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Committee on Public Information

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Committee on Public Information
Liberty Loan pictorial news, first aid in the front lines MET DP876892.jpg

CPI pamphlet, 1917
Agency overview
FormedApril 13, 1917 (1917-04-13)
DissolvedAugust 21, 1919 (1919-08-21)
Superseding agencies
JurisdictionUnited States Government
HeadquartersWashington, D.C.
Employeessignificant staff plus over 75,000 volunteers
Agency executives
Parent agencyExecutive Office of the President
Child agencies
  • over twenty bureaus and divisions including:
  • News Bureau
  • Film Bureau

The Committee on Public Information (1917–1919), also known as the CPI or the Creel Committee, was an independent agency of the government of the United States created to influence public opinion to support US participation in World War I.

In just over 26 months, from April 14, 1917, to June 30, 1919, it used every medium available to create enthusiasm for the war effort and to enlist public support against the foreign and perceived domestic attempts to stop America's participation in the war. It used mainly propaganda to accomplish its goals.

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  • ✪ Propaganda During World War 1 - Opening Pandora's Box I THE GREAT WAR Special
  • ✪ World War 1, Propaganda & War Profiteering - The Untold History of the United States | Peter Kuznick


Propaganda. Specifically wartime propaganda. Never mind what’s actually going on at the front or in the enemy’s homeland, you need to keep up your nation’s morale regardless. You need your people to hate the enemy, and so you put your propaganda machine to work. I’m Indy Neidell; welcome to a Great War special episode about Propaganda and the First World War. Propaganda was, of course, not something unseen before the war. Julius Caesar’s de Bello Gallico was written specifically to win the plebeians over to his side against his enemies- the aristocrats of Rome- who were planning to prosecute him for supposedly abusing his authority, and with the 19th century explosion in mass media like the newspaper and the new technological feats like the telegraph and telephone, you could really push the story you wanted to push. During the Crimean War, Howard Russell wrote as a war correspondent directly from the front, right? Less than a decade later during the American Civil War, over 500 correspondents were writing from the front lines, and to really get a propaganda machine going, you have to be able to censor things you don’t want people to read. All in all there are three parts of wartime propaganda; front propaganda to increase morale among your troops and weaken it in the enemy, home front propaganda aimed at the population at home, but also foreign propaganda to counter enemy propaganda abroad. Above all, you need to create hatred for the enemy, and perhaps even dehumanize him, which is one reason you see a lot of comparisons between enemy soldiers and various animals. You needed people at home to buy things like war bonds. And you need to keep other nations to trade with you and ideally stop trading with the enemy. So how do you do it? It’s easy. Look at Germany, for example. Germany already had a working propaganda apparatus at the beginning of the war. The German military did not think the population was smart enough to differentiate between real news and false propaganda so freedom of the press was abolished and censorship was established. It worked so well that soldiers complained to the high command that they couldn’t see themselves in stories about their own regiment or front line action. Germany also had a central bureau for foreign propaganda in the foreign ministry that was mainly focused on drawing attention to the British naval blockade and “disproving” enemy propaganda, which may or may not itself have been accurate. In 1916 and 1917 this was also placed under military command. As many as 7,400 press releases, flyers, and letters were sent out a day and control of the press was established via the war press bureau that held weekly press briefings and maintained control of publications. Also, General Erich Ludendorff created a picture and film agency within the bureau. Now, German home propaganda was very successful. War bonds created a steady flow of income and even at the very end the contrast between reality and propaganda was so stark that when they lost the war, many Germans actually felt betrayed, which paved the way for the “stab-in-the-back” myth that you’re going to go look up in a few minutes. It often depicted national figures like the French Marianne, British John Bull, and American Uncle Sam and it was really focused on German culture since German culture was deemed superior to other cultures. There were German national myths and heroes, knights slaying dragons, Siegfried, the valkyrie, and the dualism between culture and civilization. British propaganda, by comparison, began much more slowly than German, but it became a real Pandora’s Box, as it was so effective that it greatly influenced Soviet Russian and Nazi German propaganda later on. The Wellington House or War Propaganda Bureau was established in 1914, but its existence was a secret and it was to influence the public more subtly. You had guys like Rudyard Kipling or Arthur Conan Doyle writing essays seemingly of their own volition. All the mass media was used, newspapers, cartoons, illustrations in magazines- stuff that people bought; that people PAID for. See, when you paid for it, it created the illusion that you were forming your own opinion; that you were actually making a choice. At the same time, the Parliamentary Recruiting Committee spread its propaganda to create a steady stream of recruits. Now, this was ultimately unsuccessful as Britain eventually introduced conscription once people lost hope in a short war. Soon, the Department of Enemy Propaganda would be created, which is fairly close to our modern understanding of propaganda. Indeed, it’s head, the newspaper publisher Lord Northcliffe, stressed how important propaganda would be during peacetime. Crewe House, as the Department was known, had a seven-point program for anti-German and anti-Austrian propaganda that was so effective that the Germans specifically targeted Northcliffe with their propaganda. One German cartoon from 1918 shows Northcliffe, dressed in a tacky checked suit, standing with Satan, who has his arm around Northcliffe like a buddy, and Satan is saying, “Welcome, Great Master! From you at last we shall learn the science of lying!” Initially, British propaganda used images of the Kaiser, but eventually “the hun” began to appear. Unrestricted submarine warfare, the occupation of Belgium, the execution of Edith Cavell, such events gave fodder for the barbaric images of German soldiers. The Bryce Report in May 1915 claimed that Germans mutilated women and children in Belgium and similar stories claimed that German factories were using human body parts, but still, British propaganda was much more subtle than German. One of the greatest coups for the British was, of course, the fact that they had cut Germany’s trans-Atlantic cables so Britain had an information monopoly in the United States. Speaking of the states, here’s some interesting info about one form of US propaganda. The Committee on Public Information, also known as the Creel committee after George Creel, its chairman, was formed by President Woodrow Wilson by executive order in April 1917. Its purpose was to influence US public opinion in favor of the war effort. The Committee worked together with illustrators to create what are still today well-known war posters. They also had a unique approach to spreading their word- the four-minute men. At the time, it was believed that four minutes was the human attention span, right? So these men gave four-minute speeches all over the nation at various social gatherings. There were 75,000 four-minute men, and an estimated 11 million people heard them speak live. Interestingly enough, the media wasn’t so fond of the Committee after several of its spun facts were proven to be demonstrably false by journalists. All of the other warring nations, of course, practiced their own forms of censorship and propaganda. Here’s what I thought was a rather amusing anecdote: the Czech painter Jan Konupek wrote a great deal of letters to his wife-to-be during the war, up to three per day. Censors thoroughly read and edited them and would remove all comments about things like potato shortages to the point where one day a censor actually asked Konupek to please write shorter letters and improve his penmanship. Anyhow, I’m going to end this today. I realize many of you will mention that I only really talked about British and German propaganda. That’s partly because they had the most developed organizations, and partly because I have the most information about that. In future we will do another propaganda special about propaganda and cinema which is something that we haven’t touched today but it’s so vast that it deserves an entire episode. Until that time, I encourage you to look it all up yourself because it is both a fascinating and a scary subject to see how easily and effectively our emotions and beliefs can be manipulated during both war and peace without us really being aware of it. If you want to find out more about Edith Cavell and how her life and death were used for the British Propaganda machinery, click here for our biography episode about her. For a selection of famous propaganda posters follows us on Instagram or check out our Facebook page. See you next time.


Organizational history

"U.S. Official War Pictures", CPI poster by Louis D. Fancher
"U.S. Official War Pictures", CPI poster by Louis D. Fancher


President Woodrow Wilson (the 28th president) established the Committee on Public Information (CPI) through Executive Order 2594 on April 13, 1917.[1] The committee consisted of George Creel (chairman) and as ex officio members the Secretaries of: State (Robert Lansing), War (Newton D. Baker), and the Navy (Josephus Daniels).[2] The CPI was the first state bureau covering propaganda in the history of the United States.[3]

Creel urged Wilson to create a government agency to coordinate "not propaganda as the Germans defined it, but propaganda in the true sense of the word, meaning the 'propagation of faith.'"[4] He was a journalist with years of experience on the Denver Post and the Rocky Mountain News before accepting Wilson's appointment to the CPI. He had a contentious relationship with Secretary Lansing.[5]


Wilson established the first modern propaganda office, the Committee on Public Information (CPI), headed by George Creel.[6][7] Creel set out to systematically reach every person in the United States multiple times with patriotic information about how the individual could contribute to the war effort. It also worked with the post office to censor seditious counter-propaganda. Creel set up divisions in his new agency to produce and distribute innumerable copies of pamphlets, newspaper releases, magazine advertisements, films, school campaigns, and the speeches of the Four Minute Men. CPI created colorful posters that appeared in every store window, catching the attention of the passersby for a few seconds.[8] Movie theaters were widely attended, and the CPI trained thousands of volunteer speakers to make patriotic appeals during the four-minute breaks needed to change reels. They also spoke at churches, lodges, fraternal organizations, labor unions, and even logging camps. Speeches were mostly in English, but ethnic groups were reached in their own languages. Creel boasted that in 18 months his 75,000 volunteers delivered over 7.5 million four minute orations to over 300 million listeners, in a nation of 103 million people. The speakers attended training sessions through local universities, and were given pamphlets and speaking tips on a wide variety of topics, such as buying Liberty Bonds, registering for the draft, rationing food, recruiting unskilled workers for munitions jobs, and supporting Red Cross programs.[9] Historians were assigned to write pamphlets and in-depth histories of the causes of the European war.[10][11]

4-Minute-Men 1917 CPI.jpg

The CPI used material that was based on fact, but spun it to present an upbeat picture of the American war effort. In his memoirs, Creel claimed that the CPI routinely denied false or undocumented atrocity reports, fighting the crude propaganda efforts of "patriotic organizations" like the National Security League and the American Defense Society that preferred "general thundering" and wanted the CPI to "preach a gospel of hate."[12]

The committee used newsprint, posters, radio, telegraph, and movies to broadcast its message. It recruited about 75,000 "Four Minute Men," volunteers who spoke about the war at social events for an ideal length of four minutes. They covered the draft, rationing, war bond drives, victory gardens and why America was fighting. They were advised to keep their message positive, always use their own words and avoid "hymns of hate."[13] For ten days in May 1917, the Four Minute Men were expected to promote "Universal Service by Selective Draft" in advance of national draft registration on June 5, 1917.[14]

The CPI staged events designed for many different ethnic groups, in their language. For instance, Irish-American tenor John McCormack sang at Mount Vernon before an audience representing Irish-American organizations.[15] The Committee also targeted the American worker and, endorsed by Samuel Gompers, filled factories and offices with posters designed to promote the critical role of American labor in the success of the war effort.[16]

The CPI's activities were so thorough that historians later stated, using the example of a typical midwestern American farm family, that[17]

Every item of war news they saw—in the country weekly, in magazines, or in the city daily picked up occasionally in the general store—was not merely officially approved information but precisely the same kind that millions of their fellow citizens were getting at the same moment. Every war story had been censored somewhere along the line— at the source, in transit, or in the newspaper offices in accordance with ‘voluntary’ rules established by the CPI.

Creel wrote about the Committee's rejection of the word propaganda, saying: "We did not call it propaganda, for that word, in German hands, had come to be associated with deceit and corruption. Our effort was educational and informative throughout, for we had such confidence in our case as to feel that no other argument was needed than the simple, straightforward presentation of facts."[18]

A report published in 1940 by the Council on Foreign Relations credits the Committee with creating "the most efficient engine of war propaganda which the world had ever seen", producing a "revolutionary change" in public attitude toward US participation in WWI:[19]

In November 1916, the slogan of Wilson's supporters, 'He Kept Us Out Of War,' played an important part in winning the election. At that time a large part of the country was apathetic.... Yet, within a very short period after America had joined the belligerents, the nation appeared to be enthusiastically and overwhelmingly convinced of the justice of the cause of the Allies, and unanimously determined to help them win. The revolutionary change is only partly explainable by a sudden explosion of latent anti-German sentiment detonated by the declaration of war. Far more significance is to be attributed to the work of the group of zealous amateur propagandists, organized under Mr. George Creel in the Committee on Public Information. With his associates he planned and carried out what was perhaps the most effective job of large-scale war propaganda which the world had ever witnessed.

Organizational structure

During its lifetime, the organization had over twenty bureaus and divisions, with commissioner's offices in nine foreign countries.[20]

Both a News Division and a Films Division were established to help get out the war message. The CPI's daily newspaper, called the Official Bulletin, began at eight pages and grew to 32. It was distributed to every newspaper, post office, government office, and military base.[21] Stories were designed to report positive news. For example, the CPI promoted an image of well-equipped US troops preparing to face the Germans that were belied by the conditions visiting Congressmen reported.[22] The CPI released three feature-length films: Pershing's Crusaders (May 1918), America's Answer (to the Hun) (August 1918), Under Four Flags (November 1918). They were unsophisticated attempts to impress the viewer with snippets of footage from the front, far less sensational than the "crudely fantastical" output of Hollywood in the same period.[23]

To reach those Americans who might not read newspapers, attend meetings or watch movies, Creel created the Division of Pictorial Publicity.[24] The Division produced 1438 designs for propaganda posters, cards buttons and cartoons in addition to 20000 lantern pictures (slides) to be used with the speeches.[25] Charles Dana Gibson was America's most popular illustrator  – and an ardent supporter of the war. When Creel asked him to assemble a group of artists to help design posters for the government, Gibson was more than eager to help. Famous illustrators such as James Montgomery Flagg, Joseph Pennell, Louis D. Fancher, and N. C. Wyeth were brought together to produce some of World War I's most lasting images.

Media incidents

One early incident demonstrated the dangers of embroidering the truth. The CPI fed newspapers the story that ships escorting the First Division to Europe sank several German submarines, a story discredited when newsmen interviewed the ships' officers in England. Republican Senator Boies Penrose of Pennsylvania called for an investigation and The New York Times called the CPI "the Committee on Public Misinformation."[26] The incident turned the once compliant news publishing industry into skeptics.[27]

Early in 1918, the CPI made a premature announcement that "the first American built battle planes are today en route to the front in France," but newspapers learned that the accompanying pictures were fake, there was only one plane, and it was still being tested.[28] At other times, though the CPI could control in large measure what newspapers printed, its exaggerations were challenged and mocked in Congressional hearings.[29] The Committee's overall tone also changed with time, shifting from its original belief in the power of facts to mobilization based on hate, like the slogan "Stop the Hun!" on posters showing a US soldier taking hold of a German soldier in the act of terrorizing a mother and child, all in support of war bond sales.[30]

International efforts

The CPI extended its efforts overseas as well and found it had to tailor its work to its audience. In Latin America, its efforts were led where possible by American journalists with experience in the region, because, said one organizer, "it is essentially a newspaperman's job" with the principal aim of keeping the public "informed about war aims and activities." The Committee found the public bored with the battle pictures and stories of heroism supplied for years by the competing European powers. In Peru it found there was an audience for photos of shipyards and steel mills. In Chile it fielded requests for information about America's approach to public health, forest protection, and urban policing. In some countries it provided reading rooms and language education. Twenty Mexican journalists were taken on a tour of the United States.[31]

Political conflict

Creel used his overseas operations as a way to gain favor with congressmen who controlled the CPI's funding, sending friends of congressmen on brief assignments to Europe.[32] Some of his business arrangements drew congressional criticism as well, particularly his sale by competitive bidding of the sole right to distribute battlefield pictures.[33] Despite hearings to air grievances against the CPI, the investigating committee passed its appropriation unanimously.[34]

Creel also used the CPI's ties to the newspaper publishing industry to trace the source of negative stories about Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels, a former newsman and a political ally. He tracked them to Louis Howe, assistant to Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin D. Roosevelt and threatened to expose him to the President.[35] As a Wilson partisan, Creel showed little respect for his congressional critics, and Wilson enjoyed how Creel expressed sentiments the President could not express himself.[36][37]

Termination and disestablishment

Committee work was curtailed after July 1, 1918. Domestic activities stopped after the Armistice was signed on November 11, 1918. Foreign operations ended June 30, 1919. Wilson abolished the CPI by executive order 3154 on August 21, 1919.

The Committee on Public Information was formally disestablished by an act of Congress on June 30, 1919, although the organization's work had been formally completed months before.[38] On August 21, 1919, the disbanded organization's records were turned over to the Council of National Defense.[38]


Creel later published his memoirs of his service with the CPI, How We Advertised America, in which he wrote:[18]

In no degree was the Committee an agency of censorship, a machinery of concealment or repression. Its emphasis throughout was on the open and the positive. At no point did it seek or exercise authorities under those war laws that limited the freedom of speech and press. In all things, from first to last, without halt or change, it was a plain publicity proposition, a vast enterprise in salesmanship, the world's greatest adventures in advertising.... We did not call it propaganda, for that word, in German hands, had come to be associated with deceit and corruption. Our effort was educational and informative throughout, for we had such confidence in our case as to feel that no other argument was needed than the simple, straightforward presentation of the facts.


Walter Lippmann, a Wilson adviser, journalist, and co-founder of The New Republic, was a sharp critic of Creel. He had once written an editorial criticizing Creel for violating civil liberties, as Police Commissioner of Denver. Without naming Creel, he wrote in a memo to Wilson that censorship should "never be entrusted to anyone who is not himself tolerant, nor to anyone who is unacquainted with the long record of folly which is the history of suppression." After the war, Lippmann criticized the CPI's work in Europe: "The general tone of it was one of unmitigated brag accompanied by unmitigated gullibility, giving shell-shocked Europe to understand that a rich bumpkin had come to town with his pockets bulging and no desire except to please."[39]

The Office of Censorship in World War II did not follow the CPI precedent. It used a system of voluntary co-operation with a code of conduct, and it did not disseminate government propaganda.[17]


Among those who participated in the CPI's work were:

  • Edward Bernays, a pioneer in public relations and later theorist of the importance of propaganda to democratic governance.[40] He directed the CPI's Latin News Service. The CPI's poor reputation prevented Bernays from handling American publicity at the 1919 Peace Conference as he wanted.[41]
  • Carl R. Byoir (1886 – 1957), like Bernays, a founding father of public relations in America.
  • Maurice Lyons was the Secretary of the Committee. Lyons was a journalist who got involved in politics when he became secretary to William F. McCombs, who was Chairman of the Democratic National Committee during Woodrow Wilson's presidential campaign of 1912.
  • Charles Edward Merriam, a professor of political science at the University of Chicago and an adviser to several US Presidents.
  • Ernest Poole. Poole was the co Director of the Foreign Press Bureau division. Poole was awarded the very first Pulitzer Prize for Fiction for his novel, His Family.
  • Dennis J. Sullivan, Manager of Domestic Distribution for films made by the CPI.[42]
  • Vira Boarman Whitehouse, director of the CPI's office in Switzerland. She repeatedly crossed into Germany to deliver propaganda materials. She later told of her experiences in A Year as a Government Agent (1920).[43]

See also


  1. ^ Gerhard Peters; University of California, Santa Barbara. "Executive Order 2594 - Creating Committee on Public Information".
  2. ^ United States Committee on Public Information; University of Michigan (1917). Official U. S. Bulletin, Volume 1. p. 4. Retrieved October 23, 2009.
  3. ^ Kazin, Michael (1995). The Populist Persuasion. New York: Cornell University Press. p. 69.
  4. ^ Creel, George (1947). Rebel at Large: Recollections of Fifty Crowded Years. NY: G.P. Putnam's Son's. p. 158. The quoted words refer to the Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith.
  5. ^ Creel, 158-60
  6. ^ George Creel, How We Advertised America: The First Telling of the Amazing Story of the Committee on Public Information That Carried the Gospel of Americanism to Every Corner of the Globe. (1920)
  7. ^ Stephen Vaughn, Holding Fast the Inner Lines: Democracy, Nationalism, and the Committee on Public Information (1980). online
  8. ^ Katherine H. Adams, Progressive Politics and the Training of America’s Persuaders (1999)
  9. ^ Lisa Mastrangelo, "World War I, public intellectuals, and the Four Minute Men: Convergent ideals of public speaking and civic participation." Rhetoric & Public Affairs 12#4 (2009): 607-633.
  10. ^ George T. Blakey, Historians on the Homefront: American Propagandists for the Great War (1970)
  11. ^ Committee on public information, Complete Report of the Committee on Public Information: 1917, 1918, 1919 (1920) online free
  12. ^ Creel, 195-6
  13. ^ Thomas Fleming, The Illusion of Victory: America in World War I. New York: Basic Books, 2003; pg. 117.
  14. ^ Fleming, The Illusion of Victory, pp. 92-94.
  15. ^ Fleming, The Illusion of Victory, pp. 117-118.
  16. ^ Fleming, The Illusion of Victory, pg. 118.
  17. ^ a b Sweeney, Michael S. (2001). Secrets of Victory: The Office of Censorship and the American Press and Radio in World War II. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. pp. 15–16. ISBN 978-0-8078-2598-3.
  18. ^ a b George Creel, How We Advertised America. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1920; pp. 4–5.
  19. ^ pp. 75-76, Harold J. Tobin and Percy W. Bidwell, Mobilizing Civilian America, New York: Council on Foreign Relations.
  20. ^ Jackall, Robert; Janice M Hirota (2003). Image Makers: Advertising, Public Relations, and the Ethos of Advocacy. University of Chicago Press. p. 14. ISBN 978-0-226-38917-2.
  21. ^ Fleming, The Illusion of Victory, pp. 118-119.
  22. ^ Fleming, The Illusion of Victory, pg. 173.
  23. ^ Thomas Doherty, Projections of War: Hollywood, American Culture, and World War II (NY: Columbia University Press, 1999), 89-91. Hollywood's films "served to discredit not only the portrayal of war on screen but the whole enterprise of cinematic propaganda." Hollywood titles included Escaping the Hun, To Hell with the Kaiser!, and The Kaiser, the Beast of Berlin.
  24. ^ Library of Congress. "The Most Famous Poster". Retrieved 2007-01-02.
  25. ^ Creel, George. How we advertised America. New York & London: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1920. p. 7.
  26. ^ Fleming, The Illusion of Victory, pp. 119-120.
  27. ^ Mary S. Mander, Pen and Sword: American War Correspondents, 1898-1975 (University of Illinois, 2010), 46. Creel believed his story was correct, but that opponents in the military who were jealous of his control of military information minimized what happened en route.
  28. ^ Fleming, The Illusion of Victory, pg. 173. Creel blamed the Secretary of War for the false story.
  29. ^ Fleming, The Illusion of Victory, pg. 240.
  30. ^ Fleming, The Illusion of Victory, pg. 247.
  31. ^ James R. Mock, "The Creel Committee in Latin America," in Hispanic American Historical Review vol. 22 (1942), 262-79, esp. 266-7, 269-70, 272-4
  32. ^ Stone, Melville Elijah. Fifty Years a Journalist. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Page and Company, 1921. p. 342-5.
  33. ^ Hearings Before the Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives, on the Proposed Revenue Act of 1918, Part II: Miscellaneous Taxes (Washington, DC: 1918), 967ff., available online, accessed January 19, 2011.
  34. ^ Stephens, Oren. Facts to a Candid World: America's Overseas Information Program. Stanford University Press, 1955. p. 33.
  35. ^ Fleming, The Illusion of Victory. p. 148-149.
  36. ^ Fleming, The Illusion of Victory. p. 315.
  37. ^ For Wilson's support of Creel to a group of senators, see Thomas C. Sorenson, "We Become Propagandists," in Garth S. Jowett and Victoria O'Donnell (eds.), Readings in Propaganda and Persuasion: New and Classic Essays (Sage Publications, 2006), p. 88. Asked if he thought all Congressmen were loyal, Creel answered: "I do not like slumming, so I won't explore into the hearts of Congress for you." Wilson later said: "Gentlemen, when I think of the manner in which Mr. Creel has been maligned and persecuted, I think it is a very human thing for him to have said."
  38. ^ a b Creel, How We Advertised America, pg. ix.
  39. ^ Ronald Steel, Walter Lippmann and the American Century. Boston: Little, Brown, 1980, pp. 125-126, 141-147; Fleming, The Illusion of Victory, pg. 335; John Luskin, Lippmann, Liberty, and the Press. University of Alabama Press, 1972, pg. 36
  40. ^ W. Lance Bennett, "Engineering Consent: The Persistence of a Problematic Communication Regime," in Peter F. Nardulli, ed., Domestic Perspectives on Contemporary Democracy (University of Illinois Press, 2008), 139
  41. ^ Martin J. Manning with Herbert Romerstein, Historical Dictionary of American Propaganda (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press), 24
  42. ^ "Dennis J. Sullivan collection: Veterans History Project (Library of Congress)". Retrieved 2017-05-09.
  43. ^ Manning, 319-20

Further reading

  • Benson, Krystina. "The Committee on Public Information: A transmedia war propaganda campaign." Cultural Science Journal 5.2 (2012): 62-86. online
  • Benson, Krystina. "Archival Analysis of the Committee on Public Information: The Relationship Between Propaganda, Journalism and Popular Culture." International Journal of Technology, Knowledge and Society (2010) 6#4
  • Blakey, George T. Historians on the Homefront: American Propagandists for the Great War Lexington, Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, 1970. ISBN 0813112362 OCLC 132498
  • Breen, William J. Uncle Sam at Home : Civilian Mobilization, Wartime Federalism, and the Council of National Defense, 1917-1919. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1984. ISBN 0313241120 OCLC 9644952
  • Brewer, Susan A. Why America Fights: Patriotism and War Propaganda from the Philippines to Iraq. (2009).
  • Fasce, Ferdinando. "Advertising America, Constructing the Nation: Rituals of the Homefront during the Great War." European Contributions to American Studies 44 (2000): 161-174.
  • Fischer, Nick, "The Committee on Public Information and the Birth of U.S. State Propaganda," Australasian Journal of American Studies 35 (July 2016), 51–78.
  • Kotlowski, Dean J., "Selling America to the World: The Office of War Information's The Town (1945) and the American Scene Series," Australasian Journal of American Studies 35 (July 2016), 79–101.
  • Mastrangelo, Lisa. "World War I, public intellectuals, and the Four Minute Men: Convergent ideals of public speaking and civic participation." Rhetoric & Public Affairs 12.4 (2009): 607-633.
  • Mock, James R. and Cedric Larson, Words that Won the War: The Story of the Committee on Public Information, 1917-1919, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1939. OCLC 1135114
  • Pinkleton, Bruce. "The campaign of the Committee on Public Information: Its contributions to the history and evolution of public relations." Journal of Public Relations Research 6.4 (1994): 229-240.
  • Ponder, Stephen.. "Popular Propaganda: The Food Administration in World War I." Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly (1995) 72#3 pp. 539–50. it ran a separate propaganda campaign
  • Schaffer, Ronald. America in the Great War: The Rise of the War-Welfare State. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991. ISBN 0195049039 OCLC 23145262
  • Vaughn, Stephen. Holding Fast the Inner Lines: Democracy, Nationalism, and the Committee on Public Information. (University of North Carolina Press, 1980). ISBN 0807813737 OCLC 4775452 online
  • Vaughn, Stephen. "Arthur Bullard and the Creation of the Committee on Public Information," New Jersey History (1979) 97#1
  • Vaughn, Stephen. "First Amendment Liberties and the Committee on Public Information." American Journal of Legal History 23.2 (1979): 95-119. online
  • Merriam, Charles. American Publicity in Italy
  • Smyth, Daniel. "Avoiding Bloodshed? US Journalists and Censorship in Wartime", War & Society, Volume 32, Issue 1, 2013. online
  • Zeiger, Susan. "She didn't raise her boy to be a slacker: Motherhood, conscription, and the culture of the First World War." Feminist Studies 22.1 (1996): 7-39.

Primary sources


External links

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