so I don't think I had an opinion on it at the time. But in fact, your point is very serious. It's very well-taken. But you know what? We can't go back in time. We can't make a better past. A lot of horrible things happened in this battle. We had two peoples who each thought they had a historic right to a small piece of land in the Middle East. In terms of atrocities and other things, there is plenty of blame to go around. If you want to feel more of the blame is on the Israelis, I wouldn't even argue with you. But we can't move the needle forward to progress by reiterating the horrors that have happened since, and even before, 1948. We have to treat the past as the past and go on to figure out the present, and how we get a better future than we had in the past. Now finally, you asked me if I could support a one-state solution. And I could, but it's not realistic. In my view-- and I don't know exactly how Palestinians feel-- but in my view, Israel will never support a one-state solution because it wouldn't be a Jewish state for various historical and other reasons-- especially the persecution of the Jews by the Babylonians, and the Egyptians, and the Spanish, and the Nazis, et cetera. Most of the Jews in Israel-- and Israel, by the way, contains 40% of all the Jews in the world-- want Israel to be a Jewish state. And I therefore don't think, in the real world, it's going to happen that we had is that we have a one-state solution, everybody having an equal right. So I think the more pragmatic and more possible solution is to have two states-- a Palestinian state and Israeli state. And I think that, at least, has some possibility. As we've all said, even that's not looking very possible right at the moment. But I happen to be a little bit optimistic because I don't think occupation in historical terms has much of a future. So while it's not much comfort to the people who are living in Palestine today-- I think half the population of Palestine's under 25, something like that. No, more than that-- More-- Over 66%-- Over 60% is under 35. So all these people who are a wonderful people, and obviously, weren't even alive when much of the past happened-- they deserve a dignified life. They deserve civil liberties. They deserve citizenship in a country. They deserve the right of movement. They deserve the right of medical care. They deserve not to have to ask the IDF for a pass every time they want to go somewhere. They deserve to have an airport. They deserve all the things that people in civilized countries have. And so my view is I'd like to see that happen as soon as humanly possible. And I think it's much more likely to happen with a two-state solution. I can't see it happening-- even though I personally wouldn't object to it-- I can't see it happening in a one-state solution. OK. So shall we go to this side of the room? Hi. My name is Julia. I'm a PhD student in the history department, and I simply wanted to ask if the speakers could comment on the Palestinian Central Committee's decision to cease coordinating security details in the West Bank with the IDF-- just an open comment. Yes. This was part of a decision or a long-term plan that was adopted by the political committee which was formed by the PLO Executive Committee to look into different strategic steps for the future. One of these steps was the cessation of security coordination with Israel. The fact is security coordination is multifaceted. And it has played against the interests of the Palestinian people in many ways, where you have Palestinian security that is supposed to protect the safety and security of Israeli settlers, and even army, even when they enter into Areas A, which are supposedly under the control of the Palestinian Authority, security-wise and civil terms. Yet they cannot protect their own people. This has become a resource of loss of credibility for the leadership. And of course, one of the sources of rejection of many of the agreements, or as we said, the built-in flaws of the DOP or what is known as the Oslo Accords. By saying that we will cease cooperation, it means that the Palestinian security will go back to dealing with Palestinian rights, the Palestinian people, the public order, and so on. And there will be no coordination with the Israeli security. This is something that the Israelis do not want in any way, shape or form. This is something that the Americans do not want. And it is no secret that we were told that should this decision be adopted, there would be serious consequences. Did you want to say something? Yes. What so-called security coordination? I don't know how the Palestinian leadership made such a mistake-- how you can protect your enemy without ending the occupation. So we need to change all our politics. Part of what we need is to stop security coordination. But to do that in a very good way, you need to be ready-- not took this decision under the pressure of the people or under the pressure of the Israeli decision to stop transferring the money for the Palestinian. We need to put this issue under the international dialogue to reach a new approach for the Palestinian. In addition to that, first of all, we need to rebuild that PLO institution because if we continue in this situation, the Palestinian authority will collapse without strong institution in PLO, this will leave us to chaos, and a very dangerous situation. So we need to be more serious and take our situation as it need-- not only steps-- [NON-ENGLISH SPEECH]? Reacting. Reacting without clear, new strategy. But just by way of context, let me just say here the central console is part of the PLO, which created the Palestinian Authority. But the PLO has no power really, compared to the Palestinian Authority. It's actually a small budget item line on the PA's budget. So just by taking this decision doesn't mean that it's going to happen. It's part of the tit for tat that's going on because the Israeli government has refused to release Palestinian funds. And Palestinian civil servants have been paid about 60% or their salary for the last three months. So the situation is fairly dire. And threatening to stop security corporation is probably one way that they thought that they could create some pressure. But the decision was taken. It is not a threat. And it is not just in response to the withholding of Palestinian customs funding. And it's not just a reaction to public opinion. There is public opinion pressure, of course. People want this to cease. They don't want to see that. But the security coordination was not the result of a decision by the leadership. But it was part of the DOP, part of the agreement of the Oslo Accords. And it's one of many, as I said, built-in flaws and self-destruct mechanisms that gave the Palestinian Authority the responsibility of protecting Israel without the ability to protect its own citizens. That's why it was extremely counterproductive and it contributed to undermining the credibility and standing of the Palestinian leadership. OK. Let's get to this side of the room. Can you tap it with your finger. See if it works? Is it working? [INAUDIBLE] So we'll take that as a comment. Well, I think it deserves some response, certainly. Because people didn't hear, is what I meant. I was going to repeat the comment. Well it's awfully hard to repeat. But I think the statement, slash, question had to do with the fact that politicians really don't have a right to dictate whether it should be one state or two states, that many of these people are living in a situation that they don't want to be living in. Many of them would like to have one state with equal rights for everybody. It's understandable, and I am sure that there are many people who agree with you. I'm not sure-- The majority agree. The majority of Palestinians may agree. According to public opinion polls, but there are many who [INAUDIBLE]. I'm not a politician. I'm just a citizen who cares about this matter very, very deeply. And I care about it for the Palestinians, as well as the Jews. I'd like to come up with a solution that will not be perfect, will not make everybody happy by any means. There is no such solution. But is possible, and will greatly improve the lives of all the Palestinians compared to what they have today, who will give all these people under 35 years old a chance to have a decent life, to get an education, to be able to travel, not to be arrested in the middle of the night and held without charges for a year, to be able to get secondary and tertiary medical care, to be able to visit their relatives in another part of the West Bank or in Jerusalem without getting almost impossible permission from the IDF. So yes, it could be that many, or if not a majority of Palestinians would like to see one state with equal rights for everyone. And I can easily sympathize with why they would want that. But honestly, I don't think it's going to happen. So if we use that as our premise, these 35-year-olds are going to be 95 years old, and they still won't have regained their civil liberties. They still won't live in a state. They still won't be citizens of anywhere. So in my view, I have to balance what each side wants with a solution that will be at least acceptable, if not perfect, for each side, and will give the Palestinians back the civil rights and the dignity which they're entitled to as a great people. Yeah, sure. What in the ground? In the ground, there's one state with two systems. Israel refuse two-state solution and refused one-state solution. So we need to change the balance of power to achieve any of them. I think the majority of the Palestinians accept two-state solution and one-state solution-- but in condition to stop the apartheid system. Equal rights and democracy is that solution. So in these days-- nothing only we work towards confrontation. Because the Israeli policies force the Palestinians towards confrontation-- nothing, only confrontation. Hi. My name is [INAUDIBLE] Michelle Dardashti. I'm the rabbi at Hillel. I'm Associate University Chaplain for the Jewish community. And I appreciate your being here for this important discussion. So I didn't have the privilege of hearing you, Dr. Ashrawi, when you were here last time. You spoke about three ways that a one-state solution would manifest. And you said that you had fleshed them out previously when you were here. I'd love to hear you speak to that a bit more-- what each of those looks like. You talked about three ways that the one-state solution would manifest. You said a de facto one-state solution, post-nationalist, and postponing a solution. I'd just love to hear you flesh those out. And I had one other question that might be related, and you can choose which one. The other question is-- I'm just wondering about hope. I'm just wondering where you do find hope. I hear you talking about resistance, and I hear you talk about BDS, and I hear that. I'm just also wondering in hearing Dr. Masri speak about the indistinguishable nature between Likud and Labor. There are other parties and there are amazing nonprofits that I'm sure you all know of, really, in Israel, working for social change, like [? Isha, ?] like [? Betsellim ?]. And I'm just wondering the extent to which you think that there's power there, that you think that there's leadership there, that you do see hope in Israeli leadership that is strong, and cares, and is fighting hard for human rights. The first part is for me. The second part for Hani. The second part for both of you, really. All right. Well, the two-state solution is something that can come about in a variety of ways. But as I said, let me just remind you historically in 1968-1969, the Palestinians proposed the one-state solution. We proposed-- at that time I was a student. And I think it was Fatah that had adopted the one secular of nonsectarian Palestine in which Jews, Christians, and Muslims can live in peace and equality. That was the political plan. Of course, it was rejected outright by the Israelis because of the concept of Zionism, that they did want a Jewish state in Palestine. And therefore, the proposal of having a nonsectarian state and equal citizenship was rejected. What is being proposed now is not exactly the same. In many ways, the first option that I talked about is not a conscious option but can be an outcome of the current dynamic, which is a de facto one-state solution. Because Israel is blurring that divide between Israel-Palestine or the 67 borders, which is the compromise we talked about. Israel is taking the land of the state of Palestine. Israel is building more and more settlements. Israel has declared that Jerusalem as its own capital unified forever, even though by international law, East Jerusalem is occupied. And even though by UN resolutions, even West Jerusalem is not under Israeli sovereignty. As you know, 181 talks about Jerusalem as a whole, as being a corpus separatum. All the unilateral actions that Israel is taking, including the wall, which now the right wing don't want to see, by the way. Because people like Naftali Bennett and others claim that the wall is creating a separation. Even though it is on West Bank land, and even though it is an apartheid wall of separation and annexation, they don't want it because they want to annex all the West Bank. Some of them talk about most of it. But Naftali Bennett doesn't want even any agreement, doesn't accept a two-state solution at all. And there are people within the Likud-- you don't have to belong even to the right of Likud-- who said openly that they are in favor of a one-state solution. Because Israel has all the power tools to continue the ethnic cleansing, whether through silent transfer, whether through making what [? Shami ?] said would make life so difficult for the Palestinians that they will leave. We don't need even to expel them. So there are different ways of having ethnic cleansing. In Area C, there is a systematic policy. We will just destroy all their homes, all their structures, all their institutions and bring in more settlers and more economic enterprises in Area C, especially in the Jordan Valley. And then, de facto, it becomes Israel. And then you annex it, which is what's happening gradually. We see before our eyes, really, the materialization of great Israel. I don't know if we have time to talk about this. When you want to talk about colonial modernities in your class, we discussed this. There is a super imposition of a very abnormal, let's say, urban forgeries in the West Bank. What is [INAUDIBLE] to mean, but an urban center, which is illegal and which is superimposed as a primary source of existence in the West Bank, marginalizing the old and ancient Palestinian towns, and cities, and villages, and so on. The road system, the communication is, again, a forgery. It's a fraud because, again, it is trying to create networks and communication among settlements and linking them to Israel extraterritorially while the original Palestinian reality is being gradually eradicated, including the resources, including the water, including these horrible, horrible quarries that are eating away at the land, and so on. The environment is being destroyed. So we have modalities here, as well as very spurious modernities that are eradicating-- I wish Ilan Pappe were here because he is the one who coined the "displacement replacement" paradigm. And I think we're seeing it in effect. We're seeing it take place before our very eyes where you have the displacement of a whole nation, a whole culture, a whole history, including the naming of our towns, including the naming of our streets in the east side of Jerusalem. The settlements are being given Hebrew names that are close to the original, Arabic names to create, again, a connection that didn't exist. All these things are happening, including the theft of our costumes, our cross-stitch, clothes, our food-- everything. That's why I keep telling people we are very possessive about our hummus and falafel, including [INAUDIBLE]. And by the way, there is no such thing as Israeli couscous. It is also maftoul. Somebody raised this question in one of the classes. So this usurpation-- a system of total usurpation is creating a de facto on the land, a de facto one-state solution, in which one colonial culture-- and I call it post-neo-colonial colonialism, or another way of saying displacement replacement paradigm. Because it doesn't just seek to dominate, it seeks to eradicate, in more ways than one. That's why it's very important-- Palestinians, from the beginning, the concept of Sumud-- or steadfastness, or staying on the land. This is one of the most basic requirements of maintaining your existence. And then we get into questions of identity, history, culture, urbanization, mobility, and so on. So the de facto one-state solution, to me, is one of the most painful experiences we are undergoing. But it has within itself all of the seeds of its own self-negation. Because the Palestinians aren't going to disappear. We're not going to suffer collective amnesia. And we may be delegated to reservations or bantustans or isolated population centers. But I don't like to think of it as a demographic race, either. I think of it as a continuation of a struggle. So when they make separation impossible, an equal or a just separation, according to international law, then what they are creating is an untenable Israel really. And that is something that many Israeli leaders, and the greed for more land, and more control, and so on have lost sight of the strategic outcome of what they're doing. But in the meantime, it means that the Palestinians will be living in a state of captivity. And that is something that's not easy for any of us to accept, including the fact that we see the outright theft of our land and resources as time goes on, and it's escalating and intensifying rapidly. So that's the de facto one state. And many people say it leads to a demographic race which to me, is not the issue. There are those who talk-- I think you're one of them. I didn't get your name when you talked about rights agenda by national state. Some people say we should adopt a new political program. And we should go beyond nationalism into a post-nationalist rights agenda. There are people who are talking about it. And it could result in a bi-national state. I don't see it even as a bi-national state in many ways because there are no rights for one nation in that state. It is a dominant race state, so to speak, if it's a one-state solution. And we maintain the same imbalance of power or power asymmetry. The problem with that is that we don't have partners, and we don't have allies, and we don't have takers at present. And there are many people who say well the rights agenda-- I've always said that the standard for Palestine has always been a rights agenda-- it's nothing new. It's human rights. It's humanitarian rights. It's political rights. It's legal rights. It's every type of right. So you're struggling for your rights in different ways. But to talk about equal rights within a dominant culture, within a situation of domination, and then struggle for your rights-- that would be fine if it were a simple, classical, apartheid system like in South Africa. But this is a situation where you have a culture that wants to negate the other, not accommodate the other. And at this time, I think maybe if you adopt it as an agenda, it has to be fleshed out. I've read many, many, many articles. I've listened to many lectures about this. But it does need to be fleshed out. It does need to be looked at. Who are your partners? Who are your allies? Who are your takers? What kind of agenda would you propose in the meantime? Because people want to know. How can they stay on the ground? How can they exercise their right to Sumud and steadfastness, and exercise of their identity and rights on the ground? That is something that has to be developed. And so far, I haven't seen that. I've heard that this is one thing that the world will sympathize with. I said they didn't sympathize when we were being massacred, when our land was being stolen, when we were in a state of enslavement and captivity, very few governments, let's say, sympathized. Public opinion is sympathizing now. Why should you think that automatically, once you say we want equal rights, everybody will sympathize? We've always said we want equal rights. We want to be recognized as human beings, basically. We want the application of international law, basically. We've been struggling for these things. And we've been struggling to get the solidarity and support that we need. The international community right now-- if there is such a thing-- different countries, and so on-- are adamant about the two-state solution. And as I said, it is ironic that by the time there is an emerging global consensus for a two-state solution, Israel is succeeding in destroying it. There is always a time warp in the political discourse in Palestine-Israel. Now there are those-- about the C point, which is to postpone the solution-- there are those who say, there's nothing we can do. Within Israel, there are those who want to postpone it, manage it-- you mentioned, I think-- Ya'alon said he wants to manage it. Ya-alon, yes-- he does want to manage it. There are people who think that you can postpone it, and you can maintain the status quo as is. But the status quo is untenable. There is no way that it can be maintained. Either there will be a breakdown and a breakout of violence, and it will feed all sorts of violent acts and extremism, and become another issue that is up for grabs that will destabilize the whole region, or you will start running ahead of the situation to try to find any kind of solution. But maintaining the situation as is, postponing the settlement is not possible now. Conflict management is not possible now. Even talking in Palestine about maintaining our presence, and our institutions, as Hani always says-- we have to change the balance of power. Well, it's not just the local balance of power. It's a global balance of power. It's not just Israel that we're dealing with. We're practically dealing with the whole world. When something happens in Palestine, you don't get the reaction from Tel Aviv, or whatever, you get the reaction from Washington first. And then, of course, you get Canada following and Australia, and so on. But it's Washington that picks up the phone and tells everybody else, including that of world, including Europe, what needs to be done in order to help Israel. There are all sorts of issues. And that's why I said, it's not a discrete, isolated entity. Palestine is on the receiving end of many different forces, and many different powers. And therefore, we have to be able to plot our course very seriously and very carefully. But you also need to have alliances. Right now, our strongest alliance comes from adopting a nonviolent, popular resistance strategy, which is evolving, developing. But that also has evolved globally, whether it is within BDS or different solidarity movements, and people speaking out. That has resonated within the younger generation throughout the world. European public opinion is, on the whole, moving quite positively. Within American universities, intellectual academic circles, think tanks, and so on, and minorities, and ethnic groups there is a new discourse and a new awareness. I don't know whether this has reached the level of challenging the-- what I called in one class, the yo-yo Congress, that manages to stand up and sit down every time Netanyahu opens his mouth. But there has to be some sort of internal reconsideration because public opinion is on the move. The Palestinian question is no longer an issue of isolation and darkness. Not everything is happening in the dark. There are now social media. There are now witnesses. There are people who are acting in solidarity. They are exposing the real nature of the occupation. And it doesn't take the Palestinians, as Netanyahu says, we are delegitimizing or isolating Israel. Israel is isolating itself. And the occupation is delegitimizing Israel. And these very dangerous illegal policies are going to backfire within Israel. So these three manifestations of the one state, or let's drop the two-state solution. Each one has its own built-in drawbacks. The last thing we need is to maintain the situation of control and hope for the best in the future. That's why I say we need policies, and we need international alliances and partnerships to be able to end the occupation. Because I think that's the real issue in terms of the injustice. And then once you end the occupation, then you can deal with all the issues, including the issue of refugees which is the call of the Palestinian national identity-- not just the land, but the people. And then you can deal with the issue of re-engagement within the region, as equals, not just with Israel, but with the whole Arab world, which I hope will go through this transition safely. Thank you. Well, Hanan did flesh it out. Could I just make one quick comment? Please. And we finish in about six minutes. OK. Well, I'll only take two minutes. I'd like to take issue with the Pepsi-Coke analogy, in all due respect. There is, in my view, and I think it's an informed view, an enormous difference between, say, Labor and Likud. If you sit down with the Likud top ministers and you sit down with the heads of Labor, it's night and day. It would be like sitting down with Barack Obama, and then sitting down with Rand Paul and not seeing the difference between the two of them. There is a wide difference. And I remember so well Oslo-- and I remember the excitement in both Israel and Palestine at the idea of a two-state solution. So at that time, I think a majority of both Israelis and Palestinians would have thought that that was a wonderful solution to the problem. Unfortunately, it didn't happen. But that situation could re-present itself because I believe that if the moderate and left in Israel were to gain power-- including, by the way, the three Palestinian parties who will have 14 seats, according to the polls, in the Knesset. It's unclear whether they would join a coalition or not. And I don't know the answer to that. But the center of gravity of this debate would change radically, almost overnight. So yes, I think to some extent, we're all frustrated by the situation as it exists today and the trajectory, as Hanan points out, is very disturbing and very discouraging. But this can change. You could get a peace-oriented Israeli government. If you had a strong prime minister, I believe very strongly the Israeli citizenry would follow him or her, just as they followed Radim. And we could be back on track to a two-state solution that was favored, certainly, by a majority of Israelis, and I even tend to believe the majority of Palestinians. Because they would see that their future was so much brighter than it is now. So I think there is a difference between the right and left political spectrum in Israel. And there's a wide difference. It's a profound difference. And if you sit down and speak with Buji for an hour, and you sit down and speak to Moshe Ya'alon for an hour, you feel like you've been on two different planets. So I would not accept, and I think it would be a fallacy, and unfortunate to accept the thesis that all Israeli parties are essentially the same. It just isn't true anymore than it's true in the United States. I respect your opinion. But I think there's differences, but not wide, between Labor and Likud-- not only in these days. After signing Oslo Accord, they asked Isaac Rabin, what do you want to give the Palestinian in the final agreement? His answer-- I will give them 50% of the West Bank and Gaza. They said to him, the Palestinian will refuse that. He said, OK. If they refuse that, everyone continue what he have-- Everyone will keep what they already have. He is a historical leader. He is stronger than Herzog. Herzog's a weak person. If we read the political program which signed by Livni and Herzog, we saw that his right program, not a peace program. The difference is sure, they speak they're Palestinian partners. We need peace. We need to end the occupation. But what they implement on the ground-- not different from what Likud-- Likud, honest-- he said what he want to do. But Labor party-- he said something good, but he implement the same thing. The main thing is they refuse to withdraw to 1960s fair borders. They support Jerusalem as united capital for Israel. The defense is-- Labor party want to withdraw from some neighborhoods, which the majority are the citizens from the Palestinians. But more than half of East Jerusalem-- they want to stay there. The refugee issue, Tzipi Livni said, when she a foreign minister with Ehud Olmert, she refused to return a single refugee-- a single-- not like Olmert offered. Olmert give some flexible that he accept the 20,000, 30,000 to return back. But Livni, which now is a peacemaker, refused. Since that time and now, one single refugee to return to Palestine again. They think that Netanyahu must continue his aggression against Gaza. They refused what he'd done. They don't think that 2,020 Palestinians dead-- not enough. They push him and in their political program run in the election, they ask to continue the world against Gaza. So yes, there is a difference. But like I said, like Pepsi and Coca-Cola. All right. So this is a conversation that we plan to have every semester, probably for a very long time. This is just yet another little installment. The first question that always comes up when we meet is Hanan, how's the situation there? And she says, it's the worst it's ever been. Hani, how's the situation? It's the worst it's ever been. And I think-- I don't want to speak for you Steve. I didn't ask you that question. But I don't know what you think. He agrees. You agree? It is a tough issue. I think we heard some opinions about what's going on. And I think it came from the heart, from everybody today. That's the thing that I like the most about what happened this evening is that everybody spoke from the heart. And we'll just continue that conversation. And thank you for coming. [APPLAUSE]

Contents

Early life

Ashrawi was born to Palestinian Christian parents on October 8, 1946 in the city of Nablus, British Mandate for Palestine, now part of the occupied West Bank.[1] Her father, Daoud Mikhail, was a physician and one of the founders of the Palestine Liberation Organization,[2][3] and her mother Wadi’a Ass’ad Mikhail, was an ophthalmic nurse.[2]

1948 war and education

The Ashrawi family lived in Nablus. Then from Nablus, her family moved to the warm city of Tiberias in the north where they remained until Israel became a state in 1948.[4] In 1948, the Mikhail family fled from Tiberias to Amman, Jordan as a result of the 1948 Arab–Israeli War. Initially, her father, Daoud Mikhail, remained behind in what became Israel, but later rejoined the family in Jordan.[2][4]

In 1950 her family were able to settle in Ramallah, at the time part of the Jordanian annexed West Bank. Here, she attended the Ramallah Friends Girls School, a Quaker school for girls. She was inspired to activism by her father, who favored a greater role for women in society and was repeatedly imprisoned by the Jordanian authorities for his activities with the Arab Nationalist Socialist Party and the PLO. She received her bachelor's and master's degrees in literature in the Department of English at the American University of Beirut (AUB) and got the bachelor and master degree.

While a graduate student in literature at the American University in Beirut she dated Peter Jennings of ABC News who was then stationed there as ABC's Beirut bureau chief.[5] When the Six-Day War broke out in 1967, Dr. Ashrawi, then a 22-year-old student in Lebanon, was declared an absentee by Israel and denied re-entry to the West Bank. For the next six years, Ashrawi traveled and completed her education gaining a Ph.D. in Medieval and Comparative Literature from the University of Virginia. Ashrawi was finally allowed to re-join her family in 1973 under the family reunification plan.[6]

Personal life

On August 8, 1975, she married Emile Ashrawi,[7] a Christian Jerusalemite who is now a photographer and a theater director.[8] Together, they have two daughters, Amal and Zeina.[9]

Ashrawi is the recipient of eleven honorary doctorates from universities in the U.S., Canada, Europe, and the Arab world. These include: The American University of Beirut (AUB) – Lebanon (June 2008); The American University in Cairo (AUC), Doctor of Humane Letters – Cairo, Egypt (June 2003); Saint Mary’s University, Doctor of Civil Law – Halifax, Canada (October 2000); Smith College, Doctor of Humane Letters – Northampton, Massachusetts (1999); Earlham College, Doctor of Humane Letters – Richmond, Indiana (1999); Vrije Universiteit Brussel – Belgium (1997); Bath University, Doctor of Laws – Bath, England (1993); and The Virginia Theological Seminary – Alexandria, Virginia (1993).

She is a member of various international advisory boards and councils. Her past and present memberships include the following: U.S./Middle East Project; TAKREEM Arab Achievement Awards; Center for Transregional Studies “Advisory Council”Princeton University; Council on Foreign Relations – Washington D.C.; Deir Yassin Remembered – New York; Fund for the Future of Our Children – Washington D.C.; Initiative for Peace and Cooperation in the Middle East – Special project of The Search for Common Ground; International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty; International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)- Stockholm, Sweden; Member of the UN Secretary General’s Group for Dialogue Among Civilizations; Mercy Corps International – WashingtonPeace Works – U.S.; Task Force on Higher Education (A World Bank, Harvard University and UNESCO initiative); The Carter Center (Human Rights Center); The Dialogues Center – Holland; The World Bank Middle East and North Africa Region (MENA); United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD); Palestine Institute for Public Diplomacy (PIPD); The Holy Land Christian Ecumenical Foundation – Know Thy Heritage Advisory Board; CAABU – Honorary Patron; Beyond Conflict (formerly The Project on Justice in Times of Transition) – New York, U.S.; and the UN Women Executive Directors Civil Society Advisory Group.

On September 26, 2009, in an interview on Riz Khan's One on One on Al Jazeera English, Ashrawi defined her current role in the following way: "I think of myself essentially as a human being with a multidimensional mission. Basically, I am a Palestinian, I am a woman, I am an activist and a humanist, more than being a politician. And at the same time I feel that quite often things are thrust upon us rather than come as a result of a calm and deliberate choice."[10]

Politics and activism

Ashrawi in 2008
Ashrawi in 2008

While voluntarily a student but denied re-entry to the West Bank, she became the spokesperson for the General Union of Palestinian Students in Lebanon, helped organize women’s revolutionary groups and served as a guide to foreign reporters visiting refugee camps.

Ashrawi returned to the West Bank under the family reunification plan in 1973 and established the Department of English at Birzeit University. She served as Chair of that department from 1973 to 1978, and again from 1981 through 1984; and from 1986–1990 she served the university as Dean of the Faculty of Arts. She remained a faculty member at Birzeit University until 1995, publishing numerous poems, short stories, papers and articles on Palestinian culture, literature, and politics.

Ashrawi's political activism in the Palestinian territories began almost as early as her academic career at Birzeit. In 1974, she founded the Birzeit University Legal Aid Committee and Human Rights Action Project. Her political work took a greater leap in 1988 during the First Intifada, when she joined the Intifada Political Committee, serving on its Diplomatic Committee until 1993. From 1991 to 1993 she served as the official spokesperson of the Palestinian Delegation to the Middle East peace process and a member of the Leadership/Guidance Committee and executive committee of the delegation.

From 1993 to 1995, with the signing of the Oslo Accords by Yasser Arafat and Yitzhak Rabin, Palestinian self-rule was established, and Ashrawi headed the Preparatory Committee of the Palestinian Independent Commission for Citizens' Rights in Jerusalem. Ashrawi has also served since 1996 as an elected member of the Palestinian Legislative Council, Jerusalem Governorate.

In 1996, Ashrawi was appointed the Palestinian Authority Minister of Higher Education and Research, but she resigned the post in 1998 in protest against political corruption, specifically Arafat's handling of peace talks.

In 1998, Ashrawi founded MIFTAH—the Palestinian Initiative for the Promotion of Global Dialogue and Democracy, an initiative which works towards respect for Palestinian human rights, democracy and peace.

In November 2004, Ashrawi gave a lecture entitled "Concept, Context and Process in Peacemaking: The Palestinian-Israeli Experience" at the University of San Diego's Joan B. Kroc Institute for Peace & Justice Distinguished Lecture Series.

In April 2007, Ashrawi visited the Palestine Center in Washington, DC and gave a lecture entitled, "Palestine & Peace: The Challenges Ahead"

In July 2011, she represented the Palestinian people in a meeting with the Canadian Foreign Minister John Baird and convinced him to visit the Palestinian territories.[11]

Sydney Peace prize

In 2003 Ashrawi was awarded the Sydney Peace Prize. Her selection drew praise from Mary Robinson (former United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, and former President of Ireland), and Archbishop Desmond Tutu. Madeleine Albright, former US Secretary of State also supported the selection and said, "She [Ashrawi] is a brilliant spokeswoman for her cause."[12]

Her selection was controversial among some Jewish political organisations. Michael Kapel, a member of the board of the Australia/Israel & Jewish Affairs Council called her "an apologist for Islamic terror".[12] Activist Antony Loewenstein argued in his book My Israel Question that the Australian media, and various Jewish organizations, defamed and vilified Ashrawi in order to prevent her winning the Peace Prize.[13] Of the controversy, Israeli politician Yael Dayan said, "And this Hanan Ashrawi... I think she's very courageous, and she contributes quite a lot to the peace process."[14] Baruch Kimmerling, a sociologist from the Hebrew University, wrote, "As an Israeli, as a Jew and as an academic I am deeply sorry and ashamed that members of the Australian Jewish community are acting against this rightful nomination."[12]

Works published

  • Anthology of Palestinian Literature (ed).
  • The Modern Palestinian Short Story: An Introduction to Practical Criticism
  • Contemporary Palestinian Literature under Occupation
  • Contemporary Palestinian Poetry and Fiction
  • Literary Translation: Theory and Practice
  • This Side of Peace: A Personal Account (ISBN 0-684-80294-5)

See also

Notes

  1. ^ Sarah K. Horsley. "Hanan Ashrawi". Retrieved 2007-06-12.
  2. ^ a b c "Hanan Ashrawi". www.fembio.org. Retrieved 2019-08-23.
  3. ^ Encyclopedia of World Biography. The Gale Group, Inc. 2010.
  4. ^ a b "Hanan Mikhail Ashrawi Facts". biography.yourdictionary.com. Retrieved 2019-08-23.
  5. ^ Fenyvesi, Charles (December 30, 1991 / January 6, 1992). Washington whispers. US News & World Report through LexisNexis Academic. Retrieved on November 30, 2006.
  6. ^ Worldtrek Ashwrai Biography
  7. ^ A glimpse into the life of Hanan Ashrawi Archived 2007-07-01 at the Wayback Machine, Muslimedia: April 1–15, 1997
  8. ^ Israel – Palestina: la paz imposible Archived 2007-08-24 at the Wayback Machine (in Spanish), Solidarios humanitarian organization web site
  9. ^ Conversation with Hanan Ashrawi, University of California publication
  10. ^ Riz Khan, Hanan Ashrawi (26 September 2009). One on One (Television production). Al Jazeera English. Event occurs at 02:00.
  11. ^ Harry Sterling. "An invitation to Palestine," The Toronto Star, Jul 28 2011
  12. ^ a b c Kingston, Margo; Rees, Stuart (16 June 2004). "Revisiting the Hanan Ashrawi affair". Sydney Morning Herald. Fairfax Media. Retrieved 2011-09-27.
  13. ^ "Questioning Israel". The Australian Jewish News. 28 July 2006. Archived from the original on 9 September 2007. Retrieved 2007-06-01.
  14. ^ Loewenstein; Antony (2009). My Israel Question (3rd (pbk.) ed.). Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne University Press. pp. 11–2. ISBN 978-0-522-85706-1. LCCN 2011459644. Retrieved 2011-09-27.

External links

This page was last edited on 21 September 2019, at 19:31
Basis of this page is in Wikipedia. Text is available under the CC BY-SA 3.0 Unported License. Non-text media are available under their specified licenses. Wikipedia® is a registered trademark of the Wikimedia Foundation, Inc. WIKI 2 is an independent company and has no affiliation with Wikimedia Foundation.