To install click the Add extension button. That's it.

The source code for the WIKI 2 extension is being checked by specialists of the Mozilla Foundation, Google, and Apple. You could also do it yourself at any point in time.

Kelly Slayton
Congratulations on this excellent venture… what a great idea!
Alexander Grigorievskiy
I use WIKI 2 every day and almost forgot how the original Wikipedia looks like.
Live Statistics
English Articles
Improved in 24 Hours
Added in 24 Hours
Show all languages
What we do. Every page goes through several hundred of perfecting techniques; in live mode. Quite the same Wikipedia. Just better.

Charles Henry Sloan

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Charles Henry Sloan
Member of the U.S. House of Representatives
from Nebraska's 4th district
In office
March 4, 1929 – March 3, 1931
Preceded byJohn N. Norton
Succeeded byJohn N. Norton
In office
March 4, 1911 – March 3, 1919
Preceded byEdmund H. Hinshaw
Succeeded byMelvin O. McLaughlin
Personal details
Born(1863-05-02)May 2, 1863
Monticello, Iowa
DiedJune 2, 1946(1946-06-02) (aged 83)
Geneva, Nebraska
Political partyRepublican

Charles Henry Sloan (May 2, 1863 – June 2, 1946) was an American Republican Party politician.

YouTube Encyclopedic

  • 1/3
  • ✪ Charles Glass - The Horror of Syria: What Happened, What Might Have Been Different
  • ✪ Melanie Sloan (CREW) Take on Big Dragons


- Well, good afternoon. I'm Daniel Benjamin, I'm the director of the Dickey Center and I'm delighted to welcome you to this event entitled the Horror of Syria, what happened, what might have been different with Charles Glass. This event, I'm pleased to say is being co-sponsored by the Dickey Center, by Middle Eastern Studies, and by the Political Economy Project. Well first of all I see a few familiar faces from just a couple days ago when we did the Horror of Yemen. And I want to just congratulate you on your resilience and say we are, we must share genetic material because well, this stuff is fascinating even if it is rather gloomy. Neither the subject of today's talk nor the speaker need a lot of introduction. Almost eight years into it, the war in Syria has been the greatest humanitarian catastrophe of our era and there has been no shortage of competition for that title. What started out as an Arab spring rebellion was fueled by the ambitions of numerous outside actors including Iran, Saudi Arabia, Russia, Qatar, Turkey and the United States. More than 400,000 people are believed to have perished in this conflict. More than five-and-a-half million have fled the country and six million are internally displaced. The shock waves from the conflict especially in the form of fleeing civilians have rocked the European Union and had a profound impact on the cohesion of that institution and they've, it's also had profound effects on global politics, for example, between the United States and Russia. Our speaker today, Charles Glass, has been reporting on this long-running tragedy really since the outset. He's one of the most seasoned and accomplished English-language-speaking journalists in the business today, and his work in the region began in 1973 when he joined the ABC News Beirut Bureau, then being led by the renowned Peter Jennings. He covered the October Arab-Israeli War on both the Egyptian and the Syrian fronts. Covered the Civil War in Lebanon where he was actually wounded by artillery fire. He was ABC News chief Middle East correspondent from 1983 to '93, and since that time he has been a freelance writer in Paris, Tuscany, Venice and London, none of which sounds too bad but he has regularly covered the Middle East, the Balkans, Southeast Asia and the Mediterranean at large. He is the author of many books, perhaps the best known is his magnum opus on the Middle East, Tribes Without Flags. Tribes With Flags, excuse me. He also co-wrote with Patrick Cockburn a book, Syria Burning, the Short History of the Catastrophe. He's written several books on the World Wars of the last century. Most recently, They Fought Alone: The True Story of the Starr Brothers, British Secret Agents in Nazi-Occupied France which came out just last September, is that correct? And his work has appeared everywhere. In Time Magazine, in The Guardian, in The Telegraph, The Independent, The Times Literary Supplement, on and on. He's published short fiction in Granta, and he has been a special correspondent for the London Review of Books and writes regularly for The New York Review of Books. He's also made, many documentary films. He's been honored by the Overseas Press Club. He's shared both the Commonwealth and George Foster Peabody Awards. Born in Los Angeles, California. He makes his home in London, Provence, as he told me over lunch in Beirut. Thus soliciting the envy of all of us, and I wanna thank him for trekking here into Northern New England in the depths of winter. This is a region that has many charms, few of which you will find in Provence, and I'm really delighted and grateful that you came to be with us today. (audience applauds) - Thank you for the glowing introduction and thank you all for coming in the snow to hear what's gonna be a rather tedious little talk about a country you don't know anything, or you probably all know more about than I do. Syria, I don't know, how many of you've been to Syria? Oh good, there's quite a few, that's good. Did you like it? Yeah, okay. I mean Syria, if one puts aside the politics, the modern politics, was a wonderful country to visit before the uprising. I remember when I use to go in the, in the 1980s, the war was raging in Lebanon. A very brutal civil war that and the event lasted 15 years. That was to Syria's west, and then to Syria's east, you had Iraq which had the Iran/Iraq war, and undoubtedly the most brutal tyrant in the whole Middle East, and believe me, tyranny has very high standards in the Middle East. He was Saddam Hussein so in Syria, you felt that you were in this kind of space, safe space. I mean, it was a dictatorship and there were arrests and there was torture and there was all the things that you know about in virtually all Arab states, but it, but there was a kind of stability. There were communities of old religions, old ethnic groups doing business together, dying together. Kind of a slightly brain-dead atmosphere because of the dictatorship so people didn't talk politics but they had social freedoms and it was a rather, a rather nice place to be. And I spent a lot of time in Syria in those days in the '80s going back and forth to Beirut where I was then living and covering the Lebanese war and the presence of the American Marines at that time after the Israeli invasion. And there was a joke that everyone in Lebanon use to tell about this dog. There's this poor mangy old dog, starving, skinny, scrawny, who was just terrified of the shelling and the shooting in Lebanon. Couldn't take it anymore, so he scampered across the border to Syria. And his other dogs kinda miss him but then they're surprised one day, about six months later, he comes rocking back into Lebanon but looking magnificent. His coat was all shiny, he's well fed. He's looking absolutely wonderful and the other dog, the other dogs say, "Didn't they feed you over there?" He said, "Of course, they fed me very well." "Didn't they look after you?" he said, "They looked after me very well." "Didn't they brush your coat?" "They brushed my coat every day! "Look how it's gleaming!" and then, and they said, " Well then why did you come back here?" And he said, "Because I want to bark." (audience laughs) That was the problem with Syria. You you couldn't bark if you were a dog. You couldn't talk. You could talk about anything except politics, and it was, it was stable. There was continuity. Hafez al-Assad, when he came to power in November of 1970 ended a period of almost annual military coup d'état. And he became, he was a survivor of all of those. He was from a rather conspiratorial community. Alawites, who after centuries of living under Sunni domination learned to dissemble. And when I first went to Syria in 1973 it wasn't obvious that Assad would last because so many of his predecessors had not lasted. I mean, the first one, Husni al-Za'im in 1949. I don't know if you remembered but Syria, after the French departed in 1946 had a parliamentary democracy, and we always talk about bring democracy to the Middle East. We had a parliamentary democracy until 1949 when, in order to force through the tap line, Aramco pipeline, oil pipeline from Saudi Arabia through Jordan and Syria to Lebanon. The CIA overthrew the elected government and installed Colonel Husni al-Za'im, the military chief of staff but he only lasted six months, and then it was every six months or a year, there would be more and more coups and Assad looked like he would be just another one of those but he wasn't. He was there to stay. He came in a bloodless coup in November of 1970. He established a very thorough national security state, a very effective surveillance of all of his political opponents and even some who were potential political opponents, and gave the country while its slightly prison-like air, a period of stability, and it lasted until his death in 2000. That was with many coup attempts and many, and two major uprisings by the Muslim Brothers in 1979 and 1982 that he crushed, very thoroughly in '79 in Aleppo and in 1982 in Hama, a very famous case of his brother going in and massacring the Muslim Brothers, and many of the inhabitants of Hama but he kept, he kept his regime intact. It was, it was a fortress, that regime, so when he died in 2000, his son, Bashar, succeeded him. Now Syria was meant to be a Republic, not a monarchy. It's not, the succession should not pass from father to son but it was Syria and it was the Assads, and the only thing that Hafez could imagine succeeding him was his son. His son who who had spent nearly spent a year in Britain studying ophthalmology was seen as a kind of great white hope for Syria by the West. They thought he was gonna bring democracy to his country and serious reforms, free elections and so forth 'cause he said he would do that. He said he was gonna reform the system. There was something called the Damascus Spring, in the first year of his presidency, and during this Damascus Spring, he allowed for the first time, a private newspaper to be published, the Lamp Lighter, it was called. He allowed banks, private banks to open. He encouraged private investment. He introduced a kind of Neoliberal economy to Syria which had been a rather strict socialist economy before. So in theory, things were moving in a direction that western world would like that many Syrians might have liked. But some of the people who were encouraged to speak their mind spoke it a little too much and they wrote letters and petitions demanding fundamental changes. Not just, not just face-saving changes, but fundamental changes. And it became obvious to him in his first couple of years that if you allow an opposition in parliament, in society, the goal of an opposition is to become the government. Well, he had no intention of never being the government, so he crushed them and that was the end of the Damascus Spring, and he went right back to the way his father was in politics. In the economy, he went on liberalizing, much to the benefit of his cousin Rami Makhlouf and other people in his immediate entourage. And this led to a lot of grievances in Syria from people who were being cut out of the wealth of the country, and at the same time, a serious drought began, and people were leaving the countryside and moving to the outskirts of Dara'a in the South, of the outskirts of Aleppo, the outskirts of Damascus where the government wasn't really making provisions for them. In a way, you could say that they were leaving the dry wood all around the cities for somebody to come and light one day. But the light came, the burning came in Tunisia in 2011 with, or actually December of 2010, when a young unemployed Tunisian named Mohamed Bouazizi having been humiliated by a policewoman and having been unable to survive and his pride destroyed, burned himself to death. And this sparked, Although, there had been previous self-immolations in Tunisia interestingly enough. But his is the one that sparked mass demonstrations against Ben Ali, the president of Tunisia, and ultimately, despite the french support for Ben Ali. (phone chiming) I know that's not me. That's okay. Ben Ali had to flee the country, went to Saudi Arabia where all good dictators go when they're overthrown. And he, Tunisia gave hope to the whole Arab world because it had been so long since anyone had been overthrown and I mean, almost unheard of for the people to overthrow a dictator. And it gave hope next to the Egyptians who started their demonstrations in Tahrir Square against Hosni Mubarak, and while the U.S. supported Mubarak until it was impossible to do so anymore, the Egyptians overthrew Hosni Mubarak. And then Gaddafi was the next to go. And in Gaddafi's case, it wasn't popular demonstrations, it was a guerrilla movement that led to his overthrow. And that guerrilla movement, or several guerrilla movements received air support from Britain, France and the United States, which was, the air support that was decisive in getting rid of Gaddafi. Libya unfortunately descended into chaos afterwards but in Syria, people were watching all of this. Assad gave an interview at that time, saying that he was immune to this kind of thing, and the reason was that he was not in the American camp. He said, "Mubarak, Gaddafi, Ben Ali "were all western client states." He was, he was an anti-imperialist so his people were happy with him. He may even have believed this, but he was wrong because people were fed up with dictatorship. They were fed up with corruption. They were fed up with so many people in the suburbs, the new suburbs of the cities being hungry and not having enough work that they were ripe for a revolution themselves. And when, and the spark came in Dara'a, which is a very dusty border town right on the border with Jordan. It's famous in Seven Pillars of Wisdom, where Lawrence said he lost the citadel of his integrity when he was captured by the Turks. Some children wrote some graffiti on the walls of Dara'a saying the president must go. You are next, oh Bashar, that sort of thing, and Bashar's cousin, who was a security chief in the, in Dara'a, arrested the children and tortured them. Syria torture is not unusual, but torturing children was unheard of, and the people, the families and the people of Dara'a, who were semi-Bedouin, very proud tribes people, demonstrated. Wanted their children released. Wanted an apology, didn't get it. They were fired upon and then the uprising spread to Homs and to Damascus and I started coming to Damascus about that time, writing about the demonstrations by the young activists who very similar to the young activists in Tahrir Square, who were using the internet and social media, and wanted, were demanding democratic reforms, secular democratic reforms which Bashar was not gonna allow because serious reform would have meant a real election which he could lose. He might not but he could, and he didn't wanna take that chance. So the young people who were doing this endured being shot at. They endured being arrested. They endured being tortured, and there was a lively discussion amongst them that I remember very well 'cause I use to sit in on some of them. Whether they should fight back or whether they should continue with civil disobedience. Continue with general strikes, continue with demonstrations or arm themselves and take on the Army, and I remember one young man told me. He said, "We cannot choose the root of violence "because the regime is built for that. "The regime knew how to beat the Muslim Brothers. "It knew how, "it knew how to put down violent demonstrations." It wasn't used to dealing with non-violent, civil disobedience but others won the day, and all of those young people that I knew who were against becoming violent have left the country or are in prison. In any case, the war became a war before the end of the year, and that began the self-destruction of Syria with Homs first. Large areas of Homs being annihilated, rebel-held areas of Homs being annihilated by government forces. Serious demonstrations and I mean violence on the outskirts of Damascus. Rebels liberate what they called liberated areas like Dara'a. And in Idlib, there were more and more demonstrations pulling down the Assad statues, trying to hold territory, losing territory, and the whole war escalated and escalated and then the United States had to make a decision or felt it had to make a decision on how to respond to these events in this country. The arguments, and I wrote a piece for Harper's magazine in the last issue that I spoke to most of the people involved in making Syria a policy under Obama, and there were very violent arguments over whether to get involved militarily, as they did in Libya with no-fly zones and bombing in support of rebels or doing nothing or arming covertly the opposition. Obama wasn't keen on any of those options, he kept, he kept saying every time someone put forward a suggestion, he said, "Well tell me how this ends. "Where does it go?" Which is a good question! It's a reasonable question. He commissioned the CIA to do a report on all of its insurgent wars that had been conducted since CIA was created in the late 1940s which goes back to the Albania operations which were a disaster, Latvia, most of the Russian satellites, South America, Nicaragua, Angola. It was a long, there are more than a hundred of them, and Obama had the CIA prepare this dossier, and it's still classified. I'm hoping to have it released through a FOIA request but I'm not that hopeful. In any case, I spoke to many of the people who did read it and they said that out of the more than a hundred covert wars that the CIA had sponsored, only two could be regarded as successful. But on that basis, Obama went through and authorized a covert operations. And so they set up operational headquarters in Turkey and Jordan to train the moderate opposition, so called. And in collaboration with the Saudis and the Qataris and the Turks who were doing the same thing and the British who were doing the same thing. So these suddenly thousands of insurgents are well-armed and going into Syria and beating back the regime. But there was no central coordinating body and we discovered that the free Syrian army which was established by some ex-Syrian army officers and their men was not the most capable fighting force. The most capable fighting forces were those who were willing to die. Those who were willing to fight all out and these were the Wahhabis, Salafis, dedicated serious fighters, many of whom had fought in Chechnya and other wars, with the Islamis who had been fighting against other states. So the free Syrian army was subsumed by over 1500 militias that were operating at one time throughout Syria against the government. As the, as the war went on, the Russians came in, and the Iranians came in on Assad's side, and the Iranians sent Hezbollah from Lebanon who were probably the best guerrilla force in the Middle East and beaten the Israelis twice. And they helped turn the tide along the Lebanese border for Assad and stop arms coming in from Lebanon. They helped him to regain many important villages. And the tide was slowly turning back in Assad's favor, but not decisively until December of 1916, when the Russians saw that he was about to lose Aleppo. He'd already lost half of Aleppo. And if he lost Aleppo, he lost the war. Aleppo was the commercial capital of the country. 65% of the non-oiled economy is based around Aleppo. The industry is there, it's, and it might even be the most populous city. Damascus and Aleppo always have this rivalry that one is the oldest city that ever, oldest continuously inhabited city on Earth, and the most populous city in Syria. Both of them claim this and I don't know which is, which is true, by the way, I'm not gonna take sides in the Aleppo or Damascus dispute, but in any, Aleppo's vital. Russian air power combined with Iranian support and the Syrian army managed to drive the rebels out of Aleppo, where they, where they had come uninvited. In other areas, people were welcoming rebels, but not in Aleppo. Aleppo was a prosperous city that did not want to fight the regime. They also had memories of what had happened in 1979 and they knew the regime was probably not gonna disappear. And the, and many, some of the rebel commanders said "We're gonna punish Aleppo for not joining the revolution." The revolution came to Aleppo, Aleppo was not a revolutionary city. But anyway, in December of 1969, or 2016, when Aleppo was cleaned up, then it was a matter of time until the regime could isolate the rebels in one area or another and force them to, besiege them and force them to surrender, and they would then offer them, if they surrendered, they could either go back to some other part of Syria where the rebels were still in control, usually Idlib Province, or they could go home unarmed, or they go to prison. And it was a very easy choice. So most of them went to Idlib. By now, I mean in the last year, the Syrian government has restored its position in the suburbs of Damascus so there's no more shelling of Damascus. The suburbs are destroyed. Damascus City is more or less intact. And the government is on a roll. It feels it has won, and indeed it has won the most decisive issue of the war, which is the future of the president. He is, he is there for the foreseeable future. No one can dislodge him anymore. After eight years, if the outside powers with their rebel allies inside could not get rid of him, they're not gonna do it in another eight years. And the Russians are, the Russians and the Iranians are backing him, now the Arabs are coming back into his fold. The UAE has reopened its embassy. The Saudis, Saudi Intelligence is meeting again with Syrian Intelligence. Slowly it will be readmitted to the Arab League. And Syria is going back to the status quo anti, but at a very high price, I mean, a half-million, perhaps a half-million dead and the figures we've just heard five-and-a-half million outside the country, many of whom will never return, six million displaced inside, whole swathes of cities, mainly Homs and Aleppo, totally destroyed that will have to be rebuilt with money that Syria doesn't have. It is a political humanitarian disaster but it was going, it is going to go back to being the country it was, but with all this destruction in the way. The U.S. has failed to break the Iranian alliance. In fact, the war against Assad has strengthened the Iranian alliance. I mean, Hezbollah and the Iranian militias, the Iranian-backed militias from Iraq and from Afghanistan were never in Syria before but they're there now. The Russians, who only had a small naval base in Tartus, now have a large naval base in Tartus, and an air base at Hmeimim. So all of the things breaking the back of a Russian-Iranian alliance with Syria failed and actually had the opposite outcome of what was intended. The issue for the United States now is the fate of 2000 special forces soldiers in Northeast Iraq with the Kurds. Those forces came in in 2014 when ISIS was at its peak, when it had seized a third of Syria and a third of Iraq, and the U.S., having tolerated ISIS in Syria before, was ignoring it, when ISIS went back into Iraq, where it originally came from, and took large territory in Iraq and took Mosul, and other important bits of Iraq. The U.S. then had to act to rebuild the Iraqi army, help re-arm the Kurds and drive them out of Iraq, but if they let them go back into that area of Syria, they could always come back to Iraq, so Syria had to be dealt with as well, and so they used the Kurds of Syria to do that. The Kurds fought very, very well against ISIS. They, I think today they may be just finishing the last village, ISIS-held village in Eastern Syria, and that means that the United States administration will be free to withdraw those 2000 troops, which the president has promised he would do, but the question is then, and this is nothing to do about the whole future of Syria, but it, it's about what does the U.S. do about its allies, the Kurds, the people who fought for them? And who fought very well for them, who left the Kurdish areas in the Northeast and went all the way down to Raqqa to fight in Arab areas for them, and went to Manbidsch to fight for them. They are just going to leave them there. If they do just leave them there, the Turkish army which is occupying Northeast Syria, the provinces of Idlib and Afrin. In Afrin, they already ethnically cleansed the Kurds when they went in, and Northern Aleppo province, will the Turkish army then just sweep across the Euphrates and take that area in which case, they if they do that, they will annihilate the Kurds as they did in Afrin. And that would be a serious stain on America's reputation in ways that it deals with its allies. I mean Russia and Iran have shown that they are very loyal to their allies. They saved Bashar al Assad. The U.S. is, may be in danger of showing that it can't be trusted by its allies and the Kurds are hoping that some agreement will come out of this before the Americans leave, that the Turks will not be allowed to come in, that the, either the Syrian army will come in or the Russians will come in and allow them to go on living and not be kicked out of the. They won't have the autonomy or the, that they had hoped for, but at least just to go on living in a stable area. But we'll see, that is up to Washington now to negotiate, and it is, it is a sort of a loose end of a long war. It's a tail end of a long losing war by the West. I mean, and it's not just by the U.S., it's the British, the French, Qatar and Saudi Arbia, all deeply involved on that side, and the Arabs have thrown in the towel. We'll see what the United States does, and when that is resolved, then you still have the problem with the Turkish occupation in the North. Will the Turks leave one day and allow the Syrian army, and certain police forces to return, or will they hang onto it, the way they've hung onto Northern Cyprus since 1974? I suspect they'll hang onto it, I don't know. They've, they're already absorbing Northern Syria into the Turkish economy. They've put the Turkish post office in the Syrian post offices. They've replaced the Syrian mobile networks with Turkish mobile networks. They're putting up Turkish road signs, they're teaching Turkish in the schools, so the indications are that if they can stay a long time, they will, so the outcome of the Syrian war could mean Turkish occupation of Northern Syria, Assad doesn't move, and the Kurds get annihilated by the Turks, which, I think is, you could just, you couldn't have designed a worse policy for the fate of that country. And on that happy note, I would like to open up for questions. No questions? Wow! - [Man] We read in the newspaper of, you want me to get a mic? - You wave to him. - [Man] Of swaps between Sunni and Shia in a village, It was two 10,000 people each moving. What is the Sunni/ Shia background, what would you describe? - Well, Syria has a very, very small Shia population, and there were two villages up in the North, Kefraya, and I forget the name of the other one, and they were besieged for a long time by the Jihadis, and in order for the Jihadis to leave some areas where they were besieged, they allowed those people to come into the government areas, and they sent the Jihadis up to the Jihadi area. The makeup of Syria is basically, it's about 70% Sunni Arab, about 10%, well, and these are pre-war figures, by the way, now with so many people having left, I'm not sure. About 10% Christian, no, maybe 6% Christian, 10% Alawis, 8% Druze, that sort of thing. So, we're still, and there are Ismailis, but actual Twelver Shi'ites, real Shi-ites, it's absolutely tiny part of the population. The Alawis and the Ismailis, come out of Shi'ism, but they don't have any particular adherence to traditional Shi-ite practices. This is, what you have is the Alawis, or an Alawi family ruling the country, and one of the reasons that the Jihadis and many Sunni fundamentalists want to get rid of them is not because they're dictators, but because they're Alawi, and they regard the Alawis as a heretical sect, and that any rule by Alawis would be illegitimate, and so they have to go. But they're not going, as it happens. - [Woman] Will there be consequences, or Turkey face (voice drowned out by background noise) against the Kurds? - Well, Turkey has a track record here. It didn't suffer from the genocide of the Armenians. It's been fighting a war on and off against the Kurds, against the PKK, but also against Kurdish villages in Eastern Turkey since the 1980s. They've killed as many Kurds as Saddam Hussein has. And then last year, when they went into Afrin, they ethnically cleansed all the Kurds and they don't seem to have suffered any consequences at all, so probably not. - [Woman] Are you saying they won't (voice drowned out by background noise) - They never have. The United States has a long record of betraying the Kurds. And the United States was in the early 1970s, was supporting the Kurdish rebellion of Mullah Mustafa Barzani against Saddam Hussein, and they sent, they poured weapons in there, they gave them logistical support. The Shah of Iran was supporting them. They were taking wide swathes of, what they called, liberated territory, and Saddam in 1975, realized that this was, this, he was not gonna win that war against the Kurds, so he agreed to what the Americans and the Shah were demanding, which was a relocation of the border between Iran and Iraq in Iran's favor. So when he, once he signed that agreement in Algeirs, the next day, Henry Kissinger cut off all the supplies to the Kurds, and the Shah closed the border, and Saddam sent his army up to Northern Iraq to annihilate them, which he did, and the survivors went and lived in caves for years. I have many Kurdish friends who were born at that time, and they were all born in caves because their families were afraid to come out in the daytime. And the Kurds suffered a lot, and yet they keep going back to United States for support and keep presenting themselves as America's most reliable ally in the region, and the U.S. used them very effectively in Iraq at a time when the Arab Iraqis were fighting an insurgency against the U.S. in Iraq and the Kurds were the ones that they used to help fight against that insurgency. And they have never really been rewarded for that. Nor have they been, now it looks like they're not even gonna be rewarded for their valiant efforts against the Islamic State. - [Older Man] I apologize for this naive question but I'm always confused about Shia and Sunni. If Syria is predominantly Sunni, how do you explain the alliance with Iraq? - Well, the leadership is Alawi, so the decision is made by the leadership. And that goes back to 1979. And when the Shah fell in 1979, Saddam Hussein was in power in Iraq, that was the Iraqi Ba'ath party. Hafez al-Assad was the head of the Syrian Ba'ath party. They hated each other. They had a blood feud. They used to kill each other's diplomats around the world. They were always trying to overthrow each other. And there was a real animosity between Hafez al-Assad's regime, and Saddam Hussein's regime. The Alawi regime, minority regime in Syria, the Sunni minority regime in Baghdad. Hafez made a strategic decision to ally himself to Iraq's major enemy, which was Iran. In addition to which, in that year in 1979, the Muslim Brothers of Syria, sorry, Sunni fanatics, or Sunni believers, serious believers, launched a revolution against Assad inspired by the Iranian revolution. They announced that they wanted to turn Syria into an Islamic republic, albeit Sunni, like the Islamic republic of Iran. Hafez, one, wanting to ally himself with the enemy of Saddam Hussein, two, wanted to ally himself with any potential support for an Islamic republic in Syria. So, the Iranians were very happy to support him and not support the Muslim Brothers, who were Sunni fanatics anyway, and in the long run, would probably have problems with Shia, so he, that is why there is this gap. Now the, you might ask, as many people do, how do the Alawis, this tiny minority of a fringe Islamic sect, end up running the country? Well it goes back to the French occupation of the country in 1920, when most Sunni Arabs and Arab nationalists did not recognize the Syrian, the French occupation of Syria, did not want the French there, so the French recruited the minorities. They recruited Armenians, they recruited Christians, they recruited Alawis. And so the Alawis became the officer corps, a large part of the officer corps of the army. And that's how eventually, when the army began in 1949, taking over, slowly, the best conspirators were those Alawis and the one of the best conspirator of all came out on top in November of 1970, Hafez al-Assad. - [Guy] I have two questions, but first is, you mentioned that Aleppo was not really welcoming to the revolutionaries, and in the media, it's often portrayed that it's just the revolutionaries who are anti-Syrian who, like most Syrians, just want Assad out, and then it's the army, and just it's al-Assad with the army and that's it, but is there a significant domestic support for al-Assad and how is his reputation with them and popularity now, considering everything that's happened since Algiers, that's the first question. - Let me just do one at a time 'cause I might forget that one if you keep talking. In Aleppo, the rebels came from outside and I'll give you a kind of little vignette, which didn't happen in Aleppo, it happened in a village near Damascus. A friend of mine had his summer house up in the mountains in this village, and one day the rebels came and set up. He wasn't there, he was in Damascus. But the rebels came and put a mortar position on the roof of his house, they fired down on that army checkpoint, and ran away. The army fired back and destroyed his house. That's basically the civil war. That is what happened at Aleppo. People came in, they couldn't defend it. It's one thing to liberate an area and then defend, be able to defend it, but to go into people's houses, and take over a neighborhood, and then have the neighborhood destroyed and you flee, that's a kind of betrayal of your own revolution. And that's basically what happened. - [Guy] And then the second question was, you mentioned that Turkey is coming, you think it's incorporating the northern parts of Syria, since they've brought in all this stuff, and you said they might wanna have an ethnic cleanse of all Kurds, I presume they would like to settle there but I also read that Erdogan wants to send all of, a lot of the Syrian refugees over there back to those provinces so that they can, they can rid them of governing them in Turkey, so what are his goals for that? It seems like it's kind of conflicting whether he wants to get rid of the refugees and let them go back home, or like settle Turks there, get rid of the Kurds, and kind of fully incorporate them. - Well, no, the area that he has now, which is Idlib, Afrin, and Northern Aleppo Province, he already has ethnically cleansed the Kurds. - [Guy] Okay. - They, he sent them to the Northeast, they're gone. They fought very hard to try and hold the area, 'cause it's a largely Kurdish area, but they're not there now. There are no Kurds left. So, he might want to send some Syrian refugees from Turkey to those empty houses left behind by the Kurds. But it doesn't mean that he would leave. And I don't know that he's gonna leave, he may just be doing this as a bargaining chip, for, in some bigger game, with the Saudis or the Americans, I don't know. I'm not privy to his thinking in this matter, but clearly he's put in place, a position there where he could stay for a long, long time. He also has, and according to the U.S. government, there're about 70,000 insurgents, mainly Jihadis, in the areas under Turkish control, so he still has, Erdogan still has to deal with them. Either use them as a strike force when he needs them, or figure out a way to let them go home one day. 'Cause they're not all Syrians. - Given the extraordinary complex violent history of the Middle East, going back thousands of years, and given your experience as a, in oversight of that area of the planet, and this is a question based on the people, not the rulers, where, oh where, do you find any sense of optimism? - I know I, and having lived on and off in the Middle East for so long, I don't, I don't have any optimism myself. But I don't, I don't believe these conflicts are a millennia old, in fact, I think they, they're 20th Century phenomena. They stemmed, under the Ottoman's, there wasn't, there were very little communal, inter-communal violence. There was a, there were some massacres of Christians in 1860, in Damascus, 1851 at Aleppo, but generally, not a lot. I mean probably less than race riots by whites or blacks in this country in the same, during the same period. Now the French/British occupation, which cut up the area, and deprived it of many of, by many areas of their natural harbors, and their usual trade routes and so on, rewrote the whole game. And since then we've had more of these problems. And also the elites that have taken over, under the post, the immediate post-colonial system were corrupt, you've, and you have constant western interference. I mean all of those coups in Syria and attempted coups in Syria, were either by the KGB or the CIA or MI6. They weren't all done just by Syrian officers off their own bat. And there've been many, many, well you know the British, and the French invaded Egypt in 1956. There've been so much outside interference that the countries have, as soon as they get up on their feet, they get knocked down again. I'm very pessimistic because I don't think the outside interference will end either. But I don't think the root of the problem is that Sunnis and Shias hate each other. Sunnis and Shias in Iraq before 2003 didn't hate each other. - [Bald Man] Could you say something about the refugees? You say the refugees in Lebanon, or those in Jordan, and what is being discussed in terms of the life of refugees, going back to, to see if you have some insight on this issue. - Well, in Lebanon, the Lebanese government is doing everything they can to persuade them to go back to Syria. And there are incentives being offered and sometimes force. Put them on buses and just send them across the border. Some are going back voluntarily, and I know more about Lebanon than I do about Jordan. Some are going back across the border voluntarily. The people who are not going back are young men of military age because they don't want to be drafted into the Syrian army. So the family might go back but the son will stay in Lebanon and go on working in Lebanon. Also, before the war, the Syrian war, there were maybe 700, 800,000 Syrian workers in Lebanon anyway, so Lebanon is used to having a lot of Syrians there. I mean, the Syrians do the work. If you go to a construction site, or you go to the kitchen of a restaurant, they're Syrians. So that's always been the case. Just that when the war started, a lot of them brought their families. A lot of them brought their families, so the numbers went up, and then some people legitimately also just fled. But a lot of people are going back, but the numbers that are actually gonna go back, so will it get back to the 800,000? I don't know. In Jordan, now that the border is open again, and Dara'a is quiet, I suspect some people will go back, but I don't know. I'm sure the Jordanians would like them to. - [Man] Sort of a variation on a question that was asked by that gentleman, and it's basically asking you the cruel question of predicting, but today's ally is tomorrow's enemy, and we now have new players. The Turks kind of playing more of a role than others that had. So where are the Hagathian splits that are gonna start fragmenting the story in different directions? You have any idea of what the next stage? - Okay, in a, as - Or the next tragedy is - As Mark Twain once said, that's a very easy question to answer, I don't know. I mean, alliances have changed. I mean the Turks who were a solid NATO ally, are now buying weapons from the Russians, and all discussions on Syria are conducted by the Turks through the Russians, so that, things have changed there. I certainly wouldn't have expected that. Otherwise, the international frame is just the same. I suppose it's the U.S. versus Iran. Saudi versus Iran. Russia on the fence, vis a vis Iran, 'cause they, they're vying with Iran for influence in Syria. But in the long term, I don't, I really don't know how that will play out. I wish I did. - Is this a, is it impractical by the incursion threatened by the Turks to be relocated within the Mid-East? Is it such a big group that they couldn't, you know, if they're in dire straits, where they are, some kind of relocation, or is it totally impractical? - Oh no, they'll flee to the Kurdish zones in Iraq. That's, I mean, that won't be a relocation for them, that'll be desperation when the Turks come in and start killing them. 'Cause their main center is Hasakah and Qamishli, are very close to the border, so it'd be easy for them to flee, but it's you know, it's always a shame to give up your house and your livelihood and your schools, and everything. - [Male Audience Member] It is, it is, it's better than being massacred. - No, but no, no, I take the point, but if-- - [Male Audience Member] It's a fair negotiating point. Being that point is less desirable but less bloody. - It's more likely that the Turks would come in, and they would end up fighting and fleeing, like they did in Afrin. I don't think. - [Male Audience Member] They might not negotiate that result rather than-- - No, but you'll have to put that to the administration. I don't see them doing that. I don't think they're that forward looking. And the Turks-- - [Male Audience Member] It's not impractical. - I would be against it myself because I don't think people should be, have to leave. If you say that it's better than a massacre, I also agree. But another alternative would be to come to an understanding with the Russians, maybe to put a Syrian police force, disarm the YPG, and let them go on living as Syrian citizens. But the U.S. has a thing about keeping the Syrian army on because they see it as part of Iran. - If there's a new status quo, where's Israel in all of this? What do you see as Israel's response to this new status quo here? - Well, Israel has, for the most part, stayed out of the Syria war. It has bombed in Syria a couple of hundred times, but always Iranian or Hezbollah targets. They had not made a point of trying to hit the Syrian army. They have assisted with wounded insurgents in, near their, near the border in the Golan Heights, and treated them and let them go back to fight. But they haven't played a decisive role. They've more or less stayed out of it because they don't like Assad, but they really don't want to see Jihadis either, so they're quite happy to see them killing each other. In the long run, Israel's main interest is Iran, and eliminating Iranian influence anywhere near its borders. Which, that includes Lebanon and Syria. - I agree with you completely about the history of the Sunni and the Shia and that many of these conflicts have been manufactured by the governments and what not, over the, over the last period, particularly since the Islamic revolutions in Iran, but would you agree that one of the distinguishing elemental factors in Syria was that when the uprising came, the power elite wasn't just a bunch of huntercrats, you know as in Tunisia, or even in Egypt, but rather that it was this small sect that is viewed as heretical that no Sunni would have anything to do with in other times and that their particular fear was that they would all be slaughtered in any (speaker drowned out by coughing) that came up less than a decisive victory, in other words, unlike all the other Arab spring rebellions, in this case, you have a group led by the Alawi elite that just said there is no compromise for us that is gonna be acceptable. We can't cantonize, we can't federalize, we have to win this or we're all dead, and that that was really an important reason why this conflict both was so durable but also brought in Sunnis who wanted revenge for losing Baghdad, and Shia who absolute worried they'd lose their one partner. You know, Iran's one partner is Syria. - Well the, the Assad family, and it's not only that it was defending the Alawis, or defending Alawi interests, it's also that they had in place a very strong security state, very strong, stronger intelligence services than army, actually. And so they were able to control events much more than the opposition imagined they could. They also, and because the father created this edifice through those years of coups and uprisings, he knew how to deal with those things. Many Alawis were angry with the Assads for letting it get that far and jeopardizing their safety, and many Alawis joined the opposition, at first, until the opposition started chanting, what was it? "Alawis to the grave!" And "Christians to Beirut and Alawis to the grave!" And that, it forced their hand. And Alawis disproportionately lost their young men in the army. I went to Kardaha, the Assad village. Every house had one of those little posters with the face of a young man who'd been killed in battle. And they were, many of them were angry with the family for bringing it to that past, but there's nothing they could do about it. They had to defend themselves. And the Christians felt, in the same, that they were in the same position. The Druze stayed neutral. They were down in As-Suwayda, they had their contiguous area, they didn't join the army and they didn't join the rebellion. They only fought when ISIS came into their areas and started slaughtering Druze civilians and then they had to fight against ISIS but they didn't take part in the larger war. The Alawis, I mean the Alawis are let me put it this way, they were not as a community, beneficiaries of the Assads. They're still the poorest community in Syria. And if you go to an Alawi village, people live on a couple of acres of land, grow some oranges or olives, and that supports the family. They're not a rich community. If you, if you, if you went to Damascus, until recently, if there was a 13-year-old girl working in your kitchen, she was an Alawi girl sold by the family to help support the family. They, you know, there's a slight myth that he was doing this as a kind of Alawi, running the country for the benefit of the Alawis and no one else. In fact, he benefited the Sunni bourgeoisie probably more than anyone. The Damascus merchants did very well under him. The Sunni, the Aleppo industrialists did very well under him and didn't desert him. So, it's more complicated than just that. But that is certainly an element. - [Male Audience Member] Is it fair to say based on your comments that aside from the Kurds in the East that this was a proxy war between you know, Putin and the United States and that the endgame of Putin has been achieved with Assad in power, unlike the conflict that we heard about Yemen the other night that do not have any endgame in sight, it sounds as though we're near the end and that Putin has won the proxy war. - Again, and it's both a proxy war and a local war. I mean it's both levels and the Russians have won their part, and Assad has won his part, yes. They don't have all the territory that they want, but they have the throne is secure, and the Russian position in Syria is secure, so that, they have definitely won. - [Male Audience Member] So it sounds like in Syria, it's unlike other conflicts and the endgame is in sight where others just seem to be elusive. - I mean, I mean the endgame is done, it's just a matter of these territorial issues with the Turks and the Northeast. But basically the war is over, the real war is over, it's decided. The fighting will now be about other things. - How do you, like where do you stand on your views about the decision of Obama not to hold his red line stance against the use of chemical weapons and how that impacted, just the trust of United States to allies in the area? - Many of the people I spoke to who were in the Obama's administration regretted that he'd drawn the red line in the first place, if he wasn't going to enforce it, including his intelligence people. If you're not gonna do it, don't say it. But in the event, by a series of unexpected developments, Obama got what he wanted without bombing. I mean I was there. I went into Damascus the night he was bombing 'cause I thought he was gonna bomb and I thought, I wanted to see what the consequences were. But then everybody in Syria was slightly shocked that it didn't happen. Then there were these press conferences where Kerry said something about it, then Lavrov said something about it, and suddenly it became an issue. Would the Russians then bring in the OPCW, the UN inspectors, disarm, take away all the chemicals, and would Assad allow it, would he admit that he had them? The Russians told him to and he did. And so they came and they took away most of them. All the ones they could find, so Syria was in a better position in terms of reducing, not eliminating, chemical weapons, so in a way, you could say Obama, without bombing got, achieved his objective. In one of the best outcomes, and I'm, I don't wanna come down too hard in favor of Obama, but on this one I might have to. Many of those chemical weapon stores were in areas that were subsequently occupied by ISIS. So if the OPCW had not come into Syria and taken them away, they'd be in ISIS's hands, and that could've been a real disaster. That's it? Oh sorry. - [Man] Okay, let's start a second round. So staying with that, initially when this all started, the press gave us the impression Obama couldn't figure out who to support because the opposition was so divided. Is there truth (speaker drowned out by background noise). - Well at the very beginning, the opposition wasn't that divided, 'cause there wasn't much of an opposition. There were, there were the kids in the streets, and then there were the free Syrian army, and the others came along later. I suppose the initial approach would've been to the free Syrian army but as the money poured in and the weapons poured in and lots of family networks were giving money too to their relations inside Syria so little warlords sprang up in villages all over Syria, some of whom subsequently went over to the government's side when they saw the government was winning, so the ideological commitment was nil. But at the beginning, I think Obama wanted, labored under the misapprehension that there was going to be a dynamic secular democratic violent opposition, which never materialized. - [Male Audience Member] Since you're speaking here in the U.S., what would you estimate, or assess as the damage to the U.S. position, prestige in the region, and secondarily, should we care? - Well, I think that the damage is probably slight. I mean, you win some, you lose some. It's been very good for Russia, whose prestige has risen a lot in the region, but you know, in a year or two people will forget. I mean, they bounced back from the Iraq war which was a much bigger catastrophe for the U.S.. - [Male Audience Member] They bounced back? - Well, I mean in a way. I mean, the Saudis, the oil states have not left the American camp, which is the real concern of the U.S., they still buy, they still sell the oil to the U.S. and its allies and they still buy American weapons. Those are the core issues, and Israel's still secure. - [Man] Could you tell us a little bit about the dynamics between the Alawis and the Sunnis (speaker drowned out by background noise) but I was wondering about the dynamics between the Christians in the unrest and how, what their stance is on the regime, how it's benefited the Israelis and the U.S. (speaker drowned out by background noise) Alawis and the Sunnis, or is it part of the Saudi rebels and the Christians (speaker drowned out by background noise) - Oh, it was a chant, that they were saying. - [Man] Yeah, so I asked, what are the dynamics between the Christians over there and how it might be different in Lebanon and other places? - Well, in areas where there was a lot of fighting, Christian areas with a lot of fighting like in Maaloula, the village of Maaloula, where the, many of the people still speak Aramaic. People had to flee when the Jihadis took over the village. And they came to Damascus, and then, all those that came to Damascus, many went to Lebanon and many have now gone back to Maaloula. In Wadi al-Nasarah, up in the North, it's not clear, many people fled. In Aleppo, there's been the greatest loss of Christians. Mainly Armenians. There were, I think about 40,000 Armenians there before the war, there probably 20,000 now, all estimates but based on what community leaders have told me, and that's a real loss for Aleppo 'cause Aleppo was, prided itself on its diversity and its mosaic of religions and cultures. I mean, I remember in the old days, in, when before the war, if you went to the Aleppo at Easter, Muslims and Christians would go around to the churches and the houses of different people and and wish them well and congratulate them on the feast and so forth, it was nothing weird about it, it was just normal. I think that that's probably not the case for the time being and many of those Armenians who've left, who were the majority of the Christians in Aleppo, will not come back. They've gone to Armenia or California. - [Male Audience Member] You mentioned that the outside interests were getting involved, what basically was their objective and now that we look and see we're close to a result, would it have been any different if the U.S., and England and France and the Russians had stayed home and let the tribes fight it out on their own? - Well it would've been a lot less bloody. You have to remember Syria doesn't manufacture weapons. So without heavy weapons supplied by outside powers, the death toll would've been much lower. And I suspect since the army had the bulk of the weapons that were in existence, they would've rolled it over very quickly and it would've been over. - [Male Audience Member] So the result would've been the same. - The outcome the same but a lower price. - [Male Audience Member] And what lessons were learned by the outside interests that went in? - I spoke to a class a little earlier today. A Middle East class who were really great young students, and I just have to repeat myself what I said to them. You remember Jon Stewart, late show? Okay, Jon Stewart, a few years ago, said, American policy in the Middle East, learning curves are for pussies. (audience laughs) Oh yes. - [Man] I wonder if you could say something about the role of the gulf states in supporting some of these Islamist militias, Al-Nusra and groups like that. Were they actively funding them? They were, certainly they were always fighting with them, so what's the? - Well, one of the, an interesting, an interesting side, an interesting side war, 'cause in any war there's more than one war going on, was the war between Qatar and Saudi Arabia for influence over the rebellion. So the Qataris were funding one group of Jihadis, the Saudis the other, and they used to fight each other. Only they had the exactly the same ideology, Wabi ideology, but they were fighting each other for dominance on behalf of their benefactors in Rihad and Qatar. So it just, it just, it just raised the temperature and made things even more confused. - [Man] And now, at the end of this, when both sides have been defeated and presumably some of these folks are in prisons or whatever-- - Well no, but there, the U.S. estimates there's still 70,000 in the Turkish-held area. So there are a lot that have been undealt with. And Jabhat al-Nusra is still intact. It now calls itself Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, it's still intact, and it's much bigger than ISIS. And there, they've got territory that they control and they have exactly the same ideology. So it, that's should be a matter of concern. ISIS less so, but still a matter of concern, even if it loses all of its territory. - Did the always dynastic turmoil almost sounds like Europe symbology, years ago during the wars of religion, is there any sense that exhaustion is gonna come to this area and that anything productive could come out of it. The Islamic reconsideration of what there, Arabic, what that region should look like? - I don't, I don't know if any war ends just 'cause people get tired. And the Lebanon war went on for 15 years and would've gone on longer if the outside powers hadn't finally come and dragged the Lebanese leaders to Taif in Saudi Arabia and forced them to sign an agreement. I mean, as long as you have grievances and issues, and these are not necessarily sect against sect, but just general grievances, and outside powers willing to arm the people who have the grievances, and other outside powers willing to arm the army that's gonna crush the people with the grievances, you're gonna have conflict. - [Male Audience Member] Without exhaustion. - Well, until everybody's dead. It's just, it stops when everybody says it stops, and it's not just because the people on the ground are tired. It stops maybe 'cause the great powers get tired. They realize that there's no more, there's no more point in it. But the people on the ground seem to go on fighting until they're told to stop. In Lebanon, the militia's were told to stop, and they were forced to disarm, and they did, and now Lebanon is at peace. - Given the war is essentially over, do you see emerging fault lines or possible fault lines in the Russian/ Iranian alliance? - Yes, I think they'll be vying for influence and political and economic influence in the country, yes. - [Male Audience Member] Do you see it coming to armed conflict? - No, no, it'll be capitalist rivalry. It'll be who's gonna be able to make more money out of it? I mean, they're Iranians investing in Syria, there're Russians investing in Syria, looking for projects where they can make money out of the country, each taking advantage of the debt the regime owes it, but I don't think they have any interest in fighting over it. Syria's not enough to fight over. - So when you talk about like capital and profit, so a term that's used a lot when discussing Syria is neoliberal dictatorship. so how much do you think Assad, now that he's kind of come out on top a little bit, is going to like play into this story of disaster of capitalism, like do you think he's gonna be able to utilize his neoliberal policies to almost like, use his country to play into more of a like, the global economy? - Well, if they let him, at the moment U.S. is not allowing any financial transactions with Syria, so it's gonna be very-- - Okay, so like, but like after we get over that bridge with-- - Well, it's a pretty big bridge. - (voice drowned out by Charles) but like pouring into this economy, like what can you see the outcome being of Syria in a global economy? - Until the sanctions are lifted, it's not gonna be a player, and I don't think the U.S. has any intention, because of Iran, of allowing IMF or world-bank loans for Syria, or allowing American banks to have financial transactions with Syria. Some individual European countries might, but it won't be enough to make a huge difference. And there's a huge black market. I mean the wars produced a huge black market and that will flourish. - Oh that, yeah, I forgot about that. - Related to the Iran/Russian question and your comment that Syria has no money for reconstruction, is reconstruction likely to be financed by Iran and/or Russia, or is it just gonna be a devastating environment for years to come? - That's a good question and I really don't know. I've seen some signs of Syrians themselves rebuilding their houses. There's some private Syrian businessmen are rebuilding factories or creating new factories. I went to a factory, a pharmaceutical factory in Sednayah, a couple months ago that's opening right about now to, well, Syria used to be the biggest pharmaceutical producer in the region and it probably will be again because pharmaceuticals are excluded from sanctions. 'Cause they're medical supplies. So there are various things going on, people are building some hotels in Damascus believing that businessmen are gonna be coming and trying to look for ways of making money there and that won't be enough. It won't be enough but it means that things are happening so that there is some economic activity. - How do you think Bashar al-Assad will handle (speaker's voice drowned out by pounding noise) or handling conflicts after the civil war? - I think at the first sign of anybody raising his head, he'll cut it off. - [Woman] So can you dictate U.S. policy now? - [Charles] Thank God I can't. - [Woman] What's your five-point plan? - I don't have, I'm a writer and an observer. I'm not a policy maker, I can study what has happened, and give my analysis and see the flaws or the strengths, but in terms of a five-point plan, I don't have one. I mean I would like to see real change in Syria, I'd like to see Syria redevelop, but I also would like to see Syria have a chance for a better government and not a government of Jihadis and not a government of Ba'athis, but you know, a better government. But I don't know that there's any five-point plan that's gonna make that happen, or even a hundred-point, any hundred-point plan that's gonna make that happen. I'm sorry, I just, I just don't. - Okay, a fabulous performance, thank you very much. (audience applauds) Thank you.


Born in Monticello, Iowa on May 2, 1863, he graduated from Iowa State Agricultural College (now Iowa State University) at Ames, Iowa in 1884. He moved to Fairmont, Nebraska and became the city schools superintendent from 1884 to 1887. He studied law and was admitted to the bar in 1887. He started practice in Fairmont but then moved to Geneva, Nebraska in 1891. He became the director of the Geneva State Bank and then the prosecuting attorney of Fillmore County from 1890 to 1894.

He was elected to the state senate from 1894 to 1896. He was the chairman of the Republican State convention in 1903. Then he was elected to the sixty-second congress and the three succeeding congress as a Republican (March 4, 1911 – March 3, 1919). He voted on April 5, 1917, against declaring war on Germany. He didn't run in 1918, but ran again for the 71st Congress and won, serving from March 4, 1929, to March 3, 1931. He ran and lost in 1930, resuming practice of law in Geneva. He also did some banking. He died in Geneva on June 2, 1946, and is buried in the Geneva Cemetery.


  1. "Sloan, Charles Henry". The Political Graveyard. Archived from the original on 2005-12-18. Retrieved January 16, 2006.
  2. "Sloan, Charles Henry". Biographical Directory of the United States Congress. Retrieved January 16, 2006.
U.S. House of Representatives
Preceded by
Edmund H. Hinshaw (R)
Member of the U.S. House of Representatives
from Nebraska's 4th congressional district

March 4, 1911 – March 3, 1919
Succeeded by
Melvin O. McLaughlin (R)
Preceded by
John N. Norton (D)
Member of the U.S. House of Representatives
from Nebraska's 4th congressional district

March 4, 1929 – March 3, 1931
Succeeded by
John N. Norton (D)

This page was last edited on 11 July 2019, at 08:42
Basis of this page is in Wikipedia. Text is available under the CC BY-SA 3.0 Unported License. Non-text media are available under their specified licenses. Wikipedia® is a registered trademark of the Wikimedia Foundation, Inc. WIKI 2 is an independent company and has no affiliation with Wikimedia Foundation.