To install click the Add extension button. That's it.

The source code for the WIKI 2 extension is being checked by specialists of the Mozilla Foundation, Google, and Apple. You could also do it yourself at any point in time.

4,5
Kelly Slayton
Congratulations on this excellent venture… what a great idea!
Alexander Grigorievskiy
I use WIKI 2 every day and almost forgot how the original Wikipedia looks like.
Live Statistics
English Articles
Improved in 24 Hours
Added in 24 Hours
Languages
Recent
Show all languages
What we do. Every page goes through several hundred of perfecting techniques; in live mode. Quite the same Wikipedia. Just better.
.
Leo
Newton
Brights
Milds

73rd United States Congress

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

73rd United States Congress
72nd ←
→ 74th
USCapitol1956.jpg
March 4, 1933 – January 3, 1935
Senate President John N. Garner (D)
Senate Pres. pro tem Key Pittman (D)
House Speaker Henry T. Rainey (D), until Aug. 19, 1934
Members 96 senators
435 representatives
5 non-voting delegates
Senate Majority Democratic
House Majority Democratic
Sessions
Special: March 4, 1933 – March 6, 1933
1st: March 9, 1933 – June 15, 1933
2nd: January 3, 1934 – June 18, 1934

The seventy-third United States Congress was a meeting of the legislative branch of the United States federal government, composed of the United States Senate and the United States House of Representatives. It met in Washington, D.C. from March 4, 1933, to January 3, 1935, during the first two years of Franklin D. Roosevelt's presidency. Because of the newly ratified 20th Amendment, the duration of this Congress, along with the term of office of those elected to it, was shortened by the interval between January 3 and March 4, 1935 (61 days). The apportionment of seats in the House of Representatives was based on the Fifteenth Census of the United States in 1930. Both chambers had a Democratic majority.

YouTube Encyclopedic

  • 1/1
    Views:
    738
  • U.S. Election Assistance Commission Public Hearing

Transcription

>> Good morning, I'd like to open this public hearing of the United States Election Assistance Commission. First I've been reminded please silence your cell phones so we can proceed uninterrupted. This hearing will start with the Pledge of Allegiance. If we could stand for the Pledge of Allegiance. (Pledge of Allegiance) >> Chairman Masterson: Thank you. Good morning. We're going to start with just a couple short notes. And we're going to be conscious of time this morning as well. There's a hard stop at noon for a variety of reasons so we'll proceed relatively quickly. I want to start first by recognizing and sending I think the Commission's thoughts and prayers to Secretary of State Kim Wyman. Who was recent diagnosed with cancer. The committee knows you're going to fight and battle back cancer. We're with you. Just a moment of chairman's privilege. This is my first meeting as chairman. I became chair in February. Succeeding vice chairman now Commissioner Thomas Hicks and so I wanted to thank you for your years, chairman, for your leadership. Needless to say it was an eventually year for you, a pretty big presidential election year. So we wanted to present to you a gavel salute of your time as chairman. Thank you from all of us at the Commission >> I really do appreciate that. What I say, this is not a Commission of chair, vice chair or just Commissioners, I think all of us function well together and I want to thank you both for your leadership. We could not have done this without all three of us here >> Chairman Masterson: Appreciate it. Next I'd -- yeah. We'll do a roll call, thank you. First one. Can you tell? I'll call roll to make sure we have a quorum present. Vice chairman Thomas Hicks. Commissioner Christy McCormick. Chairman Masterson is here. I would take motions to adopt the agenda for today. >> I move to adopt the agenda for this >> I second. >> Chairman Masterson: In favor? We'll move forward. In lieu of giving opening remarks by the Commissioners, we've agreed to submit our opening remarks for the record so we can move forward with the panelists. Start with a couple truck are you comments and then start with you, secretary Merrill, allow you -- we examine Dai-ichi Dai-ichi's part of the nation's critical infrastructure [ and it's possible impact on those you, you who administer elections, stakeholder concerns and responses to the designation questions from the election officials who are still trying to figure out how it will impact the way elections work and feedback from those who will be most affected bid this step. Also have the opportunity to hear directly from the department of home hand security and thank you for being here to testify today the critical infrastructure designation has left many election officials and stakeholders including those at the table with an over abundance of questions. It's drawn fair skepticism even opposition from election leaders including resolution passed binational association of secretaries of state who will provide testimony. The purpose of today's hearing is to provide a forum for those impacted by this designation to offer their candid thoughts and ask the remaining questions. It's also a time for us to engage directly with the Department of Homeland Security and discussion that addresses those questions, and examines next steps. We gather here today at an important moment in time just this month US house and senate intelligence committees held hearings on potential interference. We heard members of the intelligence community reiterate that no voting machines or votes were manipulated during the election. Put simply the election was not hacked. They also indicated that cyber threats remain real and persistent. We know voters continue to have questions and concerns regarding the security of the elections process. We know that election officials are working hard to maintain aging election systems and incorporate new technologies in order to keep elections accessible, accurate, and secure. Against this backdrop hard working election officials from more than 8,000 voting jurisdictions across the United States are preparing for their next election. There are elections today in fact across the United States. They are working every day to secure a diverse and be interdependent set of election systems against threats by those seeking to carry out cyber attacks. They're operating on election standard time. Which means they can't his pause until all, yes, sir are answered. They are deadline next election day and their jurisdiction is not flexible and does not move. So acknowledging we have no time to waste in figuring out how this designation will impact them, let's kick off this meeting and this hearing with our first speaker. Secretary of State Denise Merrill is the 73rd Secretary of State of the state of Connecticut. Since taking off she's supported an expanded democratic participation ensuring every citizen's rights and privileges are protected and that every vote is counted accurately. She was legislation elected recent president of national association of secretaries of state for the term of 2016, 2017 secretary Merrill thank you for being here. We welcome your opening comments. >> Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Good morning. So thank you for the opportunity to be here today on behalf of the national association of secretaries of state and didn't I pick an interesting year to be president. We represent 40 chief state election officials who oversee the conduct of elections according to the law. And as Connecticut Secretary of State it's my job to ensure the integrity of the voting process which includes cyber preparedness contingency planning of all kinds. My colleagues and I also provide administrative and technical support for local election officials. I've been asked to discuss thoughts on moving forward under the US department home hand security which took place on January 6th [ you a 2017. Secretaries of states strongly opposed this move adopting a bipartisan resolution against the designation in February. We are coming to the table reluctantly because the bureaucratic wheels are clearly in motion and secretary Kelly has indicated he will keep the designation in place. And I apologize in advance for the length of my testimony but I think it's very important that this be entered in the record. What does this mean for election officials? For starters, it means gramg with how this executive order will actually work. DS -- particularly cyber attacks. [ [ Yet it comes with no added technical support beyond what was already offered without the designation. No funding to help upgrade systems and no additional help for states that do not wish to bring the federal government into their security process. While threats clearly exist, the more immediate challenge for secretaries of state is making sure that a hastily form sub sector of critical infrastructure doesn't create more problems than it actually solves. So I'm going to share some key facts and findings from the 2016 presidential election that we put forward in a briefing paper in March and then talk about the role of the states in this new normal of critical infrastructure. First the point I'd like to make echos what Mr. Masterson said. 2016 presidential election was not hacked. It's extremely important to separate fact from fiction around this election cycle. In order top set the record straight on what did and did not happen regarding our voting process, we released a briefing. And here are the several key points. No major cybersecurity issues were reported on November 8th. While our political institutions were clearly targeted by cyber attacks Russia that's been well documented but owe national intelligence agencies the voting process itself was not hacked. Manipulated or rigged in any way. In fact, the accuracy of the results were reinforced by several presidential focused recount attempts to verify vote totals. Second, the US Department of Homeland Security confirmed to NAS33 dates and 36 county jurisdictions had taken advantage of the agency's voluntary assistance by election day. NAS and DHS achieved a joint goal ensuring all 50 states were mote identified of the federal government resources available to them upon request. Including cyber hygiene scans on internet facing systems and risk and vulnerability assessments. Those scans that DHS assistance received similar support from their own state foreign instrugss from limited to two incidents that didn't involve systems using vote allying. State voter registration systems were targeted by cyber haekers but no additional systems were accessed and breached. And as many of you know and we know, that's because most of them are not cyber. Frankly voting by internet based systems is not a reality in the United States. 2016-cycle demonstrated we're not really cyber at all except for our voter registration databases which has nothing to do with the actual al Leeing of votes. It would make it very inherently difficult if not impossible to carry out large scale cyber attacks. What's this mean for securing future election elections are fundamentally different from any other sub sector of critical infrastructure. [. There's no question that expanded information sharing between all levels of government will be helpful for increasing the resiliency of our electoral system. However, there's also strong sentiment that funding and resources would be better focused on updating outdated voting technologies and supporting states in protecting their own systems. With little information released by either the Obama or the Trump administration election cyber security task force to study issues related to the designation and broadly foster cooperation and diversity on cybersecurity issues that are very unique to the election process. To date the concerns of state officials have not been sufficiently addressed despite our questions over and over again. As I've mentioned, NAS members adopted a resolution opposing the critical infrastructure February 18th. Secretaries of state have asked President Trump to rescind the decision; continue to articulate point that this is not an issue defined by political party. [ Our bipartisan position is bolstered by September 2016 letter both house and senate congressional letters stated we would oppose efforts by the federal government to exercise any degree of control over the state's administration of elections by designating the systems as critical infrastructure. The letter was signed by house speaker Ryan, senate majority leader McConnell and former minority leader Harry Reid. The current top down process of establishing and implementing the critical infrastructure designation for elections creates a number of issues when applied to our bottom up voting process. For starters there is no centralized uniform election system in the US. Elections are administered on a state and local basis. As we have repeatedly emphasized during the November 2016 presidential election, this autonomy produces a level of 50 state diversity that's our greatest asset against malicious attacks. Because our system is highly decentralized there's no way to disrupt the voting process in any large scale meaningful way through cyber attacks because there's no national system to attack. Yet pursuant to PPD21, DHS not the state becomes the center of work to protect the sub sector. The federals must oversee a process of formulating a sub sector risk profile with corresponding preparedness standards, there are myriad questions about whether this leads to additional oversight and regulation possibly raising constitutional questions. We've heard the DHS talking point that all assistance is voluntary. Over and over again. Yet there's nothing in law that defines any parameters on the designation. What resources and information will be withheld from states that do not want DHS help will voluntary guidelines become the basis for litigation in states where they're not being used, adoption of the NIST cyber security framework has become a point of litigation in history sectors of critical infrastructure. We also don't have a clear understanding how all federal agencies will be working together to serve states under the designation. For example, we've already seen federal proposals toss mandate the use of voter verified paper trails. Yet only five states still utilize electronic voting machines without those paper trails. Furthermore the AC's Voluntary Voting System Guidelines are currently being updated to reflect what's already a de facto standard across states possibly creating redundancies in federal processes and finally and very importantly, there are concerns about public trust in elections. U.S. Government military and intelligence agencies can classify their work to shield from public zut any. How will broad exemptions from public records and sunshine laws that are forwarded to critical critical infrastructure affect trust and transparency in our electoral process. Right knew our system is designed to foster transparency and participation from end to end from public testing of voting equipment to poll watchers to public count balance lot. If the infrastructure infrastructure designation reduces diversity, autonomy and transparency in state and local election systems, the potential for adverse effects from perceived or real cyber attacks will likely be much greater and not the other way around. So finally, a few goals the secretaries of state have moving forward. We have established as I said, the NAS election seizures task force which currently has members from tweven states want to ensure state election officials are working together to combat threats and foster effective partnerships with the federal government and other public private stakeholders. Specifically, the deliverables for task force we've laid out include first developing possible NAS policies or resolutions on election cybersecurity, assisting NAS with guidance on federal government outreach and information sharing related to cybersecurity, including the DHS critical infrastructure designation, assuming it will be retained. Their, developing and convening a NAS election cybersecurity forum this July as part of our summer conference. Which is already in the works. Fourth, providing input and feedback on NAS stakeholder outreach and communications. We're beginning with data collection to inform the work of the task force, also begun outreach to DHS to continue to try to under exactly what's been asked of states under this designation. While we remain opposed to the executive order it is our current reality and it's important for us to have a seat at the table. We also need to develop a better system of communication and trust with DHS. We're working to help the appropriate officials apply for classified status which apparently we need to have in order to be part of these communication systems. And advocating for greater state involvement in decision making. As we speak, the DHS inspector general is conducting an independent investigation into evidence of unauthorized scans that were performed from a DHS IP address against the Georgia Secretary of State's computer network. The Indiana Secretary of State's office has already submitted results of a state investigation that concluded with a high degree of certainty, that's a quote, that similar unauthorized activity was detected against their computer network from the same IP address. You can see this creates concern in the states, and other states have reflected similar concerns. We need a for the right account the account as soon as possible and hope to hear more on .status of this investigation. In conclusion, there's no doubt that more can and will be done to bolster resources, security protocols, technical support heading into future elections. The lesson from 2016 is that we are the front line in securing election systems from very real threats that exist in the digital age. As we continue to find our way under this new normal, let's not forget the true cyber capability of our elections rests in our hands. As Connecticut Secretary of State I continue to oversee the administration of our elections process in a non-partisan transparent and fair manner. I'm proud of the dedication and integrity of my local and state level election team, and I remain supportive of efforts to collaborate on securing and enhancing our elections. Thank you. >> Chairman Masterson: Next Chris Chambless, the 39-year Clay County resident, 18-year employee of the Clay supervisor of elections office and the supervisor since 2008. He's also a United States Air Force veteran, thank you for your service. And the president of the Florida association of supervisors of election and also a member of the election center cyber task force, also a deacon and we can all use your thoughts and prayers in this industry. With that, you have, I'm going to flip the timer if you go over that's okay. It's just a guide. The floor is yours >> Good morning. My name is Chris Chambless I represent Clay County, Florida, mid-sized community of nearly 150,000 registered voters and currently serve as the president of the Florida state association of supervisors of elections. Home to just under 13 million voters. The only constant in elections is change. When I began my service nearly 20 years ago, I came to the Clay County elections office as a contractor hired to migrate from optical -- punch cards to optical scan as well as install it the first computer in the elections office and my AS400 mainframe. Gone were the days of waiting until the hours of the morning for the winners and losers in a hotly contested contest with tabulators equipped with modems and results why learned in hours if not minutes of the polls closing. Post 2000 many jurisdictions [ in Florida made the migration from punch cards to DRE touch screens bypassing optical scanning. In fact many Florida voters cast their first votes on different voting systems for each of the next three presidential election seasons migrating from punch cards to DRE's to optical scan. It's important to take into account the changes vote methods during these transformative years going from election day voting to absentee for voters who demonstrated their absence from their local jurisdiction to models that offer no excuse vote by mail, early voting, all mail balance lot elections, fax bat lots and some cases vote centers. It's easy to see elections environment has become much more robust and technical and as elections administrators, we would be well served to increase our IT knowledge base. It's that point that I want to make that elections officials and administrators have become IT professionals. As a matter of fact, the EAC has created a new program that brings IT training to elections administrators highlighting the point to become aware of technology. With many jurisdictions depending more and more on connected various information systems offering real time access to voter registration as well as election night reporting, I see the requirement of various systems only grows to as many looked OVR vote centers and who knows what's come down the next pipe. The honest answer is is that instead of looking outside the elections community to Department of Homeland Security, election professionals for years and years have looked inwardly as we control the IT infrastructure that we use. It is my recommendation that we continue to take advantage of not only the EAC programs but ones that are offered by NAS and the election center as we grow our own administration instead of looking to Department of Homeland Security. It has been said that with the Department of Homeland Security transition that many resources will come. But I ask you, what more resources will come that aren't available today? Currently right now we have the cyber hygiene and pens testing as well as or services that Department of Homeland Security offers. Is there going to be funding that's made available to physical security enhancements? Those are questions that are left to be answered. So it is my recommendation that we continue as we have in the past to use elections administrators to handle the IT infrastructure today and tomorrow. Thank you. >> Chairman Masterson: Thank you, Mr. Chambless, I appreciate it. I hope to get to some of your questions with the next panel as well. Thank you. Next is Mr. Ricky Hatch. Mr. Hatch is the Weber County clerk and auditor in Utah. He currently serves as the election officials division director for international association of government officials. Ip got it right. The new name. IGO. He's been the 2015 Utah clerk of the year and the chairman of the ought clerk and auditors association >> Thanks for inviting us to come discuss this important topic. Really appreciate the efforts of the EAC. Let's face it. We as Americans are skeptical lot. Especially when there's a strong central government involved. It's been that way for a couple hundred years and will probably continue. That's part of the beauty of this country. As election officials we're more skeptical. I think mostly because so often people who don't -- who aren't involved in the nuts and bolts of election administration feel that they can come fix it without understanding the processes. So we're I think it's understandable as election officials those who live and breathe elections concepts and administration that we're doubtful and hesitant and concerned when so called outsiders come and offer assistance or offer aid. When I first heard about the designation back in January, I was very concerned. In fact, I immediately put a summary together and emailed it off to about 600 election officials throughout the country sharing that information through the IGO organization. However, as I've read the statement and designation a little more closely, my concern is a little bit lessened. I particularly liked how it was written. I like that it said this is not a federal takeover of local and state jurisdictions, election jurisdictions, and I appreciated that. It helped me feel a little bit better. It seemed like it's a voluntary offering of resources for states and counties and election jurisdictions that don't have the resources or perhaps the bandwidth to address these types of issues. So that's helpful. However, as the camel's nose in the tent, and I think it's very valid [ for NAS to come forward and present concerns and we should view this with an eye of skepticism I think until we understand the nuts and bolts, the details of how this designation will impact us and so I have several questions as well as far as how do you accept the designation at what levels are those accepted and once you September, there a way to rescind later if you feel it's been accomplished or no longer want to participate. [. On the election side, I am confident that the election systems in the United States are in good hands. Election officials, we're control freaks. We know that. It's a good thing. It's how it should be. We are meticulous, logistical planners focused on what we can do better. Before I took office I worked for seven years as certified information systems auditor with price water house in Los Angeles and overseas. When I took office back in 2011, I looked at our local elections infrastructure with a very critical eye, with the eye of an auditor. Frankly. I liked what I saw. I am impressed with the levels of security, physical security, logical and human based security that really provided strong controls over the process. I had no idea that the controls and security were so detailed. And so robust. And when we take tours, candidates or citizens or others who want to come see our elections process and we bring them on tours through the facilities they are impressed and actually come for theed when they see the level of controls that election officials put into securing the elections process. However we can always improve. And if this critical infrastructure designation provides additional resources for us to be able to improve our security without losing our jurisdiction or without having some super imposed power or concern from the federal level on this, then to me it's another arrow in the quiver that election officials have to make our elections better and smoother and more secure. Thank you. >> Chairman Masterson: Thank you, Mr. Hatch. Appreciate it. Next is Mr. Lance Gough who needs no introduction. Long time executive director of the Chicago board of election Commissioners. He manages day to day operations of one of the largest election authorities in the United States with approximately 1.4 million, I bet it's a little bit better -- registered voters. This year marks his 26th year, is that correct? >> 27 >> Chairman Masterson: 27th as the executive the agency. Mr. Gough look forward to your testimony. Thank you for being here >> Thank you, chairman and thank you to the Commission for inviting me. Chairman, you and I have talked many times and I just wanted to thank the EAC. When this last election, 2016, we had an issue with the postmaster general, and you and I got on phone and called and for the first two weeks that's all we did was talk to the postmaster general. So I appreciate all your help the EAC and you did. I have been the executive director for several years at the Chicago board of election and I've been in the election business for over 30 years. I've been -- held almost every major organization post. I was president of IACREAT with the election center so I've been around for a long time. The only constant in elections is change. And every time we have change in elections they get more and more complicated. When I first started almost 30 years ago, the only thing that we had to worry about is making sure we had polling places that we had our poll workers trained, and that we had the equipment delivered and it was all working. Now with new infrastructures of early voting, vote by mail, election day registration, electronic poll books, has made or job more and more difficult. Internet most recently the reason why we're here today and what we encountered in these events is internet attacks, internet hacks and attacks on voter registration database. Growing concern by the voting public and the mass and media that the balloting system could be hacked. These concerns were also amplified in statements by high profile campaign surrogates and also candidates themselves. Before and after the election. I just would like the Commission to know that our vote counting system was not hacked. There was issues with some databases, like Illinois statewide database for voter registration and also in Arizona. These were attacked, but they were not altered and nothing was changed. Both jurisdictions had back ups, were able to do find out what was wrong and they cured it right away. But because of this, we were called in, we had a meeting in Illinois with the US Department of Homeland Security, US Department of Justice, US attorney's office for the northern district of Illinois, and she the federal bureau of to talk about the infrastructure of our voting system. After meeting with these different groups [, they and we came to the conclusion that we've been the watchdogs of our vote counting system and our vote counting system has not been hacked. We also welcome any advice on any type of protocols, safeguards, but we were offered and the homeland security offered different softwares to go in and screen our -- clean our systems. You have to understand, we did not take advantage of it because once we did mention that, we were reported by people on the Republican party saying democrats are trying to take over the election mechanism. And then vice versa, the Democrats said that the Republicans were trying to take over. We're right here to say hands off. There has to be a line in the sand drawn between information and actual tampering with our systems. We know what we're doing. We've been doing this long enough. The secretary of -- Madam Secretary also the national association of secretaries of states brought that out also in their statement critical infrastructures, the Chicago board for over 30 years I've been fighting this. I've been fighting the claims that in Chicago, elections are full of vote fraud and hacked. We've had the FBI, we've had other governmental agencies come in and review and audit or systems. And found out none of this was true. And I met with ron Ravest of Mit, and I asked him certain questions about voting equipment, voting systems and he said, Lance, we know that your vote systems has not been hacked. We know that. And I said, well, let's talk. What about internet voting? And he says his comment was well, we can send a man to the moon, but with internet voting, you have people that want to try to shoot it down and also try to get into it. So he said in the near future you and I will both are retired by the time we have internet voting. So just to hurry up and wrap up because I know we're short on time, just to let you know our systems can and do come under attack. We welcome and value the input and added awareness that comes with the critical infrastructure designation. Yes, on line voter registrations can and should be scanned swept with cyber hygiene programs as one of the safeguards. However, when it comes to our local balloting and vote tabulation systems, we must tread carefully and must not cross that line between advice and access. Thank you. >> Chairman Masterson: Thank you, Mr. Gough. Finally, Mr. Trevor Timmons, the chief information officer for the Colorado Secretary of State's office. Trevor served as CIO for Colorado secretary of states since 2007. Variety of changes in the last decade. That's a theme here with this panel. As also, served as member of Colorado information security advisory board since founding in 2012 and I want to thank you for being here. So often we leave out thehe wide variety of threats that face computer systems and some uncertainty as to the risk profiles of the various entities and systems that are involved in the conduct of elections. We welcome a productive dialogue between election officials and DHS. Which started last August with the initial outreach on behalf of DHS based on concerns about the security of the election system. We do believe that DHS needs input and feedback from elections officials to understand the domain. Elections officials would benefit from knowing that current body of knowledge that has been assembled by DHS that is influence being the work that they're contemplating moving forward with. I understand that Mr. Jenkins was quoted last week saying that DHS is anticipating meeting within the next couple of weeks or months on how to establish that coordinating council for the sub sector. And we're eager to engage and we hope to develop a roadmap to dispel doubts about the scope, and impact that have designation on state and local election officials. We look forward to better understanding the expected timelines and the calls for action and information sharing as that coordinating council is formed and commences its work. Election officials are laboring from a lack of knowledge of other work areas under DHS that might explain the many signals of access to state systems that's been reported by some states such as Georgia and Indiana. We look forward to a frank discussion of DHS's assessment of that activity that was sourced from DHS computers that has been documented by those states. We want to work together as DHS both at the federal and the state level have already demonstrated a willness to do and make sure that joint resources are directed towards those areas of most prominent and likely risk and the highest probability of effective action. Average citizens and voters will benefit from public statements by elections officials and by the Department of Homeland Security affirming confidence in the elections process where that is appropriate and also urging attention paid to risks facing the system. It is difficult for citizens to separate statements around activities that may affect the confidence of folks in elections and the elections systems themselves. While Colorado initially opposed the designation, we're eager to participate and look forward to working together to prioritize areas for assessment and for action. Thank you. >> Chairman Masterson: Thank you. I appreciate it. Thank you to all. Before I open it up to questions for the fellow Commissioners I'd like to ask without objection to enter into the record the NAS resolution on critical infrastructure so we have it for a complete record. >> I move that we enter >> I second it. >> Chairman Masterson: All in favor? So moved. So we'll enter that into the record to make sure that's part of the record. With that, I'll turn it over first to vice chairman Hicks for questions for panelists. >> First I want to thank you you all for being here. It's important to hear from each and every one of you about your thoughts on these issues. I don't want to ask too many questions but I do have a few. I also want to echo the chairman's wishes for secretary wyman to make a full and quick recovery. Our thoughts and prayers go out to her. Basically one of the things that I don't want to look back on too my chairman ship of last year again, but I wanted to always look forward. So my thoughts are and questions before that is was 2016 basically the first incidents was this being an issue? And I ask that because I know that election officials pay a lot of attention to not on cyber attacks but also physical attacks. So this was nothing new to you. So I wanted to find out what were the things you did differently in 2016 that you hadn't done in 2014 or 2012, because we still had the In terms of testing, logic and accuracy testing of voter systems. Honestly, the extent of the involvement of computers around the elections process has changed significantly in the last decade. In Colorado we've become an all mail ballot state. We still allow voters to come in in person and vote -- but honestly, the extent of the involvement of computers around the elections process has changed significantly in the last decade. In Colorado we have become an all mail ballot state. We still allow voters to come in in person and vote in person and I think the growth in online voter registration systems and the growth in the us of electronic poll books he during early vote and on election day, I think it's changed the landscape in terms of the risks that election officials must prepare for. In our state as in many states, we've done vulnerability scanning such as offered by DHS. We're one of the states that took them up on that offer of cyber hygiene scanning. We view that as an additional layer of protection and knowledge in our state even though we've done that Las Vegas. We've done penetration tests of those network facing systems that are involved in the conduct of elections. In my opinion, I think the attack profile will continue to change. As online voter registration, as automatic voter registration, and as the use of electronic poll books continues to grow within the country. >> Anyone else? >> Yes. Thank you. Lance Gough. Just to let the Commission know that ever since we got the first computer in our office, we started worrying about somebody hacking it. 14-year-old with a laptop who's a genius in his home basement trying to attack into our system. We have monitors on our equipment. We have somebody trying to get in our system constantly. It's 24 hours a day. So we take this very seriously but we've been prepared for this. We've screened off anything that could do anything with identity theft. That's my biggest concern if somebody got into, got a list of voters. But if you have know phone numbers, you have no social security, you have just the last date of birth, it's a lot harder to get that information out. So the it's something that we've been concerned, I've been concerned for the last 30 years. >> Anyone else? >> Yeah. I think basically all of us in all the states became more aware of it and we started looking into what our states were already doing and I think there was a big differential, but in general, the states were all doing these things already. You have to remember that many states do not have their own IT departments. Most in the elections office. Many of them operate through the state's IT department which is responsible for security and those sorts of protocols. And I think all of us were called upon to find out about that and inform the public. I think it's also time to remind people that in most states, the voter registration list is a public document. The names on the list and it has become a big political issue in many states, including my own, when people became aware that their name on that voter list is public information and now because it's automated can now be, you know, by law, must be given to anyone who pays whatever amount the state is charging to get that list. So it's another thing to remember when we're thinking about how important this all is in the sense that what we all found out when we looked into this when it first came up publicly is that there are multiple I guess you call them redundancies in our system. All of us have backup lists, paper lists. And this is true throughout the election systems which I think is became important to let the public know exactly how many security systems are in place. Many of them ironically paper. And so when you start thinking about what is the importance of all this it, of course we should all be doing those cyber scans and the various protocols that most states, I believe, do have in place either through their main IT department or through their own IT department. But you have to remember again, back to this issue that elections are public. They're transparent. We must inform the public about who are legitimate voters in their district, we must inform them about the vote tallies and all those are public processes, careful put in place. I think that frankly is the greatest protection we have. >> A point that I want to reiterate that was mentioned before was that election officials are control freaks. And so we do have a lot of back ups to back ups absent the large removal of IP addresses given us by the FBI and other agencies based upon phishing reports we've always had a great deal of physical security to our infrastructure. In the state of Florida whenever we have ballot definitions out in our machines or ballots out, it's always two person controlled throughout the process for that. And so there was no -- it was business as usual with regards to physical security with regards to cybersecurity. I think that what highlighted it was third party entities giving us resources with blocks of IP addresses that were pinging our systems that we blocked. So other than that, it was just a normal election. >> In the interest of time I think I'll ask that we -- that I be able to submit questions for the witnesses for the record later on. But I did want to thank you Mr. Hatch again for serving with Price Waterhouse Coopers because I think they had a small fiasco with their election of the Oscars this past February. But we wish you were there. So with that I yield back my time. >> Chairman Masterson: Thank you, we will keep the record open for a period of seven days for the Commissioners to submit statements as well as any interested election officials, advocates to submit questions if you go to EAC.gov you can view the hearing and email clearinghouse at EAC.gov clearinghouse in order to submit questions for the record for the next seven days w that I'll turn to Commissioner McCormick for the panel. >> Thank you, chairman Masterson. He want to thank you for being here. This new development in elections is uncharted territory. So I think we're all kind of trying to figure out what this all means. And I appreciate all your comments and the cooperation we've seen so far from election officials and federal partners and wanted to add my thoughts and prayers for secretary Wyman and we pray you get better very soon could EP of you tell me whether you worked with the DHS and FBI in this past election cycle? If so, can you describe the experience that you have with this federal agencies, what did they provide for you, and what did that experience look like? Start with secretary Merrill and move down >> In my own state we always work with the FBI every election. We have a committee that's established before for lack of a better word, before each election where we work with the FBI with any kind of threat they hear about or we hear about. That was no different. And we did I guess the DHS did come, we did use their cyber cleansing materials or programs. But turns out he we were already doing much of that using different products. But I guess the same thing. Really the only interaction we had. I think that's pretty typical of the states. >> We utilize their cyber hygiene product. However, we have very few internet facing systems on our network. So it did not yield much success. However, we have always taken it a part of logging IP's for vote by mail ballot requests to make sure there aren't multiple requests coming from a single location for multiple people where it's not a library or such. We found the relationship to be very professional, very with my staff and what we do. We're the watchdogs. >> Chairman Masterson: Thank you, Commissioner. >> We did work and have worked closely for a number of years with the states chief information security officer. And the state IT division [ even though our agency, our Secretary of State's office possesses IT resources independently. We did have a good relationship working with the federal and the state DHS resources this cycle. We did bring in the FBI on a claimed hack that was claimed on Twitter from a prominent security researcher. And I think after a visit from a FBI agent inquiring as to the depth of this claimed hack, we believe that it was spurious, but absolutely, we had a good working relationship with them. >> Thank you. Mr. Chairman, do we have time -- one more question? We've been talking a lot about cybersecurity. But the DHS critical infrastructure designation is much wireder than that. It also includes polling places and warehouses and places where equipment is kept. Including the computer systems or voting systems and the spaces, what do you feel are the greatest areas of risk for security in elections and can you describe generally without putting yourselves at risk some of the protocols that you put in place to secure both warehouses and polling places and things of that nature in addition to the computer systems or any systems that are internet facing. We'll go the other way. Start with you, Mr. Timmons. >> Absolutely. In our office, in the stated of Colorado, we've moved very strongly not just in the area of elections but in business registrations towards online access to information as a secretary Merrill indicated, access to a voter registration list generally is public. Across the country. And any time computers are involved and network access to resources are involved, that's a risk point. And that deserves vigilance and care examinersed. Honestly I believe that DHS [ can can be of some assistance the cyber hygiene services, penetration test resources, I think could be helpful. On the part of our office and I think on behalf of the secretaries of states across the country, we'd like to know exactly what they believe those top three risks are. In their assessment of the elections infrastructure. Because we believe that connect help inform them as to those areas where we can effectively take action and prepare ourselves. >> Thank you. >> City of Chicago where our voting equipment is stored is a city owned building, it's also where the police department stores the major hardware there so we're secure 24 hours a day with police guards when we do our logic and accuracy tests we have police presence there 24 hours a day. So I feel very concerned where the voting equipment is stored and our locations. We have camera security 24 hours a day, our buildings on a lock down so I feel very comfortable with that. >> I think the physical security is quite strong in our county and I think election officials country wide are the same. We're just very, we're like mama bears, fiercely protective of the process and controls. The room where we tabulate all of our results is completely separated. It has no connection to any local network or the internet. We have numerous security prenumbered security seals that protect our machines. We're a vote by mail county as well. And we have the two-person requirement any time a ballot is touched or machine is touched you always have two people available. So those controls are good. I think the largest risk to be honest is the Rick of public perception and confidence. Johnson said confidence in the elective process is the foundation of confidence in the government. And I think that's so crucial, especially as candidates or others condemn and talk about the hacking or the high risk in elections. We need to not only make sure that our elections are secure, but we need to make sure that the public understands that they're secure and that the public has confidence when we say yes we have been very careful in doing this. And that's the hardest risk in my mind because we're doing a good job I think of maintaining the security of the elections, now we have to address the public confidence. >> That's a great point. Thank you. It drives me crazy to turn on the TV and hear people say the election was hacked when in fact it wasn't. My belief is the media was hacked probably and the campaigns probably were hacked, buffer the elections were not themselves. So thank you. >> Originally when I was pondering your question I was his physical security because that's especially for some of our smaller jurisdictions, it's something that because of limited resources that they have to deal with. But I would have to agree when Mr. Hatch and his position of misinformation is the greatest risk. It takes often double the amount of time that it takes to explain that misinformation to combat that. And so one of the things that I've often said is that while the news will run with any misinformation or with a misstatement for that, it requires that great deal of time for us to explain that process when the truth of the matter is as was stated earlier, the amount of two-person control, the amount of security that's placed in the elections profession is greater than many professions that I've been a part of. So I think that really that's where we need to spend most our time is to debunk all of the rumors sxr the mess out there of the simplest things of whether the vote by mail ballot was counted to the hacking of systems that are disconnected from the outside world. And so that's our greatest problem today. >> Thank you. Secretary Merrill? >> Yes, I guess I'd third that. I agree that the biggest result from all this and the most difficult to combat was the public perception that this area that's heavily regulated, statutorily controlled, I mean, in our state and many states the physical security of ballots and machinery and warehouses is all controlled by statute. Very strictly. So, yes, our biggest job -- and to put a more positive spin ton I think today the public has a greater understanding than they did a year ago of exactly how secure elections are. So we've made some progress at least I think in explaining it and that's the good part. I have to say, though, to be completely for the right, the breath of the critical infrastructure designation [ to include things like polling places and physical structures was the thing that gave us the most pause. Because those things in almost every state are not at all internet facing or cyber. And strictly controlled by state statute in most states. So that led us to just wonder what they mean by including a polling place, for example, does this mean that somehow this critical infrastructure designation and whatever protocols follow it would follow into being able to decide where polling places were conceivably or the parameters of those polling places, and that really gets into a territory that I think is far afield from cybersecurity. >> Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman >> Chairman Masterson: Thank you Commissioner McCormick. In the interest of time and to live up top my promise to my fellow Commission not to filibuster as I traditionally do I'll ask one question of the county folks and then let you all go. Bring up the next panel. The question for the county folks is how readily available are IT resources to you either from the state, your own county, other places, and what resources do you wish you had or do you seek out particularly after this election as you do post-mortem? >> RIT specialists and department is right down the hall from us and we meet constantly, especially as we're preparing for the election, we're constantly talking about them about the support they're providing, just on an ongoing operational side but also with the security and they're very diligent keeping us aware, making us aware of issues or potential concerns. At the state level, we have a fantastic relationship with our lieutenant governor's office who's the director of elections for the state of Utah. And any time we're meeting with their office, they have their own IT individual kind of like a specialist to their office who is this there with us. That's been just really helpful for us and for him as well to be able to see the issues that are important to oust from an operational standpoint and to bring that technological perspective as well. So in your last question, what do we need? We need funds. It takes the old car commercial, you can pay me now or you can pay me later. If we don't keep constant attention and funding towards the protection of elections infrastructure which could mean equipment, it could be consulting type services, if we don't do it eventually there will be a breach and then it will really cost. >> I would agree as well. Our office has its own IT department. The secretary of the state's IT department works hand in hand with each one of the 67 counties for that. Again, funding. To stay current on all of the applications and security softwares not only from a hardware standpoint but also from a consulting standpoint is something that all states are looking for. And so funding is the key. >> Yes. I'm very fortunate in Illinois that the state Board of Elections oversees the statewide voter registration system. We meet with the state board on a regular basis. The Chicago board of election also has a relationship with the city' IT department, county's IT department. In fact, in the city of Chicago, the county clerk of cook county is the right downstairs and we work very well together. I think we are covering the bases, what we need, but we're looking at purchasing new voting equipment both city and county and this is going to be a large ticket item. And funding, outside funding, would be helpful. >> Thank you all and thank you to all of our panelists for being here. I think to summarize two main themes. One is you all are control freaks. I try to put it a little nicer and that is you all try to manage uncertainty. You spend every day asking yourself what can go wrong, responding to that question and then solving the next problem that comes at you to manage that uncertainty. Put another way, when you talk about resources, if you think a good election is expensive, you should see a bad one. Right? That's really expensive. So as we look at this designation as we bring next panel up I think the questions you all naturally have comes from your healthy skepticism of managing risk and change so. I hope we get so some of those questions. I can tell you this Commission will continue to push to understand, ask questions and develop the kind of resources you all need as election officials whether that be IT training classes as you mentioned or simply providing forums like that. We'll take a five-minute break to bring up the next panel and then start promptly at 11:10. (Break) assistance program. Received invaluable support from the Election Assistance Commission. Couldn't have done that have of what we did without the help of the EAC and the expertise you provided and connections you provided to the election officials. Greatly appreciated insights and assistance we received from NAS, NAS and EAC helped guide our work and helped scope us and allowed us to focus efforts on what we could do in the short time we had when we started this work in the summer. In the lead up to the election day, we offered some no cost voluntary technical assistance to election officials. As discussed we offered our cyber hygiene service scanning of externally facing IP addresses of system systems done at the request of election officials and provided automated reports detailing vulnerabilities we can see and possible mitigations for those vulnerabilities. As has been noted by election day we had signed up 33 states and 36 state local jurisdictions up for the service and we've added some locals since and can add more. We also learned a lot from these scans. Distribution of the vulnerabilities that we saw was not atypical from what we see in other sectors to include federal departments and agencies other state and local officials or critical infrastructure. And by that I mean we didn't see a critical amount of -- also saw thousands of vulnerabilities from mitigated during this work. Election officials were take the information and using that information to mitigate vulnerabilities. We also offered risk vulnerability assessment service a more detailed service that offers internal and external scanning of systems. We note this is still available but the wait for this is long. Free service is popular and it's very, high demand for it with our federal departments and agencies, critical infrastructure private sector owners, and state and local officials across the nation. In the lead up to the election we shared best practices and threat information through national cybersecurity communications integration center, and the multi state information sharing and analysis center. We provided joint analysis reports that provided indicators we received from our intelligence community and law enforcement officials and provided that to election officials through the EAC to allow them to thin their own networks from these threats. We also provided best practices documents how to secure voter registration database and is how to make sure your systems were protected from destructive malware takes. These opportunities are still available today and we encourage election officials to use them whenever possible. Our cyber hygiene in particular is scaleable offers great funt for election officials to manage their cyber risk using a free service. Also wanted to on it it clear election officials have done a gent job. Provides a high level of security [ [ and election officials have excellent practices in place to ensure physical security of their equipment. From a practical matter the 20 states we know were starting last summer intrusions in only two. The other 18 we saw that add rememberization attempted to get into the system but were stopped by defenses officials had established. We must remain vigilant especially in the face of determined nation stays adversaries. Of course the reason we're ear today critical infrastructure designation. In January DHS made decision to establish an election infrastructure sub sector within government facility sector for election infrastructure. Our analysis already established systems and assets that make up election infrastructure meet the statutory definition of critical infrastructure since the incat tags or instruction would have a debilitating impact on national public safety mainly by impinging on ability to have a peaceful transition of power. Secretary Johnson made the decision to establish a sub sector and publicly state the election infrastructure was critical infrastructure. That allowed us to do the following. We can now work with you in a formal institutionalized but voluntary way to reduce vulnerabilities over time and inform security efforts from a physical and a cyber perspective. Our approach to critical infrastructure is and always has been and all all hazards approach both cyber and physical. We can work to establish coordinating councils to share information quickly and routinely. Also provide you with security clearances so we can share classified threat information that can inform your security priorities. We can prioritize efforts specially to provide technical assistance to you and designation allows us to publicly state attacks on election infrastructure will result in actions from U.S. Government to respond and retaliate. Critical infrastructure designation does not give the federal government any new regulatory authorities or control over your activities. Simply provides services and avenues for us to work together effectively to increase the security and resilience of your systems. A little bit of of time on coordinating councils. We see this as priority item going forward and is the best way to show value and benefit of the establishment of the sub sector. Coordinating councils are the way federal government works voluntarily with non-federal partners to include state and local tribal and territorial regional and private sector partners. To ensure security and resilience of nation's critical infrastructure, as outlined in the national infrastructure protection plan. Coordinating councils are the CEO or CSO level engagement forum where entities discuss strategy and policy issues related to secure and resilience and discuss risk management at the sector level. Typically a sector will have a government coordinating council or GCC and a sector coordinating council or SCC. These coordinating councils work together to share information. The government coordinating council is typically made of federal and state and local partners. DHS is specific agency will lead this group but we'll seek support for EAC as U.S. Government experts in this space. The GCC is more complicated in this case. Mainly because the necessary distance and separation between the federal government and state and local government on these issues. We want election officials to be able to leverage the critical infrastructure protections the sub sector designation allows and want them to do so amongst themselves without federal government allowed if they so choose. [ [ For election officials. In addition, the sector coordinating council would be composed of the vendors, suppliers and other entities that may need to participate in this work. National infrastructure protection plan model keeps the GCC and SCC members separated to allow each council to meet with its membership and so election officials, for example, can meet separately without their vendors and vice versa for the vendors to meet without their election officials present if needed to discuss issues. Each of these coordinating councils will need to set up a charter which is up to the sub sector members and our role is the DHS provide some examples and best practices on this topic and help them going forward. These councils can meet together under the critical infrastructure protection advisory council or CPAC to discuss issues of interest with some protections for the security related information discussed. We understand that we need to keep this information and process transparent, it's very important to maintain that transparency. We also want to emphasize that security information in these conversations does need to be kept out of the public to allow vendors and election officials to mitigate vulnerabilities before they're made public. Our office of infrastructure protection is in the process of developing a preliminary plan for engaging with the election infrastructure community on this partnership and its benefits this will also provide insight from our sectors and best practices in the establishment of the sector. It's then up to the interested participants to voluntarily stand up respective councils establish charters and decide on governance structures meeting frequency. You may want to consider leveraging existing organizations such as NAS to build and the councils. This will ultimately be your decision. You may also elect to stand up information sharing and analysis organization or information sharing analysis center as the operational sharing body that works with the sector. These don't have to be a formal relationship between the coordinating councils and ISACS but that may be something that can be done. Before I close I want to address the issue of the reports of DHS scanning on state election systems. We are aware of these requests in each case where a state reached out to us regarding these attempted scans. We have worked with the state to make sure they understand and that we come to an agreement that these are, this was authorized normal activity coming from DHS users. One of the things we have worked hard with in our public private partnership is to gain that level of trust. And these the questions that we have received have shown us that we need to learn how to engage with state and local election officials and we've done that and in all cases but one come to an agreement with the state that what we're doing and showing is actual normal traffic coming from our users through professional or personal use of their work to access the state and local election officials website as normally intended. In closing, we know that you have questions, we know that state and local election officials have concerns and look forward to answer being those and working with you especially through cyber task force to assure this is a voluntary process that will not result in any new regulations or federal oversight of your processes. As we've learned in cybersecurity regulations don't always work in a security regime. Protecting election infrastructure from incidents requires voluntary non-regulatory collaboration with election officials and vendors that works to ensure resilience while protecting privacy and civil liberties. [ Based on their own knowledge of how they're systems operate and their business and mission needs. Regulations can be counter privilege in this type of regime. The security and resilience of election system is critical to the long term health of our democracy. [. With that I'm going to turn it over Bob Hanson. >> Neil and I forgot or darth vader helmets. I'm going to lay out two things to discuss before we turn it over to you for questions. First of all, the analysis that we developed in advance of the 2016 election to help inform the department's decision making around election issues and then secondly, our analytic path forward that will help inform our activities in this space as we move forward. So first of all, in terms of the analysis that we developed in advance of the 2016 election, to put some context around it it's something we put together very quickly. We scoped just around cybersecurity issues when we spoke with people from the states, national association of secretaries of states, yourself, and other federal agencies involved with the elections, many people raised their physical security concerns to you've got a lot of people gathered add polling places and there are bad things this can happen when you have large crowds together. We scoped that out of analysis because we wanted to understand the cybersecurity issue but but going forward that's something we're want to have a longer discussion on. Secondly, in terms of how we developed the analysis, we did work very closely with national association of secretaries of state, with several secretaries of states offices staff, with you all, with the NIST and other partners again because we're not the subject matter experts in elections and we wanted to understand from you all what you thought the relevant issues were here. So quick discussion in terms of analysis around consequences, there's been a very tight focus with some people on the potential for manipulation of votes which is absolutely a consequence that we were concerned about. At the same time, there are other consequences that we were concerned about. Secretary of State Merrill mentioned that many people were seeking to essentially steal identities or personal identifiable information from voter lists which as she noted is kind of funny because if people just ask in most cases it would be provided by Secretary of State's Office. Statement stealing information like that does present in itself a vulnerability. There was a case a few years ago where a security researcher looked at a system in marry land and found you were able to change somebody's voter registration information if you were able to get some of their personal information. We're also concerned about loss of public confidence as was also mentioned by the previous group. If people even have a hint that they think an election might have been stolen or it wasn't -- it wasn't conducted as they wanted to, the impacts the government to be devastating. People questioning legitimate is I of in terms the analysis, we focused on three different phases [ of the elections and we aligned that with the NIST standards for how they're following, how they frame the process for elections. We looked' preelection activities, we looked at activities on election day even though again that's kind of a misnomer because with early voting and other activities everything happens on election day and post election activities when tabulation of votes is happening. Again, as Secretary of State Merrill mentioned a lot of the action in terms of preelection activity that we were concerned about from a cybersecurity perspective was around voter registration databases. That's not necessarily just internet connected voter registration databases because often we find when we work in anything, that's in any kind of computer, it may be connected to the internet in a way people don't, did not realize. So as I said we were worried about people stealing information from those voter databases but also people manipulating the information in the voter database toss either enable people to vote who shouldn't be or to deny people who should be able to vote the ability to vote. In terms of election day activities what we were concerned about from a risk perspective was when we first started our analysis wet a lot of people worried about manipulating votes on a voting machine. As we looked at that issue, the resources it would take to manipulate votes at thousands of voting machines even within a state just the resources that it would take to do that, if that were the problem, we were way past our level of engagement really being helpful there. What we were more worried about was looking back at voter registration databases, some kind of manipulation the rolls happening that would prevent valid voters from being able to vote or enable people who who you had h should not be able to vote from voting. In terms of post election activities, what we were concerned about was and one gentleman on the previous panel did mention some kind of malicious activity happening around vote tabulation and there are two ways that could happen. The first would be in the actual systems that are used to tabulate votes somebody manipulating votes there likelihood very low. The resources very high. And this is one place where in general finding that we had about the risk picture from cybersecurity perspective, in terms of the elections, is because of the diversity of different processes and systems used by the states and counties, essentially you had resilience in that diversity where you can't crack one system and you cracked all 50 or 51 or how many numbers you want to put on this. You have to crack 51 systems let alone systems at the county level. Our most likely but kind of worst case senator concern in terms of election night was a manipulation of the publicly reported results where you might have an election day one person being declared winner of some election and as the robust canvassing processes started to kick in, that the 2016 election wasn't the first election where people were concerned about somebody trying to steal an election. Those robust canvassing processes might determine the vote totals reported on election night weren't correct and then getting back to the public confidence concern you have a public that was told somebody won an election night on that's what people are really paying attention to and find out through the canvassing process a different candidate won and you've essentially got both sides potentially crying foul on the process. That was our 2016 focusing in addition. We had a few emerging issues we were concerned about that weren't going to be problems in 2016 but we think will impact the risk picture in the future. E poll books are a potential source going forward. There are a lot of ways that can be used to either deny legitimate voters right to vote or [ I will legitimate voters the right to vote and in general the adoption of technology is in itself a risk which isn't really a popular perspective. Some people we work with in the critical infrastructure space that would prefer everybody still be use abacus, I don't know what the plural is there, and manual overrides for all processes and not connecting to a computer which is not really a path forward that anybody can see in any space. Secondly, as many voting machines were purchased in the aftermath of the help America vote act, we're starting to reach the end of lifecycle for many voting machines. Some companies are projecting by some [ so with any big technology buy like that there's the potential for pad things to happen either you adopt new technology and didn't realize there was a vulnerability in the technology you adopted, we saw in Virginia a few years ago voting machines that had been purchased by either the state or county, I'm not sure which, turned out to have the security vulnerability that nobody realized until a security researcher essentially found it on their own. So path forward on the analysis we're doing is we're trying to do three different products that are going to inform the department's efforts in this space. The first is going to be a characterization of election systems just to inform basically from a homeland security perspective what we care about. One finding we generally have when talking about any infrastructure sector is generally we're not, we at the department are not the subject matter experts. We aren't the subject matter experts on nuclear facilities or on the chemical sector necessarily. And so we need to have those foundational products that really lay out what our election systems, why do care about them. Secondly, as Mr. Timmons noted. Right now there are a lot of potential risks and each one of them can scare individuals on their own. One thing that we do at the department is try to develop risk assessments of homeland security risks in certain sectors and we have structured processes and methodologies to help assess homeland security risks and we'd like to apply those methods to assess risk in this space. The third product we'd like to do is focused on emerging risks in this space. For risk assessment you prefer quantitative information but something like E poll books since they haven't been necessarily widely adopt yet we need to have a qualitative discussion around and. What's going to be important about those products I mentioned is that they're done in partnership with this community. We've already engaged with national association of secretary of the states staff and with you an a little bit but I'd like to engage with you all more formally on engaging with the community here, because again we're not the subject matter experts on this, and also as we develop the analysis getting it reviewed. It's going to be important that whatever analysis we put together that's going to inform our efforts in this space is technically valid and credible and put together in partnership with you all. So I understand that there are technical review committees or something along those lines set up by EAC and we would like to gej with you to figure out if that other another method would be a good way to engage with the community going forward. >> Chairman Masterson: Thank you both. Appreciate your time and comments. Start with commissioner McCormick with questions and then kind of volley questions at you until either time expires or you tap out. >> Thank you both for being here. I appreciate your willingness to come and discuss this infrastructure designation. I know that you felt resistance of community including myself, but I just want to assure you that we want to cooperate in any way possible and we are of course naturally skeptical and it is not against either of you personally, but or anyone else working on this, but it is a concern of ours. So with that, I have a lot of questions, but I won't get into all of them. I will probably submit some of them for the record and to be answered later. But Mr. Hanson, I appreciate you stating that you are not subject matter experts. Have either of you actually been involved running an election tale at any level? >> No. >> Mr. Hanson >> Not in managing an election and -- >> Other than voting have you worked an election? >> Not in managing. In working for a candidate >> Working for a candidate. Okay. >> But I do think that is not atypical for how we deal with all our sectors. Sometimes we're lucky and have people on work at DHS who come from the financial services sector and work with treasury. In most cases our employees don't have in depth knowledge of those systems unless they are working with those sectors on an every day basis >> So respectfully without having any subject matter expertise, you need the people in this room, for example, to actually work on this >> That's why we did a lot of outreach early in the process with EAC, with NAS to help build what we needed to do to shape what we needed to do. Those interactions that we had with EAC and with NAS late in the summer really affected what had we were going to do, what we tried to do, needed to do in shape the outcomes of what we did based on the expertise we got >> You've actually shaped something here? Because I don't know what the shape of of this looks like yet. >> So by that, by shaping, I mean from our perspectives, based on our limited expertise, when we went into this issue in July we saw this as a problem with internet voting. Those conversations were quickly dispelled by conversations with the experts on this. We realized the problems were not necessarily on that. The problems were more towards voter registration databases which is with we were seeing being targeted in the work that we were doing. So while we may not be experts in how an election was run, we're certainly more experts in how cybersecurity matters are handled. We were able to work with our partners in the federal government and intelligence community and law enforcement to understand what the risk picture was starting to look like from the threat side where the threat was targeting what they were going after and able to shape that with the work engaging with the EAC and with NAS on what is in the realm of the possible, what can election officials do, what do they need to do and worked, that's why we got to the point where we were offering our cyber hygiene for interfacing technologies. This sector is certainly not the first we have dealt well that's been skeptical. I think that's typical of the work we've done in the past when we stood up new sectors. We've seen worry, we've seen a lot of concern about what does this mean for their every day operations. But through work with the sector, work with the actual experts, we show that what we're providing has security and resilience information a way to get information from the federal government that can shape what you need to do to help make your systems more and you're and resilient. Providing you with the information additional technical assistance you need. >> So many questions. Are you suggesting the efforts to date in the election space have been inadequate or delinquent? >> Absolutely not. >> In security? >> Absolutely not. I think that was something we've been very up front about. The security and the diversity of the system, diversity of the system providing security and I think that we are, it's very clear to us that the physical security is extremely good on the election officials side. It's extremely career to us working with election officials how much of control freaks they are and how good they are at planning. Coming from a planning background myself working with military planners, with other planners in the federal government, the planning expertise embedded in election officials is just high if not higher than those other communities. So I have utmost confident in their ability to plan. What we want to do is make sure the information that we get from the federal government side from an intelligence and law enforcement perspective is also provided to election officials quickly and in a way they can digest and use it to help round out that security picture. >> So you mentioned that folks might need to get security clearances in order to work with you on these issues. Would that include just state election officials, local election officials? IT officials? County IT officials? What kind of scope are we looking at in security clearances here? >> So we're looking at that and that's something we need to figure out from our perspective and from the election officials perspective what is needed. The reason security clearances in this space are important is so that stakeholders can prioritize their efforts. Admittedly we in federal government give security information to our stakeholders. We give hundreds of reports indicators on a day-to-day basis. And what we often need to do is sometimes sit down with a CEO or a state homeland security advisor in a classified way and tell them this particular product we're talking to you about is directly related to a specific threat we know about right now. And then they can take that product that's unclassified and then work with their people that do not have security clearances and tell them and highlight and prioritize for them this is work that you need to do. This is work we need to implement. Often the IT folks that are working for those CEOs don't have security clearances and they don't need them. They just needed product and they need their boss to tell them go and implement this. And that's how we typically work this. So I think in some states we'll find that providing the Secretary of State with the security clearance may be enough. In other states where the Secretary of State doesn't have direct control over other things happening in the election in their states we may have to take a different approach. But that's something we're going to be looking at >> With 8,000 jurisdictions the scope of this is just immense. >> One thing I want to note is classified information is one type of security information that we share but we also have sensitive but unclassified information that we call official use only that's also valuable. And again, being acknowledged as part of the homeland security here, it essentially establishes that need to know. Many of the products that are actually developed by the Office of Cyber infrastructure analysis where I work that are relevant in your space today, look at issues like active shooter or emerging cybersecurity risks, are available through the hs homeland security information sharing network where you have to have a need to know and you have to apply for an account but it's not the same as sclurt clearance, not the same burdensome process. So this designation will give election officials access to that information just right off the bat. >> Okay. You mentioned that you're concerned about the manipulation of voter registration lists. Are you suggesting there could be fraud on the voter registration lists? >> I'm not the first person, I think -- >> I think you're not. Although there's been a lot of resistance too that >> I'm not certain that any of this has happened. It is a risk. [. >> From our past experience if someone has access to the database and can take that database, they could also leave that database there and make changes on it. They could leave that database there and they could delete some entries on it and those are the kinds of things we're really worried about in terms of voter registration databases is an add remember vary's ability to affect the integrity or availability of those databases when election officials need them >> Audits of registration lists would be probably recommended? >> Absolutely. >> Okay. You mentioned your greatest concern is manipulation of publicly reported votes on election night. Of course this has been an issue since Dewy defeats true man in 1948 way before the adoption of technology. Why do you think this is a greater risk now than in 1948 >> For exactly the reason of the adoption of more and more technology into the system. As you adopt more technology it just introduces more vectors for potential compromise. So it's not that -- again -- >> You mentioned voter confidence I think -- I don't see the difference in the issue from '48 to. Same kind of election night reporting. [ >> We're seeing the impacts today of people being more concerned about this issue now than they have been in the past. I mean, as people talk about some of the issues that have been swirling in this space, there are -- there are the seeds of people doubting the are a legitimate ma is I of -- >> Which has been forever. >> It's been -- >> Without the technology >> But I think the problem is that the technology enables actors that in the forties would not be able to create a dewy defeats true man moment now be able to do that >> The news was not malicious did I -- >> Why? I think you could take over a newspaper in 1948 and do the same thing. >> Sure, yeah, you could. So that was a threat then. I think it's a threat now. It's a threat -- >> Suddenly this has been raised to such a level that's the most concern that we have over manipulating the system >> So I would restate and I think what Bob ment was as he led up to election day that became one of our big worries on election day. I think going forward now, that's still a concern. But I don't think I would label it as our primary concern. >> It's not our primary concern. It was our concern leading up, it was probably but most impactful scenario leading up to the 2016 election. One thing that's important is when they reported dew why. Defeats true man the newspaper wasn't -- in terms of public confidence when public is going to get worried about something they're much more worried about the potential of individuals [ or other actors to potentially manipulate an election as opposed to a newspaper just running to print too quickly. >> We can get into this longer, but I don't see a whole lot of the differences of the concern at least from the voter's side. You mentioned that 20 days voter registration systems were scanned. Are all those 20 states aware of the scan >> Yes they are >> Can we get a list those states please >> We do not provide that information out publicly. >> Can the EAC get the list of those states? >> We may be able to talk about that, but we would not publicly release them. >> Okay. 33 states and 33 local jurisdictions took advantage of DHS's resources. Can we get a list those jurisdictions? >> Not publicly. >> EAC get a list of those >> We may be able to discuss that after this. >> Just by practice, by what we do working with critical infrastructure stakeholders, a lot of the work we do requires -- revolves and anonymity between us at DHS and the entity we're working with and we protect their identity, protect their information, we protect their privacy and civil liberties. We treat the state and local election officials in the same way. Which is why we haven't provided any lists publicly of what states participated and what states did not >> I think this goes to my concern about transparency and all of this. I think the public deserves to understand what's going on with their voting system. Does DHS conduct the cyber resources itself or contract those activities out to non-government companies? >> The offerings that we have provided to election officials are DHS services we do not use contractors for those services or we do not use contracted capabilities for those services >> You mentioned the win vote system in Virginia did DHS have a role in dessert fatigue that system or discovering issues with it? >> No >> I have tons more questions but I know my fellow Commissioners would like to have some question time as well. Thank you. >> Thank you, commissioner Hicks? >> Thank you for being here. I wanted to expand upon -- in terms of having institutional knowledge on becoming a poll worker. I think the designation of critical infrastructure for elections is different than banks or water ways in that there's an opportunity for DHS workers to serve as poll workers and actually see this from the inside. So I would encourage folks to do that. I know that there's elections all the time for instance I know there's elections going on right now in Missouri. So I think that actually going into seeing this from the inside might give a better perspective of how our elections are run and I know that it helped me a great deal when I was a little bit on younger side as well. In terms of ensuring transparency, I think that there are a lot of individuals who have a great fear of the government in general whether or not that be on left or right on down the middle. When you talk about involving the vendors as well, I think that there's a lot of folks who feel that the vendors have proprietary software and not let those things out. I wanted to hear a little bit more about how you want to oshgs, hour you want to maintain transparency while involving vendors or not letting people know who's being scanned and things like that as well. And then I have a couple or questions as well. >> When we work with the private sector in other critical infrastructure sectors, we work with them to decide what they need from a risk management perspective. How they need to shape their sector from a risk management perspective. What they need from the federal government for that. So as part of this process, when we engage with the private sector vendors for election infrastructure, we will work with them and seek to have conversations about what it is you want, what kind of information do you want, how can we work best with you to get you that information, our role will not be to go in and certify any systems or to do any kind of technical assistance with those companies unless they ask for that. We can provide those services going forward if they request it. But it's not something that will be mandated but it is a -- it is the heart of our private public partnership that we work with private sector to be collaborative to provide information, to have robust conversations around security and resilience that we can leverage to improve their security and resilience going forward >> Striking the right balance between transparency and proprietary information that's why it's going to be so critical to have active engagement with you all as we work to stand up the governance framework that's going to be put around this sub sector councils that will be establish. You all know better than us what's the right way to -- what information should be discussed openly, when it comes to security information, when do we start clampg down on that discussion. You all are going to know that better than us which is why we need the active involvement of the community. >> I have a ton of questions but I'll just -- I'll leave it with two quick ones. Whatever you do in terms of moving forward with solutions or cybersecurity or physical security, I want to implore that you do not forget about the disabled community and ensuring that they have full access to voting and moving forward with that as well. Also, what may work in New Hampshire may not work in California so that there's no one size fits all in terms of when you look towards solutions. And lastly, something that struck me. You said Russia was the nation state that led the attack. Are there any other nation states that instituted any sort of attacks on our election systems? >> Not that we are aware of. >> Okay. And with that, I'll stop. >> Thank you, commissioner Hicks. About five minutes remaining. I have quite a few questions too, but try to prioritize. Short answers are better. And we'll see. The first and perhaps most pressing question is, can we expect and if so, when, a clear indication from this administration that the designation is here to stay? Is that something we should expect as a community? >> So I think that statement was made by the secretary when he was asked that at congress yam testimony a couple weeks ago. His indication was that we were going to stay with the designation. >> Okay. Is there a scenario in which the designation could be rescinded or rolled back is that something that happens? >> It could happen. But there's no indications that it will happen >> Okay. Tangibly for election officials, details matter. As you heard. They're detail oriented people. What tangibly are the next steps, what happens next, what are can they expect? We've heard reports Mr. Hanson is working on three reports, we've heard coordinateing councils, do you need coordinating councils before reports and what are the time frames >> I can talk to some of the issues with the coordinating councils and planning. Essentially we would like to begin meeting with election officials mainly I think our initial contact about be lieu NAS cybersecurity task force we see that as a robust body to work with to address questions and concerns and provide what we have on best practices and guidance for establishing coordinating councils. We also look to the EAC to help us determine how to best get to the local communities so we can work with local election officials on these same issues and hear their concerns. But within the next couple weeks I hope that we can have meetings and at least preliminary conversations with NAS and task force prior to the July meetings so we can get some stuff going with that. And then potentially have a more robust conversation surrounding the July NAS meeting. >> In terms of the reports we're working on it's a parallel and linked effort with what's going on with the sub sector designation but it's not -- it's not a dependency. We have an interest in terms of understanding the election, I say sector not like capital S sector but these systems no matter what. And what we don't want to end up in is a similar situation to a year ago where all of a sudden a bunch of people get very worried about this and we don't have a great understanding of the space. So these products we would like them to inform all of the discussions around the sub sector going forward, but they're being done independently so that the department can work with your community to better understand the risk in this space >> The good news or bad news for you is I think as you heard people are already concernment you've got their attention. Is it the expectation or can we get your commitment that these reports will be vetted through the community in order to weigh in and inform your work? >> I mean, it's not just a commitment. I am asking you for help in this. It needs to happen. I can't write these in a vacuum. >> I think we'll leverage NAS cybersecurity task force and also like the support of the EAC standards board to work through those issues as well. >> Two questions from the previous panel that I thought are particularly important. First is what resources become available to election officials because of this designation that weren't already available to election officials for instance, this past election that you offered? So what benefit or resources comes that previously weren't available >> >> The main benefit will be through coordinating council structure itself at this point because the technical assistance that we provided leading up to the election are still available to election officials and will remain available. [. The benefit of the coordinating council is that more robust regular engagement that we can have and we'll have an office within DHS whose job it will be to be the sector specific agency for election officials. So they will be able to share information robustly, they will be thinking about election infrastructure all the time, be engage be with maliciously officials to build this stuff out and understand what the election officials need and be able to provide security and resilience information through that channel and we won't be doing this from an ad hoc way going forward. >> So that answer suggests that the election officials if which he choose not to engage don't have to. They don't have to come ask for those resources >> We would still work to provide those resources like our unclassified information sharing products, best practices documents, as broadly as possible. We would give those to the council and we could have conversations with the coordinating council about those. But we would also share them with EAC, we would give them to the multi state information sharing and analysis centers so they would go out to all the states. Our product distribution and our reports that go out will not be limited to just those who choose to participate in the sector. They will go to everyone and then everyone can use them as they see fit >> Chairman Masterson: Is there any money associated with the? You heard up here the two main concerns are resources as many money and public confidence. And so what's the impact -- this happens to me a lot, actually. What resources are available as far as money or may become available as a result of this designation, if any? >> So as of right now, no additional resources are available in terms of money or funds to election officials. Election officials are encouraged to leverage their -- the FEMA grant process on attempt to request funds through that process. We know that's hard. We know that's going to be very difficult for states to do but we encourage election officials to try that in the interim. We are looking at possibilities, but I think in the absence of a resources that come from Congress or from some new congressional authorization, there won't be direct funding that comes from DHS outside of the normal state and local grant program. >> Chairman Masterson: All right. Final I guess question is or response is how do you respond to the election officials and the election community and I think we heard each one of the panelists up here express it to this concern that there needs to be respect for the line of what the federal role is here, that it is important to the citizens and confidence of the process that the federal government and doesn't matter which administration, doesn't come in and take over or have too great a reach into the process. And that's something I think universally we've heard and I think is fair. How do you respond to that concern? >> We would is I we're going to show you how we work this process. And that is without regulation, without any kind of enforcement, without any requirements that are not currently in place. The critical infrastructure designation doesn't provide authorities for us [ [. And look at the legislation and what we can do legally. But the Department of Homeland Security, the way we work with critical infrastructure is not through regulations, it's through partnerships, through voluntary partnerships sharing of information, listening to the community, determining what they want and then working with them to provide that information. >> Chairman Masterson: Okay. Anything else? >> I just want to say the EAC of course wants to cooperate in any way possible and our budget is actually being cut. This is outside of our mission of HAVA. So we'll do what we can but it's going to be a struggle for us even on the funding issue. And I think I have a the states are facing and localities are facing the same issues. I just wanted to put that out there. Thank you. >> Thank you both for being here and I do have a few more questions but I will submit those for the record. >> Chairman Masterson: With your permission, we'll collect over the next week additional questions not just from us but the community and then share them with you and work to get responses if that's all right. Just in closing and I don't think this is h this will surprise y'all, but I think you said it and I think the prior panel set it. I think it's an important way to close. The process worked in 2016. The process served voters well, provided accessibility and accurate process with integrity. And so moving forward as this designation is explored, and questions are asked and answered. Let's understand that election officials did a darn good job in this last election and rose to the challenge in an election cycle I don't think none of us have ever seen before. And so they are professionals that administered a professional process, and to the extent we can help them, I think that's what we want to do. But I think it's important to recognize what great work they did this election cycle in the face of real challenges, both perception wise and otherwise. I do want to thank you you all your time. This probably isn't the first or last engagement we'll have and I want to thank the prior panelists and my fellow Commissioners for the meeting here today. So with that I would entertain a motion to adjourn >> Before the motion to adjourn I would say that this stuff will be archived on the EAC.gov website and that we should get as much information as we can so folks can go to that. With that I move we adjourn >> I second >> Chairman Masterson: All those in favor? Opposed? The meeting is adjourned. (Meeting adjourned)

Contents

Major events

Major legislation

First Session

The first session of Congress, known as the "Hundred Days", took place before the regular seating and was called by President Roosevelt specifically to pass two acts:

  • March 9, 1933: The Emergency Banking Act (ch. 1, 48 Stat. 1) was enacted within four hours of its introduction. It was prompted by the "bank holiday" and was the first step in Roosevelt's "first hundred days" of the New Deal. The Act was drafted in large part by officials appointed by the Hoover administration. The bill provided for the Treasury Department to initiate reserve requirements and a federal bailout to large failing institutions. It also removed the United States from the Gold Standard. All banks had to undergo a federal inspection to deem if they were stable enough to re-open. Within a week 1/3 of the banks re-opened in the United States and faith was, in large part, restored in the banking system. The act had few opponents, only taking fire from the farthest left elements of Congress who wanted to nationalize banks altogether.
  • March 10, 1933: The Economy Act of 1933. Roosevelt, in sending this act to Congress, warned that if it did not pass, the country faced a billion dollar deficit. The act balanced the federal budget by cutting the salaries of government employees and cutting pensions to veterans by as much as 15 percent. It intended to reassure the deficit hawks that the new president was fiscally conservative. Although the act was heavily protested by left-leaning members of congress, it passed by an overwhelming margin.
President Franklin D. Roosevelt signs the Tennessee Valley Authority Act
President Franklin D. Roosevelt signs the Tennessee Valley Authority Act

The session also passed several other major pieces of legislation:

Second Session

Constitutional amendments

Hearings

"Merchants of Death"

The Senate Munitions Committee came into existence solely for the purpose of this hearing. Although World War I had been over for sixteen years, there were revived reports that America's leading munition companies had effectively influenced the United States into that conflict, which killed 53,000 Americans, hence the companies' nickname "Merchants of Death."

The Democratic Party, controlling the Senate for the first time since the first world war, used the hype of these reports to organize the hearing in hopes of nationalizing America's munitions industry. The Democrats chose a Republican renowned for his ardent isolationist policies, Senator Gerald P. Nye of North Dakota, to head the hearing. Nye was typical of western agrarian progressives, and adamantly opposed America's involvement in any foreign war. Nye declared at the opening of the hearing "when the Senate investigation is over, we shall see that war and preparation for war is not a matter of national honor and national defense, but a matter of profit for the few."

Over the next eighteen months, the "Nye Committee" (as newspapers called it) held ninety-three hearings, questioning more than two hundred witnesses, including J.P. Morgan, Jr. and Pierre du Pont. Committee members found little hard evidence of an active conspiracy among arms makers, yet the panel's reports did little to weaken the popular prejudice against "greedy munitions interests."

The hearings overlapped the 73rd and 74th Congresses. They only came to an end after Chairman Nye provoked the Democratic caucus into cutting off funding. Nye, in the last hearing the Committee held in early 1936, attacked former Democratic President Woodrow Wilson, suggesting that Wilson had withheld essential information from Congress as it considered a declaration of war. Democratic leaders, including Appropriations Committee Chairman Carter Glass of Virginia, unleashed a furious response against Nye for "dirtdaubing the sepulcher of Woodrow Wilson." Standing before cheering colleagues in a packed Senate chamber, Glass slammed his fist onto his desk in protest until blood dripped from his knuckles, effectively prompting the Democratic caucus to withhold all funding for further hearings.

Although the "Nye Committee" failed to achieve its goal of nationalizing the arms industry, it inspired three congressional neutrality acts in the mid-1930s that signaled profound American opposition to overseas involvement.

Party summary

For details, see Changes in membership, below.

Senate

There were 48 states with two Senators per state, this gave the Senate 96 seats. Membership changed with four deaths, one resignation, and two appointees who were replaced by electees.

Party
(shading indicates majority caucus)
Total
Democratic Farmer–Labor Progressive Republican Vacant
End of previous Congress 46 1 0 48 95 1
Begin (March 4, 1933) 59 1 0 36 96 0
March 11, 1933 35 95 1
May 24, 1933 60 96 0
June 24, 1933 59 95 1
October 6, 1933 34 94 2
October 10, 1933 60 95 1
October 19, 1933 35 96 0
November 3, 1933 59 95 1
December 18, 1933 60 96 0
Final voting share 62.5% 1.0% 0.0% 36.5%
Beginning of next Congress 70 1 1 23 95 1

House of Representatives

Membership changed with twelve deaths and three resignations.

Party
(shading indicates majority caucus)
Total
Democratic Farmer–Labor Progressive Republican Vacant
End of previous Congress 220 1 0 207 428 7
Begin (March 4, 1933) 311 5 0 117 433 2
April 22, 1933 312 434 1
April 29, 1933 311 433 2
May 12, 1933 310 432 3
May 17, 1933 309 431 4
June 19, 1933 308 430 5
June 22, 1933 307 429 6
June 24, 1933 308 430 5
July 5, 1933 309 431 4
August 27, 1933 116 430 5
September 23, 1933 308 429 6
October 3, 1933 309 430 5
October 19, 1933 115 429 6
November 5, 1933 114 428 7
November 7, 1933 310 429 6
November 14, 1933 311 430 5
November 28, 1933 312 431 4
December 19, 1933 313 113
December 28, 1933 114 432 3
January 16, 1934 115 433 2
January 30, 1934 116 434 1
April 1, 1934 312 433 2
May 1, 1934 313 434 1
May 29, 1934 115 433 2
June 8, 1934 312 432 3
July 7, 1934 313 433 2
August 19, 1934 312 432 3
August 22, 1934 311 431 4
September 30, 1934 114 430 5
Final voting share 72.4% 1.2% 0.0% 26.4%
Beginning of next Congress 322 3 7 103 435 0

Leadership

Section contents: Senate: Majority (D), Minority (R)House: Majority (D), Minority (R)

Senate

Majority (Democratic) leadership

Minority (Republican) leadership

House of Representatives

Majority (Democratic) leadership

Minority (Republican) leadership

Members

Senate

Senators are popularly elected statewide every two years, with one-third beginning new six-year terms with each Congress. Preceding the names in the list below are Senate class numbers, which indicate the cycle of their election, In this Congress, Class 1 meant their term ended with this Congress, requiring reelection in 1934; Class 2 meant their term began in the last Congress, requiring reelection in 1936; and Class 3 meant their term began in this Congress, requiring reelection in 1938.

House of Representatives

The names of members of the House of Representatives are preceded by their district numbers.

Changes in membership

Senate

State Senator Reason for Vacancy Successor Date of Successor's Installation
Nebraska Robert Howell (R) Died March 11, 1933.
Successor appointed May 24, 1933, to continue the term.
William H. Thompson (D) May 24, 1933
New Mexico Sam Bratton (D) Resigned June 24, 1933, when appointed Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals.
Successor appointed October 10, 1933, and then elected November 6, 1934.
Carl Hatch (D) November 6, 1933
Vermont Porter Dale (R) Died October 6, 1933.
Successor appointed November 21, 1933, and then elected January 17, 1934.
Ernest Gibson (R) October 19, 1933
Wyoming John Kendrick (D) Died November 3, 1933.
Successor appointed December 18, 1933, to finish the term.
Joseph C. O'Mahoney (D) January 1, 1934
Nebraska William Thompson (D) Successor elected November 6, 1934. Richard Hunter (D) November 7, 1934
Montana John Erickson (D) Successor elected November 6, 1934. James E. Murray (D) November 7, 1934

House of Representatives

District Vacator Reason for Vacancy Successor Date of successor's installation
Texas 15th Vacant John Garner had resigned at the end of the previous Congress Milton H. West April 22, 1933
Arizona At-large Vacant Lewis W. Douglas (D) had resigned at the end of the previous Congress Isabella Greenway (D) October 3, 1933
Texas 7th Clay Stone Briggs (D) Died April 29, 1933 Clark W. Thompson (D) June 24, 1933
Arkansas 5th Heartsill Ragon (D) Resigned May 12, 1933, upon appointment as a judge of the United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas David D. Terry (D) December 19, 1933
Georgia 10th Charles H. Brand (D) Died May 17, 1933 Paul Brown (D) July 5, 1933
Louisiana 6th Bolivar E. Kemp (D) Died June 19, 1933 Jared Y. Sanders, Jr. (D) May 1, 1934
Alabama 8th Edward B. Almon (D) Died June 22, 1933 Archibald Hill Carmichael (D) November 14, 1933
Pennsylvania 9th Henry Winfield Watson (R) Died August 27, 1933 Oliver Walter Frey (D) November 7, 1933
West Virginia 3rd Lynn Hornor (D) Died September 23, 1933 Andrew Edmiston, Jr. (D) November 28, 1933
Illinois 21st J. Earl Major (D) appointed as a judge of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois October 6, 1933 Seat remained vacant until next Congress
Vermont At-large Ernest W. Gibson (R) Appointed U.S. Senator October 19, 1933 Charles A. Plumley (R) January 16, 1934
New York 34th John D. Clarke (R) Died November 5, 1933 Marian W. Clarke (R) December 28, 1933
New York 29th James S. Parker (R) Died December 19, 1933 William D. Thomas (R) January 30, 1934
Michigan 3rd Joseph L. Hooper (R) Died February 22, 1934 Seat remained vacant until next Congress
North Carolina 4th Edward W. Pou (D) Died April 1, 1934 Harold D. Cooley (D) July 7, 1934
Pennsylvania 13th George F. Brumm (R) Died May 29, 1934 Seat remained vacant until next Congress
Idaho 2nd Thomas C. Coffin (D) Died June 8, 1934 Seat remained vacant until next Congress
New York 23rd Frank Oliver (D) Resigned June 18, 1934 Seat remained vacant until next Congress
Illinois 20th Henry T. Rainey (D) Died August 19, 1934 Seat remained vacant until next Congress
Kansas 5th William A. Ayres (D) Resigned August 22, 1934, after being appointed a member of the Federal Trade Commission Seat remained vacant until next Congress
Pennsylvania 2nd James M. Beck (R) Resigned September 30, 1934 Seat remained vacant until next Congress

Committees

Lists of committees and their party leaders, for members (House and Senate) of the committees and their assignments, go into the Official Congressional Directory at the bottom of the article and click on the link (4 links), in the directory after the pages of terms of service, you will see the committees of the Senate, House (Standing with Subcommittees, Select and Special) and Joint and after the committee pages, you will see the House/Senate committee assignments in the directory, on the committees section of the House and Senate in the Official Congressional Directory, the committee's members on the first row on the left side shows the chairman of the committee and on the right side shows the ranking member of the committee.

Senate

House of Representatives

Joint committees

Caucuses

Employees

Senate

House of Representatives

See also

References

  1. ^ Huckabee, David C. (September 30, 1997). "Ratification of Amendments to the U.S. Constitution" (PDF). Congressional Research Service reports. Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress.
  2. ^ The Vice President of the United States serves as the President of the Senate. See U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 3, Clause 4
  3. ^ The Democratic Senate Majority Leader also serves as the Chairman of the Democratic Conference.
This page was last edited on 26 September 2018, at 18:46
Basis of this page is in Wikipedia. Text is available under the CC BY-SA 3.0 Unported License. Non-text media are available under their specified licenses. Wikipedia® is a registered trademark of the Wikimedia Foundation, Inc. WIKI 2 is an independent company and has no affiliation with Wikimedia Foundation.