341st Rifle Division (Soviet Union)

Transcription

BATTLEFIELD VIETNAM Countdown to Tet In January 1968 NLF guerrillas backed by North Vietnamese troops... ...launched a full scale offensive... ...against the cities and towns of the South. For two years they had been cautious avoiding big battles,... but at Tet, the Vietnamese new year, they staked everything... ...in one all out bid for victory. The Tet offensive was one of the most stunning surprise attacks ...ever launched by an army. More than 80,000 guerrillas and North Vietnamese troops were thrown against the forces of the South Vietnamese government and their American ally. The battles were on a scale which no one had imagined the Vietcong could achieve. The fighting even spilled into the American embassy in Saigon. The Tet offensive turned into a military catastrophe for the Vietcong. In clashes of shocking violence,... ...the guerrillas lost most of their best fighters. But in one of the greatest ironies in the history of war, the Vietcong's military defeat turned into a political victory. It was a victory that would change the whole course of the war in Vietnam. PRELUDE TO THE BATTLE American forces in South Vietnam had spent 1966... ...massively building up their numbers. Men and supplies poured in. Bases, airfields and port facilities were expanded at a frantic pace. By the start of 1967 the Americans had 389,000 troops and were ready to go on the offensive. The American aim was to defeat the NVA and NLF force, by now numbering nearly 128,000. For seven years the NLF had been fighting to overthrow the government... ...of South Vietnam and reunite the South with the North. The North was backing them with supplies and men. And it sent units of the North Vietnamese Army... ...to fight inside the South. American commanders wanted to take on the enemy's big units,... ...the battalions and regiments. If U.S. forces could destroy them faster than they could be replaced,... ...the war would soon be over. In fact the American strategy had quickly run into trouble. After early battles in which enemy regiments... ...had suffered heavy casualties, they had avoided head on clashes. Instead the Vietcong meant to stick with Hit and Run and ambush. The Vietcong's tactics caused American casualties to rise sharply. Instead of big battles there were snipers, booby traps, and surprise attacks. The Americans grew increasingly frustrated... as they mounted countless Search and Destroy operations, took casualties... ...and still failed to find important guerrilla units. The commander of American forces in Vietnam, General William C. Westmoreland... ...was determined to make Vietcong fight big battles. Only then could superior American firepower be used to the full. One answer, Westmoreland believed, might be... ...to attack in force into the Vietcong's traditional base areas. These, he was sure, the Vietcong would fight to defend. By 1967 there were strong American Marine forces... ...based in the heavily populated coastal areas of Northern South Vietnam. In the central highlands there were army units including the Air Cavalry division. However, the greatest concentration of U.S. Army strength was in the Saigon area and it was there between the capital and the Cambodian border... ...that the Americans launched their biggest operations. The Vietcong base areas targeted by the Americans... ...were the Iron Triangle, only 20 miles from the capital Saigon,... ...and War Zone C near the Cambodian border. Along with War Zone D, these areas held strong NLF regional forces... ...and the elite 9th division. Supplied down the Ho Chi Minh trail from North Vietnam, the bases were springboards for attacks in and around Saigon. In January 1967, the Americans launched Operation Cedar Falls... ...into the Iron Triangle. Between February and May, Operation Junction City swept War Zone C. In Cedar Falls and Junction City, up to 25,000 Americans... ...and South Vietnamese Army troops swept through the NLF's base areas. There were hundreds of firefights and several major NLF attacks... ...with assaults by thousands of guerrillas. But the Americans never did succeed in trapping any of the big units. The Vietcong regiments melted away into forests and swamps or over the border... into Cambodia were the Americans were forbidden to follow. Even though US commanders had failed to provoke the big battles they wanted, ...they were more optimistic than before. They had done massive damage to the Vietcong's installations... ...and had captured huge amounts of supplies. Cedar Falls and Junction City alone had killed nearly 3,000 guerrillas. U.S. forces had also blunted an enemy initiative further North, where the war was between the Americans and the North Vietnamese Army. North and South Vietnam were separated by a Demilitarized Zone... ... inside which troops were not supposed to operate. South of the Zone the American defense against the North Vietnamese Army... ...was a string of fire bases. Khe Sanh, The Rockpile, Camp Carroll, Cam Lo, ...and Dong Ha along route 9, and the newly built Con Thien and Gio Linh. All were controlled by Special Forces units... ...and later the 3rd Marine Division, which constantly swept the surrounding area. Between January and May 1967... ...two North Vietnamese Divisions operating out of the DMZ... ...launched heavy bombardments of these bases. Ground assaults at Con Thien and Khe Sanh... ...were only driven off after massive aerial bombardments. Afterwards the Marines continued to patrol aggressively. The increased North Vietnamese activity on the DMZ... ...triggered an American plan to reinforce the whole area. More Marines were moved up and Army units were redeployed... ...from other parts of South Vietnam. Meanwhile, in the central highlands the Americans intercepted... ...North Vietnamese Army units moving in from Cambodia. In late May 1967 they were 9 days of continuous battles... ...which left hundreds of North Vietnamese soldiers dead. While American ground operations were piling on the pressure... ...in the first half of 1967, the U.S. air campaign against North Vietnam had also been stepped up. The aim of the bombing was to force the North to stop supporting the war. In fact, the bombing and the massive ground assaults... ...were having exactly the opposite effect. Far from giving up, North Vietnam was preparing... ...to unleash the biggest offensive of the war so far. THE LEADERS – North Vietnam Time and again, Ho Chi Minh, the aging North Vietnamese president, ...had proclaimed that the Vietnamese people... ...were prepared to fight for 20 years. He insisted they would pay any price to reunite Vietnam... ...and drive out the Americans. Privately, however, Ho and most of the Hanoi leadership had come to believe... ...that the war could not go on in the same way for much longer. The problem was not just the casualty rate in the South, estimated by the Americans to be at least 5,000 troops dead every month. Such losses could be sustained for a long time yet. The biggest fear was that the safe base areas in Laos and Cambodia... ...or perhaps even in the North itself might soon be invaded by the Americans. There were also worries about how well the morale of the population... ...would stand up to a bombing campaign that might go on for years. The North's leaders foresaw that they might have to negotiate... ...with the Americans sooner or later. But before that happened they were determined to make one more attempt... ...to win the war on the battlefield. In July 1967, the Politburo, led by Party's first secretary Le Duan, proposed an all out offensive in South Vietnam timed for early 1968. Up to recently, command of the war effort in the South had been divided... ...between General Giap, who controlled the North Vietnamese Army's campaigns, ...and General Thanh, who ran the war further South. And there had been disagreement between them about the planned offensive. But just as preparations got underway,... General Thanh died of heart disease in a Hanoi hospital. For years afterward it was thought in the West that he died... ...as a result of an American bombing raid on his Southern Headquarters. As well as the loss of a charismatic leader... ...and the shock to the Vietcong's command, it was an ironic turn. Now Giap was solely responsible for planning the entire campaign. THE LEADERS – United States/South Vietnam Since he had first dispatched combat troops to South Vietnam, the U.S. President, Lyndon Baines Johnson, had been determined... ...to limit the war's impact on the American people. He had refused to call up the reserves and he never pushed for any formal declaration of war by congress. Despite mounting casualties the U.S.... ...never officially declared war on Vietnam. Up to now, Johnson's approach had seemed to pay off. There was some anti-war feeling, but nothing so serious... ...as to threaten the President's policy. However, the toll of American combat casualties... ...now running at more than 600 killed, wounded and missing every month... ...was hardening opposition. The draft call had been increased yet so far no real attempt had been made... ...to get the American public support for the war or its aims. Divisions were beginning to open up... ...between the president's military and civilian advisors. The Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted more damaging targets... ...for the bombing campaign against the North,... ...a widening of the ground campaign into Laos, Cambodia and possibly North Vietnam, ...and a big increase in troop levels. On the other hand, the defense secretary, Robert McNamara,... ...strongly opposed escalating the war. McNamara believed that widening the conflict would run a real risk... ...of drawing in communist China or the Soviet Union. He also believed that the war might be a long one, and if the American people were to support it, the cost would have to be kept down. That meant no wider war, and a big effort... ...to prepare the South Vietnamese Army to take over more of the fighting. In the face of contradictory advice from his military and civilian advisors, President Johnson's reaction was to compromise. The bombing war would be intensified to include a whole range of targets... ...which would hit the North Vietnamese war effort hard. On the other hand, there would be no expansion of the ground war,... the Army would get fewer than 50,000 extra men, and the reserves would not be called up. On September 29th 1967, President Johnson took a step closer... ... to those advisors who were arguing against escalating the war. At San Antonio, Texas, Johnson declared... ...that the US would stop bombing North Vietnam if Hanoi promised... ...not to take advantage of the cease-fire. There was no response from Northern leaders. STRATEGY – North Vietnam/The Vietcong The great offensive meant to change the course of the war... ...was to begin with full scale Vietcong attacks on cities, headquarters... ...and radio stations all over South Vietnam. The shock of the offensive would cause the South Vietnamese Army to collapse. Government troops would be encouraged to mutiny... ...and Some might even be persuaded to turn their guns on the Americans. At the same time as the military offensive, the signal would go out... ...for a nationwide uprising by the people of South Vietnam. It would be led by the secret youth leagues and worker's groups... ...already in place in the cities. The government would be overthrown and a new NLF led regime... ...would call for the Americans to leave. NLF planners believed that with the world looking on, the Americans would have little alternative but to go. The success of the general offensive depended on the Vietcong... ...avoiding the overwhelming firepower of American forces. Fortunately, the cities and towns would be garrisoned... ...by the much less formidable South Vietnamese Army. Still, General Giap meant to take no chances. Large numbers of American troops would be drawn away... ... of the populated areas by carefully planned diversions. In the last months of 1967 the North Vietnamese Army meant to attack... ...government troops at Song Be... ...and the American base at Dak To. The U.S. Marine outpost at Con Thien would also be hit, and forces would be massed around Khe Sanh. An elite NLF regiment would also hit the South Vietnamese Army garrison at Loc Ninh. The attacks near South Vietnam's borders would draw American forces away... ...from their main base areas and deep into the interior. The general offensive and uprising would then begin. The Vietcong would attack the national capital Saigon, most of the country's 44 provincial capitals, ...and over a hundred other towns. The last phase would happen at Khe Sanh, there the NVA would win a major victory over the United States in a huge... ...set piece battle that would destroy the American will to carry on the war. General Giap was sure that surprise would be the key to a successful offensive. His plan was to choose the one time when no attacks would be expected: The new year festival of Tet. In previous years, an informal cease-fire over the holiday... ... had seen vast numbers of South Vietnamese Army troops on leave, celebrating with their families. Although an attack during Tet would be deeply offensive... ...to much of the population, it would be certain to catch the enemy totally unprepared. STRATEGY – United States / South Vietnam Now that Washington had refused to widen the ground war, General Westmoreland was forced to carry on trying to win... ...in the same way as before. His forces would continue to mount relentless offensives... ...meant to cause the guerrillas such losses they would have to give up. Meanwhile, there was another war to be fought too. The NLF still controlled a quarter of the villages in Vietnam. Attempts by the South Vietnamese government to get back control... ...of the rural areas had been going on for years. Various pacification programs had tried to win the people's support... ... and root out the NLF political organization. The campaign had failed dismally. In part because it was poorly coordinated with the American war in the field. And because successive Saigon regimes and the CIA had alienated the people... ...with thousands of assassinations of suspected NLF sympathizers. It was also in this year that the Phoenix program of assassinations began. Washington was now insisting that the two efforts, pacification and the bigger war... ...had to be pulled together to make one grand strategy. American military planners had always seen the main force Vietcong... ...in the interior of South Vietnam as the biggest danger. They threatened the populated areas with attack and, the Americans believed,... ...they supplied men, food and weapons to the local guerrilla units. In the new plan the American role would still be... ...to keep main force Vietcong away from the populated areas. However there would now be more emphasis... ...on what happened behind the American shield. The village guerrillas would be driven out... ...by the South Vietnamese Army and militia. Local security would be strengthened and pacified areas would spread out... ...until they encompassed most of the populated regions of South Vietnam. American strategists were convinced that if the U.S. military effort... ...and the government 's pacification program could be made to work together, they could win the war against the Vietcong. To succeed they would have to get the cooperation... ...of sometimes skeptical military commanders. They would also have to do something about the huge number... ...of different American agencies supporting pacification projects. All American support for pacification and its multi-million dollar budget... ...was now placed under one man. Robert Komer was given the rank of ambassador equal to a four star general... ...and made Westmoreland's deputy. Everyone knew that Komer faced an enormous task... ...but in Saigon and Washington there was real optimism. It looked like the United States, at last had a strategy... ...that could deliver a solid victory in Vietnam. THE OPPOSING FORCES – The Vietcong For the Tet offensive, North Vietnamese leaders had decided... ...to rely on Vietcong guerrillas for most of the fighting, ...rather than the regular army. They believed that the people of the South would be more likely... ...to join the revolt if the offensive was led by Southerners. It would also reassure the NLF leadership inside the South... ...who had a real fear that their role in the war would be taken over by Hanoi. By late 1967, the NLF and the North Vietnamese Army together ...fielded 128,000 main force troops in South Vietnam, most of them in 152 infantry battalions. There were also hundreds of thousands of regional and local guerrillas, ...male and female, who would play a major part in the Tet offensive. Although the Americans believed that local Vietcong guerrillas in the villages... ...were supplied and supported by the main force units,... ... the opposite was usually the case. It was the village guerrillas that supported the main force battalions. They collected rice taxes from the local farmers, built up supplies... ...and provided scouts and screening forces for the big units. All communist military forces in the Southern part of South Vietnam... ...were controlled through the Vietcong's Mobile Headquarters: Tthe Central Office for South Vietnam. Operations further North were commanded from a North Vietnamese Army headquarters ...inside the Demilitarized zone. For the Tet offensive, the NVA would deploy elements of the 341st Division... ...supported by Vietcong sapper battalions just below the Demilitarized zone. Three more divisions and a regiment would be deployed... ...around the US Marine base at Khe Sanh. Further South, two divisions supported by Vietcong sappers and artillery units... ...were spread out along the coast... ...and another was deployed in the central highlands. The Vietcong fielded three formations of divisional strength... ...all within 75 miles of Saigon. Countrywide they also had 30 independent main force battalions... ...and more than 60 regional and local battalions. Altogether, the equivalent of ten divisions. During 1967 American fighter bombers would fly 53,000 attack sorties... ...against the Ho Chi Minh trail. Their aim was to cut off the flow of forces and weapons... from the North to the Southern guerrillas. In spite of the massive scale of the bombing campaign it was having little real impact... ...in the Vietcong's build up for the Tet offensive. The area the bombers had to cover was vast and the Vietcong were experts at camouflage. In the month of July 1967, 480 trucks made the long and arduous journey ...from North Vietnam to the South. By the end of the year traffic would soar to 3,000 trucks a month. In fact, on the eve of the offensive, many Vietcong and North Vietnamese Army units would have a surplus of modern weapons and equipment. WEAPONS – The Vietcong The North Vietnamese Army and most Vietcong guerrillas were well equipped... ...with light infantry weapons including the superb AK-47 Kalashnikov assault rifle. They also had a range of medium and heavy machine guns. Because American aircraft were always on the prowl, almost everything had to be carried by porters, often at night. That meant the most valuable weapons were... ...those that had the hitting power, but could still be transported easily. The Soviet made rocket propelled grenade launcher, the RPG 2... ...and its replacement, the RPG 7, were lightweight... ...and highly effective against armor and bunkers. Designed to be fired by one man, the rockets had a range of more than 500 meters. For much longer ranges, the Chinese 75 mm recoilless rifle... ...the Type 52, was an accurate and powerful weapon. It was able to fire high explosive shells over 6,600 meters... and with a high explosive armor piercing shell... ...it was effective against armor at up to 800 meters. Its big disadvantage was that if its crew needed to move fast, ...it was a cumbersome weapon to manhandle. In the rugged terrain of South Vietnam,... ...mortars were by far the most useful of all heavy weapons. The NLF and the North Vietnamese Army had thousands, and they were the perfect combination of hitting power, range and portability. THE TROOPS – The Vietcong Although Vietcong forces in the South were estimated by the Americans... ...to have lost more than 60,000 men in 1967, they had still managed to keep up their overall numbers. Thousands of North Vietnamese Army troops had been sent down the Ho Chi Minh trail ...to join the guerrillas and they now accounted for more than one in five Vietcong. The guerrillas also operated a draft in the villages. Because men younger than 20 were not called up by the South Vietnamese Army most teenagers were still at home and made a huge pool of potential recruits. Local NLF guerrillas were given only a basic minimum of basic infantry training. Later on though, if they were recruited to a main force unit, they could get up to a month of advanced instruction. There were also dozens of training centers spread all over South Vietnam running long courses for squad and platoon leaders, operators of crew served weapons, and radio men. To make sure the guerrillas understood what they were fighting for, all training courses included political instruction. Most Vietcong attacks planned for the Tet offensive, were to be led by elite sapper commandos. Their job would be to launch the initial assaults... ...blasting their way into enemy headquarters and bases. Most sappers were part of well trained main force battalions, but for Tet, the Vietcong would also heavily rely on local sapper units, men and women, recruited inside the cities. Many drove pedi-cabs, cyclos and taxis or were chauffeurs and delivery men... and knew their way around the streets like no one else could. During the year, as casualties had mounted under the intense pressure of the American onslaught, the morale of the Vietcong had suffered badly. But news of the planned general offensive quickly revived... ...the confidence of the guerrillas. Political officers worked hard to persuade the troops... ... that the campaign would bring the victory they had fought for so long to win. In the run-up to Tet the rate of desertions from Vietcong units... ...fell away almost to nothing. THE OPPOSING FORCES – United States / South Vietnam By late 1967 there were almost half a million... ...American military personnel in South Vietnam. Of these only one in seven were combat troops. The rest were the support personnel needed to run a military machine... ...that relied on high tech weaponry and consumed vast amounts of supplies. By now American forces in Vietnam were expending 45,000 tons of ammunition... ...and burning 60 million gallons of fuel every month. Almost everything came from the United States... and when it arrived in Vietnam there was a massive problem of storage and distribution. Huge numbers of men were tied up just handling the supply traffic. Protecting the dozens of big American installations scattered all over the country and securing major road links was another enormous drain on manpower. During 1967 the new American emphasis on pacification... ...had led to more attention than ever being payed... ...to improving the South Vietnamese armed forces. The armed forces now numbered more than 340,000 soldiers and there were also nearly 300,000 regional troops and other militia. The South Vietnamese also had a small navy for coastal and river patrols and an increasingly effective air force. Its pilots were now flying a quarter... ...of all combat sorties inside South Vietnam. The South Vietnamese Army had divided the country... ...into four tactical zones, one for each army corp. The most northerly zones each deployed two divisions... ...while the zones further South each had three. The South Vietnamese Air Force had 5 fighter squadrons and the navy a force of coastal patrol boats. The Joint Generals Staff Reserve had an airborne division and two marine brigades. For easy coordination, the American Military Assistance Command in Vietnam... ...had created a Marine Amphibious Force and two field forces... ...to match three of the South Vietnamese Army's tactical zones. Altogether the forces deployed two marine and seven army divisions, two brigades, an armored cavalry regiment, and a Special Forces group. As well as the Americans, there were two Korean Army divisions... ...and a Marine brigade, three Australian battalions... ...and contingents from New Zealand, The Philippines and Thailand. During 1967 the Americans had launched their first combat operations... ... in the extreme South of Vietnam. Up to then, the maze of rivers and canals of the Mekong Delta... ... had been left to the South Vietnamese Army. Now the Mobile Riverine Force, a brigade of the US 9th Division... ...had moved in to help fight the NLF... ...for control of the richest rice producing area in Vietnam. The Mobile Riverine Force was unique in the US Army. Not since the American Civil War had the army deployed a completely amphibious force. It had its own base, a man made island. Navy boats carried the troops into action and provided escorts. Heavy firepower was carried by armored vessels... named "Monitors" after their Civil War forebears. During the Tet offensive the Mobile Riverine Force would see heavy fighting. In the Mekong Delta and the other heavily populated parts... ...of South Vietnam, the government army would bear the brunt... ...of the Vietcong's planned offensive. Some South Vietnamese formations, Ranger, Marine and Airborne units, and a handful of infantry divisions were professional, dedicated and well led. They knew their battleground and their enemy. But six of the army's eleven divisions were in poor shape, suffering from corrupt and incompetent officers, desertion and obsolete equipment. WEAPONS – United States / South Vietnam At the center of American military doctrine was the idea... ...that troops should be maneuvered to fix the enemy in position... ...so that firepower could be unleashed to destroy him. In defense too heavy firepower played a critical part. Every American infantry division in Vietnam could call on... ...massive support from aircraft, and sometimes from long range artillery. Divisions had their own artillery as well, mostly 105 mm weapons and the divisions always set up fire bases before every operation. Each company also had its own mortars. Tanks were used by almost every American division in Vietnam. The most important tank unit was the 11th Armored Cavalry brigade. All of them used the M-48, a 44 ton vehicle with a 90 mm gun. In spite of early doubts about how tanks might fare in Vietnam, ...their firepower and armor were invaluable... ...for securing roads and escorting convoys. The Marines also deployed the Ontos, a weapon originally designed as a tank destroyer. The Ontos mounted six recoilless rifles and during the Tet battles... ...they proved invaluable for clearing buildings and destroying fortifications. Of all the armored vehicles deployed in Vietnam, ...the most useful by far was the M 113 armored fighting vehicle... ...known to American troops as "the track". It was so vulnerable to mines, that its crew usually sat on top, but it was extremely heavily armed. Tracks mounted several weapons including at least one 50 caliber machine gun, a weapon too heavy to carry on foot. The 50 was incredibly destructive. Able to cut a tree in half hundreds of yards away. The weight of firepower that a track could deliver... ...and the vast amounts of ammunition it could carry, saved American units from being overrun time and time again. One weapon highly valued by the crews of armored vehicles and by foot soldiers... ...was the M-79 grenade launcher called the Dooper, from its sound. The Dooper's range was up to 250 meters and its explosive shell would kill within 15 feet of the blast. A good grenadier could hit a target the size of an open window... ...at 100 meters and fire a shell every 3 or 4 seconds. THE TROOPS – United States / South Vietnam For the South Vietnamese conscript soldier, 1967 had begun to show some signs that army life might become bearable. Food and accommodation improved slightly. Amongst the professionals and the better units at least, confidence was high. Many officers and NCO's had been at war for years and were both tough and tactically skilled. But in spite of this, the desertion rate continued to rise. While the South Vietnamese conscript served four years, the United States Army had stuck to its policy of bringing soldiers home... ...after one 13 month tour of duty. It was effective in preventing combat fatigue, but the decision was having a real impact on the battlefield. Units were constantly losing experienced men... ...who were replaced by newcomers unable to spot booby traps and ambushes... and not yet used to Vietnam's punishing climate. Officers served only six months in combat... ...and new arrivals had a very high chance of being killed or wounded. “Drop back about five meters, five meters” American combat units on the field were almost always seriously under strength. With operations running all the time... ...and the men perpetually short of sleep, ...exhaustion was beginning to tell on morale. So too was boredom, and sometimes disillusion. Returning again and again to the same places... on exhausting Search and Destroy sweeps often seemed utterly pointless. EVE OF BATTLE In the early autumn of 1967, as communist forces... ...were building up for the Tet offensive, the internal divisions that had plagued both sides throughout the war... ...began to come to a head. In Hanoi 200 senior officers were arrested in a crackdown on opponents of the Tet strategy. In Washington, Robert McNamara, the increasingly disillusioned defense secretary, had lost the confidence of the president and would soon resign. As for Johnson himself, he faced a presidential election... ...late in 1968, and there was already opposition... ...from within his own democratic party. Meanwhile on the streets, opposition to American involvement in Vietnam... ...was growing more and more vocal. As Johnson's popularity slipped to an all time low, he clung to his belief that the public could be persuaded... ...to back his conduct of the war. He embarked on a huge public relations campaign... in which Washington and Saigon pumped out masses of information, all supporting the line that the war was being won. President Johnson toured military bases around the country and even recalled ...General Westmoreland from Vietnam to add his weight to the argument. Speaking to one influential gathering after another... ...Westmoreland assured his listeners that the end was almost in sight. What the General did not know was that halfway around the world, in the forests and mountains of South Vietnam, the first phase of the communist offensive had already begun. Subtitling: DeStrangis