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California Army National Guard

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

California Army National Guard
Seal of the United States Army National Guard.svg
Seal of the Army National Guard
Active July 27, 1849 – Present
Country  United States of America
Allegiance  State of California
Branch  United States Army
Type State militia, reserve forces
Role "To organize, train, equip, and resource community based land forces to support state and/or federal authority"
Size 18,450
Part of
Seal of the United States Army National Guard.svg
Army National Guard
California Military Department
Garrison/HQ 9800 Goethe Road, Sacramento, CA 95826
Nickname(s) "Army Guard"
Motto(s) "Always Ready, Always There!"
Commander MG Lawrence A. Haskins
(Commander, CA ARNG)
CCWO CW5 Anthony C. Williamson
(Command Chief Warrant Officer, CA ARNG)
CSM CSM Joseph R. Menard
(Command Sergeant Major, CA ARNG)

The California Army National Guard (CA ARNG) is the land force component of the California National Guard, one of the reserve components of the United States Army and is part of the National Guard of the United States. The California Army National Guard is composed of 18,450 soldiers. Nationwide, the Army National Guard comprises approximately one half of the US Army's available combat forces and approximately one third of its support organization. National coordination of various state National Guard units are maintained through the National Guard Bureau.

California Army National Guard units are trained and equipped as part of the United States Army. The same enlisted and officer ranks and insignia are used and National Guardsmen are eligible to receive all United States military awards. The California Army National Guard also bestows a number of state awards for local services rendered in or to the state of California.

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BOB: Thanks for coming. Donald Stoker is professor of strategy and policy at the US Naval War College in Monterey at the Naval Postgraduate School. He's the author of, or editor of, seven books, including a book on the Civil War, "The Grand Design-- Strategy and the Civil War," which won the 2010 Fletcher Pratt award. So he's going to tell us about Clausewitz, which many of you have heard of. The most famous quote is, "War is the continuation of policy by other means." But I think he's going to tell us there's more to him than that, which is good, because the book is kind of hard to read. I've tried reading Clausewitz and didn't go too far. So with that, let's welcome Donald Stoker. DONALD STOKER: Thank you very much. [APPLAUSE] Well, thank you, Bob. And I thank Google for inviting me. It's a good opportunity for me. And to start with my disclaimer, because I'm a federal employee. Everything I say is my opinion and not that of the United States government or any branch or association thereof. So I'm going to talk to you just a little bit this morning about Carl von Clausewitz. I teach a class-- a class called Strategy and War-- and we talk about Clausewitz the theorist. And one of the things I have to overcome with my students-- some of the students, the mid-grade officers-- is there's a reluctance sometimes to study theory. And sometimes their reluctance is with good reason. But if they've ever heard of Clausewitz, or if anyone's ever heard of him, obviously he's the author of "On War." And that's certainly where he's been most of influential. But Clausewitz was also a soldier, and this is sometimes forgotten in the discussion of his ideas and end of his life. And it gives him a little bit more credibility to some of my students, who have often been deployed nine or 10 times to Iraq, Afghanistan, or sundry other entertaining places, when they realize, yeah, this is a guy, he's not just a theorist, some professor like me up there just spouting things to them. He's a guy who actually had done something as well. And to me, you can't separate his experience as a soldier from his writing as a theorist, because both things are so intertwined. And so Clausewitz, again, he was a soldier, and a soldier with an enormous amount of experience. He was probably in 36-- either in or present at least three dozen battles. I think it was more, but it's difficult to decisively determine that from the source material I could find. His father was a soldier. He grew up in the country of Prussia, which is the country, as you guys know, eventually unifies Germany. And he goes into the army probably at age 11. There's some argument over his birth date. And this is not actually unusual for this time period. In British Navy famously, kids went to sea eight, nine, 10 years old. So the child soldier has been with us for a long time. It's not just a scourge we see today. And he fights in all five of these wars here. And this is essentially in some ways an outline for some of the stuff I'm going to talk about to you. Because I'm going to talk about why these things matter for his development and hopefully why it matters for what he eventually gives us. And there are several strong influences, obviously, in his life and influences in writing as well. And one of the most important is the French Revolution in 1789, when the French revolutionaries revolt, overthrow the king, eventually execute him. And you see a situation where, because of the French Revolution, you overturn the political and military apple carts and social apple cart in many ways of Europe-- in a particular way, warfare. For our purposes, it was an important way warfare is done. Armies go from being small, fairly small, relatively professional to having mass armies fed by conscription and fed by large elements of the state. And you see this unleashing of the passion of the citizen, the passion of the people, as Clausewitz himself calls it, to harness to war, whereas the people had been kind of pushed aside and war was the realm of the army and the king and the princes. It becomes the role of the people as well. And from this French Revolutionary experience rises up one Clausewitz's other influences in many ways, this man here-- Napoleon Bonaparte-- who becomes, because of his own skill, the opportunity he has, and just his brilliant as well in co-opting this wonderful French military machine that develops, becomes the master of Europe. And you can see what Clausewitz says about him. Calls him "the god of war himself, the most determined general the world has ever seen." He doesn't like Napoleon's politics, but he admires, respects Napoleon's military skill, and wants to know why is this guy so good at what he does. Well, Clausewitz goes off to his first war in January of 1793. Remember, he was born in 1780. And this campaign is essentially one of the first revolutionary wars, where it's essentially Prussia and Austria fighting the French, and there are some other little countries, smaller states involved. And the French revolutionaries had essentially ended up eventually at war with most of Europe, to boil it down. But he'll participate in the siege of this city of Mainz, and he'll help attack some of the fortifications here. Following this will be this campaign in the [? Voz ?] area. It was a really rugged campaign. Clausewitz says it almost kills him. He's only 12, 13 years old when this is going on. There are two other officer cadets in the unit that are young like him. They both are killed. They both die as a result of the rigors of the campaign. And he almost dies as well at a couple places when the position he's in one time is overrun. But what does this tell us, though, about him? Well, it's important for his development. One, the experience that he gets from this always lives with him. He refers to this later on, the events that happens here. But he also, reflecting on it later, he talks about just how confused he was. He never really knew what was just physically going on. But also intellectually, he didn't understand, why are we here? What are we doing? What is the point of all of this? Why is this war being fought? And that puzzled him, and he really wanted to know and understand these things. And after this-- now, he never had any education growing up, or very little education. Just some of the local school. When you go into the army at age 11, you haven't had much time for graduate school. So he's posted on a village family and a peasant family for a little while. And here's a library nearby, and he begins to read. And he discovers the Enlightenment, discovers education, and becomes a voracious reader. He's posted to another command where the commander of the base he's at is very much interested in the education of his officers and his men and even of the men's families as well. And he has a garrison school and so on. And here he really falls in love with learning and really starts to blossom here, and gets himself an appointment to one of the officer schools in Berlin. And this becomes a pivotal thing, as far as his development for his career, but also in why we get "On War." Because here in Berlin, he graduates first from his class, and he ends up with a mentor named Scharnhorst, who is this gentleman here-- Gerhard von Scharnhorst who runs the school. And Clausewitz is his star pupil. Scharnhorst, he teaches Clausewitz how to think in many ways, which is what is critical. Scharnhorst very much believed in critical analysis, where you look at something ruthlessly, cut away the stuff that's not true, cut away the stuff that doesn't make sense. And when you look at past events, you try to get solid history on it. Understand what was really going on. Don't let your own deceptions and perceptions confuse you. Try to get at what is the truth. And Scharnhorst also gets him his next job as well as an adjutant to one of the Prussian princes. And through that, he meets this woman here, a lady named Marie von Bruhl who will eventually become his wife. She's a very intelligent, articulate woman. Very well read. Very much his intellectual equal. From a much more distinguished family then Clausewitz. Marie's mother-- widowed mother-- is not so approving of the relationship. It actually takes them seven years to wear Madame von Bruhl down to where she'll actually agree to let them get married. Because she's like, oh, this young officer without any land or maybe-- does he have much career prospects? She's kind of skeptical. As a father of a daughter, I kind of understand. Who's your daughter going to marry here? But also at the same time, he begins to write. And this is important as well. So we're already starting to see when he's 23, 24 years old what we're going to eventually see partially in "On War." Now in 1806, Clausewitz will march off to his second war. Why does this matter? Well, Clausewitz has become very ambitious, and he's in a country-- Prussia-- where being a soldier matters. This is important. And he is a soldier. What matters to be a successful soldier is to prove yourself, to have success in warfare. And in his view, this is the way that he can make it for himself. He says something along the lines of my country needs war and I do too. So ambition is driving him here for this. What you have happen in 1806 is essentially where Napoleon, who is the master of most of Europe, he invades the country of Prussia. And you end up with this two-pronged invasion of Prussia by the French that is met by two Prussian armies. They will fight two battles, Jena and Auerstedt. The French will decisively win both of these battles. And they will win the war because of it. Now Clausewitz will fight at the Battle of Auerstedt right here. And his unit is the rear guard, meaning the Prussians had essentially already lost the battle. The unit he is in is committed as part of the rear guard. And they fight their way into this city of Poppel and then fight their way out. And his boss, Prince August, is wounded three times-- likely wounded three times in this attack-- which was a glimpse of the intensity of what is going on here. And then what you have after this is a 14-day fighting retreat where you can see from the map here. Roughly, Clausewitz's unit follows this blue line essentially, and eventually they're forced to surrender near the city of Prenzlau after a three-hour firefight. And Prussia essentially comes apart during this. And Clausewitz is shipped off to France as a prisoner of war with Prince August. And now when Americans, for most of us today, if we think anything about prisoners of war, we think about Andersonville, or we think about Stalag 17, or maybe Stalag 13 if you're watching old "Hogan's Heroes" reruns. But we don't think about the experience that he has as an officer and an officer that serves an aristocrat. They're posted to a village outside Paris. They spend a couple weeks in Paris. They go to Switzerland and hang out in Madame de Stael's salon, one of the famous intellectuals of the day. Go visit the glacier. You know, it's very much a gilded imprisonment, to say the least. He hates every minute of it and complains about it all the time, because the war is still going on. He's missing a chance to make a name for himself. When the war is over, he's sent back to Prussia. And here he gets involved in the Prussian Reform Movement. And what this is, briefly, is Prussia was shattered by this war. Prussia before the war, Prussia after the war. The French essentially take half their country. The Prussians know they've got to change how they do things. They've got to tap into this nationalist sentiment that the French had tapped into. They've got to make the Prussian people more supportive of the Prussian state, give them an interest in the state. They've got to reform the army. They've got to reform the government. Clausewitz is very heavily involved in this. He also becomes the instructor of what becomes their war college. And he also begins to write as well during this period and starts developing some of the ideas that will eventually show up in "On War." But also, he sees by 1812 the way the political winds are blowing. And he sees that Prussia is forced into an alliance with France. France is about to invade Russia. Clausewitz doesn't want to participate in anything under the French flag. He hates Napoleon. He admires Napoleon's military skill, but he hates him politically. And he doesn't want anything to do with this. He thinks that Prussia should rise up and fight. And so he writes just gigantic political declaration which boils down to a cry, in many ways, of violence, to rise up and fight against France. But also, he says some not nice things about a lot of the ruling elites in the Prussia political system, which wins him a lot of enemies and a lot of bad blood. And eventually, he just resigns from the army in the midst of all of this-- from the Prussian army. And a lot of other officers do as well, because there are a lot of other officers-- well, a few dozen others-- that feel the same way. And what he will do now is go to his next war, the 1812 invasion of Russia. If anyone knows anything about the Napoleonic period, they usually have heard of this and usually know something about this campaign, where essentially Napoleon tries to defeat the Russians in order to-- it would make him master of Europe essentially if he does this, at least of the continent. Clausewitz is involved in this campaign from the first day it starts to the very bitter end of it. And it's just a gruesome bloodletting the entire time. And everyone knows about how bad the winter is on the troops here, but the summer is also pretty grueling on it. Essentially, you have a French invasion, and the Russians retreat in the face of the French invasion. Clausewitz initially is on one of the extended versions of the czar's staff through his connections with various officers and politicians, but he doesn't want to do this. He wants to have a posting where he'll see some action, because, again, here's the ambition. He wants to make a name from himself. He says, I'm going to Russia to make a name for myself. I can't do it on the staff. And so he ends up fighting in several rear guard actions, because that's where you can make a name for yourself. So he gets posted to the rear guard. Eventually, he will participate in the Battle of Borodino. As the French advance, the Russians decide, well, here's where we have to fight them, see if we can stop them. And he's fortunate in this battle in the sense that he misses the worst of the bloodletting of it. And you can see, it's about 130,000 men involved. You have 65,000 casualties. It's a serious slug fest. You have French troops attacking Russian positions. Clausewitz is involved in the cavalry attack that the Russians launch, try to launch on this flank here, and they have a firefight with some French and Croatian troops here. Essentially, the Russians fight them to a standstill. They begin their retreat toward Moscow again. Clausewitz goes back to the rear guard. Has a horse shot out from under him in one action on the way to Moscow. He sees the famous burning of Moscow. He's in one of the last units that go through that. And after this, he gets himself posted to yet another unit. They're constantly shuffling him around from different places. He's supposed to go work in this unit called the Russo-German Legion as one of the staff officers for that. It's a unit that the Russians were forming from German exiles like him and from prisoners of war. They were doing it for political reasons. But the unit is not put together yet. So he doesn't want to sit around, and so he gets himself posted to work for a man named Wittgenstein. Now, what is happened here? This is one the other famous events of the Russian invasion, Napoleon's crossing of the Berezina. It's well known for just the harshness of the weather and the messiness of it, the causalities of it, and very much the destruction of Napoleon's army. What the Russians try to do-- they have an army under Wittgenstein, an army under Kutuzov, an army under Chichagov, which I'm sure I'm mispronouncing that one, and they're trying to catch Napoleon's army. Napoleon fights his way through them and gets away. But the destruction here at the crossing of the river is enormous. And you can see from-- I'm not going to read the letter for you, but Clausewitz experiences very much this. But also in the wake of this, as the French are retreating, he will get the opportunity to make a very significant impact on warfare during the Napoleonic period or the shape of it, but not in the way he wants. He wants to make a name for himself as a soldier, as a combat soldier, make a name for himself in the field. Again, he's very ambitious. But what will happen is as the French and their other ally troops are retreating from Russia, the unit that Clausewitz is in will make contact with the Prussian Expeditionary Corps. Now, you remember, the Prussians had been forced to ally with France to invade Russia. But the Prussians had been forced to commit an army to help them do this. As Napoleon is retreating, the Prussian troops are also retreating in a different part of Russia. Clausewitz's unit comes in contact with this. He worked for this man here named Diebitsch. And Diebitsch says, hey, talk to them and see if you can get them to change sides. And the other Russians had been trying to do this. Clausewitz talks to them and after a couple days of conversations-- and there's certainly some willingness. A lot of the Prussians didn't want to be here anyway. They agree to change sides essentially in the war. And this is a pivotal thing for the Napoleonic period because it shifts the alliance structure in what is going on here. This is a thing, arguably, that in his military career that Clausewitz accomplishes that is the most important thing, because what you will have happen on the tail of this is you will have yet Clausewitz's next war. And this is a gigantic campaign in 1813 and 1814 with an armistice in the middle, which is a campaign that will eventually lead to the first overthrow of Napoleon. Clausewitz, he tries to get back in the Prussian army. The king isn't real happy with what he's done. And the king tells him essentially, well, fight in this campaign. We'll see how you do and then we'll talk about it afterwards. So he gets himself detailed to his old friend Scharnhorst here, who is essentially the chief of staff for the Prussian army here. And so he goes to the staff as a Russian liaison officer. So technically, he's still in the Russian army, but he's back with all the people that he knew from before. And he will help fight in this campaign. And he will also help plan this campaign. And one of the places where he will fight is the Battle of Lutzen here, which it's a real slugfest. Napoleon, the French commander, defeats the Russian-Prussian army that comes against him. Clausewitz calls this the most memorable day of his life. And he says this, I think, one, because the intensity of the battle. The sides were so mixed in, and the Prussians and the Russians were-- essentially, the entire staff, which normally would not have participated-- is also fighting hand-to-hand at times in this battle. And Clausewitz is hit on the side of the head with a bayonet in what was probably a cavalry charge against a French infantry square, certainly a French infantry unit. That would make it memorable to me if I'd been hit on the head with a bayonet. So what you will see after the armistice is a gigantic campaign that the Austrians, who enter the war, the Prussians, and the Russians will then launch through central Germany and into France that will eventually lead to Napoleon's downfall. But to Clausewitz, this is kind of a disappointing campaign in a couple senses. One, the primary campaign is through central Germany and into France. He is posted up here into the northern part of Germany-- here's the city Hamburg, province of Mecklenburg-- through what is very much a peripheral part of the war. He's very upset by this. He tries to get this reversed. He doesn't. They won't let him back into the Prussian army, so he's still technically in the Russian army. So he's put in this multinational force fighting in northern Germany. The coalition warfare here is extremely complex and confusing. You have so many different countries involved in it. But to boil it down, what has happened is this man here was a former French marshal, a very important officer in the French army-- a man named Bernadotte. He becomes the Crown Prince of Sweden. The other countries-- the Prussians, the Russians, the Austrians-- want him to bring Sweden into the war. He says, OK, I'll bring Sweden into the war against Napoleon. I want Norway. OK, you can have Norway. Well, Norway belongs to Denmark. OK, so we have to invade Denmark for you to get Norway. This is the way business is done. They trade countries around like they're poker chips. And so Clausewitz ends up in this army that's Bernadotte's army, but he ends up working for this man named Walmoden in Walmoden's corps. Walmoden's corps is one of the-- and some of the units in it are the oddest units. He's got Russians and Prussians and various Germans. The unit that Clausewitz is technically a part of-- I looked at their roster-- it's supposed to be the Russo-German legion. It's got some Germans in it. It's got some Russians in it. It's got Frenchman, Italians, Poles, and even found a couple of Americans listed on the roster. So obviously not what it was originally intended to be. But why does this campaign matter here is the most important thing. Well, again, one, Clausewitz was ambitious. He wants to make a name for himself. How do you make a name for yourself in the peripheral theater? He's very much angered by that. But what will happen here is they will fight a campaign through here into the northern part of Germany and southern part of Denmark. And there will be a battle here-- a tiny battle for the Napoleonic period-- in a town called [? Zeistet ?]. And here what happens is Clausewitz's unit is surprised by the Danish army, and the Danes kick them around pretty hard. And after this is what matters, because this worries Clausewitz. Yes, they were defeated and it's bad and the casualties are bad. But there are two things that come out of it that matters. One, this is a defeat. This injures their reputation of their corps. And he worries how this is going to affect his future and the embarrassment this causes. Defeat is not good. Secondly, one of the things he writes after the battle, he writes one of his letters. He says, the intelligence we had all said the Danes weren't there. Now in "On War," he's very critical in parts of his book on war about intelligence. He's very skeptical about it. Now, can you draw a direct connection between this one event and that? I would say it would be very difficult to do. I would say it's more of an example of his experience, because so much of the time he is the chief of staff officer. He's the guy handling the intelligence. So I think some of it is that. They finish up this campaign in Holland and Belgium. Not a lot dramatic happens after this. And Napoleon is deposed. But then Clausewitz goes to yet his fifth war. And Napoleon escapes, comes back to France, becomes emperor of France again for a short time. The various countries he was at war with before mobilize against him. And what you will see is one of the other most famous campaigns of the Napoleonic period, the Waterloo campaign. And Clausewitz does not fight in the Battle of Waterloo itself, but he fights in a couple of other places during the campaign. One in the Battle of Ligny here. He is chief of staff for Thielmann corps, 3rd Corps of the Prussian army. He's back in the Prussian army. They finally let him back in. And so he fights in this Battle of Ligny. His unit is not committed very heavily there. They're mostly used as a reserve. But when the Prussian army is defeated here by Napoleon and comes apart, he has this harrowing retreat where he's almost overrun by French cavalry and they have to march all night through the rain. But then right after this, they'll fight the Battle of Wavre. Now why does Wavre matter? Well, here you have Waterloo where Napoleon is defeated. Here you have the Battle of Wavre. This battle matters for a couple of reasons. One, because they tied down a lot of the troops, a whole corps that Napoleon could have had in support at Waterloo. And if he'd had those men at Waterloo, maybe then the battle goes differently. Maybe not, but maybe it does. And this sort of critical. For Clausewitz, it's the worst night of his life. And they fight a two-day battle here against a superior force. They're defeated here and forced to retreat. And Clausewitz's wife writes later about why he thought this was such a bad day. Well, in his mind, why it was the worst night of his life because he knows now he's not going to get the chance to ever get the military glory that he wants. He's not going to have it, because they've learned during their battle that Napoleon has been some severely defeated. They know, yes, the war will go on for a few more weeks, but the conclusion's pretty foregone at this point. Now, what happens after this? 1815, Napoleon is deposed. Clausewitz will have a couple of jobs in the Prussian army after this. But in 1818, he goes to be the director of the Prussian War College. And this is primarily an administrative job, and so it gives him time to write. He's always been writing during this period-- history, theory, politics, even stuff on art and architecture. In 1816, he begins to write "On War," which is what he's most famous for. And 1818, he will really start seriously pursuing it. And he will work on it until 1830, when he boxes it up and then takes up a new command. And then eventually he'll go and watch the Polish revolt in 1831. He won't publish the book before he dies. His wife will publish it afterward. And so we might not have it if it wasn't for her efforts to put it together with some friends to publish it and some of his other works. Now, why does "On War" matter? Well, "On War" matters because of the influence that it has in the way that people think about war. And it's not a book that tells you how to fight a war. It's a book that tells you how to think about fighting a war and things you should consider and things that matter and what the reality of war he is. He's trying to make us develop, arguably, a system for analysis. So what I'm going to talk about here just very, very briefly, a couple of things about "On War." I'm going to cherry pick some things, obviously, because it's a very large book. To Clausewitz, theory was really very important-- having a theory, a method for approaching things. It clarified things in your mind. It put you on a foundation for what you want to do, a level playing field. I think CS Lewis said-- I think he said understanding the terms of your argument, knowing where that is makes you better able to understand what you're actually talking about. And to him, theory, though, has to be realistic-- not hairsplitting, not flights of fancy. It has to be based on reality, based on experience, based upon history, particularly military theory. It's not something you just make up with this ethereal idea. It has to be something useful. And to train the mind. Now, one of things he does in the book, he's trying to set up to explain what war is. Well, what is it? And you could get different views. Obviously, for him, force is an inherent part of it. To think of anything less than this is delusional in his mind. But it's not a science in his view. It's an art. It's an art because there are these things you can't measure. These intangibles-- the will, the spirit, courage, and so on. But there are scientific things that obviously intervene-- how many men do you need, how much are they going to eat, how far can you move them, what is the ammunition going to cost you, and so on. So there are various things where they're hard numbers, but how this all works together. Obviously, complex. You could make an argument that war is the most complex things that people do-- except maybe marriage. That might trump it a little bit. But it's certainly pretty close to being the best or most complex. It's a political act. Bob mentioned earlier the famous quote from Clausewitz, "War is nothing but the continuation of policy with other means or politics by other means," the political tool. And one of the things that some people argue that separates Clausewitz's theory from others is the fact that how much the role of politics-- it penetrates his theory and is shot through it. And it helps to explain what he is thinking about. Because to Clausewitz, war and reality-- its influence is determined by these various things. The political factors always go on, the politics always go on, even while you're fighting, the human nature, the moral force, the intangibles we talked about-- chance, uncertainty, friction, the uncontrollable factors. The enemy gets a vote on what's going on. He calls war a true chameleon. So what would Clausewitz say about how do you think about fighting a war-- what do you think about, what do you do before you're getting into this thing? And he would say, well, really, you have to understand the nature of it first. He said the leadership has to get this in their mind before they do anything. What kind of war is it? What is the war about? It's nice and easy to say-- understand the nature of the war. OK, what in the world does that mean? Well, how do you do that? There's one paragraph here from Clausewitz. He says, "To discover how much of our resources must be mobilized for war, we must first examine our own political aim"-- or objective-- "and that of the enemy. We must gauge the strength and situation of the opposing state. We must gauge the character and abilities of its government and people, and do the same in regard to our own. Finally, we must evaluate the political sympathies of other states and the effect the war may have on them. To assess these things and all the ramifications and diversity is plainly a colossal task." I put this one particular paragraph up because to me, just in this one little section, is so much. That if countries or planners that are thinking about getting into a war, just examining these things can give you so much of a clue potentially as to what can happen and what you're going to need to do to fight the war-- knowing what you want, figuring out how you're going to get it, and how it's going to affect other nations, as well. Now, how else do you to determine the nature of the war? Well, in his mind, first be clear in his mind what he intends to achieve-- your political objective. Get that first, then figure out how you're going to conduct it. Because in Clausewitz's mind, understanding what you want-- everything else is going to flow from that. Rationally, it should. It may not necessarily. But ideally it should. It should flow from that. If there's anybody that has read any similar things, you hear the word "objectives" or "aims," but you hear the term "ends and means." What you want-- what is the end that you're hoping to get? Do you have the means to get it? Can you get to that point that you're trying to get to? Is it worth it? Is it worth what we're going to pay in blood, treasure, prestige, and so on? Do you have the power to get it? If you do, well, use the force necessary to get it. Do what is necessary to get the job done. So again, the political object for him-- how it determines all of these other things. He talks about what he calls the value of the object. He says, "Since war is not an act of senseless passion but is controlled by its political object, the value of the object must determine the sacrifices to be made for it in magnitude and also in duration. Once the expenditure effort exceeds the value of the political object, the object must be renounced and peace must follow." In other words, when countries go to war, they have things they want. They will only pay so much for it-- in blood, treasure, other things. Once one side is unwilling to pay, he argues that-- again, you don't have to agree with him-- but he argues somebody will make a deal at that point. Now, he says also, well, we know our object. What kind of object do we have, or political objective do we have? To Clausewitz, wars are divided into two types. There's a war fought for regime change-- to overthrow the enemy regime. And then every other reason less than that. In his view, wars fall under these two types. Now also, if you read the book, he will put forward this concept of absolute war. And this is confusing sometimes for people. And it leads to a lot of the criticism that you get of Clausewitz. We're saying, oh, he says everything has to be used and war must be fought at an absolute sense. He actually says-- he uses this as a theoretical construct. He puts up the idea of the absolute and says war can't really be waged this way. Meaning, you're not going to use everything, and everything is not going to work, because reality intervenes. People don't always do what they should do. Friction keeps you from doing what you do. You don't have the intelligence you want. It's uncertain, and so on. So he uses a theoretical concept to explain what war is really like. So we've got our objective and we know the value of it. But the paragraph I showed you, which is essentially an assessment-- how do you figure out the nature of the enemy, the character of the enemy, his abilities, his military strength? Well, he puts forward some tools, arguably one of them that would be useful for this. It is called his "paradoxical" or "wondrous trinity," depending which translation you use. And he says, "As a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies always make war a paradoxical trinity-- composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force, of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam, and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone. The first of these aspects mainly concerns the people--" violence-- back to the French Revolution-- primordial violence. Passion-- you want the passion of the people to help you fight the war. "The second, the commander and his army"-- the creative spirit is free to roam, chance and probability. War is the realm of chance, the realm of probability. The army and its leaders have to be able to manage this. And "third, the government"-- instrument of policy. In other words, the assumption is that the government goes to war for rational reasons. Either it's forced to defend the country, or if fighting an offensive war, then it has a good reason for doing it. It's not doing this just because it wants to. So it's these three forces-- violence, creativity, rationality-- the people, the government, the army. But he says, well, sometimes it doesn't really work this way, because sometimes governments will go to war for passionate reasons. They will not really think clearly about what they're doing and not have a clear objective. So you look at the strengths, you look at the society-- the military, the government, and so on. Then you say, well, where am I going to land my blows? Where is my force going to be put against? And he puts forth this concept of the center of gravity and essentially argues that countries have elements of power-- elements of national power-- certain key strengths. And in his view, these-- the army, the capital, the allies, the leader, public opinion-- it depends on various different things, which one matters-- that one or all of these things will be key sources of strength of a nation. And ideally, you should go after these if you can. The reality is sometimes you can't. And also, with Clausewitz, these are things you should do, he will say. But you always have an exception. There's always an exception to any of his rules. You say, well, ideally, yes, you want to go after the center of gravity. But sometimes, there's an opportunity that is so great and so beneficial that you go after that as well. There's some other objective worth pursuing. So you know where you're landing your blow, you're fighting your war. How do you end the war? Well, he says, ultimately, you really want to make sure you are getting what you want. You're preserving your state. You're trying to get ultimately a peace treaty that will resolve the conflict. And you have a settlement that hopefully you can live with that you've paid an acceptable cost for. But ideally, that's what you want-- final victory. But how do you get to that ends up being the question. You have to keep that in mind. What do you do militarily to get to this point? And again, with so much of things like this, it depends. It depends on the situation. There's no just template for fighting any war. How do you get there? You might destroy the enemy's forces, you might take his territory, you might occupy parts of him, you might do something else that will bring him around to your point of view. But what you're also hoping to get is eventually a settlement that is lasting. But he says the reality is a lot of countries and a lot of leaders, yes, they will make a deal with you, but they don't intend to keep it. For them, he calls a "transitory evil," as he says. I think this is certainly drawn from his study of history, and some from his experience in the Napoleonic wars, where the wars are fought maybe a year or two. And then you take a break. And then maybe a couple years later, you fight it again. So in 1831, Clausewitz will die as a result of the big cholera epidemic that sweeps through Europe. His wife, along with some friends, will publish "On War" and a lot of his other works as well. And it is generally-- not always certainly, but is generally-- considered the best theoretical work on war, the best military theory on war. There are obviously things you can argue with it. Again, some things that some would say are obsolete. But with it, he gives us a good method for thinking about war, for doing analysis and trying to figure out what we're doing and why. But there are, of course, other books of theory as well. It's certainly not the only one. Well, thank you very much. And I'll take any questions you might have. [APPLAUSE] AUDIENCE: Is there anything Clausewitz has to say that you find has become particularly relevant in current conflicts or with current technology? DONALD STOKER: With the technology, I don't know. But with the current conflicts, just really having a clear idea in your mind what you want and why you're sending people there to get it. Knowing that and then saying, is it worth it? Particularly really knowing what you want, I think, is always relevant. Because if you know what you want, then that arguably should spark some thought. AUDIENCE: So it would be fair to say he was critical of mission creep? DONALD STOKER: Critical would be the wrong word, I think, to say. Because the reality would be sometimes the mission will change because sometimes the circumstances will change. But if you know what you want going in, then maybe you don't get the mission creep. But then the circumstance will change. Maybe you're forced to have mission creep. AUDIENCE: I know it was kind of early for this, but with all of his interest in theory, do you know if Clausewitz did anything with war games or laying stuff out on tables, that sort of thing? DONALD STOKER: Honestly, I don't know. He participated in a lot of real maneuvers in real wars, but I honestly don't know on that. I never caught that anywhere. But he did like counterfactual studies, where here's a problem. Let's think about the various ways we can approach this problem. And here is the solution. Well, one of things he said, if someone sets out their plan and you criticize it, you better have a better option. If you're just criticizing and you don't have a better choice, then who cares what you say? You've got to wonder about that. AUDIENCE: So you talked about how he saw the ongoing conflict in Europe as a way of making a career and a fact of life. But does he ever talk about the morality of it? Say, if he saw where today the Swedes and Danes are no longer fighting, attacking each other for territory, would he be disappointed to hear they're no longer doing that? Would he see it as an improvement? Does he ever talk about the morality of it? DONALD STOKER: The book is really-- to them, war is man's natural state in many ways. And you could argue almost that if you look at the certainly the shape of European history, it's sadly that way. The book is a non-moral approach to war. He certainly understood the reality of it but to him, this is the reality of it. As far as what he would say about today, honestly I don't know. I think he would be-- like what I mentioned related to his question, I think, the lack of clarity about what people want would always confuse him. But he would say the same thing about his own people. He criticizes his own government for not knowing what it wants and criticizes them for their behavior afterward in some wars, and gets himself in trouble sometimes doing it. AUDIENCE: It's a two-part question. So the first is, why do you think Clausewitz's work has been so influential? And second, what are some of the real-world applications of that? Like, where in history have we seen his influence really has shaped events? DONALD STOKER: As far as why, I haven't read most of the other primary theoretical works. And we teach some others. We teach Mahan. We teach Sun Tzu. We teach Corbett's "Principles of Maritime Strategy," which there are no boats in Clausewitz's world. But the others are certainly useful. His, to me-- and others would disagree, certainly-- to me, it gives a clarity of thought and a systemization of thought which is useful. And plus he does give us-- one of the reasons we use it to teach with, it gives us terms to define things and it gives us tools for analysis. When we're teaching one of our case studies and we'll say, OK, what is the American center of gravity? And this gives us certain things that we could look at and say, we know what center of gravities are. How do we look at the strengths or weaknesses of an enemy? It's very useful for that. As far as your second question-- I'm sorry, what was your second question again? You'll have to repeat it to me. AUDIENCE: Where do we see real-world applications? DONALD STOKER: Clausewitz's influence was actually slow to develop. There just wasn't that much interest in it for a very long time. People started taking more of an interest in it after the Franco-Prussian War, 1870 to '71, where the Prussians come out successful in that. And you see a general, then, spread of his ideas. It was fairly influential with Lenin. He liked the idea that war is a political tool. He said, this is clever. You see it with some American foreign policy, but only after Vietnam. And you see it particularly in the Reagan administration. There's an argument over how you use military force. You've certainly got the post-Vietnam hangover about that and you have certain groups of the administration that are more hawkish than others. Some want to intervene in places, some don't. And you end up with Caspar Weinberger. He develops this Weinberger Doctrine, which is some elements based upon Clausewitz's teachings, where having a clear political objective, understand the end you want, understand the means you want, make sure you have the support of the people to do this. If the people aren't supportive of it and the government isn't supportive of this, then we should really be questioning whether we're doing this and whether it's worth it. That's the best examples of the influence of it. I think it's had more influence among military thinking and analysis than among politicians. AUDIENCE: I was wondering if you could say something about how Clausewitz's "On War" compares with say, Sun Tzu's "Art of War" or [INAUDIBLE]. What are the points of sharpest similarity or sharpest contrast between the other books? DONALD STOKER: Actually, when we teach our theorist case study, we use Clausewitz and Sun Tzu at the same time. And so we can get some back and forth with them. One of the things that's very similar to them is both of them understanding-- look, figure out what you're getting yourself into here. Clausewitz says, look, war is violence. People are going to die. It's going to be expensive. And it's going to be messy. Understand that before you go in. It better be worth it to you. Sun Tzu says the same thing. He has a passage where he tells the king, he says, look, when you go to war, it's going to cost you this. You've got to raise an army like this. People are going to be mad at you. It's going to be expensive and messy. Get this through your head beforehand, it better be worth it. When Clausewitz talks about his centers of gravity, Sun Tzu has his priorities of attack, and some of them are exactly the same. He talks about hitting their allies, he talks about cities, but he warns against it. So there's a lot of similarities to that. Sun Tzu is much more in tune with intelligence and deception and Clausewitz is not-- he's a little more skeptical of that than Sun Tzu. But they are really fun to study together, because you get here's what it's similar to, but also here's where they disagree. AUDIENCE: I think I have the last question, myself. Take an example-- it's in the news right now-- Vladimir Putin just got humiliated at the G20 and sent home for his Ukrainian adventures. What do you think his objective really is in Ukraine? DONALD STOKER: I was in New York last week, and I was involved in a piece of a conversation with other people with that. And they were having an argument about that, back and forth. Both the people were very informed, so I don't know who to believe on it. What are his objectives? Probably all of Ukraine, a lot of people would say-- at least the parts of the Ukraine that would allow him a land bridge to the Crimea and connect to Moldava-- that's another opinion that I've heard. Another opinion that I've heard is that not only Ukraine, but Belarus. Ukraine's the first step in Belarus. And also there's a lot of fear, apparently-- and this is my opinion, and from what I've heard, not the government-- there's a lot of fear among prominent figures in the Baltic states about what might be-- the big cyber-attack they launched in the Estonians a couple years ago and the kidnapping of the Estonian officer. And there's been a shifting of all the Polish defense forces around. But basically, to look on the border with Ukraine. But I don't know what he wants. I'm not a Russian expert, by far. BOB: Let's thank Dr. Stoker for coming here. [APPLAUSE]




Formation of the California State Militia and its early years

The California Army National Guard was formed with the passing of the Militia Act of 1903, also known as the Dick Act. Prior to that time, the California Army Guard originated from the state militia established by the Constitution of California in 1849. On April 4, 1850, the first California Legislature in San Jose adopted enabling legislation formally establishing a militia of volunteer or independent companies. The law required every free, white, able-bodied male citizen of the State to perform military duty or to pay a $2 fee for nonperformance of this duty. Such payment exempted the person from duty except in case of war, insurrection, invasion, assistance to the sheriff, or a requisition of the militia. It provided that a judge of the superior court of a county should cause a suitable person to open a book, and enter the names of persons who apply and are able to perform military duty. After required notice, the volunteers were to be organized, and their officers and noncommissioned officers selected by election. The volunteer or independent companies were to be armed and equipped as in the Army of the United States. The units were to adopt a constitution and by-laws as well as rules and regulations for the government of its personnel and determination of fines and penalties to enforce them.[4]

The legislature then provided for the organization of these enrolled state militia, volunteers or independent companies into four divisions, each commanded by a major general and consisting of two brigades, with a statewide adjutant general responsible to the Governor of California.[5] From 1852, the Quartermaster General of California was subsumed under the office of Adjutant General of California, when William H. Richardson resigned and Quartermaster General William Chauncey Kibbe became adjutant general by a law of 1852.

The first unit, known as the First California Guard (officially Company A, First Regiment, Light Artillery), was formed from volunteers in San Francisco, California under Captain Henry Morris Naglee on July 27, 1849, as a territorial militia. It then was the first organized under state authority.[6] Under these regulations, 307 volunteer or independent companies were organized in the early years of the states history to oppose the Indians, hunt down bandits, quell riots or Vigilantes, protect officials, intervene in mining claim disputes and other civil disturbances.

During 1850, Governor Burnett called out the militia two times. The first was prompted by incidents involving the Yuma Indians at the confluence of the Gila and Colorado rivers on April 23, 1850; in response, the Governor ordered the sheriffs of San Diego County and Los Angeles County to organize a total of 100 men for the Gila Expedition to “pursue such energetic measures to punish the Indians, bring them to terms, and protect the emigrants on their way to California.”[7] The second instance occurred in October 1850, when Governor Burnett ordered the sheriff of El Dorado County to muster 200 men. The commanders were instructed to “proceed to punish the Indians engaged in the late attacks in the vicinity of Ringgold, and along the emigrant trail leading from Salt Lake to California.”[8]

From 1850 to 1851 the Mariposa Battalion was raised to fight the Mariposa War in the Sierras.

In 1851, the Garra Revolt occurred in San Diego County and the Governor called for troops, the Fitzgerald Volunteers were raised in San Diego to defend the County and conducted an expedition to Warners Ranch. Also two companies of Rangers were organized in San Francisco from members of the three militia companies that existed in that city then: First California Guard, Washington Guard and Empire Guard.[9] However, by the time transportation to San Diego was arranged the revolt had been suppressed, and the now idle volunteers caused more trouble in San Diego than the Indians.[10]

In 1853, a company of California State Rangers was organized for the purpose of capturing the famous bandit Joaquin Murietta. At the same time Los Angeles County formed two companies, Los Angeles Rangers[11] and the Los Angeles Guard.[12] In 1854 the Monte Rangers[13] were formed. During 1855 in San Bernardino County the San Bernardino Rough and Ready Cavalry[14] was formed, replaced in 1856 by the San Bernardino Rangers.[15] These units were raised to support the local authorities in combating Indian raids and the influx of criminals into Southern California, driven out of the northern part of the state by vigilantism in San Francisco and the Gold Country.[16]

In 1854, the six companies in San Francisco, were formed into a battalion. In 1855, the militia was again reorganized. Provision was made for six divisions and 12 brigades. More extended military rolls were to be kept by the county assessors of each county.[4]

In 1855, six California militia units were raised or mobilized in Humboldt and Klamath Counties for defense of the inhabitants in the Klamath and Salmon River War.[17]

In 1856, Tulare Mounted Riflemen, a California State Militia unit of Tulare County, fought the Yokut in the Tule River War.[18][19]

In the winter in early 1858, a number of militia companies were raised for the Utah War, which was settled in by that spring before they could become involved.

In 1858-59, Captain Isaac G. Messec and his company, the Trinity Rangers fought the Klamath & Humboldt Expedition against the Whilkut or Redwood Indians.[20]

In 1859, the Kibbe Rangers under William Byrnes and local posses fought the Pitt River Expedition against the Achomawi (Pit River) and Atsugewi (Hat Creek) tribes.

In 1860 the Independent City Guard and another company of volunteers from Sacramento, and the Nevada Rifles from Nevada City joined the Washoe Regiment and fought in the Carson River Expedition in the Paiute War.[21]

Civil War

As the secession crisis developed in early 1861, several Volunteer Companies of the California Militia[22][23] had disbanded because of divided loyalties and new ones with loyal Union men were sworn in across the state under the supervision of County sheriffs and judges. Many of these units saw no action but some were to form the companies of the earliest California Volunteer Regiments. Others like the Petaluma Guard and Emmet Rifles in Sonoma County suppressed a secessionist disturbance in Healdsburg,[24] in 1862. Union commanders relied on the San Bernardino Mounted Rifles[25] to hold the pro southern San Bernardino County for the Union in late 1861 as federal troops were being withdrawn and replaced by California Volunteers.

Notable as the only active pro-Southern militia unit, the Los Angeles Mounted Rifles was organized on March 7, 1861, in Los Angeles County. It included more than a few Californios in its leadership and its ranks including the County Sheriff, one of his Undersheriffs and several of his deputies. A. J. King another Undersheriff of Los Angeles County (and former member of the earlier "Monte Rangers") and other influential men in El Monte, formed another secessionist militia the Monte Mounted Rifles on March 23, 1861. However the attempt failed when A. J. King marched through the streets following news of the Battle of Fort Sumter with a portrait of the Confederate General P. G. T. Beauregard and was arrested by a U.S. Marshal. State arms sent from Governor John G. Downey for the unit were held up by Union officers at the port of San Pedro. Due to the activities of secessionists within companies and disappearance of arms with the Los Angeles Mounted Rifles, the Legislature passed a law giving the Governor the power to recover from any company its arms and equipment to prevent traitors from getting possession of state arms.[26]

In 1862, the crisis of the American Civil War compelled the militia to be reorganized. Volunteer companies were to be reorganized, classified, assigned to militia battalions and regiments and staffs were to be provided to them. Administration was improved, bonds required, military duty exacted, enrollments and assessments created, muster rolls defined, activation of the militia determined, disciplinary procedure adopted, courts-martial provided, compensation fixed, arms and equipment provided, and prior conflicting acts repealed.[4]

During the Civil War 88 militia companies had been formed to serve, if required, in their respective localities, or to respond to a call from the governor.[27] However, by the end of the Civil War only two of the six Divisions were active and only six of the twelve Brigades of which only the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Brigades were organized into battalions and regiments.

Later 19th Century

In 1866, the Legislature for the first time employed the term "National Guard" as the title of the organized uniformed troops of the State of California. The statute provided for the organization of the National Guard, General and Special Staffs, formations of companies, service, arms and equipment, created a Board of Organization, formed a Board of Military Auditors, adopted a system of instruction and drill, described in detail the duties of the Adjutant General, created privileges and exemptions, allowances and expenses, limited the issuance of arms to troops only, provided for military musters and active service.

20th and 21st Century

Secretary of Defense William Cohen talks with soldiers from a California Army National Guard
Secretary of Defense William Cohen talks with soldiers from a California Army National Guard

The Militia Act of 1903 organized the various state militias into the present National Guard system. Between the wars the 79th Infantry Brigade existed in the state, with the 159th and 184th Infantry Regiments. Soon after World War II the 49th Infantry Division was organized in the state, but it disappeared after later reorganization.

On February 1, 1976, the 49th Infantry Brigade, California Army National Guard, was redesignated the 49th MP Brigade at Alameda, California.

Units and members of the California Army National Guard have served in: World War I, World War II, Korean War, the Vietnam War, Operation Desert Storm and Desert Shield, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, Guantanamo Bay, Sinai Peninsula, Qatar, Germany, Spain, Panama, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, Kuwait, during the L.A. Riots, on the US/Mexico Border mission, during Hurricane Katrina humanitarian efforts, in airports and seaports around California, in various military bases across the US in support of Homeland Security, and more.

Historic units

See also


  1. ^ "HHC 40th Aviation Brigade". California National Guard. State of California. 2011. Retrieved 24 December 2012. 
  2. ^ "40th Combat Aviation Brigade". The California Military Department. January 5, 2017. 
  3. ^ "C 1-168th GSAB (Air Ambulance)". The California Military Department. January 5, 2017. 
  4. ^ a b c "Outline History of the California National Guard, extracted from the 1950 edition of the California Blue Book". Retrieved 2012-07-23. 
  5. ^ "Creation of the National Guard of California". California State Military Museum. Retrieved 2007-05-25. 
  6. ^ "First California Guard". California State Military Museum. Retrieved 2007-05-25. 
  7. ^ [Peter H. Burnett, “Governor’s Annual Message to the Legislature, January 7, 1851,” in Journals of the Senate and Assembly of the State of California, at the Second Session of the Legislature, 1851-1852, (San Francisco: G.K. Fitch & Co., and V.E. Geiger & Co., State Printers, 1852), pp. 16-17.]
  8. ^ [Burnett, “Governor’s Annual Message...,1851“, p. 18.]
  9. ^ "Hubert Howe Bancroft, The Works of Hubert Howe Bancroft Vol. XXIV: History of California Vol VII, History Co., San Francisco, 1890, p.455". Retrieved 2012-07-23. 
  10. ^ "Richard F. Pourade, '''The Silver Dons 1833–1865''', Copley Press, 1963, CHAPTER TEN: THE GARRA UPRISING". Retrieved 2012-07-23. 
  11. ^ "California State Militia and National Guard Unit Histories; Los Angeles Rangers". Retrieved 2012-07-23. 
  12. ^ "California State Militia and National Guard Unit Histories; Los Angeles Guard". Retrieved 2012-07-23. 
  13. ^ "California State Militia and National Guard Unit Histories; Monte Rangers". Retrieved 2012-07-23. 
  14. ^ "California Militia and National Guard Unit Histories; San Bernardino Rough and Ready Cavalry". 2008-12-27. Retrieved 2012-07-23. 
  15. ^ "California State Militia and National Guard Unit Histories; San Bernardino Rangers". 2008-12-28. Retrieved 2012-07-23. 
  16. ^ Hubert Howe Bancroft (1887). Popular tribunals. 1887. Vol. 1, (XXXVI). History Company. pp. 437 to 438.  "Following the great uprisings in San Francisco, there was a general exodus of crimmals to the interior. A San Francisco paper thus sounds the note of warning:
    "The recent hanging and banishing of the friends and companions of these villains in San Francisco caused a stampede for the interior and southern portion of the state, where they formed themselves into organized banditti, robbing and murdering indiscriminately. Neither sex nor age were regarded by these desperate gangs of marauders. ... the law was found to be inefficient to punish the bloody outrages which were daily being committed; the people in the lower counties, in Los Angeles, Monterey, San Luis Obispo, and later still in Carson Valley, have been obliged in self-defence to follow the example of San Francisco ..."
  17. ^ "Anthony Jennings Bledsoe, '''Indian wars of the Northwest: A California sketch''', Bacon & Company, San Francisco, 1885; Chapter VI The Klamath War. pp.153-176". Retrieved 2012-07-23. 
  18. ^ "California and the Indian Wars, The Tule River War by William Gorenfield. The California State Military Museum website. Article originally appeared in the June 1999 issue of Wild West". 2009-10-30. Retrieved 2012-07-23. 
  19. ^ "Eugene L. Menefee and Fred A. Dodge, History of Tulare and Kings Counties, California, Historic Record Company, Los Angeles, California, 1913. Chapter II The Indian War of 1856 pp.20-27". Retrieved 2012-07-23. 
  20. ^ "California Militia and National Guard Unit Histories: Trinity Rangers from The California State Military Museum, accessed September 8, 2011". Retrieved 2012-07-23. 
  21. ^ "California and the Indian Wars, The Paiute War". The California State Military Museum. Retrieved August 7, 2011. 
  22. ^ "Index to Militia Units of the State of California 1850-1881". 2009-01-30. Retrieved 2012-07-23. 
  23. ^ "Inventory of the Military Department. Militia Companies Records, 1849-1880" (PDF). Retrieved 2012-07-23. 
  24. ^ "The California State Military Museum, California State Militia and National Guard Unit Histories, Petaluma Guard". Retrieved 2012-07-23. 
  25. ^ "California State Militia and National Guard Unit Histories, San Bernardino Rangers. This history was written in 1940 by the Works Progress Administration (WPA) in conjunction with the Office of the Adjutant General and the California State Library". 2008-12-28. Retrieved 2012-07-23. 
  26. ^ "George Henry Tinkham, California men and events: time 1769-1890, CHAPTER XVI note (s)". Retrieved 2012-07-23. 
  27. ^ "By Colonel Norman S. Marshall and Chief Warrant Officer 2 Mark J. Denger, The Creation of the National Guard of California, California Center for Military History". 1916-06-03. Retrieved 2012-07-23. 
  28. ^ "250th Air Defense Artillery Regiment (First California)". California State Military Museum. California Military Department. Retrieved 18 July 2012. 
  29. ^ "140th Aviation Regiment". California State Military Museum. California Military Department. Retrieved 18 July 2012. 
  30. ^ "134th Tank Battalion". California State Military Museum. California Military Department. Retrieved 18 July 2012. 
  31. ^ "170th Cavalry Regiment". California State Military Museum. California Military Department. Retrieved 18 July 2012. 
  32. ^ "115th Quartermaster Battalion". California State Military Museum. California Military Department. Retrieved 18 July 2012. 
  33. ^ "Headquarters and Headquarters Company 115th Support Group". United States Army Center of Military History. United States Army. 31 January 2012. Retrieved 18 July 2012. Reorganized and Federally recognized 12 May 1936 in the California National Guard at Sacramento as Company A, 115th Quartermaster Regiment, an element of the 40th Division 

External links

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