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China Global Television Network

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

China Global Television Network
TypeState media
BrandingCGTN
Country
China
AvailabilityGlobal
HeadquartersCCTV Headquarters, Beijing
OwnerCentral Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist Party
ParentChina Media Group
Established2016; 8 years ago (2016)
Launch date
31 December 2016, 04:00 London Time/12:00 Beijing Time
Affiliation(s)Chinese Central Television
China Radio International
Official website
www.cgtn.com Edit this at Wikidata
China Global Television Network
Simplified Chinese中国国际电视台
Traditional Chinese中國國際電視台
Literal meaningChina International Television Station
Transcriptions
Standard Mandarin
Hanyu PinyinZhōngguó Guójì Diànshìtái
Wade–GilesChung-kuo Kuo-chi Tien-shih-t'ai
Alternative Chinese name
Simplified Chinese中国环球电视网
Traditional Chinese中國環球電視網
Literal meaningChina Global Television Network
Transcriptions
Standard Mandarin
Hanyu PinyinZhōngguó Huánqiú Diànshì Wǎng
Wade–GilesChung-kuo Huan-ch'iu Tien-shih Wang

China Global Television Network (CGTN) is one of three branches of state-run China Media Group and the international division of China Central Television (CCTV). Headquartered in Beijing, CGTN broadcasts news in multiple languages. CGTN is under the control of the Central Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist Party.[1][2][3]

Several media regulators and journalist advocacy groups have accused CGTN of broadcasting propaganda and disinformation on behalf of the Chinese government, and airing forced confessions.[4][5][6][7][8][9]

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Transcription

FEMALE SPEAKER: Authors at Google New York is pleased to have Professor Ying Zhu come and speak to us today. Please welcome Professor Zhu. [APPLAUSE] PROFESSOR YING ZHU: Thanks for having me here. I think I will start by actually, instead of talking about China Central Television, I wanted to show you something else, which I think you're familiar with, actually. So this is an interesting video clip of Korean pop singer, Psy, doing his "Gangnam Style" song and dance sequence. [VIDEO PLAYBACK] [MUSIC - PSY, "GANGNAM STYLE"] [END VIDEO PLAYBACK] PROFESSOR YING ZHU: Now, according to Wikipedia, as of January 1 of this year, this music video has been viewed over 1.1 billion times. I just clicked a couple more times into it on YouTube, of course. And this is the site's most watched video. Now, the question is, what does this slice of K-pop have anything to do with Chinese media or China Central Television? Well, nothing much. And this missing link is precisely what I wanted to call your attention to today. What the South Koreans have accomplished via this funky music video is what the Chinese state media have been craving for to promote name recognition and make people desire what you desire-- in other words, that is to project China's soft power. But Chinese media have yet to come up with such a pop hit to boost its soft power. Now, the lack of recognition or desirability of Chinese soft power is not due to lack of trying, as billions have been spent in promoting China's soft power globally. And the Chinese government invested $7.8 billion alone in 2009 to facilitate Chinese media's global soft power campaign. And all the money has gone to major state-run media firms, including China Central Television. Now, the global image campaign was launched by the Chinese state over a decade ago, back in 2001. The goal was to change China's international image which was, for the most part, negative. The Chinese Communist Party warned Chinese media practitioners that it would be unrealistic to expect the West to promote China's cause and perspective. But a decade later and many billions after, the overall international image of China continues to be, to put it mildly, uncool. Even the Chinese president, Hu Jintao, acknowledged a year ago the dismal record of Chinese soft power, telling the Party that, quote, "The overall strength of Chinese culture and its international influence is not commensurate with China's international status," end quote. So what was his solution? Well, not Psy's "Gangnam Style" K-pop, that's for sure. The popular and the grassroots have no place in China's image campaign. In fact, the satirical and rebellious "Gangnam Style" might even be considered unseemly to China's censors and cultural guardians. Instead, Hu Jintao encouraged the development of Chinese national culture rooted in Confucian tradition capable of countering Western cultural influence. So a state-manufactured and managed Chinese national culture is the prescription the Party has in mind for the people and for the rest of the world. Never mind that the world might not be all that interested in what the CCP has to preach. But this sort of heavy-handed approach is nothing new. Now, in China, culture is to enlighten rather than entertain. And then the media is to guard the purity and quality of Chinese culture. And the media, of course, must also serve the Party. Now, to be fair to the Chinese Communist Party, the subservience of culture to politics is not the party's invention. It is rooted in a much longer tradition of Chinese aesthetics that defines art and culture as the good and the beautiful. The Chinese cultural tradition puts a greater emphasis on the responsibility of art in the normalization of society, as opposed to a Western tradition of art as a critical vanguard or individual expression. Now, to this end, Western culture is often perceived as a source of decadence and evil for polluting the purity of Chinese culture. And thus, China has time and again waged wars against the cultural vulgarity and degradation seen, again, as a result of Western cultural pollution or erosion. The K-pop video can easily be condemned as vulgar, a cheap knockoff of Western-style pop music. Now, in January of last year, the Chinese president, Hu Jintao, urged Chinese cultural policymakers to, quote, "clearly see that international hostile forces are intensifying the strategic plot of westernizing and dividing China, and ideological and cultural fields are the focal areas of their long-term infiltration," end quote. And he said further that, quote, "We should deeply understand the seriousness and complexity of the ideological struggle, always sound the alarm, and remain vigilant, and take forceful measures to be on guard and respond," unquote. Now, though reminiscent of Cold War rhetoric, this sort of militant talk is nothing new in China. And to be fair, the West has, over the years, harbored similar apprehension and distrust towards China, particularly China's rise in the past decade. So the feeling is somewhat mutual. Let's just put it that way. Except that in China, the state can quickly enact policies that aim to deter Western cultural pollution. And in October 2011, China banned scores of racy and overtly materialistic entertainment shows on prime-time television in an effort to curb excessive entertainment, exemplified by a Chinese dating show on local satellite television, "If You Are The One," in which a provocatively dressed young woman are paraded on stage, blatantly embracing materialism. I think I have that queued up here. [VIDEO PLAYBACK] -[SPEAKING CHINESE] -Wang Peijie is the executive producer of "If You Are The One." -[SPEAKING CHINESE] -The show is a window through which we can look at our society. -Reality TV shows like "If You Are The One" have become common on Chinese television. The winning formula has attracted fans and ad revenue. -[SPEAKING CHINESE] -I think the conversations between the male and female contestants reflect the attitudes and concerns of people in their 20s, 30s, and 40s. I think they authentically represent the current state of things in China. -But the sometimes racy and materialistic content has also attracted the attention of China's censors. This type of content is relatively new for China. In the past, television's main purpose was to spread propaganda. [END VIDEO PLAYBACK] PROFESSOR YING ZHU: We don't need more propaganda here. Now, these material girls and boys from other reality programs have seriously offended Party comrades and conservative cultural commentators and viewers alike. And new rules were promptly issued, forcing all satellite TV stations across China to cut vulgar entertainment programs, essentially reducing weekly entertainment programs to two during prime time. Furthermore, and as a counterprogramming strategy, at least one show during prime time must be about promoting, quote, "traditional Chinese virtues, core socialist values, and advanced cultures," unquote. Now, the battle against Western popular culture is equated with ensuring China's cultural security. So it's a serious matter. The Chinese state's cultural anxiety was keenly felt in 2011, a year when "Avatar" pretty much dominated the Chinese box office and Lady Gaga was a household name, popular among the Chinese young and old. Now, actually, to demonstrate Lady Gaga's popularity in China, I wanted to take the liberty here to play a clip from Hunan Satellite TV's rendition of Lady Gaga's 2009 hit, "Bad Romance." Only that the song is now sung in Hunan's Changsha dialect and no less by a senior choir. And bear in mind that in this region of China, the word, gaga, means grandmother. I'm not sure if the Lady would be pleased with this kind of connection, the connotation, the image of grandmother and Lady Gaga. The second is part of Hunan Satellite Television's Mid-Autumn Festival Gala. Mid-Autumn Festival, some of you might know, is an occasion for family gathering and reunion in China. And the choir changed Gaga's lyrics to be about the elderly empty-nesters' yearning for the grown-up children and grandchildren to come home and visit. Let's have a sample of this. This is going to be very interesting. [VIDEO PLAYBACK] [MUSIC - "BAD ROMANCE"] [END VIDEO PLAYBACK] PROFESSOR YING ZHU: So you get a taste. So, is this Western culture pollution or Eastern cultural appropriation or subversion? And to use Lady Gaga to preach for Confucian family values seems to me pretty cool, especially coming from a group of very euphoric senior citizens. Regardless, the Chinese authority was not amused by the flood of Western-infused Chinese programs produced mostly by China's provincial TV stations, therefore the crackdown. But the crackdowns do hurt Chinese television, bottom line. Now, state-owned and controlled Chinese television is by now financially self-reliant and operationally autonomous. So when it comes to chasing ratings, it functions just the same as the US commercial networks. You have Three Blind Mice, I was told, since a decade ago with networks competing for ratings. Now, what is different is that in China, one network is granted greater leverage in market share. And that network is, of course, China Central Television, the only national TV network in China. To understand how China Central Television obtains its leverage, one must understand China's overall TV structure. Now, China has the so-called four-tier television structure, where television stations are set up at the national, provincial, county, and city levels. And both national and local regulators operate their own TV stations and serve audiences within their own administrative boundaries. Now, as a result, television stations, broadcasting bureaus, and governments at the same administrative levels are closely linked in economic and political exchange. And CCTV is the only broadcaster that is allowed a nationwide coverage, although the arrival of cable and satellite television would challenge the neat structure. So how does satellite television work in China? Well, in China, each provincial TV station is allowed to operate one satellite TV channel with signal coverage capable, or theoretically capable, of reaching the entire nation. But because of the administrative boundaries and local protectionism, provincial satellite TV stations must negotiate with each other to expand their satellite channels. And local broadcasters have managed over the years to extend their regional reach, their independent satellite and cable distribution deals with other provincial broadcasters. It's a bread and butter issue. Now, the essential regulator that oversees China Central Television is the State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television, or SARFT in short. Now, SARFT is motivated both politically and economically, understandably, to boost CCTV's market share. And how does it do it? Well, there is the must-carry policy that guarantees CCTV-1's national coverage. CCTV has altogether 24 channels under the big umbrella of CCTV China Central Television. And CCTV-1 is by far the most significant channel that carries network news and other culturally significant programs. Now, carrying CCTV-1 is considered a political mission-- an undeniable obligation and responsibility of local broadcasters. Then there is the exclusive information available to only CCTV-1, and then the crackdown on programs utilizing local dialects that appeals to local audiences. As the financial stakes grew higher, local stations rebelled, challenging CCTV's market dominance by producing entertainment programs that would attract audiences nationwide. And they used entertainment-oriented Hunan Satellite TV for what has emerged as CCTV's formidable challenger. If you recall, Hunan TV is the one who made all these video clips of grandmother and parents act up just to make sure you go home and visit your parents, so that they don't act up. So in 2004, Hunan Satellite TV debuted a singing competition show with mobile phone voting, modeled on "American Idol." And the show "Super Girls" became an overnight rating sensation, promoting CCTV to launch a campaign attacking Hunan Satellite Television, calling it a rogue broadcaster with culturally vulgar programs. And a top official from SARFT echoed CCTV, complaining about what he saw as an excessive amount of low-quality and lowbrow reality shows on Chinese television. And he wanted to strengthen the Party's supervision of entertainment programs and to restrict the number of reality shows allowed on TV. And SARFT eventually announced a ban on airing talent shows during prime time, which is somewhere between 7:30 to 10:30 in China. The ban started in 2007. And under the new rules, the programs must be no longer than 90 minutes and offer no prizes to attract contestants. And "Super Girls" was suspended in 2008 when the Beijing Olympics pretty much preempted everything. And then in 2009, Hunan Television made an attempt to relaunch "Super Girls," only in the different name "Happy Girls." This time it's called "Happy Girls." OK, so let's see if "Happy Girls" can fail better here. Take a look at these restrictions. So SARFT promptly handed down strict conditions for Hunan TV to run "Happy Girls." The draconian directives made even my then-preteen daughters wince, who complained quite wisely, I should say, that, quote, "This is ridiculous. Reality TV is all about expression, not the suppression of raw emotions," end quote. Now, here is a segment from the now much-subdued "Happy Girls," which is actually the opening of the championship competition in 2011. [VIDEO PLAYBACK] [MUSIC PLAYING] -[SINGING IN CHINESE] -[SPEAKING CHINESE] -[SINGING IN CHINESE] -[SINGING IN CHINESE] -[SINGING IN CHINESE] [END VIDEO PLAYBACK] PROFESSOR YING ZHU: So how is this for C-pop? Pretty cool? Well, the Chinese cultural guardians would have none of that either. Now, let's march on. Now, as CCTV is busy bothering local stations, it is confronted with yet another formidable challenger. And this time, it's something called the internet. Though television remains the Party's most manageable vehicle for cultural engineering, even the Chinese state can't control consumer behavior. CCTV has largely become irrelevant to the young and educated population who has pretty much opted for the more open cyberspace. At the end of last year projected that the number of Chinese watching entertainment programs online would surpass 445 million. CCTV has tried to woo audiences back by importing popular movies and TV dramas from the UK and the US. And the most recent lineup includes, surprisingly, "V For Vendetta," featuring an anti-hero with anti-authoritarian and totalitartian powers, and yes, "Downton Abbey." Now, let's dwell on the internet a bit. The internet has been a very positive force in compelling Chinese state and the media to open up. The internet has made it that much harder for Chinese authorities to shut out undesirable news or keep it out of the traditional media in China. And in keeping the news of, let's say, collapsing schools in Sichuan or collapsing governments in the Middle East out of the state media when millions of people can access them online would further drive people away from the traditional media. So the Chinese state gets it. But the compulsive censorship regime will not give it a rest. The internet and the social media are subject to very sophisticated monitoring and filtering. Now, official campaigns were launched in China a decade ago to effectively push for internet self-censorship, equating diligent self-censorship with upholding corporate social responsibility, proper professional codes of conduct, and also individual self-discipline. You have to be self-disciplined to censor yourself, in other words. And these days, sensitive terms are routinely blocked. A search in Chinese about a recent protest in Guangzhou against political censorship yields not much results. And in December last year, many of you know probably Sina Weibo, the Chinese version of Twitter, enacted a seven-day delay function for sensitive terms. Imagine not getting a result for seven days. Gosh, Google would go bankrupt. And I suppose it's the modern day version of the Pony Express. And to think about it, it could be a useful tool to deter my daughter from getting online. So Facebook and Twitter are censored. So is YouTube, which leads back to the piece of K-pop we sampled at the beginning of my talk. The Ministry of Culture in Korea actually gave an award to Google for YouTube's effectiveness as a platform for spreading Korean popular culture. And Psy's "Gangnam Style" song exploded in large part because his video went viral on YouTube. But YouTube is off limits in China, of course. Now, despite China's great firewall, sensitive information does manage to find surreptitious and guerrilla style online existence through various transgressive tactics such as code-breaking, multiple blogging, creative use of terms and phrases, and et cetera, et cetera. And also, censorship has had little impact on the tech-savvy professionals and rights activists who actively seek out and also spread information by circumventing the wall. Although, recently, China started to crack down on foreign VPNs and other circumventing technology, which makes it harder to climb the wall. But censorship cannot prevail. It cannot eliminate dissent. It would only ferment further discontent as cohesion would eventually lead to rebellion. Now, by trying hard to fend off Western media and information from coming in, the Chinese state somehow imagined that it would be able to push its own media overseas. And in the case of CCTV, it launched its official English channel on September 25, 2000. CCTV International rapidly expanded its foreign language services in the last few years, adding Spanish, French, Russian, Arab, and African channels to its cocktail of foreign language services. And then came CCTV America. On February 6 of last year, before an official visit to the US of Xi Jinping, China's incoming president, CCTV launched its American outpost, CCTV America. And on February 11, CCTV America's panel showed "The Heat," which, by the way, is hosted by Michael Walter, gave a preview of Xi Jinping's upcoming stopover in Iowa, the leading soybean producer in the US and big supplier to China. [VIDEO PLAYBACK] -When Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping's itinerary to the United States was announced, it included stopovers in Washington, DC, California, and also Iowa. It turns out Vice President Xi is keen to revive old connections and meet with friends he made when he spent some time in Iowa 27 years ago. He visited the Hawkeye State as part of an agricultural delegation from the Northeastern Hubei province in 1985. Vice President Xi spent two nights in the home of an American family, toured farms, and even watched a baseball game. He also met Iowa Governor Terry Branstad, who says Xi Jinping was pleased by the warmth and friendly reception he received back then and feels a sense of kinship with the people of Iowa. Branstad visited Xi Jinping during a visit to China last September. He says the Vice President saved his itinerary from his 1985 Iowa trip and inquired about a number of people he met. Iowa is also critical for another reason. It's exporting a record amount of corn, soybeans, and pork to meet a massive surge in demand by China's growing middle class. Look at the exponential growth in trade over a 10-year period. In 2000, Iowa's exports to China totaled $45 million. By 2010, that rose nearly 13 times to $627 million. What does that do for the job market? Unemployment in Iowa was at 5.6% in December of 2011. The US national average at the same time-- 8.5%. [END VIDEO PLAYBACK] PROFESSOR YING ZHU: Now, CCTV America's vast financial resources have brought or bought veteran news people from the US, UK, and Australia. But it remains to be seen if viewers, too, can be bought or brought along. And CCTV America is highly skewed towards reporting economic and financial news. And when it comes to political news, it actively engages in major events elsewhere except in China. When it comes to political news about China, CCTV's America branch is highly disciplined, sticking to the Party's script and reporting only what is permissible. It is very much on the Party's short leash. So when the journalist strike against the censorship at China's Southern Weekend became headline news around the world, CCTV America kept silent. And Al Jazeera, on the other hand, has created their brand name for producing intriguing news about the Middle East, which is actually what CCTV America aspires to be when it comes to news about China. But political editorial makes it impossible for CCTV America to function as a credible and valuable news about China. Now, I'm going to wrap it up a little. Now, China's top-down, state-orchestrated soft power campaign has so far shown little impact in altering how the world perceives China. The soft power campaign has failed to account for the power of the grassroots and the popular. The paternalistic Chinese state does not get it that if the Chinese back home do not want to be lectured to, the audiences abroad would hardly want to have the same patience or to listen in. Now, I'm not suggesting here that the "Gangnam Style" pop is the only way or even a viable way towards accruing soft power. China can certainly produce its own brand of soft power, fusing cultures high and low. But whatever it produces, it must resonate with the grassroots and be capable of unleashing individual creativity and aspiration. And when the leaders do lecture, it wouldn't hurt for them to lighten up a little-- perhaps show some emotions and be a little more animated. And I want to show you a clip here, particularly delivering New Year's greetings. Let's see how the Chinese leaders deliver the New Year's greetings here. [VIDEO PLAYBACK] -[SPEAKING CHINESE] [END VIDEO PLAYBACK] PROFESSOR YING ZHU: And you know what? What the CCP needs, actually, is the "bouncy, irrepressible" Joe Biden, to quote Maureen Dowd. Here is Biden in action. Let's take a look at what the Biden in action was like. [VIDEO PLAYBACK] -Hey, mom. -Hey, what's the story? -How are you? Good to see you. I'm Joe Biden. Come here. Look at this smile-- God love you, get over here. Come on, sis, get in here. -You've got a million dollar smile. -There's a lot to smile about today. -You betcha. -Good-looking bunch. Spread your legs, you're going to be frisked. I want you next to me. [LAUGHTER] -How are you, John? It's good to see you. Come on, let's do this. [INAUDIBLE] Ah, leave him there, will you? You got a smile that lights up the room. Look at your smile-- lights up the room. You got a smile that lights up the whole chamber. -Thank you. -Mom, you could come by me. Mom, how are you? -Oh, great. -You look like his sister. Get over here. Look, in my house, it was real simple. There's mother's, and then there's something else, and something else, and then there's mother's, and then there's mother's. Come on, mom. Take a chance. Ruin your reputation here. Mom, do you realize that in parts of Arizona, you just risked your reputation? [INAUDIBLE] -As they say in Southern Delaware, mom, you've done good with this one. As they say in Southern Delaware, you've done good, boy-- good, girl. As they say in Southern Delaware, you've done good. [END VIDEO PLAYBACK] PROFESSOR YING ZHU: I wish I could continue just playing this. And the Joe Biden can be very good soft power, actually, for the Chinese state. Now, let's get serious here as I wrap up. Now, to think of the fundamental problem is that the Chinese state has no moral authority in imparting cultural values here. And ultimately, what needs to be fixed is not just China's draconian image alone. For China's charm offense to work, it has to shake off its repressive and authoritarian reputation. And for that to happen, it will need to lift political censorship to allow for a very vibrant civil society to emerge. It also needs to dismantle the state monopoly of the media so that information channels are open to dissent, diversity, and competition. After leaving behind the totalitarian state of Mao's era, China glided through a relatively open phase with rapid economic growth and political exploration only to arrive today at a toxic cocktail of authoritarian and plutocratic rule where money and power converge to guard interests of a few. And for China's soft power to work, China has to first respect and empower its own people. And that's today's talk. Thanks very much for having a good ride with me. [APPLAUSE] PROFESSOR YING ZHU: Want me to take questions? AUDIENCE: I was impressed in your book with the response of the senior CCTV individuals, and how they were trying to balance commitment with the different venues they had to satisfy. How do they react to this whole coming out and soft power? PROFESSOR YING ZHU: Well, I think a lot of Chinese journalists-- some of them are very idealistic. And they really do tie their success and their aspiration with the success and aspiration of China and globally. So they somehow do tie their fate with the fate of China. So they're also very patriotic. And so they do want to see China prosper and to become a respectable global player. But how China is to reach that step-- I think that's another issue. I think they, too, have their own ideas. And some of them have to struggle with very strict censorship where they can't even express their ideas freely. And a lot of them have to exercise routinely self-censorship. I use self-censorship as just a descriptive term. I'm not condemning self-censorship or being judgmental about it, but that's the reality that they face. I think, again, there's a certain aspiration there, but there's a huge gap between the reality and what they aspire to be. AUDIENCE: I wonder if you know about the Southern Weekly news that just broke today about-- PROFESSOR YING ZHU: Yes. The New York Times. AUDIENCE: Yes. The Chinese journalists are all coming out saying, we're speaking for freedom of speech. PROFESSOR YING ZHU: Yes. This is a very exciting moment. This is actually a watershed moment. The Chinese government called these demonstrations a mass incident. In this case, this is the first incident that people actually come out and gather together to demonstrate against the political censorship. And this is a very exciting moment. And in fact, I was accepting Boston Globe's interview yesterday. And the question was posed to me, and I expressed my optimism. I think this is unstoppable. The world has opened, and China has opened itself to the world. And China cannot retreat and go back to a dark age. I hope that the new leader will stand back and think twice before they crack down on these demonstrations. But again, I think it's a great moment, and I personally felt very excited about that. AUDIENCE: I think you did mention Al Jazeera as being the antithesis, if you will, of CCTV. What are the short and medium-term steps that CCTV can become as reputable and as far-reaching as something as Al Jazeera? PROFESSOR YING ZHU: Well, when the image of China changes, that's the only time you can do that. Two things. One is the image of China changes. And also, China lifts its censorship. They're all interrelated. You cannot do without the other. AUDIENCE: So sort of the forces that created modern Western ethos and thinking came out of a bunch of funny cultural events like the English Civil War and a bunch of fairly horrible experiences that we had in the past. And those things sort of drive a lot of things even though we are often sort of forgetful of their background. What do you think the similar cultural forces or drivers within China need to be, or are, to bring China to the place where you and certainly most of us think it ought to go? Because it's not the case that China had something like the English Civil War to wake it up to certain things that it was doing wrong. PROFESSOR YING ZHU: Well, we have different events throughout the last century-- not similar in nature, but the force for change, the modernization force has been there all along, too. It's not going back to history, thinking about, at this particular moment, what one might do, what one might seize. Clearly, again, going back to the internet. The internet has opened the technological revolution. Let's put it this way-- technological revolution. The internet has opened a whole terrain for competing voices to emerge and for information to go out at a very fast rate and to really make it impossible, really, for censorship to control the information flow. And so that's something that really helps to facilitate this kind of change. And don't forget that as recent as back in 1989, there's a student movement. So there is a mass grassroots demand for change. And so I'm not sure if I'm answering your question succinctly, but I guess I'm not in a position to really prescribe certain solutions. Just suffice it to say that there's so many incremental changes out there already. And it seems to me that China is at a crossroads, and China is ready to make that leap. AUDIENCE: In your book, you were able to interview many members of the CCTV family who responded with considerable candor. And I wonder, were they jeopardizing either their careers or any personal safety by being so candid with you? And I'm wondering if the book has been banned in China. PROFESSOR YING ZHU: I will be interested to know whether the book is banned in China. You're right. A lot of those interviews were very candid. And first of all, let me say, I do not consider these journalists whom I interviewed back in China my research subjects. They're my fellow journalists. I felt a very keen sense of camaraderie with these people. And so these are not interviews per se. These are conversations conducted at various occassions over their own period of time. I do not just go in there and put on the video and audio tape and say, let's talk. No. A lot of conversations conduct over dinner, even over hot pot. And so this makes it easier for people to be less guarded and open up. But there is a very fine line. And I know and they know there are certain questions I cannot ask. Because it's easy for me to come back, leave China. But people who are there have to stay there. And they have to live, to make a living. So it was a very delicate balance. I'm very careful not to ask certain questions that will be too provocative. And then also, a lot of the high-profile interviewees or my comrades back there, we grew up under similar cultural conditions around the same age. And so there is a mutual understanding there, too. So there's a trust there, so that they get to open up to me. And I can tell you that I did not really put everything in that book, because I, too, have to exercise some kind of control. There's an ethical consideration. So yes, it's very candid. But it also walks a very fine line. It works within the boundary. Let's put it that way. AUDIENCE: As CCTV America tries to project China's soft power, what is its metric for success? Because even in the US, there's all these different news outlets and organizations and publications, and there's no real consensus on many important issues. So how does CCTV see itself reaching its goal in terms of changing America's image of China? PROFESSOR YING ZHU: Well, it'll be interesting if they actually have a goal. Well, their goal is very clear-- it's to project its soft power. Whether they have a very coherent strategy, I highly doubt there is. And CCTV America and a lot of CCTV's foreign services really are straight-jacketed by the heavy-handed policy interference. So they're not left alone to follow their professional instinct, to do reporting, and so on and so forth. So I don't think it is a real strategy in capital terms or in non-capital terms in a strategy, per se. There's only goal, only wishful thinking that if we have the financial resources, we can come over and we can set up an outpost there. And we can hire your people to broadcast for us. And it might soften up this kind of propaganda tone a little bit. But if you cannot really report the major news items that everybody else is interested in, then you really do not have the credibility. And if there's a strategy, I'm not aware of it. And it's certainly not succeeding. [APPLAUSE]

History

CGTN grew out of CCTV's all-English channel, known as CCTV-9 or CCTV International, launched in 2000 and renamed CCTV News in 2010.[10] Channels in other languages were launched during the mid and late 2000s. In December 2016, the six non-Chinese language television channels under CCTV International were rebranded to bear the CGTN name.[5] In 2018, CGTN was brought under the umbrella of the China Media Group.[11] By 2022, CGTN had built a network of social media influencers, according to the Associated Press.[12]

Observers have noted that the "aim [of CGTN] is to influence public opinion overseas in order to nudge foreign governments into making policies favourable towards China’s Communist party" through subtle means.[5] Australian researchers Thomas Fearon and Usha M. Rodrigues argued that CGTN has a "dichotomous role as a credible media competing for audience attention on the world stage, and a vital government propaganda organ domestically."[13]

According to James Palmer at Foreign Policy, the contrasting aims of RT (formerly Russia Today) and CGTN, "mirrors wider strategies: Moscow wants chaos it can exploit, while Beijing wants a stable world order—on its terms".[14] While "RT doesn't mind whether it goes to the far-left or the far-right," Chinese state media is permitted to "act from a very narrow, officially approved scope, and the risk of the political extremes is too much," according to journalist Hilton Yip.[15] On the contrary to CGTN's investments in studios and numerous overseas bureaus, "the actual content is a mix of brutally tedious propaganda and bland documentaries. The audience is always the bosses in Beijing, not the average viewer overseas".[15] Yip also noted the growing disillusionment of journalists in China who "are allowed to do little more than parrot the official line", citing a viral video of a journalist rolling her eyes at another reporter's softball question during a ministerial press conference, which "seemed to speak for many in the country who are tired of the charade that local media has become".[15]

Despite a decade of overseas expansion, the redoubling of efforts by CGTN, and to an extension other state media, to push the party's theories and principles abroad is at odds with boosting China's overseas image.[16] CGTN, along with other Chinese state media outlets, is still widely regarded as "editorially biased and full of propaganda, and they still struggle to attract large audiences", particularly in the age of widespread internet use with social media and nontraditional forms of media where the public has become "more averse to clumsy state-run propaganda than ever".[15]

In his 2022 book Beijing's Global Media Offensive: China's Uneven Campaign to Influence Asia and the World, journalist Joshua Kurlantzick wrote that CGTN "tried to build itself a presence that could rival other global broadcasters like Al Jazeera, RT, the Turkish global broadcaster TRT World, and, the Chinese government hopes, giants like CNN and the BBC."[17] In December 2022, he said that the government "wanted CGTN to be regarded as a credible source of information, like Al Jazeera", but described the idea as "something of a fantasy". He added: "Qatar is a small state, and it has significant foreign policy on a few certain issues. But outside of those issues, Qatar has basically left its Al Jazeera reporters alone. China was never going to be able to do that because virtually any issue could have an impact on China."[18]

Editions

TV channels

Name Language Launch date Previous names
CGTN
English 20 September 1997[19]
  • CCTV-9
  • CCTV-NEWS
CGTN-Español
Spanish 1 October 2007[19]
  • CCTV-E
  • CCTV-Español
CGTN-Français
French 1 October 2007[19]
  • CCTV-F
  • CCTV-Français
CGTN-العربية
Arabic 25 July 2009 CCTV-العربية
CGTN-Русский
Russian 10 September 2009 CCTV-Русский
CGTN Documentary
English 1 January 2011 CCTV-9 Documentary

Online platforms

Name Language Launch date Replaced Format Source
CGTN Turk Turkish 2023 CRI Turk operates a website and various social media platforms (Facebook, Instagram, X) [20]
CGTN Malay Malay CRI Malay operates on Facebook only [21]
CGTN Hausa Hausa CRI Hausa operates on Facebook only [22]
CGTN Tajikistan Tajik None operates on Facebook and X only, videos translated from CGTN Russian [23]
CGTN Uzbekistan Uzbek operates on Facebook and X only, videos translated from CGTN Russian [24]
Cgtn Қазақша Kazakh operates on Facebook and X only, videos translated from CGTN Russian [25]
CGTN Кыргызча Kyrgyz operates on Facebook and X only, videos translated from CGTN Russian [26]

Reception

Bias, censorship, and disinformation

Critics have accused CGTN of broadcasting misinformation and making false allegations against opponents of the Chinese government.[3] The network has been investigated and censured by Britain's Ofcom for biased coverage of the 2019–2020 Hong Kong protests and the airing of forced confessions.[6][27][28][29][30] CGTN has been characterized as a vehicle for government propaganda and disinformation campaigns by Reporters Without Borders, BBC, and other sources.[3][5][31][32][33][34]

Despite its revamp launching of CCTV America, critics have voiced concerns over the level of censorship exercised by the channel, especially on sensitive domestic issues in China.[15] Philip Cunningham of Cornell University, who has appeared more than 100 times on CCTV talk shows, noted that sensitive issues such as Tibet and Xinjiang were heavily edited on various programs.[35] Ma Jing, Director of CCTV America, defended the channel against such allegations by saying that the channel edits stories the same way other news organizations do. She said: "We uphold the traditional journalistic values. We consider accuracy, objectivity, truthfulness, and public accountability very important, more important than anything else."[35]

In December 2018, the U.S. Department of Justice determined that CGTN must register under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) as an agent for the Chinese government and the Chinese Communist Party.[36] In the subsequent FARA filing with the U.S. Department of Justice dated February 2, 2019, Ms. Ma Jing wrote that CGTN maintained editorial independence free from the state's influence and functioned similarly to other news media.[37][38] A month later, in early March 2019, she was summoned to return to China.[38]

On 18 September 2019, Nick Pollard, a British TV executive, resigned from his post as consultant and advisor to CGTN, giving his reason for leaving as being CGTN's failure to comply with Ofcom's rules on impartiality in connection to its coverage of the Hong Kong anti-extradition bill protests.[39] He had joined CGTN in December 2018.[40] Ofcom had several inquiries into CGTN going on in September 2019.[41] In March 2021, CGTN was fined £225,000 by Ofcom for bias in its coverage of the 2019 pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong, which was found to have repeatedly breached fairness and impartiality requirements.[42][43]

A September 2019 article in The Diplomat stated that CGTN "has a consistent record of blatantly and egregiously violating journalistic standards and encouraging or justifying hatred and violence against innocent people."[44]

In July 2021, BBC News reported that CGTN initiated a drive to use foreign vloggers, such as Raz Gal-Or and Lee and Oli Barrett, as stringers to denounce negative coverage of Xinjiang.[45][46] The use of these individuals prevents YouTube from labelling their content as state-sponsored content, although their videos are promoted by state media accounts. Australian cybersecurity researcher Robert Potter from Internet 2.0 said there was evidence that these vloggers were heavily promoted using a mix of 50 Cent Army, click farms, fake bot accounts, and fake news websites, all to "spoof YouTube into treating it like a legitimate view."[45] Global Voices reported in October 2021 that CGTN had also hired Arabic-speaking social media influencers to frame Chinese government policies toward the Uyghurs as part of an anti-terrorist measure.[47]

In February 2021, a Press Gazette investigation found that CGTN purchased ads on Facebook that denied any mistreatment of Uyghurs and promoted Xinjiang internment camps as "vocational training centres."[48]

In a 2022 research paper comparing RT and CGTN's coverage of the 2020 United States presidential election, Martin Moore and Thomas Colley of King's College London described CGTN as using a "surface neutrality" propaganda model, noting that it "avoid[ed] expressing partisanship or framing US politics in an unduly biased or subjective way" in its coverage of the election, but it "dropp[ed] its objective tone in favour of being enthusiastically pro-China, without exception" in its coverage of geopolitical issues affecting China, and that CGTN did not publish content that was critical of or embarrassing to the Chinese government. They added: "Unlike RT, it frequently frames issues (such as the revelations about Trump's taxes) through the prism of the Chinese interest—even if the issues have no direct bearing on China. These characteristics contravene journalistic norms of independence from government and impartiality".[4] Moore and Colley noted in another paper that during the election, "[CGTN] presented the US as poorly governed, plutocratic, racist and a destabilising international influence, and China as well governed, benign, stable, and as a rising superpower."[49]

Broadcasting of forced confessions

CCTV broadcast two forced confessions of the British journalist Peter Humphrey. The first was staged in August 2013, and was filmed by a CCTV crew with Humphrey locked in an iron chair inside a steel cage, wearing handcuffs and an orange prison vest. This was before he had been indicted, tried or convicted of a crime. The second, in July 2014, was once again filmed by CCTV, not in a cage this time, but still in a prison vest and handcuffs, before he had been tried or convicted on the charge of illegal information gathering.[50] Both were aired in the UK by CGTN.[51]

On 23 November 2018, Humphrey filed a complaint to Ofcom against CCTV, citing violations of the United Kingdom Broadcasting Code's Fairness and Privacy provisions. Humphrey said that both confessions were scripted and directed by the Chinese police, the public security bureau, while he was a prisoner, in conditions of duress amounting to torture.[51][52] On 6 July 2020, Ofcom ruled that CGTN was guilty of breaching UK broadcasting standards in both incidents. The ruling stated that CGTN had breached Humphrey's privacy and that in the channel's reporting, "material facts were presented, disregarded or omitted in a way that was unfair to Mr Humphrey".[6]

In November 2019, CGTN aired a video of a UK consular employee, Simon Cheng, in captivity "confessing" to consorting with prostitutes. Within a week, Cheng had filed a complaint with Ofcom.[53]

On 8 March 2021, CGTN was fined a total of £225,000 by Ofcom for serious breaches of fairness, privacy and impartiality rules. "We found the individuals (Simon Cheng and Gui Minhai) concerned were unfairly treated and had their privacy unwarrantably infringed," Ofcom said, adding that the broadcaster had "failed to obtain their informed consent to be interviewed." It concluded that "material facts which cast serious doubt on the reliability of their alleged confessions" had been left out of the programmes, which aired pre-trial "confessions" of the two men while they were being detained. Ofcom said it was considering further sanctions.[9][54]

Detained Australian journalist

In August 2020, Australian CGTN television anchor Cheng Lei was detained by Chinese authorities on national security grounds but no details of accusations were provided.[55][56] On October 11, 2023, Australia government announced Cheng returned to Australia.[57][58] China's Ministry of State Security said that Cheng provided state secrets she gathered from her work to a foreign organization through her mobile phone.[57]

COVID-19 misinformation

In April 2020, the non-governmental organization Reporters Without Borders criticized CGTN for engaging in disinformation regarding COVID-19.[7] The United States Department of State described CGTN's output on COVID-19 as part of a wider government-led disinformation campaign.[59] In April 2021, the European External Action Service published a report that cited Chinese state media outlets, including CGTN, as spreading disinformation to present Western vaccines as unsafe.[60][61]

French journalist controversy

In March 2021, an investigation by Le Monde claimed that a supposed French journalist for CGTN named "Laurène Beaumond" was a fabricated identity.[62] Le Figaro disputed this, saying "Beaumond" was a real French journalist from Sarthe, but had been publishing for CGTN under a pseudonym. Le Figaro said they had interviewed "Beaumond", under the condition that her true identity be kept secret.[63]

Israel coverage

In May 2021, Israel's embassy in Beijing accused CGTN of "blatant antisemitism" when it broadcast an antisemitic trope during the 2021 Israel–Palestine crisis.[64][65][66]

A week after the 2023 Hamas-led attack on Israel, CGTN journalist Stephanie Freid visited Sderot and reported that during a shootout at the local police station, "Hamas fighters and their police captives were apparently killed when Israeli forces opened fire on the station with a tank."[67] CGTN's report was cited by Republika,[67] Tribunnews.com,[68] and DeWereldMorgen to support the controversial claim that Israeli forces killed their own soldiers and civilians during the attack.[69]

Peng Shuai disappearance

In December 2021, Chinese professional tennis player Peng Shuai disappeared after publicizing sexual assault allegations against former Chinese vice premier Zhang Gaoli. CGTN's official account on Twitter subsequently posted an "email" professed to be from her claiming she was okay, but attracted questions over its authenticity as a cursor was visible in the screenshot of the third line.[70] The Women's Tennis Association did not believe the email was genuine.[71]

Russian invasion of Ukraine

In March 2022, CGTN paid for digital ads on Facebook targeting global users with briefings and newscasts featuring pro-Kremlin talking points about the Russian invasion of Ukraine after Meta Platforms banned Russian state media advertisement buys.[72][73] CGTN has promoted unsubstantiated Russian claims of biological weapons labs in Ukraine.[74][75][76][77]

Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant

In 2023, CGTN ran paid ads on social media platforms in multiple countries and languages denouncing the discharge of radioactive water of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, which critics labeled part of a concerted disinformation campaign.[78][79][80]

Responses

U.S. designation as foreign mission

In 2018, the United States Department of Justice directed CGTN America, the U.S. division of CGTN, to register as a foreign agent under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA).[16] CGTN America said in its FARA filings on 1 February 2019 that it disagreed with the Justice Department's decision, but registered nonetheless.[81] In 2020, the United States Department of State designated CGTN and its parent company, CCTV, as foreign missions.[82][83]

Revocation of UK broadcasting license

On 4 February 2021, Star China Media (the UK broadcast license holder for CGTN) had its broadcast license revoked by UK broadcasting regulator Ofcom.[84] Ofcom found that Star had no editorial oversight over the channel it was broadcasting, and was instead acting as a third-party distributor for CGTN's feed.[84] Ofcom also denied an application to transfer the broadcast license to the China Global Television Network Corporation (CGTNC), on the grounds that CGTNC was "controlled by a body which is ultimately controlled by the Chinese Communist Party".[84] UK law prohibits license holders from being controlled by political bodies.[85] In a statement, Ofcom said:

We have given CGTN significant time to come into compliance with the statutory rules. Those efforts have now been exhausted. Following careful consideration, taking account of all the facts and the broadcaster’s and audience's rights to freedom of expression, we have decided it is appropriate to revoke the licence for CGTN to broadcast in the UK. We expect to conclude separate sanctions proceedings against CGTN for due impartiality and fairness and privacy breaches shortly.[86]

In what CNN Business characterised as "an apparent tit-for-tat move", the Chinese government banned the BBC World News TV channel from airing in China on 11 February. Given that BBC World News could only be received in so-called foreign compounds (such as internationally owned hotels) in mainland China in the first place, it was unclear what impact, if any, this ban would have.[87] Following the license revocation, CGTN no longer had permission to broadcast in Germany, due to its German license being approved by Ofcom,[88] but it resumed broadcasting via Vodafone Germany in March 2021.[89]

CGTN later sought and received agreement from French regulatory authorities to broadcast in France, which would allow them to broadcast in member states of the Council of Europe, including the United Kingdom.[90]

In August 2021, Ofcom levied additional fines on CGTN's UK license holder, Star China Media, for breaches of rules around fairness and privacy.[91] The channel announced later in the month that the channel has returned to the UK by launching on Freeview. Ofcom later claimed the channel uses the Vision TV Network, an internet-based datacasting service.[92]

Suspension from SBS

In March 2021, the Australian television network SBS suspended the English and Mandarin broadcasts of CGTN and CCTV respectively, which were broadcast on SBS as part of its World Watch program, over human rights complaints concerning the airings of "forced confessions."[8][93] CGTN responded that CCTV has signed a cooperation agreement with SBS to broadcast some of CCTV's Chinese programs for free in 2006, but CGTN did not authorize SBS to broadcast its English programs.[94]

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