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Battle of Caporetto

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Battle of Caporetto
Part of the Italian Front (World War I)
Battle of Caporetto.jpg

Battle of Caporetto and Italian retreat.
Date24 October – 19 November 1917
Result Central Powers victory[1]
Commanders and leaders

Austria-Hungary Svetozar Boroević
Austria-Hungary Johann Ritter von Henriquez
German Empire Otto von Below

Secondary attacks:
Austria-Hungary Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf
Kingdom of Italy Luigi Cadorna
Kingdom of Italy Luigi Capello
Units involved

Austria-Hungary Army Group Boroević
German Empire 14th Army

Secondary attacks:

Austria-Hungary South Tyrolean Army Group
Kingdom of Italy 2nd Army
~350,000 soldiers[2]
2,213 artillery pieces
~874,000 soldiers
6,918 artillery pieces[3]
Casualties and losses
70,000 killed and wounded 305,000:
10,000 dead
30,000 wounded
265,000 captured
3,152 artillery pieces
600,000 internally displaced people[4]

The Battle of Caporetto (also known as the Twelfth Battle of the Isonzo, the Battle of Kobarid or the Battle of Karfreit) was a battle on the Italian front of World War I. The battle was fought between the Kingdom of Italy and the Central Powers and took place from 24 October to 19 November 1917, near the town of Kobarid (now in north-western Slovenia, then part of the Austrian Littoral). The battle was named after the Italian name of the town (also known as Karfreit in German).

Austro-Hungarian forces, reinforced by German units, were able to break into the Italian front line and rout the Italian forces opposing them. The battle was a demonstration of the effectiveness of the use of stormtroopers and the infiltration tactics developed in part by Oskar von Hutier. The use of poison gas by the Germans also played a key role in the collapse of the Italian Second Army.[5]

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  • ✪ The Battle of La Malmaison - Breakthrough at Caporetto I THE GREAT WAR Week 170
  • ✪ On the Battlefield of Caporetto - Exploring the Kolovrat I THE GREAT WAR Special
  • ✪ BATTLE OF CAPORETTO | WWI: 100th anniversary of Battle of Kobarid, Reenactment
  • ✪ Life On The Isonzo Front I THE GREAT WAR On The Road
  • ✪ Redipuglia and the Isonzo Front in WW1


There are been 11 Battles of the Isonzo River, all launched offensively by the Italians, but that changes this week. This week a 12th battle begins, launched by the Central Powers, and this week the Italian front breaks. I’m Indy Neidell; welcome to the Great War. Last week the Germans continued Operation Albion, a combined air - land - sea offensive in the Gulf of Riga, while in the west casualties for the two and a half months of the ongoing Battle of Passchendaele were finally being tallied, and they were enormous. Plans were made to continue that battle when the weather improved, and plans were also made for a tank attack that would be the first of its kind. Action now began again on the Western Front this week, and it was begun by the French. In fact, they scored a big victory at the Battle of La Malmaison, which ran from the 23rd to the 26th. The French captured the village and the fort of La Malmaison and took control of the Chemin des Dames ridge. This was a well - prepared limited scale attack, much like the second battle of Verdun six weeks ago, and it was partly designed to boost French morale after the disastrous spring offensive and general mutiny of the summer. German artillery was outnumbered 3 - 1 and the French guns silenced the German ones. Also, the French saturated the Ailette Valley with gas, so the Germans could not bring forward supplies or evacuate the wounded. The preliminary bombardment had been six days long and French aerial recon had identified the German infantry shelters, which were systematically destroyed. When the French infantry went over the top, still in darkness on the morning of the 23rd, there were 63 Schneider CA-1 and Saint Chamond tanks with them. 27 of these got bogged down behind French lines in the mud. 15 more were stopped in no man's land or at the German front lines, but the other 21 reached the German second lines according to plan. In four days, the French advanced nearly 10 km, and the success here and recently at Verdun, as well as the Allied September successes at Passchendaele, showed that with proper planning and artillery preparation, the German defenses were vulnerable, as they had not been earlier in the year. Casualty estimates vary, sometimes widely, but William Philpott estimated a few years ago 38,000 German casualties and 12,000 prisoners against just 14,000 French casualties. Even after the spring offensives and the general mutiny, there is no way you could count out the French army. Elsewhere on that front, though, the Germans were holding their ground. On the last day of the week, the 26th, the Passchendaele Offensive against them began again. The Canadians under Sir Arthur Currie were chosen to lead the attack, but Currie had serious reservations. Still, he made his plans. It would be a three - phased attack, and the codenamed objectives were, in order, the Red, Blue, and Green Lines. The 3rd and 4th Divisions of Canadian Corps would take the first two, and the 1st and 2nd would take the last and doing any mopping up. The attacks would take place the 26th and 30th of October, and November 6th. This caused issues with General Hugh Gough, who planned an attack with his 5th Army the 22nd, and wanted Currie to attack the same day. Currie refused to be rushed. Still, his attack the 26th caused equally heavy casualties on both sides. Currie’s men were brought to a halt before they could reach Passchendaele Ridge or what rubble remained of the village. They did not completely take even the Red Line, the nearest objective, but they did secure jumping off positions for next week’s attack. But if the Germans were holding their ground there, they were advancing in the east. Operation Albion continued, and on the 20th, Dagö and Schilden Islands were captured. The next day, the Germans land on the Russian mainland at Verder. In nine days have taken 20,000 prisoners and 100 guns. But that operation was just a sidenote to the big advance this week in Italy. Now, the 10th and 11th battles of the Isonzo River this summer had cost the Italians nearly 300,000 casualties and the Austrians a couple hundred thousand, and both sides were begging their allies for help. Italian Chief of Staff Luigi Cadorna thought the impending collapse of Russia was going to free up Austria-Hungary to send all its armies against Italy, but the British and French only helped him with artillery. He also kind of ruled by fear at this point, and he was so certain his strategies were right that he didn’t even listen to alternative opinions from his own intelligence services. By this time, he had fired 217 generals and 255 colonels (Caporetto), mostly for “lack of offensive spirit”, so standards were pretty low in the officer corps by this time Austrian Emperor Karl, who was told by his general staff that the army couldn’t handle another Italian assault, asked German Quartermaster General Erich Ludendorff for German aid. Ludendorff said no, but Karl went right to the Kaiser, who intervened. A German general sent to the Italian front reported that the Austrian army was at the end of its rope, so Ludendorff created the German 14th Army with bits and pieces taken from the Baltic, Romania, and Alsace-Lorraine. He sent it to the Italian front under General Otto von Below with orders just to stabilize the Austrians with the most limited campaign he could manage. He wanted his divisions back by December to prepare for the 1918 campaign against France. The operation was codenamed Waffentreue - Loyalty to Arms. This army included some of the best Alpine divisions the Germans and Austrians had, and would also be featuring new infiltration tactics, or “Hutier” tactics, named after General Oskar von Hutier. They would proceed in four phases: 1) short artillery barrage of high explosive and poison gas shells. No preliminary sighting shots would be fired since the guns would be aimed mathematically with help from aerial recon. This barrage was not to destroy the enemy front lines, but to neutralize them. 2) Under a creeping barrage, shock troops would move forward and infiltrate identified weak spots in the defenses, avoiding all combat if possible, and continuing until they reached enemy artillery or command posts, which they would then destroy or capture. 3) then, machine gun and mortar units would launch heavy attacks on narrow fronts against enemy strongpoints that had been avoided by the shock troops. Artillery was now brought forward. 4) the regular infantry was sent in to mop up any resistance that remained.. On October 24th, 33 German and Austrian divisions attacked 41 Italian ones. This was the Battle of Caporetto, named after one of the villages where the fighting took place that is known as Kobarid to the Slovenians there- it was the 12th Battle of the Isonzo, but it was the first that was planned and executed by the Central Powers. It began with 4 hours of artillery, two hours of which was gas shells. The main attack then began as a pincer movement. The northern arm attacked from the Bovec basin along the river to the southwest toward Caporetto, on the slopes and ridges. The southern arm attacked from Tolmen and the bridgehead there to the west. Once Caporetto fell, Austrian General Svetozar Borojevic von Bojna would attack to hold the forces on the Bainsizza Plateau and the Carso while the 14th army moved south from the newly conquered ridges. That day the attack in thick fog on a 32km front broke through at Tolmen and Caporetto, taking 10,000 prisoners and the Italians fell back as far as 20km just that day. By the 26th, the Central Powers claimed 60,000 prisoners and 500 guns, and the Italians were in full flight along the whole front. Now, Von Below wanted the mountains cleared of Italian soldiers and artillery, to provide safe access to the Venetian Plain. He sent in his elite Alpine troops, which included the , which featured one Lieutenant Erwin Rommel. Rommel was given three mountain companies and one machine gun company, “the Rommel Detachment”. On the 25th, they took two mountain peaks and 3,600 prisoners. The next day he then took Monte Matajur. In 52 hours of fighting his men had captured 150 officers and 9,000 men and had only had six of their own killed and 30 wounded. Even decades later as a famous general in another large conflict, Rommel called this the high point of his career. By the end of the week, all of the battlefields Italy had dominated for the past two years at the cost of so many lives were falling behind or would soon do so - Gorizia, Monte San Michele, Monte Sabotino, Podgora. The defeat even caused the fall of Paolo Boselli’s government in Rome. It had become a complete and total rout. Von Below’s commanders wanted to head south, win total victory over the Italians, and knock them out of the war, but Von Below had no intention of being an occupying army. He still intended to get his forces to the Western Front by December. And the week ends, with German making huge advances in Italy, a smaller advance in the northeast, holding their ground in Belgium, but losing it in France. And a final note - on the 26th Brazil declares war on Germany. Think how it would feel in the Italian army this week. You’d sacrificed men in the hundreds of thousands to slowly take enemy territory over two and a half years, you bleed out a whole generation of your young men, and suddenly you lose it all in a week. A few days. What was the sacrifice for then? What do you tell the people at home? The families of the dead? I don’t know. If you want to know more about Erwin Rommel and his exploits in World War 1, you can click right here for our episode about him. Our Patreon supporter of the week is Alaska Mike - what a “cool” name. Thank you for your ongoing support on Patreon which made it possible to film special episodes in Kobarid itself. Don’t forget to subscribe, see you next time.



The Soča (Isonzo) river, location of the initial attacks at Kobarid (Caporetto).
The Soča (Isonzo) river, location of the initial attacks at Kobarid (Caporetto).

Throughout the Spring and Summer of 1917, the Italians had launched numerous offensives on the Austro-Hungarian Lines in the Isonzo Sector, with The 11th Battle of the Isonzo being the most successful in pushing back the Austro-Hungarians. After the Italian success in the 11th Battle of the Isonzo, Emperor Karl knew a breakthrough was going to happen at any moment, as both the Austro-Hungarians and Italians were exhausted, and running out of men to sustain the war. So, he wrote to the Kaiser and requested German Forces be deployed to Italy.

In August 1917 Paul von Hindenburg decided to send troops from the Eastern Front to the Isonzo Sector. Erich Ludendorff was opposed to this but was overruled.[6] Later, in September three experts from the Imperial General Staff, led by the chemist Otto Hahn, went to the Isonzo front to find a site suitable for a gas attack.[7] They proposed attacking the quiet Caporetto sector, where a good road ran west through a mountain valley to the Venetian Plain.

The Austro-Hungarian Army Group Boroević, commanded by Svetozar Boroević, was prepared for the offensive. In addition, a new 14th Army was formed with nine Austrian and six German divisions, commanded by the German Otto von Below. The Italians inadvertently helped by providing weather information over their radio.[8]


German assault troops at Caporetto.
German assault troops at Caporetto.
Italian 102/35 anti-air guns mounted on SPA 9000C trucks during the retreat
Italian 102/35 anti-air guns mounted on SPA 9000C trucks during the retreat
Provisional Italian trenches along the Piave river
Provisional Italian trenches along the Piave river

Foul weather delayed the attack for two days but on 24 October there was no wind and the front was misted over.[9] At 02:00, 894 metal tubes similar to Livens Projectors (Gaswurfminen), dug into a reverse slope, were triggered electrically to simultaneously fire canisters containing 600 ml (21 imp fl oz; 20 US fl oz) of chlorine-arsenic agent and diphosgene, smothering the Italian trenches in the valley in a dense cloud of poison gas. Knowing that their gas masks could protect them only for two hours or less, the defenders fled, though 500–600 were still killed.[10] Then the front was quiet until 06:00, when all the Italian wire and trenches to be attacked were bombarded by mortars.

At 06:41, 2,200 guns opened fire, many targeting the valley road along which reserves were advancing to plug the gap. At 08:00 two large mines were detonated under strong points on the heights bordering the valley and the infantry attacked.[11][12] Soon they penetrated the almost undefended Italian fortifications in the valley, breaching the defensive line of the Italian Second Army between the IV and XXVII Corps. To protect the attackers' flanks, Alpine Troops infiltrated the strong points and batteries along the crests of the adjoining ridges, Matajur and Kolovrat, laying out their telephone lines as they advanced to maintain contact with their artillery.[13] Specially-trained and equipped stormtrooper units led attacks, making good use of the new German model 08/15 Maxim light machine gun, light trench mortars, mountain guns, flamethrowers and hand grenades.[14]

The attackers in the valley marched almost unopposed along the excellent road toward Italy, some advanced 25 kilometres (16 mi) on the first day. The Italian army beat back the attackers on either side of the sector where the central column attacked, but Below's successful central penetration threw the entire Italian army into disarray. Forces had to be moved along the Italian front in an attempt to stem von Below's breakout, but this only weakened other points along the line and invited further attacks. At this point, the entire Italian position was threatened.

The Italian 2nd Army commander Luigi Capello was bedridden with fever. Recognizing that his forces were ill prepared for this attack and were being routed, Capello requested permission to withdraw to the Tagliamento. Cadorna, who believed the Italian force could regroup and hold out, denied the request. Finally, on 30 October 1917, Cadorna ordered the majority of the Italian force to retreat to the other side of the Tagliamento. It took the Italians four full days to cross the river, and by this time the German and Austro-Hungarian armies were on their heels, ambushing the defenders whenever they could. These ambushes would become known as the Battle of Pozzuolo. Eventually, the retreating Italian Soldiers were able to break through the Austro-German encirclement and retreat to the Tagliamento River. Then, on 2 November, a German division had established a bridgehead on the Tagliamento River. About this time, however, the rapid success of the attack caught up with them. The German and Austro-Hungarian supply lines were stretched to the breaking point and unable to launch another attack to isolate a part of the Italian army against the Adriatic. Cadorna was able to retreat further and by 10 November had established a position on the Piave river[9] and Monte Grappa, where the last push of the German and Austro-Hungarian forces was met and defeated by Italian forces at the First Battle of Monte Grappa.

Even before the battle, Germany was struggling to feed and supply its armies in the field. Erwin Rommel, who as a junior officer won the Pour le Mérite for his exploits in the battle, often bemoaned the demands placed upon his "poorly fed troops".[15] The Allied blockade of the German Empire, which the Kaiserliche Marine had been unable to break, had led to food shortages and widespread malnutrition in Germany and the Central Powers in general. The inadequate provisioning, as well as the grueling night marches preliminary to the Battle of Caporetto, took a toll on the German and Austro-Hungarian forces. Despite these logistical problems, the initial assault was extremely successful. However, as the area controlled by the combined Central Powers forces expanded, an already limited logistical capacity was overstrained. By the time the attack reached the Piave, the soldiers of the Central Powers were running low on supplies and were feeling the effects of exhaustion.[15] As the Italians began to counter the pressure put on them, the German forces lost momentum and were once again caught up in another round of attrition warfare.



Brian R. Sullivan called Caporetto "the greatest defeat in Italian military history."[16] John R. Schindler wrote "By any standard, Twelfth Isonzo [Caporetto] and its aftermath represented an unprecedented catastrophe for Italian arms."[17] The disaster "came as a shock" and "triggered a search for scapegoats," culminating in a 1919 Italian military commission that investigated the causes of the debacle.[18][2][19] At Rapallo, a Supreme War Council was created to improve Allied military co-operation and develop a common strategy.[20] Luigi Cadorna was forced to resign after the defeat, a final straw according to the Prime Minister, Vittorio Emanuele Orlando. Cadorna was known to have maintained poor relations with the other generals on his staff and by the start of the battle, had sacked 217 generals, 255 colonels and 355 battalion commanders.[21][22] In addition, he was detested by his troops as being too harsh.[23] Cadorna had been directing the battle 20 miles (32 km) behind the front and retreated another 100 mi (160 km) to Padua when replaced by Armando Diaz and Pietro Badoglio. Italian propaganda offices were established, promising land and social justice to soldiers. Italy also accepted a more cautious military strategy from this point on. Diaz concentrated his efforts on rebuilding his shattered forces while taking advantage of the national rejuvenation that had been spurred by invasion and defeat.


Italian POWs after the battle.
Italian POWs after the battle.

Italian losses were enormous: 10,000 were killed, 30,000 wounded and 265,000 were taken prisoner[3] – morale was so low among the Italian troops, mainly due to Cadorna's harsh disciplinary regime, that most of these surrendered willingly.[20] 3,152 artillery pieces, 3,000 machine guns and 1,712 mortars were lost,[3] along with a vast amount of stores and equipment.[20][a] In contrast, the Austro-Hungarians and Germans sustained 70,000 casualties.[3][b]

Subsequent operations

The last push of Austro-Hungarian and German forces was met and defeated by Italian forces at the First Battle of Monte Grappa: they had advanced more than 100 km (62 mi) in the direction of Venice, but they were not able to cross the Piave River. Although up to this point the Italians had been left to fight on their own, after Caporetto they were reinforced by six French infantry divisions and five British infantry divisions as well as sizeable air contingents. However, these troops played no role in stemming the advancing Germans and Austro-Hungarians, because they were deployed on the Mincio River, some 97 kilometres (60 mi) behind the Piave, as the British and French strategists did not believe the Piave line could be held. The Piave served as a natural barrier where the Italians could establish a new defensive line, which was held during the subsequent Battle of the Piave River and later served as springboard for the Battle of Vittorio Veneto, where the Austro-Hungarian army was finally defeated after four days of resistance.


The Museum of the Isonzo Front in Kobarid, Slovenia
The Museum of the Isonzo Front in Kobarid, Slovenia

Opera Nazionale Combattenti, an Italian charitable organisation, was set up in December 1917 in the immediate aftermath of the battle, to provide assistance to veterans of the First World War; it was closed in 1977.[24]

After the battle, the term "Caporetto" gained a particular resonance in Italy. It is used to denote a terrible defeat – the failed General Strike of 1922 by the socialists was referred to by Mussolini as the "Caporetto of Italian Socialism".[25] Many years after the war, Caporetto was still being used to destroy the credibility of the liberal state.[21]

The Battle of Caporetto has been the subject of a number of books. British writer and military historian Cyril Falls' one volume The Battle of Caporetto is a straightforward and well-balanced operational and tactical account of the battle as the centerpiece of the larger campaign in northeastern Italy. Infanterie greift an (Infantry Attacks), an interwar memoir and military handbook written by the future German Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, features the actions of then Lieutenant Rommel and units he led during the battle, providing superb insight into "stormtroop" tactics. The Swedish author F.J. Nordstedt (pseud. Christian Braw) wrote about the battle in his novel Caporetto. The bloody aftermath of Caporetto was vividly described by Ernest Hemingway in his novel A Farewell to Arms. Curzio Malaparte wrote an excoriation of the battle in his first book, Viva Caporetto, published in 1921. It was censored by the state and suppressed; it was finally published in 1980.

Today, a museum in the town of Kobarid is dedicated to the Isonzo Battles in general, and the Caporetto Battle in particular.


  1. ^ An additional 350,000 troops were temporarily separated from units before rejoining them, mostly at the Piave line.[13]
  2. ^ By 10 November Italian losses were 10,000 dead, 30,000 wounded, and 265,000 prisoners (about 350,000 stragglers from the Second Army did manage to reach the Piave line). The army had also lost 3,152 artillery pieces of a pre-offensive total of 6,918. An additional 1,712 heavy trench mortars and 3,000 machine guns had been captured or abandoned in the retreat, along with vast amounts of other military equipment, especially as the rapid withdrawal had prevented the removal of heavy weapons and equipment across the Isonzo River. In contrast, the attackers had sustained about 70,000 casualties.Tucker, Spencer C.; Roberts, Priscilla Mary (25 October 2005). World War I: A Student Encyclopedia. United States: ABC-CLIO. p. 431. ISBN 1-85109-879-8. Retrieved 5 August 2012.


  1. ^ The Signifigance [sic] of Caporetto
  2. ^ a b Tucker, Spencer C. (11 November 2010). Battles That Changed History: An Encyclopedia of World Conflict. United States: ABC-CLIO. p. 430. ISBN 978-1-59884-429-0. Retrieved 16 September 2012.
  3. ^ a b c d Tucker, Spencer C.; Roberts, Priscilla Mary (25 October 2005). World War I: A Student Encyclopedia. United States: ABC-CLIO. p. 431. ISBN 1-85109-879-8. Retrieved 5 August 2012.
  4. ^
  5. ^ Seth, Ronald (1965). Caporetto: The Scapegoat Battle. Macdonald. p. 147
  6. ^ Falls, Cyril (1966). Caporetto 1917. Weidenfeld & Nicolson. p. 25.
  7. ^ Hahn, Otto (1970). My life. Herder and Herder. p. 127.
  8. ^ Geoffrey Regan, More Military Blunders, page 161
  9. ^ a b Stearns, Peter; Langer, William (2001). The Encyclopedia of World History (6th ed.). Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. p. 669. ISBN 0-395-65237-5.
  10. ^ Haber, Leonard (1986). The Poisonous Cloud: Chemical Warfare in the First World War. Clarendon Press. p. 186. ISBN 0198581424.
  11. ^ Dupuy & Dupuy (1970), p. 971
  12. ^ Die Kriegführung im Sommer und Herbst 1917. Die Ereignisse außerhalb der Westfront bis November 1918. Der Weltkrieg: Militärischen Operationen zu Lande. XIII (Die digitale landesbibliotek Oberösterreich ed.). Berlin: Mittler. 2012 [1942]. OCLC 257129831. Retrieved 28 October 2015.
  13. ^ a b Taken from the rest of the army: 300,000 stragglers and 50,000 deserters, overwhelmed by the routed first line but then were back. See also previous footnote and Rommel, Erwin (1995). Infantry Attacks. Greenhill Books. pp. 168–227. ISBN 1-85367-199-1.
  14. ^ Gudmundsson, Bruce (1989). Stormtroop Tactics. Innovation in the German Army, 1914–1918. Praeger. ISBN 0-275-93328-8.
  15. ^ a b Macksey, Kenneth (1997). Rommel: Battles and Campaigns. Da Capo Press. pp. 16–21, 224. ISBN 0-306-80786-6.
  16. ^ Sullivan, Brian R. (1994) "Chapter 4. Caporetto: Causes, recovery, and consequences" in: Andreopoulos, George J.; Selesky, Harold E., ed.s, The Aftermath of Defeat: Societies, Armed Forces, and the Challenge of Recovery (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1994), p. 60.
  17. ^ Schindler (2001), p. 263
  18. ^ Tucker (2010), p. 433
  19. ^ Cassar (1998), p. 232
  20. ^ a b c Simkins, Peter; Jukes, Geoffrey; Hickey, Michael (2003). The First World War. Osprey Publishing. pp. 312–313. ISBN 1-84176-738-7.
  21. ^ a b Townley, Edward (2002). Collier, Martin, ed. Mussolini and Italy. Heinemann. p. 16. ISBN 0-435-32725-9.
  22. ^ Geoffrey Regan. More Military Blunders, p. 160.
  23. ^ Morselli, Mario (2001). Caporetto, 1917: Victory Or Defeat?. Routledge. p. 133. ISBN 0-7146-5073-0.
  24. ^ [s.n.] (2010). Opera nazionale combattenti (in Italian). Dizionario di Storia. Roma: Istituto dell’Enciclopedia Italiana. Accessed December 2017.
  25. ^ Nolte, Ernst (1969). Three Faces of Fascism: Action Française, Italian fascism, National Socialism. New York: Mentor. p. 274.


External Links

Further reading

  • Cavallaro, G. V. (2009). Futility Ending in Disaster: Diplomatic, Military, Aviation and Social Events in the First World War on the Austro-Italian Front 1917. Bloomington, IN: Xlibris. ISBN 1-41345-742-8.[self-published source]
  • Connelly, O. (2002). On War and Leadership: The Words of Combat Commanders from Frederick the Great to Norman Schwarzkopf. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. ISBN 0-691-03186-X.
  • Dupuy, R. E.; Dupuy, T. N. (1970). The Encyclopaedia of Military History: From 3,500 BC to the Present. sbn 356-02998-0 (rev. ed.). London: Jane's.
  • Morselli, M. (2001). Caporetto 1917: Victory or Defeat?. Military History and Policy. London: Frank Cass. ISBN 0-7146-5073-0.
  • Reuth, R. G. (2005). Rommel: The End of a Legend. London: Haus Books. ISBN 1-904950-20-5.
  • Seth, Ronald (1965). Caporetto: The Scapegoat Battle. London: Macdonald. OCLC 1407385.

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