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From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Despite its popular usage, anocracy lacks a precise definition.[1] Anocratic regimes are loosely defined as part democracy and part dictatorship,[2][3] or as a "regime that mixes democratic with autocratic features".[3] Another definition classifies anocracy as "a regime that permits some means of participation through opposition group behavior but that has incomplete development of mechanisms to redress grievances".[1][4] Scholars have also distinguished anocracies from autocracies and democracies in their capability to maintain authority, political dynamics, and policy agendas.[5] Similarly, these regime types have democratic institutions that allow for nominal amounts of competition.[2]

These regime types are particularly susceptible to outbreaks of armed conflict and unexpected or adverse changes in leadership.[6]

The operational definition of anocracy is extensively used by scholars Monty G. Marshall and Benjamin R. Cole at the Center for Systemic Peace and gains most of its dissemination through the polity data series. The data set aims to measure democracy in different states, and retains anocracy as one of its classification methods for regime type.[7] Consequently, anocracy frequently appears in democratization literature that utilizes the polity-data set.[8] In a closed anocracy, competitors are drawn from the élite. In an open anocracy, others compete too.[6]

The number of anocratic regimes has steadily increased over time, with the most notable jump occurring after the end of the Cold War.[6] During the period from 1989 to 2013, the number of anocracies increased from 30 to 53.[9]

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  • Why Civil Resistance Works with Erica Chenoweth

Transcription

>> GOOD EVENING, EVERYBODY. WELCOME, AGAIN. TO THE COLLEGE OF St. SCHOLASTICA AND FOR ANOTHER LECTURE IN THE PEACE AND JUSTICE LECTURE SERIES. WE'RE DELIGHTED YOU'RE HERE. I CAN ALMOST GUARANTEE YOU A STIMULATED EVENING. MY NAME IS TOM MORGAN AND I'M THE DIRECTOR FOR THE CENTER OF STUDY FOR PEACE AND JUSTICE AND THIS IS THE 4th IN A SERIES OF FIVE PROGRAMS, EXPLORING THE QUESTION OF VIOLENCE IN THE HUMAN STORY, IN THE HUMAN CONDITION. AND THIS LECTURE TONIGHT IS SPONSORED BY THE ALWORTH CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF PEACE AND JUSTICE HERE AT THE COLLEGE OF St. SCHOLASTICA THROUGH THE GENEROUS SUPPORT OF THE ALWORTH FAMILY AND ALSO FUNDED IN PART BY THE WARNER LECTURE SERIES OF THE MANITOU FUND, THE DEWITT AND CAROLYN VAN EVERA FOUNDATION, A FORMER TRUSTEE OF THE COLLEGE. ADDITIONAL SUPPORT HAS BEEN RECEIVED FROM THE GLOBAL AWARENESS FUND OF THE DULUTH SUPERIOR AREA COMMUNITY FOUNDATION, READER WEEKLY OF DULUTH, AND FROM NUMEROUS OTHER PRIVATE DONORS. THANK YOU ALL SO MUCH FOR YOUR CONTINUED SUPPORT. WOULDN'T HAPPEN WITHOUT YOU, I CAN GUARANTEE THAT. ON THE SCREEN TO YOUR LEFT WE ARE DISPLAYING THE TEXT OF TONIGHT'S LECTURE THROUGH TECHNOLOGY CALLED REALTIME CAPTIONING. ALTHOUGH WE ANTICIPATE A HIGH QUALITY FORMAT, THIS IS THE SECOND TIME WE'VE DONE THIS. THERE WILL INEVITABLY BE ERRORS THAT ARE INHERENT TO THE TECHNOLOGY. NEVERTHELESS, RESEARCH INDICATES THAT MANY VIEWERS BENEFIT FROM CAPTIONING, INCLUDING THOSE WITH HEARING LOSS. A SPECIAL THANKS TO THE EDWARD H. EDDY FOUNDATION WHOSE GENEROUS SUPPORT MAKES THIS INCLUSIVE SERVICE POSSIBLE. IF YOU CAN'T SEE THAT SCREEN OVER THERE, THERE'S SOME MORE SEATS, AND YOU'RE WELCOME TO TAKE THOSE SO YOU GET CLOSER TO THAT SCREEN IF YOU WANT TO LOOK AT IT. AFTER THE LECTURE NEXT WEEK, AS USUAL, WE'LL HAVE A TALK BACK WHERE WE GET TOGETHER HERE ON CAMPUS AND CHAT ABOUT WHAT WE'VE HEARD AND WHAT WE THINK ABOUT IT, AND MAYBE WHAT WE SHOULD DO NEXT. THIS TIME, THE TALK BACK WILL BE FACILITATED BY TED LEWIS, ALL HIS CREDENTIALS ARE ON THE SHEET OF PAPER THAT YOU SHOULD HAVE ALL RECEIVED. HE'S DIRECTOR OF COMMUNICATIONS AT THE CENTER FOR RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND PEACE MAKING AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA IN MINNEAPOLIS. SO LOOK FOR THAT. ON WEDNESDAY -- WELL, IT'S ALL RIGHT HERE. HERE IN TOWER HOWL ROOM 2607 AT 7 O'CLOCK. COMING ATTRACTIONS HERE AT THE COLLEGE INCLUDE A LECTURE, SPONSORED BY THE COLLEGE OF St. SCHOLASTICA THEOLOGIST AND WOMEN AND GENDER STUDIES DEPARTMENT. ENTITLED "RAPE, CULTURE, SPIRITUAL VIOLENCE AND VISIONS OF HEALING." THAT'S ON THE 31st OF MARCH. WHICH IS ALSO A THURSDAY. AND THEN THIS SERIES ON VIOLENCE WILL CONCLUDE IN APRIL, APRIL 7th, WITH ROSALIE WHO WILL TALK ABOUT CROSSING LINES AND DOING TIME. PEOPLE ARE DOING SERIOUS CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE. AFTER THE LECTURE, AS USUAL, YOU ARE WELCOME TO ASK QUESTIONS. AND PLEASE COME TO THESE MICROPHONES AND WE'LL -- THE SPEAKER WILL JUST RECOGNIZE YOU IN TURN. AND -- BUT THOSE OF YOU FROM THE COMMUNITY, DELIGHTED YOU'RE HERE. BUT PLEASE DEFER TO THE STUDENTS. LET THEM ASK QUESTIONS FIRST. THAT'S WHAT WE BUILT THIS HALL FOR WAS FOR THE STUDENTS, SO WE LIKE TO LET THEM GO FIRST. AND IF THERE'S TIME, AND I THINK THERE WILL BE, YOU COMMUNITY PEOPLE ARE VERY WELCOME TO ASK QUESTIONS. ONE OTHER THING, YOU SHOULD HAVE GOTTEN AN EVALUATION AS YOU CAME IN. FROM TIME TO TIME, WE LIKE TO DO THAT. SEE HOW WE'RE DOING, SO YOU MIGHT FILL THAT OUT AND TURN IT IN AT THE -- AT THE TABLE OUT THERE. AND IF YOU'RE NOT ON OUR MAILING LIST AND YOU WANT TO BE, YOU CAN DO THAT BY FILLING OUT THE FORMS ON A TABLE OUT ON THE -- IN THE FOYER. SO, ON TO THE MAIN EVENT. OUR SPEAKER THIS EVENING IS AN INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED AUTHORITY ON POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND ITS ALTERNATIVES. SHE IS PROFESSOR AND ASSOCIATE DEAN FOR RESEARCH AT THE JOSEF KORBEL SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES AT THE UNIVERSITY OF DENVER AND HAS BEEN AN ASSOCIATE SENIOR RESEARCHER AT THE PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF OSLO, NORWAY. SHE CURRENTLY IS CO-CHAIR OF THE ACADEMIC COUNCIL AT THE INTERNATIONAL CENTER ON NONVIOLENT CONFLICT, A FELLOW AT THE ONE EARTH FUTURE FOUNDATION, A COUNCILOR AT THE PEACE SCIENCE SOCIETY INTERNATIONAL AND A TERM MEMBER AT THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS. FOREIGN POLICY MAGAZINE RANKED HER AMONG THE TOP 100 GLOBAL THINKERS OF 2013. SHE ALSO WON THE 2014 KARL DEUTSCH AWARD GIVEN BY THE INTERNATIONAL STUDIES ASSOCIATION TO THE SCHOLAR UNDER 40 WHO HAS MADE THE MOST SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON THE FIELD OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OR PEACE RESEARCH. ERICA CHENOWETH IS THE CO-AUTHOR WITH MARIA J. STEPHAN, OF "WHY CIVIL RESISTANCE WORKS," WHICH HAS EARNED SEVERAL PRESTIGIOUS AWARDS. THAT BOOK IS ON SALE AFTER THE LECTURE. BEFORE COMING TO THE UNIVERSITY OF DENVER, PROFESSOR CHENOWETH TAUGHT AT WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY, WHERE SHE WON THE 2010 CAROL A. BAKER MEMORIAL PRIZE FOR EXCELLENCE IN JUNIOR FACULTY RESEARCH AND TEACHING. SHE�S ALSO HELD VISITING APPOINTMENTS AT HARVARD, STANFORD, UC-BERKELEY AND THE UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND. PROF. CHENOWETH�S OTHER BOOKS INCLUDE EDITING "POLITICAL VIOLENCE" AND CO-EDITING "RETHINKING VIOLENCE" WITH ADRIA LAWRENCE. HER NEXT BOOK, "DEMOCRACY ENCOURAGES TERRORISM" EXPLORES UNDERLYING REASONS WHY TERRORISM IS SO COMMON IN DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES. PROFESSOR CHENOWETH HAS PRESENTED HER RESEARCH ALL OVER THE WORLD AT VARIOUS ACADEMIC CONFERENCES, GOVERNMENT WORKSHOPS AND INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS, INCLUDING AN APPEARANCE AT THE 2013 WORLD SUMMIT OF NOBEL PEACE PRIZE LAUREATES IN WARSAW. AND NOW SHE�S PRESENTING AT ST. SCHOLASTICA! THIS WILL BE SOMETHING TO PUT IN YOUR RESUM�. [ APPLAUSE ] HER RESEARCH HAS BEEN FEATURED IN THE NEW YORK TIMES, THE WASHINGTON POST, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE ECONOMIST, THE BOSTON GLOBE, FOREIGN POLICY, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, NRP�S MORNING EDITION AND ELSEWHERE. SHE CO-HOSTS THE AWARD-WINNING BLOG, "POLITICAL VIOLENCE @ A GLANCE" AND HOSTS THE BLOG "RATIONAL INSURGENT." IN 2008, PROFESSOR CHENOWETH ESTABLISHED THE PROGRAM ON TERRORISM AND INSURGENCY RESEARCH, A THINK TANK THAT PRODUCES POLICY-RELEVANT RESEARCH ON THE CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF INSURGENCY, TERRORISM AND STRATEGIC NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE. THE PROGRAM, NOW AT THE KORBEL SCHOOL IN DENVER, SUPPORTS MULTIPLE PROJECTS AND PROVIDES STUDENTS WITH OPPORTUNITIES TO ENGAGE IN RESEARCH RELATED TO THE PROGRAM�S MISSION. IN HER SPARE TIME, SHE ENJOYS TREKKING AND FLY FISHING IN THE ROCKY MOUNTAINS, TRAVELING TO ADVENTUROUS DESTINATIONS AND LISTENING TO ALL KINDS OF MUSIC FROM HIP HOP TO OPERA TO EVERYTHING IN-BETWEEN. LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, PLEASE WELCOME PROFESSOR ERICA CHENOWETH. [ APPLAUSE ] >> GOOD EVENING. THANK YOU SO MUCH, TOM, FOR THAT AMAZING INTRODUCTION, WHICH, YOU KNOW, LOWER YOUR EXPECTATIONS MAYBE A LITTLE BIT. THAT WAS -- YOU READ OFF A LOT OF THINGS FROM MY CV AND IT MADE ME SOUND GOOD. WE'LL SEE HOW IT GOES. AND I ALSO WANT TO THANK THE COLLEGE FOR SUCH A HOSPITALABLE WELCOME. IT WAS WONDERFUL. SHARING A MEAL WITH MANY OF YOU, AND TALKING POLITICS AND SO I HOPE THAT WE CAN GO FORWARD TONIGHT IN SPIRIT OF TRYING TO BETTER UNDERSTAND WHY CIVIL RESISTANCE WORKS. WHEN IT WORKS, WHEN IT DOESN'T. AND I ABSOLUTELY WELCOME COMMENTS, CRITIQUES, QUESTIONS, INSULTS, ANYTHING ALONG THOSE LINES IS FINE AFTER THE FORMAL REMARKS ARE FINISHED AND I'VE HANDLED THEM ALL BEFORE, SO WE'LL GO FROM THERE. SO BEFORE I GET STARTED, I WANTED TO LET YOU KNOW WHERE I WAS WHEN I FIRST CAME TO THIS RESEARCH. I WAS FINISHING MY Ph.D. AT THE UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO AND I WAS WHAT YOU MIGHT CALL A TRADITIONAL GUNS AND BOMBS TRADITIONAL SCIENTIST. I STUDIED THINGS THAT BLOW UP. THE PEOPLE THAT MAKE THEM BLOW UP AND TRY TO UNDERSTAND WHY THAT HAPPENS. SO I SPENT A LOT OF IN GRADUATE SCHOOL TRYING TO COLLECT DATA ON TERROR VIOLENCE, TERROR GROUPS, AND WHERE THEY APPEAR IN THE WORLD MOST OFTEN, AND I'D COME ACROSS THIS INTERESTING CORRELATION BETWEEN DEMOCRACY AND THE EMERGENCE OF NEW TERROR ORGANIZATIONS, SO THAT'S WHAT MY THESIS WAS ABOUT. AND I GOT THIS INTERESTING e-MAIL FROM A COLLEAGUE OF MINE, WHO ALSO STUDIED TERRORISM. AND HE SAID, "THIS IS THE OTHER SIDE OF THE COIN, HA HA HA" AND I LOOKED AT THE BODY OF THE e-MAIL AND IT WAS A FORWARDED INVITATION TO A WORKSHOP CALLED "PEOPLE POWER AND PEDAGOGY" THAT WAS TAKING PLACE DOWN THE ROAD. AND THE ORGANIZERS OF THE WORKSHOP WAS THE EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION CALLED THE INTERNATIONAL CENTER ON NON-VIOLENT CONFLICT. THEY ARE TO SPREAD KNOWLEDGE ABOUT THE PRACTICE OF NON-VIOLENT RESISTANCE. AND I WAS CURIOUS ABOUT THIS WORKSHOP BECAUSE IT WAS SO CLOSE AND IT OFFERED FREE BOOKS AND FOOD. AND BEING A GOOD GRADUATE STUDENT I COULDN'T TURNDOWN AN OPPORTUNITY TO GET THOSE THINGS AND APPLIED AND GOT IN. AND THEY SENT ME THE BIG BOX OF BOOKS IN ADVANCE AND ASKED ME TO READ THEM. AND THEY WERE BOOKS BY PEOPLE LIKE JEAN, JACK, STEVEN, KURT AND A FEW OTHER PEOPLE. THAT WERE MAKING A SET OF CLAIMS THAT I FOUND PRETTY DISTURBING TO MY KNOWLEDGE BASE. AND WHAT THEY WERE BASICALLY ALL SAYING, WAS THAT NON-VIOLENT RESISTANCE, WHERE UNARMED CIVILIANS -- USING A VARIETY OF TECHNIQUES USING PROTEST STRIKES, DEMONSTRATIONS, STAYAWAYS AND HUNDREDS OF OTHER TECHNIQUES OF NON-VIOLENT ACTION, THAT THEY COULD ACTUALLY BE AS EFFECTIVE OR MORE EFFECTIVE THAN VIOLENT INSURGENTS IN ACHIEVING THEIR POLITICAL OUTCOMES. AND, YOU KNOW, I -- WHAT STRUCK ME ABOUT THIS, THIS ARGUMENT, WAS THAT FIRST OF ALL, THEY WERE CALLING ON A NUMBER OF DIFFERENT EXAMPLES LIKE SERBIA OR THE PHILIPPINES WHERE IT WAS CLEAR THAT PEOPLE POWER HAD MADE A DIFFERENCE. BUT FOR EVERY EXAMPLE WHERE IT HAD WORKED, I COULD THINK OF A HALF DOZEN EXAMPLES OFF THE TOP OF MY HEAD, WHERE ORGANIZED PROTESTS HAD BEEN BASICALLY SLAUGHTERED BY OPPONENTS THAT WERE WILLING TO USE BRUTAL VIOLENCE AGAINST THEM. AND SO WHEN I WENT TO THE WORKSHOP, I KEPT BRINGING UP MY RESERVATIONS AND I'LL SHARE THEM WITH YOU AND HERE I CALL THEM COMMON CLAIMS BECAUSE I HEAR THEM ALL THE TIME. FROM WELL-MEANING PEOPLE, LIKE MYSELF AT THE TIME. SO THE FIRST THING I THOUGHT WAS THAT NON-VIOLENT RESISTANCE OF THIS KIND CAN'T SUCCEED IF THE OPPONENT THE TYRANT THEY OPPOSING, IS VERY POWERFUL, THEY HAVE MASSIVE MILITARY MEANS TO DEPLOY AGAINST THE CIVILIANS. THAT THEY WERE REPRESSIVE. ABSOLUTELY WILLING TO USE IT TO KILL THEIR OWN PEOPLE OR KILL A GROUP OF PEOPLE IN A FOREIGN OCCUPIED TERRITORY, IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE STATUS QUO. OR IF THEIR AUTHORITARIAN, MEANING THEY COMPLETELY SHUTDOWN ANY SPACE FOR ACTIVE POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONING OPPOSITIONS. THE SECOND MAJOR RESERVATION I HAD, WAS MORE RELATED TO MY FAMILIARITY WITH THE TOPIC OR LACK THEREOF, GOING INTO THIS WORKSHOP. WHICH IS THAT I THOUGHT THAT NON-VIOLENT RESISTANCE WAS AASSOCIATED WITH REFORM GOALS. LIKE WAGE DISPUTES. OR TRYING TO ACHIEVE FAIRER ECONOMIC JUSTICE. OR RACIAL JUSTICE REFORMS. AND I ASSOCIATED IT WITH BROAD BASE SOCIAL MOVEMENTS FOR PROGRESSIVE CHANGES IN SOCIETY. BUT I THOUGHT THAT IF IT CAME DOWN TO NEEDING TO REMOVE A LEADERSHIP FROM NATIONAL POWER, OR IF IT CAME TO TRYING TO SUCCEED TERRITORY OR KICK OUT A FOREIGN MILITARY OCCUPATION, THAT'S WHEN VIOLENT INSURGENCY BECOMES THE ONLY TOOL WE ASSOCIATE WITH THOSE GOALS. AND THEN THE THIRD RESERVATION I HAD, REALLY CAME FROM A IMPORTANT ARTICLE THAT WAS PUBLISHED IN SUMMER OF 2006 IN THE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY BY MY COLLEAGUE MAX ABRAMS. WHY TERRORISM DOES NOT WORK. AND IN IT WHAT MAX DOES IS HE COLLECTS DATA ON ALL THE DIFFERENT SIGNIFICANT FOREIGN TERROR ORGANIZATIONS. IN THE STATE DEPARTMENTS LIST. AND HE LOOKS AT HOW MANY OF THEM ACTUALLY ACHIEVED WHAT THEY SAID THEY WANTED. AND FOUND THAT ONLY 7% HAD DONE SO. AND ON THE LAST PAGE OF HIS ARTICLE, HE SAYS, 7% IS A VERY UNIMPRESSIVE SUCCESS RATE. SO WHY DO WE SEE SO MUCH TERRORISM IF IT'S SUCH A -- A FAILURE. HE SPECULATES, ONLY 7% EFFECTIVENESS, IT'S PROBABLY MORE EFFECTIVE THAN NON-VIOLENT PROTESTS. SO THIS WAS THE INTELLECTUAL ENVIRONMENT THAT WAS EMERGING FROM WHEN I WENT TO THIS WORKSHOP AS I'VE MENTIONED. SO I'M BRINGING UP ALL THESE ARGUMENTS. PEOPLE ARE GETTING REALLY IRRITATED. AND AT THE END OF THE WEEK, I SAT DOWN WITH THIS WOMAN MARIA STEFFAN, WHAT IS AN OUTREACH COORDINATOR, AND I SAID, YOU KNOW, LIKE I CAN HELP YOU GUYS IF YOU'RE INTERESTED. DEVELOP A RESEARCH DESIGN THAT WOULD ACTUALLY GET AT THIS QUESTION. BECAUSE I DON'T THINK YOU'RE TOTALLY SELLING THE SKEPTICS ON THIS QUESTION ABOUT WHETHER OR NOT NON-VIOLENT RESISTANCE WORKS. AND IF YOU WANTED TO FIND OUT WHAT YOU COULD DO IS, YOU COULD DEVELOP A LONGITUDINAL STUDY. GO BACK, YOU KNOW, IN HISTORY TO SAY, 1900. PICK AN ARBITRARY DATE. AND LOOK WORLDWIDE AT EVERY COUNTRY IN THE WORLD AND FIGURE OUT WHERE THEY WERE COMPARABLE KINDS OF PEOPLE POWER MOVEMENTS, VERSUS VIOLENT INSURGENCIES. AND THEN LOOK AT WHETHER THEY ACHIEVED THEIR GOALS AND BE REALLY STRICT ABOUT IT. SO LOOK AT WHETHER THEY ACHIEVED THEIR GOALS WITHIN A YEAR OF THE PEAK OF THE CAMPAIGN. AND LOOK AT WHETHER THEY GOT EVERYTHING THEY SAID THEY WANTED, AND THAT THEY HAD A DISCERNIBLE IMPACT ON THAT OUTCOME. AND IF YOU DO THAT, THEN YOU CAN ACTUALLY COUNT SIDE-BY-SIDE, THE INCIDENCES OF VIOLENT AND NON-VIOLENT RESISTANCE AND YOU CAN ASSESS THEIR RELATIVE SUCCESS RATES. AND SHE SAID, GREAT. LET'S DO IT. AND SO SHE AND I SAT DOWN AND -- OVER THE COURSE OF ANOTHER TWO YEARS, BASICALLY ENGAGED IN AN INTELLECTUAL BET ABOUT WHETHER NON-VIOLENT RESISTANCE WORKS. AND I THOUGHT I WAS GOING TO BE ON THE WINNING SIDE VIOLENCE BLOWS NON-VIOLENT OUT OF THE WATER. WE COLLECTED DATA FROM 1900 TO 2006, WHICH IS WHEN WE STARTED THE WORK I SINCE UPDATED THE DATA THROUGHOUT THE LAST QUARTER OF 2015 AND I'M GOING TO SHOW YOU THE LATEST RESULTS HOT OFF THE PRESS. WE ALSO LOOKED AT A VERY SPECIFIC KIND OF CAMPAIGN. SO WE LOOKED ONLY AT RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS THAT WERE TRYING TO ACHIEVE THOSE MAXIMALIST GOALS THAT I'M SKEPTICAL ABOUT. ONLY ONES TRYING TO MOVE DICTATOR FROM POWER OR TRYING TO SUCCEED AND BECOME AN INDEPENDENT COUNTRY, OR KICK OUT A FOREIGN MILITARY OR COLONIAL OCCUPATION. THOSE, I ASSOCIATED AS MAXIMAL GOALS BECAUSE THEY FUNDAMENTALLY RESHAPE THE SOVEREIGN COUNTRY THAT PEOPLE WERE LIVING IN. THEY ALL HAD TO HAVE AT LEAST A THOUSAND OBSERVED PARTICIPANTS. AND THAT INCLUDES THE VIOLENT AND NON-VIOLENT CAMPAIGNS. AND AS I MENTIONED, THEY ALL HAD TO ACHIEVE SUCCESS THAT IS THE REMOVAL OF THE LEADER, OR INDEPENDENCE OF THE -- OF THE PEAK. THEY HAD TO FOUND EVIDENCE, THAT THE CAMPAIGN MADE A DIFFERENCE. IF A DICTATOR DIES OF A HEART ATTACK WHILE IN OFFICE, EVEN THOUGH YOU MIGHT BE ABLE TO MAKE AN INDIRECT CASE. THAT THE MOVEMENT HAD SOMETHING TO DO WITH THE STRESS AND THAT COULD HAVE LED TO THE HEART ATTACK, WE COULD NOT COUNT THAT AS A -- COUNT THAT AS A SUCCESS. SO HOLDING COMPETITIVE ELECTIONS OR FORCING AN OCCUPIER TO ALLOW YOU TO HAVE SIGNIFICANT AUTONOMY OVER YOUR TERRITORY, DO NOT COUNT AS SUCCESS, IN OUR METRICS. SO AFTER LOOKING AT ALL THAT, WE HAD, AT THE TIME, 323 CASES OF VIOLENT AND NON-VIOLENT RESISTANCE FROM 1900 TO 2006. AND NOW DAYS WE HAVE 429 CASES, AND WHAT YOU CAN SEE IS THAT THE NON-VIOLENT RESISTANCE CAMPAIGNS HAVE OUTPERFORMED THE VIOLENT ONES BY ABOUT 2 TO 1 MARGIN, IN TERMS OF TOTAL SUCCESS. THEY ARE ALSO MORE LIKELY TO ACHIEVE THOSE. AND ONE OF THE REALLY STRIKING THINGS THAT WE'VE UNCOVERED AND I FURTHER DEVELOPED IN THIS RESEARCH SINCE THEN, IS THE DRAMATIC RISE IN THE INCIDENCE OF NON-VIOLENT RESISTANCE ESPECIALLY OVER THE LAST 40 YEARS. SO HERE YOU CAN SEE THE DISTRIBUTION OF NON-VIOLENT RESISTANCE VERSUS VIOLENT RESISTANCE. THESE ARE NEW CAMPAIGNS THAT ARE SET ON, GIVEN A GIVEN DECADE. AND LOOK AT THE DECLINE AND NEW INCIDENCES OF VIOLENCE. THIS IS NOT SOMETHING YOU WOULD INFER FROM WATCHING THE NIGHTLY NEWS. WHAT WE INFER FROM WATCHING THE NIGHTLY NEWS IS WE LIVE IN A DESPERATELY VIOLENT TIME. WHAT WE CAN SEE IN THE DATA IS WE LIVE IN THE TIME OF THE LEGACY OF GANDHI AND KHAN, WHERE WE ARE -- MOST CONTENTIOUS -- AND SO THIS REALLY IS A VERY INTERESTING PHENOMENON THAT, AT LEAST THROUGH 2006 COULD BE EASILY EXPLAINED BY THE INCREASING SUCCESS RATES OF NON-VIOLENT RESISTANCE OVER TIME. SO WHEN MARIA AND I ACTUALLY SAT DOWN AND WROTE OUR BOOK, IT WAS THE CASE THAT NON-VIOLENT RESISTANCE WAS ACTUALLY BECOMING EVEN MORE EFFECTIVE, DECADE BY DECADE. AND UP TO 70% EFFECTIVENESS IN THAT DECADE, UP TO 2006. SO WHY IS THIS? WHY IS THIS HAPPENING? FOR A PERSON LIKE ME, THIS IS A VERY PUZZLING RESULT. IT DID NOT MAKE SENSE IN LIGHT OF ANY OF THE PRIOR RESEARCH I HAD DONE MYSELF. AND WHAT WAS EVEN MORE STUNNING ABOUT THIS, IS THAT I DIDN'T KNOW ANY MAINSTREAM QUOTE/UNQUOTE SECURITY STUDIES OR POLITICAL SCIENCE SCHOLARS WHO KNEW ANYTHING ABOUT THIS. SO IT WAS AN ENTIRELY NEW KIND OF EMPIRICAL DISCOVERY THAT MANY PEOPLE HAD WRITTEN ABOUT AND WRITTEN VERY COMPELLING CASE STUDIES ABOUT, BUT IT HADN'T BEEN SYSTEMICALLY DEMONSTRATED BEFORE. AND SO WHEN WE DROVE DOWN INTO THE DATA, AND WE TRIED TO LOOK AT THE SPECIFIC ATTRIBUTES OF THESE CAMPAIGNS AND THEIR ENVIRONMENTS, WE FOUND A REALLY IMPORTANT RESULT, AND THAT IS THAT NON-VIOLENT RESISTANCE CAMPAIGNS POWER AND HEARS FROM ABILITY TO ATTRACT LARGE AND DIVERSE AND INCLUSIVE PARTICIPATION FROM THE SOCIETIES IN WHICH THEY EMERGE. SO IT IS NOT A HUGE KIND OF ROCKET SCIENCE TO SUGGEST THAT THE LARGER REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT IS THE MORE LIKELY IT IS TO SUCCEED. A POLITICAL ECONOMIST NAMED MARK LICHBACH (PHONETIC) SAID THERE WAS A 5% RULE. THE 5% RULE WAS THAT ANY GOVERNMENT ANYWHERE, THAT FACED A 5% CHALLENGE, POPULAR CHALLENGE FROM BELOW, MEANING 5% OF ITS POPULATION WAS RISING UP AGAINST IT. ANY GOVERNMENT THAT PHASED THAT -- THAT FACED THAT MEASURE OF CHALLENGE COULD NOT SURVIVE. THAT SEEMED LIKE A SMALL PERCENT OF THE POPULATION, BUT IF YOU LOOK AT THE UNITED STATES TODAY THAT'S LIKE 15 MILLION PEOPLE. SO NOT THAT SMALL. SO WHAT'S REALLY INTERESTING, WHEN WE LOOKED AT OUR DATA AND LOOKED AT THE PARTICIPATION RATES AT PEAK LEVELS, WE FOUND IT'S PRETTY CLOSE TO 5%. BUT MORE LIKE 3.5%. SO ANY MOVEMENT THAT ACTUALLY ATTRACTED THE ACTIVE PARTICIPATION OF 3.5% OF THE POPULATION WON. AND MANY OF THEM WON WITH LESS THAN THAT. BUT THAT SEEMED TO BE THE MAGIC NUMBER. AND WHAT WAS EVEN MORE STRIKING, IS THAT VERY FEW OF THE CAMPAIGNS THAT WE LOOKED AT, ACHIEVED THAT 3.5% THRESHOLD UNLESS THEY WERE NON-VIOLENT MASS MOVEMENTS. SO NON-VIOLENT CAMPAIGNS WERE THE ONES THAT WERE GETTING THE LARGEST NUMBER OF PEOPLE PARTICIPATING. IN FACT, IF YOU JUST LOOK AT THE NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS AS A FUNCTION OF THE TOTAL POPULATION OF A SOCIETY, NON-VIOLENT CAMPAIGNS ARE SOMETHING LIKE 11 TIMES LARGER THAN THE AVERAGE VIOLENT CAMPAIGN. SO WHY WOULD IT BE THAT NON-VIOLENT CAMPAIGNS GET MORE PEOPLE TO PARTICIPATE? WELL, WE THINK THERE ARE LOWER BARRIERS TO PARTICIPATING AND NON-VIOLENT CAMPAIGNS IN GENERAL. THE FIRST IS A LOWER FISCAL BARRIER, WHICH IS TO SAY ENGAGING IN ANY KIND OF ORGANIZED ARMED ACTIVITY, REQUIRES A CERTAIN LEVEL OF PHYSICAL COMMITMENT, AGILITY AND SACRIFICE. THAT MANY ORDINARY PEOPLE SIMPLY AREN'T WILLING OR ABLE TO PERFORM. SO I'LL GIVE YOU A REALLY MUNDANE EXAMPLE FROM MY OWN HISTORY. WHICH IS THAT WHEN I WAS IN COLLEGE, I THOUGHT THAT A GOOD IDEA WOULD BE FOR ME TO GO INTO ROTC, SO THAT I COULD GET THEM TO PAY FOR MY COLLEGE AND THEN GO INTO THE ARMY AFTER I GRADUATED, AND GET MY CAREER STARTED THAT WAY. AND THE REASON I ENDED UP LEAVING ROTC WASN'T BECAUSE I DIDN'T LIKE THE MILITARYISM, IS BECAUSE I HATED THE 430 TIME 12 A.M. WAKE UP TIME TO DO THE WORKOUTS. AND RUNNING 10 MILES UNTIL YOU THROW UP AT 4:30 IN THE MORNING IS NOT MY IDEA OF FUN. SO I ABANDONED THE ORGANIZED ARMED ACTIVITY AND DID SOMETHING ELSE. THIS IS A SILLY MUNDANE EXAMPLE, BUT THE TRUTH IS, ANYBODY THAT'S GOING TO ENGAGE IN SUSTAINED ACTIVITY IN AN ORGANIZED WAY IS GOING TO HAVE TO DO STUFF LIKE THAT THAT THEY DON'T LIKE. WHAT THAT MEANS IS YOU'RE NOT GOING TO GET AS MANY PEOPLE WHO ARE PHYSICALLY WILLING TO COMMIT TO THESE TYPES OF THINGS. NON-VIOLENT RESISTANCE HAS SUCH A WIDE VARIETY OF TACTICS. ONE OF THEM IS A FAVORITE FOR COUCH POTATOES. IT IS THE STAY AT HOME DEMONSTRATION. IT MEANS DO WHAT YOU'RE DOING RIGHT NOW FOR THREE DAYS. STRAIGHT. AND IF EVERYBODY IN HERE DID THIS FOR THREE DAYS STRAIGHT, THE WHOLE CITY DID THIS FOR THREE DAYS STRAIGHT, THAT CITY'S ECONOMY WOULD SHUTDOWN, RIGHT? VERY POWERFUL TECHNIQUE OF NON-VIOLENT ACTION. REQUIRES NO PHYSICAL ABILITY WHATSOEVER. JUST REQUIRES YOU TO STAY AT HOME. AND IN FACT, THE STAY-AT-HOME DEMONSTRATION IS A VERY POPULAR TECHNIQUE FOR MOVEMENTS UNDER STRAIN BECAUSE OF REPRESSION. SO MANY TIMES YOU'LL SEE EXAMPLES OF MOVEMENTS THAT START TO FACE VERY FIERCE VIOLENCE FROM THEIR OPPONENTS WHEN THEY ARE OUTDOORS DOING PROTEST. AND ALL OF A SUDDEN, NOBODIES ON THE STREETS ANYMORE. IT'S BECAUSE THEY ARE DOING THE STAY AT-HOME DEMONSTRATION. WITH MUCH LOWER RISK. THE SECOND LOWER BARRIER TO PARTICIPATION IS A LOWER COMMITMENT BARRIER. AND BY THIS, I DON'T MEAN COMMITMENT TO THE CAUSE. I JUST MEAN THE BARRIERS TO ENTRY, AND THE BARRIERS TO EXIT FROM THE MOVEMENT ARE LOWER FOR NON-VIOLENT CAMPAIGNS. SO FOR ORGANIZED ARMED ACTION, I STUDY A LOT OF THESE REBEL GROUPS AND INSURGENT MOVEMENTS, AND GENERALLY THE RECRUITMENT STRATEGY REQUIRES THAT THE OUTSET A DEMONSTRATION OF LOYALTY TO JOIN THE MOVEMENT. USUALLY WHAT THAT MEANS IS THE PERSON IS ASSIGNED TO KILL SOMEBODY ON THE OTHER SIDE AND THEY DO THAT TO ENSURE THAT THE RECRUIT THAT JUST SHOWED UP AS A VOLUNTEER, IS NOT AN INFORMANT. SO ONCE THE RECRUIT CARRIES OUT THE ORDER TO KILL THE PERSON ON THE OTHER SIDE, THE MOVEMENT BECOMES THEIR PROTECTION. THEY CAN'T LEAVE BECAUSE THEY ARE GOING TO BE FUGITIVES FROM THE LAW FOR THE REST OF THEIR LIVES. SO IT SOLIDIFIES THE COMMITMENT TO THE MOVEMENT. PRECISELY TO SOLIDIFY THE COMMITMENT TO THE MOVEMENT THAT CAN GIVE THEM AWAY IF THEY WANT TO, OR KEEP THEM SAFE IF THEY WANT TO. NON-VIOLENT CAMPAIGNS ON THE OTHER HAND, GENERALLY DON'T REQUIRE PEOPLE TO GIVE UP THEIR DAY JOB OR GO ON THE RUN. TO PARTICIPATE. THERE ARE OFTEN SOME PEOPLE IN THE MOVEMENTS THAT DO. THEY HAVE TO KIND OF GO UNDER GROUND OR WHATEVER, BUT THE WIDE SPREAD POPULAR PARTICIPATION THAT MAKES THESE CAMPAIGNS SO EFFECTIVE DOESN'T REALLY REQUIRE PEOPLE TO QUIT SCHOOL OR QUIT THEIR DAY JOB OR LEAVE THEIR FAMILY BEHIND. THE THIRD LOWER BARRIER TO PARTICIPATION IS A LOWER INFORMATIONAL BARRIER. AND HERE'S WHAT I MEAN, IS THAT ARMED ACTIONS, BECAUSE OF THE CANDESCENT NATURE OF THEIR PLANNING AND OPERATIONS, IT'S VERY DIFFICULT TO READ FROM THEM, HOW MANY PEOPLE ARE ACTUALLY IN THE MOVEMENT. SO TERRORIST GROUPS, FOR EXAMPLE, WILL OFTEN USE VARIOUS SPECTACULAR DEMONSTRATION TO VIOLENCE TO OVERREPRESENT HOW TRULY POWERFUL THEY ARE. A VERY FAMOUS EXAMPLE OF THIS IS THE NOVEMBER 17 MOVEMENT IN GREECE. WHICH, FOR ABOUT 30 YEARS, CONDUCTED SUSTAINED BOMBINGS AND OCCASIONAL SHOOTING IN ATHENS. AS IT TURNED OUT, IT WAS ONLY THREE PEOPLE. BUT NOBODY KNEW THAT UNTIL THEY WERE FORWARD IN THEIR LAST ATTACK, JUST ABOUT EIGHT YEARS AGO. FOR NON-VIOLENT CAMPAIGNS, IF YOU ARE THINKING ABOUT JOINING, ALL YOU HAVE TO DO IS ASK A FRIEND THAT YOU KNOW IS INVOLVED. HOW MANY PEOPLE DO YOU THINK THERE ARE GOING TO BE? OR IF YOU'RE PREDISPOSED TO, YOU KNOW, ANXIETY LIKE I AM, LET'S SAY THAT YOU ARE LIVING IN YOUR APARTMENT. YOU LIVE IN A VERY REPRESSIVE COUNTRY AND YOUR NEIGHBOR COMES TO YOU AND SAYS, WE'RE GOING TO HAVE A DEMONSTRATION TONIGHT DOWN AT THE MAIN PUBLIC SQUARE, JUST DOWN THE ROAD FROM YOUR APARTMENT. AND IT'S GOING TO START AT 8 O'CLOCK AND WE EXPECT THE POLICE TO COME AND KIND OF BEAT US UP A LITTLE BIT. SO MAKE SURE YOU HAVE AN ESCAPE ROUTE PLANNED AND I HOPE TO SEE YOU THERE. I KNOW YOU SORT OF LIKE WHAT WE'RE DOING IN THIS MOVEMENT. NOW, IF YOU'RE LIKE ME, YOU'RE NOT GOING TO BE THE PERSON THAT SHOWS UP AT 7:45 AND WAITS FOR EVERYBODY ELSE TO ARRIVE. IF YOU'RE LIKE ME, WHAT YULE DO -- WHAT YOU'LL DO IS PEAK OUT YOUR WINDOW AT 8:30 OR SO AND SEE HOW MANY PEOPLE ARE DOWN THERE, AND THEN MAYBE HOW MANY MORE PEOPLE LOOK LIKE THEY ARE COMING DOWN THERE. AND, YOU KNOW, IF I SEE LIKE SIX PEOPLE DOWN IN THE SQUARE AND IT'S THE USUAL SUSPECTS, I'M GOING TO SIT THIS ONE OUT. BUT IF I SEE 6,000 PEOPLE AND I SEE MORE COMING DOWN THE WAY, I COULD JUST JOIN MYSELF, AND STAND IN THE MIDDLE, AND HAVE A PARTY. WHICH IS WHAT THAT STARTS TO LOOK LIKE WHEN YOU HAVE 6,000 PEOPLE IN ONE PLACE. THEN FINALLY, THERE'S A LOWER COGNITIVE BARRIER TO PARTICIPATION IN A CAMPAIGN THAT DOESN'T REQUIRE ANY OF ITS ADHERENCE TO ENGAGE IN OFFENSIVE VIOLENCE. COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGIST HAVE LONG STUDIED THIS INTERESTING PUZZLE THAT HUMAN BEINGS HAVE THIS REMARKABLE SET OF INHIBITORS IN OUR BRAINS TO VIOLENCE. MOST HUMAN BEINGS. SO WHAT THAT MEANS IS THAT WHEN WE ENGAGE IN OFFENSIVE VIOLENCE, THE AVERAGE PERSON GENERALLY HAS TO UNDERGO CONSIDERABLE TRAINING AND SORT OF PROGRAMMING IN ORDER TO GET THEM TO DO IT WITHOUT HESITATION. NOW, THIS IS WELL-DOCUMENTED BY MANY DIFFERENT ARMY PSYCHOLOGIST, AND PSYCHIATRISTS WHO LONG STUDIED THE PHENOMENON OF BATTLEFIELD INEFFECTIVENESS DUE TO DELIBERATE MALFUNCTION OF WEAPONS OR DECEPTION AND DESERTION. AND MANY MILITARIES HAD INVESTED BILLIONS OF DOLLARS WHY IT IS THEIR TROOPS WON'T OFFENSIVELY ENGAGE. AND THEY BASICALLY FOUND OUT THEY HAVE TO BE TRAINED TO DO THAT. SO FOR NON-VIOLENT RESISTANCE, NOBODY IS ASKING ANYBODY TO SORT OF OVERRIDE THE INHIBITORS THAT THEY HAVE IN THEIR BRAIN. AND THAT JUST MAKES IT EASY INJURY FOR PEOPLE -- IT MAKES IT EASIER FOR PEOPLE TO PARTICIPATE. SO WHY DOES PARTICIPATION MATTER? IS IT JUST BECAUSE ALL THESE PEOPLE FLED THE STREETS AND IT DISRUPTS EVERYTHING? WHAT MARIA AND I SUGGEST IS THAT'S NOT REALLY WHAT'S GOING ON AS MUCH. WHAT'S GOING ON IS THE LARGER AND MORE DIVERSE THE POPULATION IS, THE MORE LIKELY IT IS THAT PEOPLE ARE GOING TO HAVE CONNECTIONS WITH THE OPPONENTS PILLARS OF SUPPORT. SO LET ME MAKE THIS A REALLY CONCRETE THING. THE PILLARS OF SUPPORT FOR THE OPPONENT ARE THE RELATIONSHIPS AND RELATIONSHIPS THAT THE REGIMERS RELY ON. CIVILIAN BUREAUCRATS, RELIGIOUS AND CULTURAL AUTHORITIES AND THE LIKE. AND THE IDEA HERE IS THAT NO REGIME, NO MATTER HOW TYRANNICAL OR BRUTAL, IS PERMANENT IN IT'S POWER BASE. IS THAT IT'S ALWAYS 100% DEPENDENT ON THE COOPERATION, OBEDIENCE AND HELP OF PEOPLE THAT RESIDE IN THOSE PILLARS. SO EVEN IF YOU'RE A TOTALITARIAN REGULAR SEEM, THERE'S ALL KINDS OF INSTITUTIONS AND PEOPLE THAT HAVE TO DO WHAT YOU SAY, IN ORDER FOR YOU TO STAY IN POWER. THE PHILOSOPHER, WAS VERY INSPIRING TO GENE SHARP WHO IS KIND OF THE GRANDFATHER OF STRATEGIC NON-VIOLENT ACTION ON THIS SUBJECT. AND HER WORK REALLY SPOKE TO THIS IDEA THAT POWER IS NOT BASED ON THE ABILITY TO DEPLOY VIOLENCE. ACTUALLY POWER IS BASED ON THE ABILITY TO VOLUNTARILY GET CONSENT TO OBEDIENCE FROM THE PEOPLE THAT RESIDE BELOW YOU. AND THE IDEA HERE IS THAT WHEN PEOPLE WOULD DRAW THEIR COOPERATION, EVEN THE MOST TYRANNICAL POWER HOLDER CAN'T STAY THERE. SO GENE SHARP TOOK THIS A LITTLE FURTHER AND ARGUED THAT, IN GENERAL, THERE ARE IDENTIFIABLE PILLARS THAT EVERY TYRANT OR UNJUST COLONIAL OCCUPIER HAS TO HAVE IN SUPPORT OF THEM. AND COOPERATING WITH THEM IN ORDER TO KEEP THINGS CALM. AND, IN FACT, THE MAIN STRATEGY OF CIVIL RESISTANCE IS NOT TO MELT THOSE PEOPLE'S HEARTS AND CONVERT THEM. IT'S TO PUT PRESSURE ON THEM. SO THAT IN THEIR OWN INTERESTS, IT BECOMES A BAD IDEA TO CONTINUE TO OBEY. SO LET ME GIVE YOU AN EXAMPLE OF THIS. IN 2000, THERE WAS A BIG POPULAR UPRISING IN SERBIA TO REMOVE -- FROM POWER. IT WAS A BIG OPPOSITION UPRISING THAT WAS LARGELY HELPED BY A STUDENT MOVEMENT, BUT INVOLVED A LOT OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN OPPOSITION GROUPS. AND THIS MOVEMENT, STARTED TO ATTRACT PEOPLE FROM ALL OVER THE COUNTRY. THE COUNTRY SIDE, IT BROUGHT PHEASANTS FROM VILLAGES, WAY OUT IN THE MOUNTAINS AND IT BROUGHT PEOPLE FROM BELGRADE. NOW AS THIS MOVEMENT GREW IN ITS DIVERSITY, IT STARTED TO BE ABLE TO GROW IN ITS CAPACITY TO EFFECT THOSE PEOPLE THAT LIVED IN THOSE PILLARS OF SUPPORT. PARTICULARLY THE SECURITY FORCES. SO WHEN HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE CAME TO BELGRADE AND DEMANDED HE LEAVE POWER IN OCTOBER OF 2000, THE SECURITY FORCES WERE STANDING IN THE LINE, PROTECTING THE PARLIAMENT BUILDING AND THEY WERE ORDERED TO SHOOT LIVE FIRE ON THOSE DEMONSTRATORS. THEY REFUSED THE ORDER. THEY KNEW THE ORDER CAME BECAUSE THE ACTIVISTS STOLEN A COUPLE RADIOS AND HEARD IT. AND THEY LOOKED AND SAW POLICE AND ALL JUST STANDING THERE, LOOKING AT EACH OTHER OUT OF THE CORNER OF THEIR EYES. AND NONE OF THEM MOVED AND DIDN'T FIRE INTO THE CROWD. WITHIN A COUPLE DAYS, HE FLED THE COUNTRY AND THAT WAS THE END. SO THOSE POLICE WERE NOTICED BY A LOT OF ACADEMICS AND JOURNALISTS THAT WENT AND ASKED THEM, WHAT WERE YOU THINKING? WHY DIDN'T YOU FIRE? AND THEY EXPLAINED THAT, I THOUGHT MY KIDS MIGHT BE IN THE CROWD. OR, EVEN MORE MUNDANE, I THOUGHT THE GUY WHO SOLD ME LIQUOR ON SATURDAYS, MIGHT HAVE BEEN IN THE CROWD, AND HE SELLS IT AT A DISCOUNT AND I THOUGHT IF WE SHOUT INTO THE CROWD, I MIGHT NOT GET MY DISCOUNTED LIQUOR ON SATURDAYS. RIGHT? SO NOTICE HOW THIS ISN'T A MORAL THING. IT'S NOT ABOUT MELTING THEIR HEARTS. IT'S ABOUT MAKING A VERY CLEAR DEMONSTRATION THAT THEIR LIVES WILL CHANGE IN WAYS THEY CANNOT TOTALLY CONTROL IF THEY FOLLOW THE ORDER. AND THEIR LIVES MIGHT CHANGE FOR THE BETTER IF THEY DON'T. AND, IN FACT, THIS IS WHY THE NON-VIOLENT RESISTANCE IS SO EFFECTIVE IN PROVOKING THOSE SHIFTS IN LOYALTY IN PILLARS OF SUPPORT. BECAUSE THE MOVEMENT ON THE ONE HAND IS SAYING, THIS HAS TO STOP, AND ON THE OTHER HAND ITS SAYING, WE DON'T WANT TO HURT YOU. IN FACT, WE WANT YOU TO BE PART OF THE NEW SOCIETY. SO MARIA AND I TESTED THIS HYPOTHESIS, AND IT TURNS OUT THAT SHARP WAS LARGELY RIGHT. THAT AS NON-VIOLENT CAMPAIGNS GROW IN SIZE, THE PROBABILITY THAT SECURITY FORCES DEFECT OR OUTRIGHT DISOBEY ORDERS TO DEPRESS, INCREASES QUITE A LOT. AND THIS DOESN'T OCCUR TO THE SAME DEGREE WHEN THE CAMPAIGNS ARE VIOLENT, BECAUSE WHEN IT'S VIOLENT INSURGENTS SHOOTING AT THEM, THEY TEND TO COALESCE. AND SHOOT BACK. SO IT IS THE CASE THAT SOMETIMES, NON-VIOLENT CAMPAIGNS DO GET REPRESSED BY THE OPPONENT. AND EVEN WHEN THAT'S TRUE, WE FIND THAT THE NON-VIOLENT CAMPAIGNS HAVE ABOUT A TWO TO ONE ADVANTAGE OVER VIOLENT ONES, IN TERMS OF THEIR LONG-TERM EFFECTIVENESS. WHY IS THAT THE CASE? WELL, WE THINK THERE ARE TWO THINGS REALLY GOING ON HERE. THE FIRST IS THE PROCESS OF BACKFIRE. WHICH IS WHEN THE INTENDED EFFECT OF THE REPRESSION IS NOT WHAT HAPPENS. IN FACT, THE OPPOSITE HAPPENS. SO IF A REGIME IS TRYING TO MAKE PEOPLE GO HOME AND IT USES REPRESSION TO TRY TO SCARE THEM INTO DOING THAT, BACKFIRE WOULD MEAN THE NEXT DAY, TWICE AS MANY PEOPLE SHOW UP BECAUSE THEY ARE SO ANGRY ABOUT THE REPRESSION FROM THE DAY BEFORE. SCHOLAR NAMED BRIAN MARTIN IDENTIFIED THAT THE PROCESS OF BACKFIRE REALLY RELIES ON A COUPLE OF KEY ATTRIBUTES OF THE INCIDENT. ONE OF WHICH IS THE FACT THAT THE INCIDENT PRODUCES MORAL OUTRAGE BECAUSE IT'S PERCEIVED AS UNJUST, DISPROPORTIONAL OR EXCESSIVE COMPARED TO THE THREAT. AND WHAT WE OBSERVE IS THAT THERE'S A GENERALIZED PATTERN THAT WHEN REPRESSION TAKES PLACE AGAINST NON-VIOLENT ACTORS, THAT PEOPLE ARE MORE LIKELY TO BE MORALLY OUTRAGED THAN WHEN IT HAPPENS AGAINST VIOLENT ACTORS. THE SECOND THING THAT I THINK IS GOING ON IN -- AND MIGHT EVEN BE MORE IMPORTANT, IN A LOT OF CONFLICTS, IS THE FACT THAT AS CAMPAIGNS GET VERY LARGE, IT BECOMES REALLY COSTLY TO CONTINUE TO REPRESS THEM. SO COSTLY THAT THE REGIME CAN'T ACTUALLY SUSTAIN IT. AND THIS WAS MARK LICHBACH 5% RULE THAT I TOLD YOU ABOUT EARLIER. NOW, THERE ARE TWO GROUPS OF METHODS OF NON-VIOLENT ACTION THAT I THINK ARE REALLY APROPOS HERE. THINGS -- METHODS OF CONCENTRATION, WHEN LARGE NUMBERS OF PEOPLE GATHER IN A SPECIFIC SPACE TO DISRUPT IT. SO IT WOULD BE A DEMONSTRATION OR A PROTEST. AND THEN THERE ARE METHODS OF DISPERSION. THIS IS WHEN PEOPLE STAY AWAY FROM PLACES THEY ARE EXPECTED TO GO. THAT'S YOUR SIT IN YOUR SEAT STRIKE. SO WHEN A MOVEMENT IS VERY LARGE, IT CAN SHIFT BETWEEN THESE METHODS. AND MAINTAIN DISRUPTION. IN WAYS THAT MAKE MAINTAINING REALLY HARD. IT'S COSTLY TO REPRISE A STAY AT HOME DEMONSTRATION. IT CAN BE DONE, BUT IT IS COSTLY. YOU HAVE TO PAY PEOPLE OVERTIME. YOU HAVE TO MAKE SURE THEY ARE SAFE WHEN THEY GO INTO THE PERSON'S HOME AND ARREST THEM. THERE'S ALL KINDS OF RISKS THAT COME TO PASS, AND SECURITY FORCES, A LOT OF TIMES IN THOSE SOCIETIES, START CALLING IN SICK FOR THAT KIND OF WORK. I'LL GIVE YOU AN EXAMPLE FROM HISTORY. THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION. 1977 TO 1979. IN THIS UPRISING, THE PEAK WAS REFERRED TO 100 DAYS REVOLUTION. AND THE FIRST 90 OR SO DAYS OF THIS INVOLVED MASS DEMONSTRATIONS THAT WERE BRUTALLY REPRESSED BY THE SHAW'S REGIME. THE PROTESTERS STARTED TO REALIZE DAY AFTER DAY, THEY WERE GETTING CUT DOWN IN THE STREETS. TACTICS WERE BECOMING QUITE PREDICTABLE AND THEY PUT MANY PEOPLE WHO WERE PARTICIPATING IN THE DIRECT LINE OF FIRE, WITH REGIME SNIPERS AND ULTIMATELY MILITARY FORCES. SO THE LAST TEN OR SO DAYS, MOVEMENT GOT VERY WELCOME PARTICIPATION OF AN IMPORTANT ALLY, WHICH WAS OIL WORKERS, WHO WORKED IN THE FIELDS AND THE RURAL AREAS. AND THESE OIL WORKERS WENT ON STRIKE, AND PAIRED IT WITH A STAY AT HOME DEMONSTRATION. SO WHEN THE INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES CAME DOOR-TO-DOOR, THEY PULLED THE OIL WORKERS BACK OUT ON TO THE STREET, THEY GOT TO THE OIL FIELDS AND THE WORKERS WORKED AT HALF PACE. THE SECURITY FORCES STARTED TO GET NERVOUS. THIS HAPPENED DAY AFTER DAY. THEY WOULD GO DOOR TO DOOR, PULL THE PEOPLE OUT IN THE STREET, MARCH THEM TO THE OIL FIELDS AND THEY WOULD WORK AT HALF PACE. AFTER FOUR OR FIVE DAYS OF THIS, THE SECURITY FORCES STARTED CALLING IN, SICK TO WORK. WHY IS THAT? BECAUSE THEY THOUGHT -- I WAS PROMISED OVER TIME, BUT THESE OIL FIELDS ARE NOT PUMPING. AND WE'RE NOT GOING TO GET IT. AND I'M NOT GOING TO DO THIS KIND OF REALLY UNCOMFORTABLE REPRESSION THAT'S VERY PERSONAL AND FACE-TO-FACE, KNOWING THAT I HAVE TO LIVE DOWN THE STREET WITH THESE PEOPLE FOR THE REST OF MY LIFE. AND THAT OUR KIDS GO TO SCHOOL TOGETHER AND IT COULD CHANGE ALL OF OUR LIVES IF WE CONTINUE THIS REPRESSION. SO THEY ABANDONED THE SHAW AND HE HAD TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY AS WE KNOW. SO THESE ARE GOOD EXAMPLES OF HOW LARGE MOVEMENTS ARE ABLE TO WIELD AND MANEUVER AROUND REPRESSION IN WAYS THAT ALLOW THEM TO MAINTAIN DISRUPTION WHILE ALSO STAYING RELATIVELY SAFE. SO I'M GOING TO WRAP IT UP PRETTY SOON, BUT I WANT TO TALK A LITTLE BIT ABOUT THOSE CASES OF VIOLENT INSURGENCY THAT SUCCEED. BECAUSE WE KNOW THEY DO SOMETIMES, ABOUT 25% OF THE TIME, VIOLENT COMPLAINTS ACTUALLY WIN. SO MARIA AND I WANTED TO DO SOME EVALUATION OF UNDERSTANDING, WHAT ARE THE LONG-TERM IMPACTS OF VICTORIOUS VIOLENT INSURGENCY, VERSUS NON-VIOLENT RESISTANCE. SO WE LOOKED AT TWO OUTCOMES IN OUR BOOK AND I'VE SINCE BEEN LOOKING AT ANOTHER ONE. THE FIRST IS THE IMPACTS OF NON-VIOLENT VERSUS VIOLENT RESISTANCE ON DEMOCRACY. NOW, WE USED A FAIRLY STRICT MEASURE WHETHER THE COUNTRY IS DEMOCRACY FIVE YEARS AFTER THE CAMPAIGN IS OVER? WE DON'T THINK DEMOCRACY IS EVERYTHING. BUT I'LL BORROW FROM WINSTON CHURCHILL, EVEN THOUGH IT'S HORRIBLE FORM OF GOVERNMENT, IT'S BETTER THAN THE OTHER ONES THAT HAVE BEEN TRIED FROM TIME TO TIME. AND WHAT WE SEE HERE IS THAT THIS IS THE PROBABILITY THAT A COUNTRY IS A DEMOCRACY, BY MOST POLITICAL SCIENTISTS STANDARDS WITHIN FIVE YEARS AFTER THE CAMPAIGN IS OVER. AND THIS AXIS SHOWS US WHAT THE COUNTRY WAS A YEAR BEFORE THE CAMPAIGN ENDED. SO WE'RE CONTROLLING HERE, FOR THE NATURE OF THE REGIME, PRIOR TO THE CAMPAIGN'S END. AND WHAT WE CAN SEE HERE IS THAT NEGATIVE 5 TO 10 OR WHAT MOST POLITICAL SCIENTISTS WOULD CONSIDER AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES, BETWEEN NEGATIVE 5 AND 5, MIXED REGIMES. THEY DON'T HAVE ANY CIVIL LIBERTIES OR FREE PARTICIPATION IN THOSE ELECTIONS, SO THAT WOULD BE LIKE AN ANOCRACY. AND PLUS 5 OR HIGHER. WHICH IS WHAT MOST POLITICAL SCIENTISTS CONSIDER DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS. SO WHAT WE CAN SEE HERE IS THAT, WHEN VIOLENT CAMPAIGNS WIN AGAINST ANY KIND OF REGIME FROM A TOTALITARIAN SYSTEM UP TO A HIGH-END ANOCRACY, ONLY ABOUT 30% OF THE TIME DO THEY RESULT IN A DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION. AND THEN YOU CAN SEE, THIS IS A REALLY KIND OF TROUBLING FINDING. EVEN AMONG THE DEMOCRACIES THAT FACE VIOLENT INSURGENCIES, ONLY HALF OF THEM REMAIN DEMOCRACIES, FIVE YEARS AFTER THE CAMPAIGN IS OVER. SO THIS IS THE FAMILIAR KIND OF CREEPING OF COUNTER INSURGENCY LOGIC INTO THINGS LIKE CIVIL LIBERTIES, CHECKS AND BALANCES, SEPARATION OF POWERS, AND SO FORTH. SO VIOLENT INSURGENCY IS VERY DANGEROUS FOR DEMOCRACIES IN MAINTAINING THEIR DEMOCRACY. AND THEN WE CAN SEE THE DIFFERENCE WITH NON-VIOLENT CAMPAIGNS WHERE YOU CAN ALREADY SEE THAT AMONG THE AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES, WE'RE ALREADY SEEING LIKE A 10-FOLD INCREASE IN THE PROBABILITY THAT THE COUNTRY WILL BE A DEMOCRACY AFTER THE CAMPAIGN IS OVER. AND THEN WE SEE THIS HUGE SPIKE. AND BASICALLY ANY DEMOCRACY THAT FIGHTS A NON-VIOLENT CAMPAIGN IS STILL WON AFTER THE CAMPAIGN IS OVER. AND ONE OF THE THINGS THAT REALLY STRUCK ME ABOUT THESE FINDINGS, AND THAT IS REALLY IMPORTANT, I THINK, IS THAT EVEN IN THE CASES WHERE NON-VIOLENT CAMPAIGNS FAILED, THAT IS THEY -- THEY DIDN'T WIN BY OVERTHROWING THE DICTATOR OR WHATEVER, AND EVEN THOSE CASES, THOSE COUNTRIES ARE STILL FOUR-TIMES MORE LIKELY TO BE DEMOCRATIC FIVE YEARS AFTER THEY FAIL, THAN ANY OF THE VIOLENT INSURGENCIES, INCLUDING THE ONES -- SO EVEN WHEN IT FAILS IN THE SHORT TERM, IT'S STILL OFTEN EMPOWERS REFORMERS AND STARTS USHERING IN AND BRING IN OTHER TYPES OF FORMS THAT DO RESULT IN RELATIVELY MORE POLITICAL FREEDOM. THE SECOND OUTCOME THAT WE WERE REALLY INTERESTED IN WAS RESURGENCE OF CIVIL WAR. AND IT TURNS OUT THAT NON-VIOLENT CAMPAIGNS ARE ABOUT 15% LESS LIKELY TO HAVE A RESURGENCE OR RELAPSE INTO CIVIL WAR WITHIN TEN YEARS COMPARED TO VIOLENT CAMPAIGNS. AND THEN ANOTHER FINDING THAT I'M REALLY INTERESTED IN NOW IS THE IMPACT OF THE METHOD OF STRUGGLE ON MASS ATROCITIES. THAT IS MAJOR EPISODES OF REGIME VIOLENCE AGAINST CAMPAIGNS OR OF DISSIDENCE, THAT RESULT IN AT LEAST A THOUSAND FATALITIES IN A SINGLE SHOT. OR TIANANMEN SQUARE. SO IT TURNS OUT ONE OF THE BEST PREDICTORS OF WHETHER A GOVERNMENT ENGAGES IN A MASS KILLING TOWARDS OWN POPULATION IS WHETHER THE CAMPAIGN IS VIOLENT. IN FACT, VIOLENT CAMPAIGNS ARE THE MOST COMMON PREDICTOR OF A MASS KILLING, WHICH IS WHAT MOST PEOPLE WOULD CONSIDER -- ONE OF THOSE AGENDA ITEMS FOR PRESIDENT OBAMA TO TRY TO PREVENT IS MASS ATROCITIES. SO A LOT OF PEOPLE HAVE ASKED US ABOUT, OKAY, SO YOU'RE TALKING ABOUT DEMOCRATIC REFORM, YOU'RE TALKING ABOUT STABLE SOCIETIES, LOW HUMANITARIAN CATASTROPHE RATES AND SO FORGOT. WHAT ELSE DOES IT CORRELATE TO? ARE THERE OTHER TYPES OF TARGETS BESIDES DICTATORS THAT NON-VIOLENT RESISTANCE HAS HELPED WITH? AND CERTAINLY THERE'S A LOT OF NEW RESEARCH COMING OUT THAT LOOKS AT THESE DIFFERENT TYPES OF CAMPAIGNS. I'VE DONE SOME WORK ON CORPORATE HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES, IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. IT TURNS OUT THAT CONSUMERS, SHAREHOLDERS, AND MIDDLE MANAGERS ARE JUST LIKE STATE'S PILLARS OF SUPPORT. THEY ARE VERY SENSITIVE TO THINGS LIKE REPUTATION AND THEY ARE VERY SENSITIVE TO COST, THE BOTTOM LINE. AND SO WHEN MOVEMENTS ARE ABLE TO DISRUPT AND PUT PRESSURE ON THOSE DIFFERENT PILLARS, INDEED, WE HAVE FOUND THAT THE SAME KIND OF DYNAMIC TAKES PLACE. IN FACT, 48% OF THE CAMPAIGNS THAT WE'VE LOOKED AT IN 4 DIFFERENT DEVELOPING COUNTRIES SUCCEEDED WHICH IS REMARKABLY CLOSE TO THE PROPORTION THAT HAVE SUCCEEDED AGAINST STATES. SECOND GROUP THAT IS REALLY INTERESTING IS ARMED REBEL GROUPS. SO MANY PEOPLE ASK ABOUT ISIS OR DIFFERENT TYPES OF REBEL ACTORS AND WHETHER CIVIL RESISTANCE IS EFFECTIVE AGAINST THEM. MY COLLEAGUE, OLIVER KAPLAN, HAS A GREAT BOOK COMING OUT CALLED "CIVILIAN AUTONOMY AND CIVIL WAR" WHERE HE STUDIED PEACE VILLAGES IN COLUMBIA. AND THEIR ABILITY TO ENGAGE IN NON-VIOLENT CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE AGAINST ALL DIFFERENT NON-ARMED ACTORS TO PROTECT CIVILIANS FROM THE VIOLENCE THEY DID NOT WANT TO PARTICIPATE IN. THERE'S ALSO A GREAT DEAL OF WORK ABOUT THE IMPACTS OF NON-VIOLENT RESISTANCE ON RACIAL JUSTICE REFORMS. AND ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT PAPERS IS ONE THAT'S JUST COME OUT. IT'S A WORKING PAPER BY OMAR WASOW WHO STUDIES VIOLENT AND NON-VIOLENT PROTEST EFFORTS DURING THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT. AND THE IMPACTS THAT THOSE DIFFERENT TECHNIQUES HAD ON PUBLIC OPINION. ABOUT WHAT THE MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM FACING THE UNITED STATES WAS. AND WHAT HE SHOWS IS THAT WHEN THE PROTEST STAYED RELATIVELY NON-VIOLENT, PEOPLE RESPONDED TO THESE PUBLIC OPINION POLLS SAYING THE MOST IMPORTANT ISSUE IS CIVIL RIGHTS. AND AS SOON AS THE VIOLENT PROTEST STARTED TO TAKE OVER, PEOPLE STARTED ARGUING THE MOST IMPORTANT ISSUE IS LAW AND ORDER. AND SO WHAT WE CAN SEE IS THAT IMPACT THAT IT HAS ON PULLING IN THOSE POTENTIAL THIRD PARTY THAT IS CAN REALLY PUT PRESSURE ON THE PILLARS OF SUPPORT AND CREATE CHANGE. AND THEN MANY OTHER PEOPLE HAVE BEEN INTERESTED IN QUESTIONS REGARDING LABOR RIGHTS, ECONOMIC JUSTICE AND CLIMATE CHANGE REFORM. AND I'LL POINT YOU TO ONE PAPER BY A GUY NAMED HUET-VAUGHN. AND HE'S LOOKED AT THE EFFECT ITSELF OF NON-VIOLENT RESISTANCE AND PARTICIPATION RATES ON LABOR REFORMS IN ADVANCE AND OTHER PLACES, AND BASICALLY, IS REPLICATED THESE RESULTS IN THAT CONTEXT. I'M ONLY TELLING YOU ALL OF THIS, JUST TO SAY THAT, YOU KNOW, ONE OF THE KEY CONCERNS OF THE MACRO STUDY LIKE THIS, IT'S REPLICABILITY ACROSS OTHER CONTEXTS AND CASES. SO FAR THE EVIDENCE I'VE SEEN FROM THESE NEWER WORKS BY OTHERS, SUGGEST WE CAN HAVE GREATER CONFIDENCE IN THE UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES THAT I'VE TALKED ABOUT HERE TONIGHT. SO I'M GOING TO LEAVE YOU WITH A COUPLE KEY TAKEAWAYS. THE FIRST IS ABOUT JUST KIND OF WRAPPING UP WHAT THE BIG 3 TAKEAWAYS ARE FROM THE RESULTS THAT I'VE SUGGESTED SO FAR. SO THE FIRST IS THAT NON-VIOLENT RESISTANCE, AS A METHOD OF ACTIVE CONFLICT, IS A SURPRISINGLY SUCCESSFUL FORCE IN CREATING MAJOR POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CHANGE. EVEN DRAMATIC RADICAL POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CHANGE. AND WHILE I WOULD NEVER ARGUE AND NO INTELLECTUALLY HONEST PERSON COULD ARGUE IT COULD ALWAYS SUCCEED ANYWHERE. IT SUCCEEDS WAY MORE OFTEN THAN MOST OF THE DETRACTORS WANT YOU TO BELIEVE. THE SECOND POINT IS, AND THIS IS STUFF I HAVEN'T SHOWED YOU TONIGHT, BUT WHEN WE CONTROL FOR ALL DIFFERENT KINDS OF FACTORS. DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF A COUNTRY, THE LEVEL OF AUTHORITARIANISM, MILITARY MIGHT, POPULATION STATISTICS, CULTURE AND REGION OF THE WORLD, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND THINGS LIKE THAT, EVEN WHEN WE CONTROL FOR ALL OF THOSE FACTORS, THESE FINDINGS ARE VERY ROBUST. MEANING THAT IT'S HAPPENING IN ALL KINDS OF DIFFERENT COUNTRIES. THERE ARE NO CULTURES THAT IMMUNE FROM THE PRACTICE OF CIVIL RESISTANCE OF THE POWER OF CIVIL RESISTANCE. AND IN FACT, THIS TECHNIQUE HAS WORKED IN LOTS OF PLACES, WHERE YOU WOULD EXPECT CIVIL RESISTANCE TO BE IMPOSSIBLE. LIKE CHILE UNDER PINACHE, OR DENMARK UNDER THE NAZIS. AND THE THIRD BIG TAKE AWAY IS THE VITAL IMPORTANCE IN CONNECTING MEANS TO ENDS. THIS IS A VERY CRUCIAL INSIGHT THAT GANDHI TRIED TO PERPETUATE, BUT HE FELT WAS LOST ON MANY FOLLOWERS. THAT THE WAY THAT ONE FIGHTS THE BATTLE IS GOING TO DETERMINE THE WAY THE COUNTRY LOOKS WHEN THE BATTLE IS OVER. IN FACT, WHAT HE ARGUED IS ONE CANNOT SEPARATE THE MEANS FROM THE ENDS. THE WAY THAT ONE STRUGGLES WITH NON-VIOLENT ACTION, AND THE OUTCOME OF A NON-VIOLENT SOCIETY. AND IF IT'S REALLY TRUE THAT THAT'S WHAT PEOPLE ARE TRYING TO CREATE, A PEACEFUL AND JUST SOCIETY, THEN IT'S REALLY IMPORTANT TO CONSIDER THAT THESE, BEINGS ARE STRONGLY CORRELATED WITH THOSE OUTCOMES. SO I WOULD SAY THERE'S A COUPLE KEY THINGS FOR STUDENTS OF CIVIL RESISTANCE TO TAKE AWAY. THE FIRST IS THAT BASICALLY POWER DOESN'T APPEAR TO FLOW FROM THE BARREL OF A GUN AS MUCH AS PEOPLE OFTEN SUSPECT. IT ACTUALLY SEEMS TO FLOW FROM THE ABILITY FROM THE POWER HOLDER TO MAINTAIN THE CONSENT OF -- AND THE OBEDIENCE OF THE PEOPLE THAT SHE OR HE RULES. AND IN FACT, THAT CONSENT IS NOT PERMANENT. IT HAS TO BE EARNED. IT'S REALLY ABOUT LEGITIMACY RATHER THAN FORCE. THE SECOND THING THAT THIS REALLY POINTS TO, IS THE ROLL OF CIVILIANS IN CONFLICT. IN PARTICULAR, IN MY FIELD OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, CIVILIANS ARE USUALLY SEEN AS EITHER VICTIMS OF ABUSE, OR RESOURCES TO LOOT OR PLUNDER. BUT DON'T GENERALLY GET SEEN AS ACTIVE AGENTS WHO CAN, BY OWN DECISIONS AND CONSCIENCE, SHAPE THE -- AND I THINK THIS RESEARCH ASKS US TO ELEVATE THE STATUS OF THE CIVILIAN A LITTLE MORE IN THIS SCHOLARSHIP IN GENERAL. TO AGENTS IN CONFLICT RATHER THAN JUST VICTIMS OR RESOURCES OF CONFLICT. AND IT ALSO REALLY KIND OF POINTS US TO A LARGER PHILOSOPHICAL DEBATE. IN ACADEMIA. WHICH IS, YOU KNOW, CAN PEOPLE ACTUALLY DECIDE THEIR FUTURES? OR ARE THEY JUST SUBJECT TO THE WHIMS OF THE STRUCTURES AROUND THEM? AND THEIR ENVIRONMENTS? AND THIS IS A LONG STANDING DEBATE, AND I'M NOT GOING TO RESOLVE IT HERE. BUT I WOULD SUGGEST THAT BECAUSE WE HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO ISOLATE ANY CONDITIONS, WHERE CIVIL RESISTANCE IS IMPOSSIBLE OR HASN'T SUCCEEDED. THIS REALLY CALLS INTO QUESTION, THIS IDEA THAT PEOPLE DON'T DECIDE. THAT THEIR ENVIRONMENTS DECIDE THEIR ACTIONS FOR THEM. AND INSTEAD, SUGGESTS THAT PEOPLE ACTUALLY ARE MAKING CHOICES THAT CAN ALTER THEIR FUTURES. FOR POLICY MAKERS, I'LL POINT OUT JUST A COUPLE OF THINGS. IT IS OFTEN DISCUSSED WHEN AN ARMED INSURGENCY ARRIVES SOMEWHERE ON THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE. WHETHER OUR GOVERNMENT, UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT OUGHT TO SUPPORT THE REBELS OR THEIR OPPONENTS. ONE THING I CAN TELL YOU FROM THIS RESEARCH, IF IT IS TRUE THAT THE GOVERNMENT SUPPORTS THE REBELS, THEN THE OUTCOME IS GOING TO PROBABLY BE, LIKE, ALMOST UN -- WITH ALMOST TOTAL CERTAINTY, AN AUTHORITARIAN REGIME IF THEY WIN. WITH THE MASSIVE HUMANITARIAN CATASTROPHE IN THE MEANTIME BECAUSE OF THE ATROCITIES THAT TAKE PLACE AGAINST CIVILIANS IN SURGERY ENSEE CAMPAIGNS. AND COUNTRY IS LIKELY TO REMAIN IN TURMOIL FROM A CONFLICT TRACK THAT WILL RESURRECT ITSELF OVER 10 TO 15 YEARS, OVER AND OVER AGAIN. THAT'S WHAT SUGGESTS IN OUR DATA. THAT SPREADING DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS AND MINIMIZING HUMANITARIAN -- WE SHOULD NOT BE GIVING REBELS GUNS. THAT'S WHAT THIS FINDING SUGGESTS, VERY STRONGLY. SO THEN THE QUESTION IS, WHO DO WE SUPPORT? "WE" MEANING THE U.S. GOVERNMENT RIGHT NOW. AND I WOULD SAY, OUR FINDINGS SUGGEST THAT ACTUALLY BY GIVE ING DIRECT MATERIAL AID TO NON-VIOLENT CAMPAIGNS, THEY ACTUALLY AREN'T THAT MUCH MORE LIKELY TO SUCCEED. AND ACTUALLY, IF YOU THINK ABOUT IT, IT MAKES SENSE. PART OF IT IS BECAUSE NON-VIOLENT CAMPAIGNS WIN BECAUSE OF DOMESTIC POPULAR LEGITIMACY AND PARTICIPATION. SO IF YOU'RE PARTICIPATING IN A NON-VIOLENT CAMPAIGN, AND YOU FIND OUT THAT YOUR LEADERSHIP IS ON THE BANK ROLL OF THE FOREIGN GOVERNMENT, YOU MIGHT NOT BE REAL THRILLED ABOUT THAT. AND YOU MIGHT STOP SHOWING UP. IT COULD ALSO GIVE THE REGIME A LOT OF EXCUSE TO CALL YOU TRAITORS, OR TO USE PROPAGANDA TO MINIMIZE YOUR POPULAR APPEAL. SO MANY OF THESE CAMPAIGNS DO BETTER WITHOUT DIRECT SUPPORT FROM THE FOREIGN GOVERNMENT. THAT SAID, THERE IS A WIDE SKILL SET AND BASE OF KNOWLEDGE THAT IS REQUIRED FOR NON-VIOLENT CAMPAIGNS TO SUCCEED. AND SO HOW DO PEOPLE GET SKILLS AND KNOWLEDGE? THEY GET IT FROM OTHER PEOPLE. NOT NECESSARILY GOVERNMENTS, BUT OTHER PEOPLE WHO HAVE BEEN THERE BEFORE. AND SO I WANT TO SUGGEST, AND THEN OVER THE NEXT TWO YEARS EMPIRICALLY TEST, THE ARGUMENT THAT ACTUALLY CIVILIAN TO CIVILIAN INITIATIVES ARE WHAT MIGHT BE THE MOST POTENT MECHANISM FOR CHANGE AND FOR EMPOWERING PEOPLE AND USING NON-VIOLENT RESISTANCE IN THEIR ENVIRONMENTS. WE HAVE SOME ANECDOTAL EVIDENCE TO SUGGEST THAT EVEN MODERATE AMOUNTS OF TRAINING, AND PREPARATION ABOUT BASIC COMMON KNOWLEDGE LIKE HOW LONG DOES IT TAKE FOR A NON-VIOLENT CAMPAIGN TO SUCCEED? COMPLETELY CHANGED THE WAY THAT PEOPLE BUILD A STRATEGY, AND EFFECTIVELY ORGANIZE, TO PROMOTE CHANGE IN THEIR SOCIETIES. AND SO WHAT I WANT TO SUGGEST IS THAT NIGHTS LIKE TONIGHT, WHERE ORDINARY PEOPLE ARE GETTING TOGETHER, AND TALKING ABOUT THIS DIFFICULT QUESTION, AND TRYING TO WRAP OUR MINDS AROUND HOW WE CAN REALIZE CHANGE IN OUR SOCIETIES, ARE BASICALLY THE FUTURE OF SUPPORT FOR NON-VIOLENT MOVEMENTS. AND SO I'M GOING TO LEAVE YOU WITH A COUPLE OF KEY FACTS, AND THEN I'M GOING TO STOP TALKING. THE FIRST KEY FACT IS THAT THE AVERAGE NON-VIOLENT CAMPAIGN TAKES ABOUT THREE YEARS TO RUN ITS COURSE. SO FOR THOSE PLANNING NON-VIOLENT CAMPAIGNS, IT'S NOT A MATTER OF HOW TO GET THROUGH THE NEXT THREE WEEKS OF TACTICS. IT'S ABOUT HOW TO PLAN A THREE-YEAR STRATEGY. AND IF WE THINK ABOUT THIS IN KIND OF MILITARY TERMS, WHICH IS UNCOMFORTABLE TO SOME, BUT I THINK MAKES SOME SENSE, TACTICS DON'T LEAD STRATEGIES. STRATEGY LEADS TACTICS. SO WE BUILD OUR STRATEGY AND THEN WE POPULATE OUR STRATEGY WITH TACTICS THAT WILL GET US TOWARDS THE ULTIMATE GOAL. AND I THINK, EVEN IF WE THINK ABOUT CAMPAIGNS AS SOMETHING THAT WE CAN PURPOSIVELY PLAN, TO IMPROVISE WHEN BAD THINGS HAPPEN, WE'LL SEE A WHOLE DIFFERENT SOCIETY THAT WE LIVE IN. SO WITH THAT, I'M GOING TO LEAVE YOU WITH SOME CONTACT INFORMATION. AND, AGAIN, INVITE YOUR CHALLENGES, YOUR QUESTIONS, YOUR COMMENTS, YOUR FEEDBACK. AND EVEN YOUR INSULTS. I CAN TAKE IT. THANKS. [ APPLAUSE ] >> AUDIENCE MEMBER: HI, I WAS WONDERING WHAT YOU THINK THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL MEDIA WILL BE ON THE ORGANIZATION OF NON-VIOLENT RESISTANCE GROUPS. >> THAT'S A GREAT QUESTION. SO I'M A SKEPTIC WHEN IT COMES TO SOCIAL MEDIA. PART OF THE REASON IS BECAUSE THE HUGE EXPLOSION IN NON-VIOLENT CAMPAIGNS PRECEDED THE ONSET OF THE INTERNET. SO WE'VE SEEN THIS PHENOMENON SPREADING BEFORE WE HAD INTERNET TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIAL MEDIA. AND SECOND THING IS SOCIAL MEDIA IS OPEN, AND USUALLY GOVERNMENTS HAVE FAR MORE RESOURCES TO DEVOTE TO CAPTURE AND SURVEIL PEOPLE, THAN ACTIVISTS HAVE AT THEIR DISPOSAL TO USE IT EFFECTIVELY TO COORDINATE. A COUPLE DISTURBING EXAMPLES, I'LL GIVE YOU ONE, IN SUDAN IN JANUARY OF 2011, OMAR BECAME NERVOUS HE MIGHT FACE AN ARAB UPRISING OF HIS OWN. SO HAD SOME OF HIS SECURITY FORCES BUILD A VERY COMPELLING-LOOKING FACEBOOK SITE. CALLING FOR PROTEST. IT HAD EXCELLENT GRAPHIC ART. IT LOOKED LIKE SOMETHING THAT THE MOST CREATIVE MILLENNIAL WOULD HAVE CREATED. AND IT CALLED FOR THE PEOPLE TO RSVP AND 17,000 PEOPLE RSVP'D. WHEN THE FIRST ORGANIZERS SHOWED UP TO SORT OF FIGURE OUT WHAT WAS GOING ON AT THE PROTEST, THE SECURATIVE FORCES ROUNDED THEM UP AND TORTURED THEM AND ABLE TO GET FACEBOOK PASSWORDS AND THAT'S ALL THEY NEEDED TO ROUNDUP THE REST. I THINK IT'S DANGEROUS TO OVERRELY ON SOCIAL MEDIA AS A METHOD OF COORDINATION AS A TACTICAL MATTER. AND I ALSO WORRY SOMETIMES ABOUT THE ABILITY OF SOCIAL MEDIA TO TRANSMIT THE WRONG KINDS OF LESSONS TO PEOPLE ABOUT NON-VIOLENT RESISTANCE. SO FOR EXAMPLE, I THINK THAT RIGHT NOW, PEOPLE SEE THINGS LIKE MASS DEMONSTRATIONS AND SIT-INS AS THE MODAL NONE EFFECTIVE NON-VIOLENT RESISTANCE. IT ISN'T. STRIKES ARE THE MOST EFFECTIVE OF NON-VIOLENT RESISTANCE AND LABOR ACTION. BECAUSE WE SEE THESE VERY SPECTACULAR PICTURES THAT GET FLASHED AROUND ON SOCIAL MEDIA, PEOPLE THINK, WE CAN IMPORT THAT TACTIC INTO OUR CONTEXT AND IT WILL WORK. AND SO IT DOESN'T. IT FAILS UTTERLY. AND THEN PEOPLE THINK, NON-VIOLENT RESISTANCE DOESN'T WORK. SO I THINK IT'S ACTUALLY VERY TRICKY, AND I THINK THAT IT JUST CALLS FOR US TO BE A BIT SMARTER ABOUT HOW WE DEPLOY SOCIAL MEDIA AND SOCIAL TO HAVE A FEW BACK UP PLANS WHEN IT GOES AWRY. >> ALL RIGHT. THANK YOU. >> AUDIENCE MEMBER: -- [ NO AUDIO ] >> YEAH, SO THAT'S A GREAT QUESTION. THE FIRST WORLD WAR ACTUALLY CAME INTO BEING IN THE CONTEXT OF THE WORLD'S FIRST PEACE MOVEMENT. THE PEACE MOVEMENT ITSELF THEN GOT A BOOST FROM WORLD WAR I, BUT REALLY EMERGED IN THE LATE 19th CENTURY AND WAS VERY NEW AT THE TIME. AND IN FACT, MOST OF THE PEACE MOVEMENT REALLY GENERATED ITSELF AS A RESULT OF WORLD WAR I, AND THEN MOVED INTO WORLD WAR II WITH CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTIVTORS (PHONETIC) AND ALONG THOSE LINES. IT DID NOT HAVE THE POPULAR SUPPORT THAT IT DOES TODAY. MANY PEOPLE THINK OF THE PEACE MOVEMENT IN GENERAL, AS BEING FAIRLY UNSUCCESSFUL BECAUSE OF INABILITY TO STOP OR STALL MAJOR WARS WHEN POLITICIANS SEEM TO WANT TO DO THEM IN THE FIRST PLACE. CAN I TELL YOU THE FIRST WORLD WAR WAS AT LEAST AIDED ALONG BY VIOLENT UPRISING. SO VARIOUS KINDS. BOTH IN TERMS OF NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION MOVEMENTS, BUT ALSO A GLOBAL ANARCHIST NETWORK THAT TOOK IT UPON ITSELF TO ASSASSINATE HEADS OF STATE, EVERY YEAR FOR ABOUT 35 YEARS, AS PART OF A WAY TO OVERTHROW THE KIND OF MANARICAL SOVEREIGNTY AT THE TIME. AND IT WAS EXTREMELY DISRUPTIVE AND RESULTD IN MASSIVE CRACK DOWNS OF GOVERNMENT. WHICH TODAY WE WOULD CALL GENOCIDE. BUT THAT WORD DIDN'T COME ABOUT UNTIL 1948. SO IT'S A LITTLE BIT TRICKY TO SAY THAT NON-VIOLENT RESISTANCE COULD FORESTALLED THOSE THINGS. I THINK VIOLENCE RESISTANCE DEFINITELY MOVED THEM ALONG AND BOTH WORLD WARS WERE LARGELY DUE TO DOMESTIC INSTABILITY THAT RESULTED IN HUGE DISSIDENT GOVERNMENT TRACK DOWNS AND VIOLENCE THAT DESTABLIZE THE WORLD AND PULLED THESE REGIMES INTO THE ALLIANCES AND PULLED THEM INTO THE WORK. >> AUDIENCE MEMBER: HELLO. MY QUESTION IS, SO WHAT IS THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF A NON-VIOLENT MOVEMENT, MAYBE LIKE LEADERSHIP-WISE AND HOW DOES THAT FUNCTION? IS IT MORE SPONTANEOUS, OR DOES SOMEONE CALL THE SHOTS, I GUESS? OR DEMOCRATIC? >> YEAH, IT'S A GOOD QUESTION. THERE'S A LOT OF VARIATION ACROSS THESE MOVEMENTS. SOME OF THEM ARE MUCH MORE DECENTRALIZED LEADERSHIP MOVEMENTS. AND SOME ARE MORE CENTRALIZED. EVEN IF THERE'S NOT A LEADER HEAD, THERE'S OFTEN A COALITION OF LEADERS OR GROUPS. AND WHAT I CAN SAY IS THAT SO FAR IN THE DATA, IT LOOKS LIKE THE MORE CENTRALIZED VERSIONS ARE THE MORE SUCCESSFUL ONCE. IT'S NOT NECESSARILY CAUSAL, IT'S A CORRELATION I FOUND. AND THE DATA, AND I THINK THAT IF IT IS A CAUSAL, IT'S BECAUSE THE MORE CENTRALIZED ONES, ARE ABLE TO FACILITATE THINGS LIKE TRAINING AND ORGANIZATION. AND PLANNING. BETTER THAN THE MORE DISPARATE MOVEMENT THAT IS ARE DECENTRALIZED AND LEADERLESS IN A SENSE. THAT SAID, THERE'S A NEW PAPER FROM A GRAD STUDENT AT MIT THAT LOOKS AT WHETHER LABOR UNIONS ARE AT THE FOREFRONT OF THE MOVEMENT? AND HE FINDS WHEN THEY ARE, THE MOVEMENTS ARE MUCH MORE LIKELY TO SUCCEED. AND THAT'S BECAUSE OF GREATER CAPACITY FOR ORGANIZING. GREATER EXPERIENCE WITH SKILLS REQUIRED FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION BOTH INTERNALLY AND IN NEGOTIATING WITH THE OPPONENT. AND THEY OFTEN HAVE MUCH MORE KIND OF ROBUST COLLECTIVE ACTION POTENTIAL. THAT GIVES THEM AN EDGE. EVEN WHEN THEY DON'T HAVE AS MANY PEOPLE INVOLVED. SO THAT MAKES SOME SENSE TO ME. AND IT JUST SUGGESTS THAT THESE MOVEMENTS DO BEST WHEN THEY ARE ABLE TO PULL IN THESE DIFFERENT COALITIONS. ESPECIALLY ORGANIZED LABOR, AND IT CAN ALSO PRESENT A REAL CHALLENGE FOR MOVEMENTS THEN, TO FIGURE OUT HOW TO NEGOTIATE AMONG THEM, THE DIFFERENT ACTORS THAT JOINED. MY FRIEND SAYS, IF YOU'RE COMFORTABLE WITH EVERYBODY IN YOUR COALITION, YOU'RE NOT IN A COALITION. [ LAUGHTER ] SO I THINK THAT'S A REALLY IMPORTANT PRINCIPLE FOR MOVEMENTS TO REMEMBER. >> AUDIENCE MEMBER: COOL. THANK YOU SO MUCH. [ NO AUDIO ] >> SO WE LOOKED AT REGION OF THE WORLD FOR PROXY, FOR CULTURE, AND SORT OF DISPOSITION TOWARD ONE OR THE OTHER. AND WE ACTUALLY FOUND THAT THERE WAS NO CHANGE. IN TERMS OF THE FAILURE RATES FOR NON-VIOLENT AND VIOLENT RESISTANCE, EXCEPT IN ONE EXCEPTION, WHICH IS IN ASIA, WHERE NON-VIOLENT RESISTANCE IS EQUALLY AS EFFECTIVE, BUT VIOLENT RESISTANCE IS A BIT MORE EFFECTIVE THAN ON AVERAGE. AND I THINK THAT THE REASON FOR THAT IS BECAUSE OF THE MOEST (PHONETIC) TECHNIQUE OF INSURGENCY. WHICH IS BASICALLY LIKE NON-RESISTANCE -- BASICALLY LIKE NON-VIOLENT RESISTANCE WITH A LITTLE BIT OF VIOLENCE. IT'S ABOUT ORGANIZING PHEASANT CLASS AND ORGANIZING FROM THE BOTTOM UP, FROM THE GRASSROOTS TO ENGAGE IN TRUE POPULAR REVOLUTION. THERE'S AN EMPHASIS ON BUILDING PARALLEL INSTITUTIONS. THERE'S AN 'EM IF A SIGNIFICANCE ON DEVELOPING CONSTRUCTIVE ALTERNATIVE TO THE EXISTING GOVERNMENT. AND BY THE TIME MOE (PHONETIC) HAD SPENT 20 YEARS BUILDING COALITIONS AMONG THE PHEASANT TREE IN CHINA, HE WAS WELL-POSITIONED IN ENGAGE IN A MASS VIOLENT UPRISING WITH THEIR SUPPORT. AND IN OTHER COUNTRIES THAT ADOPTED THESE TECHNIQUES, WE TEND TO SEE HIGHER RATES OF SUCCESS AMONG THE VIOLENT INSURGENTS, BUT STILL -- >> AUDIENCE MEMBER: I'M TRYING TO UNDERSTAND OBAMA. YOU KNOW, THE COMMUNITY ORGANIZER, AND HE GETS TO WASHINGTON AND FORGETS HE'S A COMMUNITY ORGANIZER. I DON'T KNOW IF YOU HAVE ANY INSIGHTS ON HOW, YOU KNOW, WHEN YOU BECOME PRESIDENT, OR YOU BECOME THE MAN, YOU KIND OF WALK AWAY FROM ALL THAT. WHAT -- MY OTHER HALF OF THE -- PART OF WHAT I'M TRYING TO UNDERSTAND. I GET THIS SNEAKING SUSPICION FROM BERNIE SANDERS, HE'S WILLING TO CALL IN THE TROOPS. MAYBE NOT. BUT THAT'S THE GIST I GET FROM HIM, IS THAT HE'S WILLING TO SAY TO FOLKS, COME TO WASHINGTON, LET'S -- LET'S MAKE A MESS OF THIS PLACE UNTIL IT SHAPES UP. >> SO I GUESS THE QUESTION IS ABOUT LIKE, WHAT HAPPENS TO A NON-VIOLENT INSURGENT, WHEN THEY BECOME PART OF THE ESTABLISHMENT, RIGHT? PART OF THE INSTITUTIONAL GROUP. AND I WOULD SAY, YOU KNOW, THIS IS OFTEN A KEY DILEMMA FOR DIFFERENT SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, IS THE EXPECTATION, AND THEN THE SUBSEQUENT DISAPPOINTMENT, WITH WHAT'S OFTEN REFERRED TO AS SELLING OUT. AND WHAT YOU'LL OFTEN SEE, ACTUALLY, IN DIFFERENT SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, IS A PERIOD OF RECALIBRATION, BECAUSE MANY DIFFERENT PEOPLE WHO ARE THE MOST EFFECTIVE LEADERS AND ORGANIZERS, GET HIRED INTO, LIKE, PROFESSIONAL POSITIONS. EITHER ORGANIZING NON-PROFITS, OR ORGANIZING AT THE -- AT THE SORT OF NATIONAL-LEVEL OR THE STATE POLITICAL LEVEL. A LOT OF PEOPLE HAVE SAID THINGS LIKE THIS ABOUT JOHN LEWIS AND OTHER PEOPLE AS WELL. AND I WOULD SAY, YOU KNOW, I MEAN, THERE ARE TWO WAYS TO GO ABOUT THINGS. THERE'S THE OUTSIDE IN STRATEGY AND THEN THERE'S THE INSIDE IN STRATEGY. AND FOR ME, WHAT MY RESEARCH SUGGESTS TO ME IS THAT, PEOPLE WHO ARE OFTEN ACCUSED OF SELLING OUT, ARE OFTEN THEN CAST ASIDE AS ALIENATED FROM THE MOVEMENT AND NOT ABLE TO HELP. BUT I THINK OUR RESEARCH SUGGESTS THAT THOSE PEOPLE OUGHT TO BE VIEWED AS EXTREMELY EASY TO MANIPULATE PILLARS OF SUPPORT. POTENTIAL ALLIES FOR THE MOVEMENT THAT AREN'T ALWAYS GOING TO COME THROUGH FOR YOU, BUT CAN COME THROUGH FOR YOU AT REALLY CRITICAL MOVEMENTS. SO ANYTHING ABOUT THIS RESEARCH SPEAKS TO YOUR QUESTION, I THINK IT WOULD BE TO VIEW THE PEOPLE THAT HAVE MADE THE CHOICE TO GO INTO INSTITUTIONAL POLITICS, AS ONE'S POTENTIAL ALLIES IN THE FUTURE. EVEN IF THEY DON'T LOOK LIKE IT TODAY. IMAGINE THOSE TROOPS DEFENDING THE PARLIAMENT IN BELGRADE AND THE FACT THAT ALL THEY HAD TO DO WAS, IN ONE MOMENT SAY, NO. AND IT COMPLETELY CHANGED THE COURSE OF THAT COUNTRY. SO TO ALIENATE PEOPLE AND SAY, THEY SOLD OUT OR WHATEVER, THEY ARE NOT GOING TO COME THROUGH FOR US, MIGHT ACTUALLY CUT OFF THE OPPORTUNITY FOR THEM TO SAY NO IN A CRITICAL MOMENT THAT WOULD HELP THE MOVEMENT. SO FOR ME, I TRY TO THINK ABOUT WHO CAN I PULL INTO MY SIDE RATHER THAN WHO CAN I PUSH OUT OF THE MOVEMENT? [ NO AUDIO ] >> YEAH. IT'S A GOOD QUESTION. WE DID LOOK AT PRIMARY SCHOOL RATES. AND THEN SECONDARY SCHOOL RATES. AND NEITHER OF THEM ENDED UP REALLY REVEALING ANYTHING IN THE MODEL. AND I THINK PART OF THAT IS, IT HONESTLY MIGHT BE BECAUSE OF HORRIBLE DATA QUALITY. WE DON'T REALLY HAVE GOOD METRICS OF GENERAL EDUCATION LEVELS ACROSS THE WORLD DURING THIS ENTIRE TIME SERIES. WE GOT IT MORE RECENT YEARS, BUT IT'S NOT ENOUGH TO ACTUALLY MAKE REALLY CONFIDENCE INFERENCES ABOUT IT. I CAN TELL YOU THOUGH, THAT SOME OF THE MOST POIGNANT CASES OF CIVIL RESISTANCE THAT HAS SUCCEEDED HAS COME IN PLACES WHERE -- WITH THE LOWEST LITERACY PLACES IN THE WORLD. LIKE BALI, IN 1989 AND 1990 WHICH HAD ALMOST NO LITERACY IN THE BLACK POPULATION ALTHOUGH SOME IN THE FRENCH POPULATION. BUT WHAT THEY WOULD DO, INSTEAD OF WRITING DOWN FLIERS OR PRINTING OR ANYTHING ALONG THOSE LINES, THEY WOULD ACTUALLY SING VILLAGE-TO-VILLAGE, WHAT THEY WERE GOING TO DO AND HOW THEY WERE PLANNING THE NEXT ACTION. AND THEY TRANSMITTED THE MESSAGE THROUGH SONG AND TRAINED THROUGH SONG. AND ULTIMATELY HAD A NATIONAL UPRISING THAT REMOVED THE DICTATOR IN THAT COUNTRY. SO I THINK THAT -- I THINK THAT IT CAN -- PEOPLE FIGURE OUT A WAY TO COMMUNICATE WHERE THEY ARE. AND THAT, YOU KNOW, I THOUGHT MAYBE THAT LITERACY WOULD MAKE A DIFFERENCE, BUT IT DIDN'T IN THE END. [ NO AUDIO ] >> AUDIENCE MEMBER: I WONDER IF YOU FOUND ANY CORRELATION BETWEEN THE INVOLVEMENT OF WOMEN IN THESE CAMPAIGNS AND THE ABILITY OF ONE TO MAINTAIN A NON-VIOLENT APPROACH, AND SECONDLY TO BE SUCCESSFUL. >> YEAH, I THOUGHT A LOT ABOUT THIS. AND COLLECTING DATA AS WE SPEAK ON THIS QUESTION. PART OF THE REASON IS BECAUSE WHEN I GIVE WORKSHOPS ON THIS TOPIC, WITH PEOPLE WHO HAVE BEEN VERY INVOLVED IN ACTIVISM, THEY OFTEN ASK THE QUESTION ABOUT, YOU KNOW, HOW SHOULD WOMEN BE INVOLVED AND WHAT ROLE AND WHERE AND WHAT TYPES OF TACTICS AND TO WHAT EFFECT? AND THE TRUTH S WE'VE NEVER -- NOBODY'S EVER COLLECTED DATA ON THAT. THERE'S A RECENT TREND IN PEOPLE COLLECTING DATA ON WOMEN IN ARM STRUGGLE, BECAUSE EVERYBODY'S REALLY EXCITED NOW THAT WE KNOW, OH, WOMEN ACTUALLY ENGAGED IN ARMED INSURGENCY. LIKE, GREAT. AND SO WHAT I'M TRYING TO DO NOW IS COLLECT SIMILAR DATA TO THE ONE THAT IS HAVE BEEN COLLECTED ON WOMEN IN ARMED INSURGENCY, BUT FOR NON-VIOLENT CAMPAIGNS. AND WHAT WE'RE LOOKING AT, WHAT PROPORTION OF THE CAMPAIGN IS WOMEN? OBSERVABLY. THEN WHAT ARE THEIR ROLES? ARE THEY THEY PLAYING ACTIVE CONFRONTATIONAL OR SUPPORT OR SYMBOLIC ROLES? AND THEN WE'RE LOOKING AT BASICALLY, WHETHER THERE ARE ANY INDICATORS OF GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE WITHIN THE MOVEMENT AGAINST THE WOMEN, AND WHETHER THERE ARE INDICATIONS OF GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE FROM OUTSIDE THE MOVEMENT AGAINST THEM? AND THEN WE'RE ALSO VERY INTERESTED IN WHETHER THEIR PARTICIPATION IS VOLUNTARY OR COERCED. AND WHAT WE'RE INTERESTED IN, IS LOOKING AT THE IMPACTS OF THOSE DIFFERENT METRICS ON WHETHER THE CAMPAIGN IS ABLE TO MAINTAIN NON-VIOLENT DISCIPLINE. OVER THE LONG HAUL. AND THEN ALSO WHETHER IT'S ABLE TO SAVE OFF THE WORSE FORMS OF OPPRESSION. I HAVE A HUNCH WHEN WOMEN STAY ENGAGED IN THE MOVEMENTS, MASS KILLINGS ARE MUCH LESS LIKELY. SO WE'RE GOING TO TEST THOSE THINGS AND IT WILL BE REALLY USEFUL WHEN WE KNOW THE ANSWER. >> AUDIENCE MEMBER. THE HI THERE. THANK YOU FOR COMING. HOW IF SO CAN WE MOVE TO USING CIVIL RESISTANCE IN ONGOING WARS SUCH AS THE WAR ON DRUGS IN OUR COUNTRY, WHEN THE SO-CALLED OPPONENT IS SUCH AN EXTREME AND VIOLENT NATURE. >> MM-HMM. YEAH. SO -- OKAY, THE WAR ON DRUGS IS A TOUGH ONE, BECAUSE IT'S NOT A DISCRETE OPPONENT PER SE, IS IT? WHO WOULD YOU SAY -- GIVE ME THE DISCRETE OPPONENT? >> AUDIENCE MEMBER: SURE. COMING, SAY, FROM THE MEXICO CARTELS AND CARTELS OF SOUTH AMERICA AND THINGS OF THAT NATURE. >> GREAT. SOY WORK WITH A PH -- WELL JUST DEFENDED HER Ph.D. PROFESSOR AT UNM WHO WROTE HER THESIS ABOUT CIVILIAN AGENCY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE DRUG WAR. AND SHE DID THESE AMAZING SURVEYS OF PEOPLE IN MEXICO. ABOUT THEIR DISPOSITIONS AROUND WHETHER THEY THOUGHT NON-VIOLENT RESISTANCE OR VIOLENT RESISTANCE WAS EFFICACIOUS IN PROTECTING THEMSELVES AGAINST THE CARTELS AND ALSO THE MEXICO GOVERNMENT. AND SO ULTIMATELY WHAT THEY FOUND IS THAT WHEN PEOPLE WERE AWARE OF THE STORY OF JAVIER, WHO IS THE FIGURE HEAD OF THE MOVEMENT OF PEACE OF JUSTICE AND DIGNITY THERE, THAT THEY WERE LIKE 40% MORE LIKELY TO BE WILLING TO ENGAGE IN CIVIL RESISTANCE, AND QUITE A BIT MORE LIKELY TO SAY THAT THEY THOUGHT IT WOULD WORK. AND THAT THEY HAD ENGAGED IN CIVIL RESISTANCE, AND THAT THEY HAD FOUND IT TO BE EFFECTIVE AND PROTECTING THEMSELVES AT A MINIMUM. AND WHEN THEY WERE FAMILIAR WITH GANDHI, AND WHEN THEY WERE FAMILIAR WITH BOTH, IT WAS REALLY HIGH EFFECT. SO I THINK, AGAIN, THE QUESTION IS ABOUT HOW TO SPREAD KNOWLEDGE ABOUT THIS IN A WAY THAT RESONATES WITH PEOPLE, AND PEOPLE CAN OFTEN FIGURE OUT, HOW TO RESIST IN THEIR OWN SITUATIONS, AND VERY CLEVER WAYS I COULDN'T ANTICIPATE OR YOU COULDN'T ANTICIPATE. IT'S SORT OF LIKE, ALL OF US, I DON'T KNOW ABOUT YOU ALL, BUT I WENT THROUGH A STAGE WHEN I WAS 2. TWO YEARS OLD I MEAN. WHEN I -- I FIGURED OUT HOW TO MAKE MY PARENTS BLINDINGBLY ANGRY, BY NOT LETTING THEM PICK ME UP. AND THEY COULDN'T PICK ME UP NO MATTER HOW HARD THEY TRIED. THEY WERE BIGGER AND STRONGER, BUT I FIGURED OUT A WAY TO MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE. I THINK WE ALL HAVE THIS ABILITY TO SAY NO AND DISOBEY, A LARGER POWER THAT'S TRYING TO HARM US, THEY WEREN'T TRYING TO HARM ME, BUT TRYING TO MAKE ME DOING SOMETHING WE DIDN'T WANT TO DO. RIGHT? SO I THINK A LOT OF THIS IS ABOUT KIND OF TAPPING INTO THAT VERY NATURAL EXPRESSION OF HUMAN INDEPENDENCE, AND THAT PEOPLE ARE ABLE TO, WHEN THEY COLLECTIVELY ORGANIZE, DO REALLY CREATIVE AND INCREDIBLE THINGS. THE MEXICANS, I THINK THEY ARE DOING AMAZING WORK. >> THANK YOU VERY MUCH. >> ANOTHER QUESTION. >> AUDIENCE MEMBER: SO YOU SPOKE ABOUT HOW THE SOLDERS AT BELGRADE WERE UNWILLING TO SHOOT SON CIVILIANS. IN AMERICA WE SEE NATIONAL GUARD ABSOLUTELY WILLING TO INTERACT VIOLENTLY WITH NON-VIOLENT PROTESTORS, CAN YOU SPEAK TO WHY THAT WOULD BE? >> YEAH, IS CERTAINLY HAPPENS SOMETIMES. I ALSO SAY THAT IN THE LONG RUN, THE VIETNAM -- THE ANTI-VIETNAM WAR PROTESTS WERE PRETTY EFFECTIVE IN CHANGING THE POLITICAL CONVERSATION IN THE UNITED STATES. SO IT IS THE CASE THAT YOU'LL HAVE EPISODES OF VIOLENCE AND REPRESSION. IT'S NOT USUALLY THE CASE THAT CIVIL RESISTANCE STARTS, AND THAT THE SOLDERS IMMEDIATELY DEFECT. BUT WHAT CAN HAPPENS, IS SOLDERS DEFECT A POLITICAL CRITICAL MOMENTS THAT ALTER THE COURSE OF HISTORY. AND SO THAT'S WHAT HAPPENED IN BELGRADE. THE MOVEMENT HAD BEEN BRUTALIZED FOR A COUPLE YEARS BEFORE THAT. SO I'D SAY THAT, YOU KNOW, SINGLE INCIDENCE OF HORRIFIC VIOLENCE DON'T NECESSARILY MEAN THE END OF A MOVEMENT. ALTHOUGH, YOU KNOW, THEY -- THEY ARE SOMETHING TO NOT DELIBERATELY PROVOKE EITHER. BUT THEY DEFINITELY DON'T NECESSARILY END THE MOVEMENT, BECAUSE OF THE BACKFIRE DYNAMIC. SO I'D SAY, KENT STATE FOR EXAMPLE, BACKFIRED IN A MAJOR WAY. MASSIVE MORAL OUTRAGE IN THE COUNTRY. IT DREW PEOPLE INTO THE ANTI-VIETNAM WAR MOVEMENT THAT OTHERWISE WOULD NOT HAVE PARTICIPATED, AND I THINK THAT IT CHANGED THINGS. SO YEAH. EVEN THOUGH IT WAS DEPLORABLE ACT THAT WE WOULDN'T WANT TO HAVE ACT IF WE COULD HAVE AVOIDED IT. THE MOVEMENT SUSTAINS ITSELF AND WIN THE POLITICAL CONVERSATION IN THE LONGER TERM. >> THANK YOU. >> AUDIENCE MEMBER: HI. SO I WAS WONDERING IF YOU THINK THERE'S A WAY FOR, IN AMERICA, WHICH IS A PLACE THAT'S SO RUN BY PEOPLE WHO LOVE GUNS AND LOVE VIOLENCE, DO YOU THINK THERE'S A WAY FOR US TO, IF THE GOVERNMENT WERE TO BECOME TOO CORRUPT TO RUN OUR COUNTRY IN A FAIR AND EQUAL WAY FOR EVERY PERSON, IS THERE A WAY THAT WE COULD PEACEFULLY STAND UP AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT, DESPITE ALL THOSE PEOPLE THAT ARE SO VIOLENT IN THEIR TENDENCIES? >> YEAH, THAT'S A GOOD QUESTION. I THINK -- I THINK, YES. BUT I THINK THAT IT WOULDN'T -- IT COULDN'T HAPPEN SPONTANEOUSLY, AND IMPROVISED WAY. I THINK NIGHTS LIKE TONIGHT PROVIDE US WITH A SNEAK PEAK INTO WHAT A NON-VIOLENT FUTURE MIGHT LOOK LIKE. BUT, YES, IT WILL REQUIRE A LOT OF CREATIVITY AND DISCIPLINE. AND THE ABILITY TO PULL IN DIFFERENT SECTORS OF SOCIETY THAT HAVE NOT WORKED TOGETHER WELL. IN THE PAST. AND TO WIN THE ARGUMENT ABOUT THIS. RIGHT? AND THAT'S THE PART THAT IS -- THAT'S REALLY DIFFICULT. THERE ARE A LOT OF PEOPLE THAT HOLD ON TO VIOLENCE FOR LOTS OF REASONS, OTHER THAN WHETHER IT WORKS. YOU KNOW, THERE ARE LOTS OF PEOPLE WHO DON'T CARE WHETHER IT WORKS. OR NOT. AND SO, YOU KNOW, BIG PART OF THE CONVERSATION IS ABOUT KIND OF TRYING TO DEVELOP SOME COMMON TERMS OF UNDERSTANDING ABOUT LIKE WHAT'S ACCEPTABLE AND WHAT'S EFFECTIVE IN THE WAY WE APPROACH CONFLICT IN OUR SOCIETY. AND I THINK WE ALL NEED A LOT OF HELP WITH THAT. SO I'M VERY GLAD YOU HAVE THIS SERIES, AND I HOPE YOU'LL HELP ME SPREAD THE WORD ABOUT THIS AS WELL. >> AUDIENCE MEMBER: THANK YOU VERY MUCH. >> ONE MORE QUESTION? >> DOES YOUR BOOK REQUIRE READING FOR COMMUNITY ORGANIZERS? >> NOT THAT I KNOW OF. I DON'T KNOW IF YOU COULD GET REQUIRED READING FOR ANY COMMUNITY ORGANIZERS. [ LAUGHTER ] >> TAKE ONE MORE QUESTION. >> AUDIENCE MEMBER: WITH ALL THE CONFLICTS THAT'S HAPPENING IN THE VIOLENCE ON EITHER SIDE, HOW DO YOU LOVE THE PERSON THAT YOU'RE DOING THE CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE AGAINST? HOW DO YOU LOVE THEM? I MEAN, IT'S VERY HARD WHEN THERE'S THIS POWER THAT HAS A HOLD OF YOU, AND HOW DO YOU COMMIT TO THE NON-VIOLENT, BUT BE ABLE TO LOVE THEM AT THE SAME TIME. LIKE GANDHI SAID, LOVE YOUR ENEMY OR WHATEVER. HOW DO YOU SEE THAT HAPPENING WITH THIS RESISTANCE? >> YEAH, SO THIS IS A REALM OF THE HEART, THAT I'M NOT AS EXPERT IN, I MUST SAY. I MOSTLY DO STUFF STRAIGHT OUT OF MY HEAD AND INTO NUMBERS, AND I HAVEN'T QUANTIFIED THAT ONE YET. BUT WHAT I CAN SAY IS THAT I'VE SEEN SOME INCREDIBLE EXPRESSIONS OF THIS DONE WELL, IN MOVEMENTS ALL OVER THE WORLD. AND WHEN I HEAR PEOPLE TALK ABOUT WHAT'S REQUIRED TO DO THAT. LIKE WHAT MANDELA WAS ABLE TO DO UPON LEAVING PRISON FOR FORGIVING HIS CAPTORS, HE KNEW IF HE DIDN'T FORGIVE THEM HE WOULD SUFFER. JESUS, POTENTIALLY ONE OF THE GREAT NON-VIOLENT ACTIVISTS OF ALL TIME, SAID ABOUT LOVING THY NEIGHBOR AS YOU LOVE ME AND YOURSELF BECAUSE BASICALLY, WE'VE HAD ALL OF THESE EXAMPLES OF THIS GOLDEN RULE THAT WE HAVE TO LIKE SPEND ALL THIS MONEY AND RESEARCH UNCOVERING THAT ACTUALLY, YES, IT'S TRUE. YOU KNOW, THE GOLDEN RULE HOLDS. AND WE -- WE SORT OF HAVEN'T WON THAT ARGUMENT YET, EITHER. SO TO ME, ACTUALLY, THE -- THE PEOPLE THAT HAVE DONE THIS WELL, ARE MOSTLY PEOPLE THAT HAVE BEEN ABLE TO ACCESS SOME SPIRITUAL STRENGTH, OR SOME KIND OF RELIGIOUS OR THEOLOGICAL BASIS FOR MAKING THAT ARGUMENT. AND THAT I THINK THAT IS SO POWERFUL. AND I THINK IT'S -- IT'S SO NECESSARY FOR MANY OF THESE MOVEMENTS TO TAP INTO THAT, AS A WEALTH OF CONNECTION AND RESOURCE AND COMMUNITY, AND SUPPORT, AND MOMENTS WHERE NOTHING BUT SPIRITUAL NOURISHMENT CAN HELP RIGHT NOW, RIGHT? AND I THINK THAT MANY OF THE MOVEMENTS TODAY YOU SEE AROUND THE WORLD TODAY, KIND OF DELIBERATELY WANT TO BE SEPARATE FROM RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS, AND SPIRITUAL INSTITUTIONS. BECAUSE THEY WANT TO BE KIND OF SECULAR AND WHATEVER. BUT I ACTUALLY THINK THAT SPIRITUAL AND RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS ARE ABSOLUTELY CRUCIAL IN PROVIDING PEOPLE WITH THE MORAL AND THEOLOGICAL BASIS FOR BEING ABLE TO LOVE SOMEBODY WHEN THEY ARE DOING SOMETHING HORRIBLE AND UNFORGIVING TO YOU. AND WHAT I'LL JUST SAY, AND I'M NOT GOING TO GO TOO MUCH INTO DETAIL ABOUT THIS, BUT JUST ON A PERSONAL LEVEL, SINCE WE HAD A PRAYER EARLIER TONIGHT, I'LL JUST SAY THAT I HAVE FOUND PRAYER REALLY USEFUL. IN BEING ABLE TO FORGIVE PEOPLE FOR UNFORGIVABLE STUFF. SO I DO A LOT OF THAT, ON A DAILY BASIS. TO TRY TO FORGIVE PEOPLE FOR THINGS THAT HAVE HAPPENED. BECAUSE IT HURTS ME TO HANG ON TO IT. AND IT'S NOT USEFUL IN MY LIFE, AND IT INTERFERES WITH MY ABILITY TO BE USEFUL TO THE WORLD. BUT, YOU KNOW, I ALSO WOULDN'T TELL ANYBODY ELSE THAT'S THE WAY THEY HAD TO DO IT. BUT I WOULD SAY THAT SOURCES OF SPIRITUAL SUPPORT ARE SO NECESSARY IN MOVEMENTS. AND I HOPE THAT WE DON'T FORGET THAT. [ APPLAUSE ] >> TOM: I THINK THEY LIKED IT. I THINK THEY LIKED IT. AGAIN, THANK YOU ALL FOR COMING. WE HAVE A LITTLE RECEPTION OUT THERE, IN THE LOBBY. SOME BOOKS TO SELL. IF YOU'D LIKE TO BUY ONE. I'M SURE YOU'D SELL THEM ONE. AND BY THE WAY, THERE'S ANOTHER LITTLE TABLE OUT THERE, TOO, THAT HAS SOME THINGS TO OFFER, AND THINGS TO SELL, TOO. YOU MIGHT WANT TO TAKE A LOOK AT THAT. THE LOCAL CHAPTER, CHAPTER 80 OF VETERANS FOR PEACE IS HERE, TOO, AND I THINK THEY ARE ON THE SAME PAGE. I KNOW THEY ARE. THANK YOU ALL FOR COMING. [ APPLAUSE ] D I S C L A I M E R THIS TEXT IS BEING PROVIDED IN A ROUGH DRAFT FORMAT. COMMUNICATION ACCESS REALTIME TRANSLATION (CART) IS PROVIDED IN ORDER TO FACILITATE COMMUNICATION ACCESSIBILITY AND MAY NOT BE A TOTALLY VERBATIM RECORD OF THE PROCEEDINGS.

Contents

Traits of anocracy

Human rights

Due to the instability of anocratic regimes, human rights violations are significantly higher within anocracies than democratic regimes.[10][11][12] According to Maplecroft's 2014 Human Rights Risk Atlas, eight of the top ten worst human rights violating countries are anocracies.[13][14] In addition, the report categorized every current anocracy as "at risk" or at "extreme risk" of human rights offenses.[13]

The high correlation between anocratic regimes and human rights abuses denotes the nonlinear progression in a country’s transition from an autocracy to a democracy.[15][16][17][18] Generally, human rights violations substantially decrease when a certain threshold of full democracy is reached.[11][19] However, human rights abuses tend to remain the same, or even increase, as countries move from an autocratic to an anocratic regime.[12][20][21]

During the revolutions of the Arab Spring, Libya, Egypt, and Yemen all made relative progress towards more democratic regimes.[22] With many of the authoritarian practices of their governments remaining, the states currently fall under the category of anocracies.[9] They are also listed as some of the most extreme human rights violating countries in the world.[13][14] These violations include, but are not limited to, torture, police brutality, slavery, discrimination, unfair trials, and restricted freedom of expression.[14][23] Research has shown that political protests, such as those that occurred during the Arab Spring, generally lead to an increase in human right violations as the existing government tries to retain power and influence over governmental opposition.[12][15][24][25][26] Therefore, transitioning governments tend to have high levels of human rights abuses.[27][28]

In their annual Freedom in the World report, Freedom House scored state’s violations of civil liberties on a seven-point scale, with a score of seven representing the highest percentage of violations.[29] Freedom House defined civil liberty violations as the infringement of freedom of expression, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and individual rights.[30] While most consolidated democracies received scores of one, almost all anocracies were scored between four and six, due to the high percentage of civil liberties violations within most anocratic regimes.[29]

Violence

Statistics show that anocracies are ten times more likely to experience intrastate conflict than democracies, and twice as likely as autocracies.[31] One explanation for the increase in violence and conflict within anocracies is a theory known as More Murder in the Middle (MMM).[15][32] The theory argues that the unstable characteristics of anocratic regimes, which include the presence of divided elites, inequality, and violent challengers who threaten the legitimacy of the current social order, cause governing elite to resort to political repression or state terror at a much higher rate than democratic or authoritarian regimes.[15][15][28][33] This leads to high levels of what are termed "life-integrity violations"[15][27][28] which include state-sponsored genocide, extrajudicial executions, and torture.[15][15][20][21][27][28][34]

State life-integrity violations can be categorized as acts of state-terror.[27][28][35] Acts of terrorism by both governmental and outside groups are generally higher in transitioning, anocratic, governments than in either democratic or authoritarian regimes.[36][37]Harvard Public Policy Professor Alberto Abadie argues that the tight control of authoritarian regime is likely to discourage terrorist activities within the state. However, without the stability of a clear authoritarian rule or a consolidated democracy, anocracies are more open and susceptible to terrorist attacks.[37][38] He notes that in Iraq, and previously in Spain and Russia, transitions from an authoritarian regime to a democracy were accompanied by temporary increases in terrorism.[39]

According to the Political terror scale (PTS), a data set which ranks state sponsored violence on a five-point scale, almost every anocracy is ranked as having a score between three and five.[40] On the scale, a score of three indicates a state where "there is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such imprisonment. Execution or other political murders and brutality may be common. Unlimited detention, with or without a trial, for political views is accepted."[40] States are ranked as a four when, "civil and political rights violations have expanded to large numbers of the population. Murders, disappearances and torture are a common part of life. In spite of its generality, on this level terror affects those who interest themselves in politics or ideas."[40] Scores of five are given to states where, "terror has expanded to the whole population. The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals."[40] While only eleven states were given scores of five in the 2012 Political Terror Scale report, four of those states, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Somalia, and Sudan, were classified by the Polity data series as anocracies.[9][40]

Civil war

There are differing views on whether or not anocracy leads to civil war. It is debated whether or not transitions between government regimes or political violence leads to civil war.

Civil war in unstable countries are usually the outcome of a country's inability to meet the population's demands.[6] The inability for the state to provide the needs of the population leads to factionalism within the country.[6] When the factions are not able to get what they want, then they take up arms against the state.[6]

Former democracies that transition to anocracy have a greater risk of being embroiled in civil conflict.[1] The population's awareness of what rights they had as a democratic society may compel them to fight to regain their rights and liberties. On the other hand, autocracies that transition into anocracies are less likely to break out in civil war.[1] Not all anocracies are unstable. There are many countries that are stable but are classified as anocracies, such as Russia and Saudi Arabia.[1][9] It is the transitional qualities associated with some anocracies that are predicative of civil conflict.[1] The magnitude of the transition also affects the probability of a civil conflict. The higher magnitude of the transition, the higher likelihood of civil war.[1]

However, some international relations experts use the polity data series in the formulation of their hypothesis and study and this presents a problem because the Polity IV system uses violence and civil war as a factor in their computation of a country's polity score.[2] Two components, "the degree of institutionalization, or regulation, of political competition",[2] and "the extent of government restriction on political competition",[2] are problematic to use in any study involving Polity IV and civil war in anocratic governments. In the numeric rating system of one of these parts of Polity IV, unregulated, "may or may be characterized by violent conflict among partisan groups."[2] The other component says "there are relatively stable and enduring political groups - but competition among them is intense, hostile, and frequently violent."[2] The only thing that can be deduced concretely, is that political violence tends to lead to civil war.[2] There is no solid evidence to support that political institutions in an anocracy leads to civil war.[2]

Broadness and complexity

While the first three characteristics capture the instability of anocracies, another feature of anocratic regimes is its broad descriptiveness. Anocracy describes a regime type with a mix of institutional characteristics that either constrains or promotes the democratic process, "encapsulating a complex category encompassing many institutional arrangements".[1][3] While anocracies demonstrate some capacity for civil society and political participation, their autocratic and democratic counterparts show considerably more or less capabilities.[1][3] Thus, while scholars are easily able to identify democratic and autocratic regimes based on their respective characteristics, anocracies become a wider, "catchall" category for all other regimes.[1] Yet, despite its broadness and complexity, the convention is still used because of its relevance to civil instability as well as its usage in the Polity data series.[1][41]

Examples of anocracy

Anocracy in Asia

Cambodia

Cambodia is an example of anocracy because its government displays democratic and authoritarian aspects. Under the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia, Cambodia implemented an electoral system based on proportional representation, held legitimate elections, and instituted a parliamentary system of government.[42] The constitution, created on 21 September 1993 indicated that Cambodia was a parliamentary government with a constitutional monarchy.[42] Cambodia exhibited signs of a democratic state, especially with the presence of elections and a proportionally representative government. Following the coup in 1997, the Cambodian government has taken more authoritarian measures to keep peace in the country.[43] Protests have been suppressed violently by pro-government forces and many human rights activists and protester have been arrested by the Cambodian government.[43][44][45]

Cambodia shows signs of being an unstable government with abrupt changes in leadership, making it an anocracy. The initial elections led to FUNCINPEC's victory under the leadership of Prince Ranariddh. FUNCINPEC and the Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party won 68 out of 120 seats in the National Assembly.[42] The Cambodian People's Party, led by Hun Sen, refused to accept the outcome. Although a coalitional government was created with Prince Ranariddh as the First Prime Minister and Sen as the Second Prime Minister, the deal failed as Sen led a coup d'état on July 5, 1997.[46] Sen and the CPP have been in power ever since and the CPP recently won a general election against the Cambodia National Rescue Party led by Sam Rainsy.[47]

Thailand

Thailand's history of leadership changes make it an anocratic state. Thailand has been undergoing constant political upheaval since 1993.[42] Coups d'état and the purchase of political votes are the main causes for Thai political instability. Thailand experienced a period of political liberalization under General Prem Tinsulanonda who was an unelected Prime Minister during the 1980-1988 period.[42][48] A series of coups ensued soon after. General Suchinda Kraprayoon led a coup against Prime Minister Choonhavan on February 23, 1991.[49] After the Black May incident Suchinda was forced to resign and Anand Panyarachun was assigned the position of temporary prime minister.[49] Thaksin Shinawatra won the 2001 elections and became Prime Minister of Thailand; he won again in 2005 but a coup led by the Thai military deposed Prime Minister Shinawatra in 2006.[50] After a new constitution was adopted, Samak Sundaravej and his People's Power Party (Thailand) won the election on December 23, 2007 and Sundaravej became prime minister.[51] However, due to a conflict of interest, Sundaravej was ousted and Somchai Wongsawat was elected as the new prime minister.[52][53] Shortly after his election, Prime Minister Wongsawat and the PPP was found to be guilty of electoral fraud and Wongsawat lost his position.[54] Abhisit Vejjajiva's election as the next prime minister was met with opposition by "Red Shirts."[55] On July 3, 2011, Yingluck Shinawatra, belonging to the Pheu Thai Party, was elected as prime minister.[56] Following mass protests in 2013, Shinawatra was deposed by a military coup led by General Chan-o-cha, who is currently the prime minister.[57][58]

Burma

Burma, or the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, is classified as an anocracy because of adverse armed conflict, changes in leadership, and the part-democratic, part-authoritarian nature of its government. Burma had a representative democracy after it gained independence from Britain. Soon after independence was achieved, there was an outbreak of various insurgencies and rebellions.[59] Many of these insurgencies were caused by divides along ethnic lines.[59] One of the most prominent civil wars in Burma, the Kachin conflict, restarted in 2011 and Burma is still embroiled in a civil war.[60][61]

Burma has had a history of changes in government, usually through military coups. In 1962, General Ne Win enacted a military coup and created the Burma Socialist Programme Party which held power for 26 years.[62] On September 18, 1988, General Saw Maung led another military coup to return the government to the people and created the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), renamed State Peace and Development Council.[63] After holding free and legitimate elections in May 1990, the National League for Democracy (NLD) won with Aung San Suu Kyi at its head.[63] However, the military junta refused to give up power to the NLD.[63] The Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), backed by the military, won the 2010 elections and the military government was dissolved soon after.[62][64][65]

The Burmese government shows signs of having democratic as well as authoritarian features. Burma is a pseudo-democratic state because of the elections that have been held in 1990 and 2010.[63][64] However, both these elections were problematic because the military did not transfer power to the winning party in 1990 and the 2010 elections were seen as illegitimate.[63][64][66] Violent repression is the biggest signifier of the authoritarian nature of the Burmese government. The Win regime was marked by extreme oppression and human rights abuses and as a result, Burmese civilians and students protested against the government.[67][68] The Burmese government responded violently to the protests and the Tatmadaw, or Myanmar Armed Forces, killed many of the protestors.[68] After the coup in 1988 by General Maung, the protests were violently suppressed again as Maung's government proceeded to implement martial law to bring peace and order.[63]

Anocracy in Africa

At the end of World War II, European control over its colonial territories in Africa diminished.[6] During this period of decolonization in the 1950s and 1960s, many African states gained independence.[6] Although these newly independent African states could become either democratic or autocratic regimes, manageability issues made way for autocratic regimes to come into power.[6] Most underdeveloped African states that did become democracies in this time period failed within 10 years and transitioned to autocracies.[6] For about 30 years after 1960, the number of autocratic regimes in Africa rose from 17 to 41 as the number of democratic regimes stayed around five.[6][69] After the collapse of communism in Europe and the rise of democratization at the end of the Cold War, Africa experienced a major political transformation.[69] In the 1990s, the number of autocracies decreased to nine and the number of democracies increased to nine as many African countries remained stuck in an anocratic state.[6][69] By 2012, Africa had three autocracies, 17 democracies, and 30 anocracies.[69] By 2013, the majority of African countries remained either open or closed anocracies.[6] As African states transition from autocracy to anocracy and anocracy to democracy, electoral conflicts and violence remains prevalent.[70]

Nigeria

With a polity score of four in 2014, Nigeria is categorized as an open anocracy, transitioning closer to democracy than autocracy.[9] In recent years, Nigeria has displayed characteristics of anocratic regimes including political corruption and electoral riggings.[71] Following years of military rule after gaining independence in 1960 to 1999 with excluding 1979-83, the 2007 general elections marked the first time in Nigerian history that political leadership could be passed from one civilian to another through the process of election.[71] However, in late 2006, just months before the April 2007 general election, former president Olusegun Obasanjo used state institutions to try to defeat political opponents as he attempted to win his third straight presidential term.[71][72] Using the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), an institution created by Obasanjo's administration, the former president had some of his political enemies and their family members either arrested or detained.[72] Despite the electoral conflicts, some Nigerians view their country as running on democratic principles because military power has been controlled by political elites for 15 years.[72] However, the aforementioned electoral conflicts combined with state governors using legislative and judiciary power to repeatedly win elections suggests that Nigeria remains an anocracy.[72] Former president Goodluck Jonathan was accused of abusing his power in an attempt to remain in office past 2015, despite claiming his presidency advocated democratic principles.[72]

Zimbabwe

When Robert Mugabe gained presidency in 1980, Zimbabwe was listed as an open anocracy with a polity score of four.[9][73] By 1987, the country had almost fully transitioned to an authoritarian regime with a polity score of negative six, which made it a closed anocracy.[9] After remaining on the border between an authoritarian regime and closed anocracy for over a decade, Zimbabwe's polity score increased in the early 2000s. Currently, Zimbabwe has a polity score of 4, making it an open anocracy.[9] In recent years, Zimbabwe has moved toward becoming a more democratic regime, but electoral conflicts and human rights violations still exist leaving Zimbabwe as an anocratic regime.[73][74]

When Zimbabwe was a closed anocracy in the late 1990s, the country experienced major human rights violations.[74] Labor strikes were common as employers did not listen to the demands of their employers and real wages fell by 60 percent from 1992 to 1997.[74] The labor strikes that occurred in the late 1990s were declared illegal by the government of Zimbabwe and blame was put on poor, working class citizens.[74] As labor laws continued hurting workers, health services declined and housing projects stagnated.[74]

Since becoming president in 1980, Mugabe has used a variety of tactics to remain in power that have led to major electoral conflicts over the years.[73] In the March 2008 presidential election, the electoral body reported that Morgan Tsvangirai, the presidential candidate of the opposing party, received more votes than Mugabe.[73] However, because Tsvangirai received 48 percent of the vote and not full majority, it was announced that a runoff would take place. Using intimidation tactics, including murder threats, Mugabe and his party forced Tsvangirai to withdraw from the runoff and Mugabe remained in power.[73] A U.S. led United Nations security council to impose sanctions on Mugabe failed and talks about power-sharing between Mugabe and Tsvangirai ended soon after the runoff.[73] After opposing party candidate Lovemore Moyo won Speaker of the Legislature, a power-sharing coalition was finally set up in September 2008 in which Tsvangirai was named Prime Minister.[73] Following this, the polity score of Zimbabwe increased from one to four by 2010.[9] Yet, in 2013, Mugabe won his seventh straight presidential term and the election was criticized for being rigged to allow Mugabe to win.[73]

Uganda

In the 1990s, Uganda transitioned from an autocracy to a closed anocracy.[9] Although Uganda saw a jump in its polity score in the mid-2000s, it has retained a polity score of negative two for the last decade.[9] Uganda is populated by many ethnic groups with the Buganda group, the largest of these groups, making up 17 percent of the population.[75] Since Uganda gained independence in 1962, incessant conflict has ensued between the approximately 17 ethnic groups, which has led to political instability.[75] Dictator Idi Amin was responsible for around 300,000 deaths under his rule from 1971-1979 and guerrilla warfare from 1980-1985 under Milton Obote killed 100,000 people.[75] Human rights abuses under both of these rulers led to even more deaths from 1971 to 1985.[75]

In the early 1990s, Uganda experienced large-scale violent dissent as the country experienced more rebellions and guerrilla warfare.[76] As a result of the warring, the government called for non-party presidential and legislative elections in the mid-1990s.[75] A period of relative peace followed as a common law legal system was instituted in 1995. During this period, Uganda transitioned from an authoritarian regime to a closed anocracy.[9][75] The political situation of Uganda has seen little improvement under the rule of Yoweri Museveni who has maintained power since 1986.[75] Museveni has retained power due to the fact that other political organizations in Uganda cannot sponsor candidates.[75] Only Museveni and his National Resistance Movement (NRM) can operate without any limitations leading to electoral conflicts and violence.[75]

Somalia

Somalia was labeled as an autocracy from 1969 to 2012 with a polity score of negative seven throughout the entire period.[9] From 1969 to 1991 Siad Barre was the military dictator of the Somali Democratic Republic.[77] After Barre was overthrown in 1991, two decades of chaos ensued as civil war broke out and rival warlords fought to gain power. The consistent fighting of tribal leaders and warlords made the country unable to deal with natural disasters, droughts, and famines causing a combined 500,000 deaths in the famines of 1992 and 2010-2012.[77]

After years of being split into fiefdoms, the main Somali warlords established an agreement to appoint a new president in 2004. However, this plan failed when Islamist insurgents, including the radical youth militia al-Shabaab who had links to Al-Qaeda, gained control over much of southern Somalia from 2006 to 2008.[77][78] With the assistance of international peace keeping offensives and the Kenyan army, the Islamist insurgents were forced to withdraw in 2012.[77] In the same year, the first formal parliament in over 20 years was appointed in Somalia.[77] The newly formed parliament chose Hassan Sheikh Mohamud as the new president in September 2012. With international assistance, the Somali government has been able to rebuild itself and the country has been relatively more stable recently.[77] Since 2013, Somalia has retained a polity score of five and is listed as an open anocracy.[9]

Anocracy in Europe

Russia

Russia, as of 2016, is classified as an open anocracy on the Polity IV scale, which means that it is between one and five in its score.[2] Open anocracies hold democratic elections, but ones that are not very free, and the country does not grant some rights of[clarification needed] the population.[2][need quotation to verify] The press is strictly monitored, as is incoming news from the outside world.[2] Russia allegedly has all of these characteristics.[79]

Ukraine

Late in 2013 the then president of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovych, conducted talks with the European Union about establishing closer ties. Instead, Yanukovych backed out of the prospective agreement and turned to Russia for some multibillion-dollar loans.[80] Civil unrest broke out in the streets of Kiev, with the citizens showing their anger over the president spurning the EU. Yanukovych fled to Russia (February 2014) as the protests got out of hand. An interim government took office in early 2014, with new elections scheduled for later in 2014. A referendum held to determine if Crimea was to become part of Russia came under criticism.[81] Questionable plebiscites are a characteristic of anocracy[citation needed]. In February 2014 the death toll in Kiev rose to almost 100 due to escalating clashes between demonstrators and security forces.[82] This, in combination with the government's loose hold on its subjects, and foreign interference makes Ukraine an example of a transitional state, one that is in an anocratic stage.[1]

However, the duration of the period where the term (i.e. 'Anocracy') might be considered relevant to Ukraine did not last long, but, rather, there was a number of outbreaks and they fitted mostly into the Maidan period (i.e. from 30 November 2013 till 20 February 2014): notably, they concentrated around certain events that earmarked the intensification of the hostilities.[83]

Otherwise, the Ukrainians as a nation have demonstrated sound ability to self-organization, self-discipline and absence of temptations to indulge in mass criminality, which normally accompanies such events. In contrary - the acting authorities of that period (Viktor Yanukovych and his apparatus) were the ones to instigate and provoke criminality: from using notorious thugs (widely referred there to as 'titushki') to outright releasing criminals from the prisons in the neighbourhood of capital city Kyiv[84] - with the aim to distabilize the overall situation and compromise the post-Maidan authorities.

Theoretically, the secession of territories (Crimea on the South and Donbass on the East) might be other tokens to justify the classification of Ukraine as anocracy. However, it has been proved that in both cases Russia stood behind the local separatists: vote on Crimean referendum led to international condemnation and the public opinion might have been skewed by massive propaganda in Russian mass media (which dominated the peninsula's media landscape) as well as temporary vacuum of central power after Yanukovych has fled the country; whereas the same has been attempted in the rest of South-East (e.g. Kharkiv, Odesa, Kherson, Dnipro, etc.), but succeeded only in extreme South-Eastern part of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts - and would have been inevitably ended without both open and implicit Russian intervention and military aid.

Yugoslavia

Yugoslavia was a large country in Europe until the 1990s. It was mostly held together in the latter half of the 20th century by Josip Tito,[85] a president strongman who ruled by force of personality.[citation needed] Tensions rose between the different ethnic groups in Yugoslavia[86] - including the Croats, Serbs, Albanians, Bosnians, Montenegrins, Macedonians, Slovenians, and Kosovars. New separate states formed: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia.[87] The destructive Yugoslav Wars in the 1990s cost many lives. The fragmentation of power in Yugoslavia, disputed elections, and the discontent of the differentiated ethnic political groups are the main factors resulting in Yugoslavia and its successor states[which?] being[when?] considered[by whom?] anocracies.[88] The political stagnation, and the non-civilian control of the military during the civil wars play a large part as well.[89]

Successful transitions

Anocratic regimes are often implicitly mentioned in democratic transition literature.[90][91][92] There are numerous examples of regimes that have successfully transitioned to democracy from anocracy.

Mexico

Mexico's transition from an anocratic to democratic regime occurred during the 1980s and 1990s on the electoral stage. This period was characterized by the rise of multiple parties, decline of power from the Institutional Revolutionary Party, and decentralization of power from the national level into municipalities.[93] The democratization process produced competitive elections with less voting fraud, culminating with the 1994 presidential election.[94][95] There was also a documented increase in the role of media and journalism during this period, which led to the creation of various special interest groups, such as those representing the environment, indigenous rights, and women's rights.[94] However, violence continues to remain a characteristic of Mexico's local elections.[96][97][98]

Taiwan

In the aftermath of World War II, Japan surrendered Taiwan to the Republic of China. The constitution that the Republic of China used to govern Taiwan guaranteed civil rights and elections, but was ignored in favor of rule under martial law.[99] Taiwan's pro-democracy movement gained momentum during the early 1980s and coalesced into the formation of the Democratic Progressive Party in 1986. Over the next decade, Taiwan attempted to restore the civil rights promised in its constitution, culminating with the Taiwan's first direct presidential election in 1996.[100] Taiwan continues to move towards a consolidated democracy.[101]

Ghana

In 1991, Ghana was listed as an autocratic regime with a polity score of negative seven. By the late 1990s and early 2000s, Ghana was an open anocracy. In 2005, Ghana successfully transitioned from an open anocracy to a democracy as it has retained a polity score of eight since 2006.[9] A major part of Ghana's success can be attributed to its management of the electoral process in order to decrease electoral conflict.[70] Since Ghana began having elections in 1992, strengthening government institutions such as a strong, independent electoral commission has decreased electoral conflict.[70] The existence of civil society organizations and a media aimed at ensuring democratic principles have also helped manage electoral conflicts in Ghana. For example, Ghana's 2008 elections ended peacefully as political institutions were able to respond to electoral challenges and advance democratic principles and processes.[70] However, some electoral conflicts remain on a small scale in Ghana such as ethnic vote blocking, vote buying, intimidation and hate speeches.[70] Yet, even with these minor conflicts, Ghana has been able to transform from an anocracy to a democracy by decreasing electoral conflicts.[70]

Terminology

Use of the word "anocracy" in English dates back to at least 1950, when R. F. C. Hull's reprinted translation of Martin Buber's 1946 work Pfade in Utopia [Paths in Utopia] distinguished "anocracy" (neoclassical compound: ἀκρατία akratia) from "anarchy" - "not absence of government but absence of domination".[102]

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