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308th Infantry Division (Vietnam)

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The 308th Infantry Division is a division of the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN), first formed in August 1950 in southern China from the previous Regimental Group 308.[1]: 150 

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Transcription

BATTLEFIELD VIETNAM Peace with Honor Between 1972 and 1975 the armies of North and South Vietnam clashed... ...in some of the greatest battles of the Vietnam war. Twice in three years the government of the North launched... ...full scale attacks against the American-backed South. What had been a war of hit and run and ambush... ...became one of huge set piece engagements between conventional armies. The South Vietnamese Army, backed by American air power, ...repelled the North's first onslaught. Over North Vietnam, the heaviest air strikes of the war... ...came close to bringing the country to its knees. But the North's second great offensive proved unstoppable. The American strategy had been to arm and train the South Vietnamese... ...to defend themselves. American combat troops had gone. For South Vietnam, the result was catastrophe. In a fierce campaign lasting four months, North Vietnamese tanks smashed their way to the gates of Saigon. PRELUDE TO THE BATTLE Hanoi's strategy for 1969 was to keep up the pressure on South Vietnam. While negotiations were going on in Paris... ...they meant to improve their position on the battlefield. Half a million American troops were now deployed in the South. In February 1969, in an echo of the Tet offensive the previous year... ...their bases were the targets of a major Vietcong offensive. 1,140 Americans died. The newly inaugurated president, Richard Nixon, and his national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, ...immediately ordered retaliation. American B-52 bombers dropped half a million tons of bombs... ...on Vietcong base areas along the Vietnam Cambodia border... ...in a secret campaign codenamed “Menu”. Congress was not informed and the flight logs and target destinations... ...were falsified to hide the fact that the bombs were falling on Cambodia, ...a neutral country. At the same time, U.S. and South Vietnamese troops... ...began to advance towards the Cambodian border. The Vietcong offensive of Spring, 1969 had been launched... ...by four divisions made up mostly of North Vietnamese Army units. After bitter fighting, the NVA battalions pulled back. Only local NLF battalions were left behind and those were ordered... ...to break down into smaller groups. In turn, big American units were also broken down... ...and spread out over a wider area of countryside. Increasingly, American forces were paired with the South Vietnamese Army... ...for operations in the most heavily populated areas of South Vietnam. In April 1969 a gruesome benchmark was reached... ...that added to the pressure for Vietnamisation. U.S. combat deaths surpassed the 33,629 men killed... ...throughout the Korean war. Increasingly the U.S. felt that it had to insure the South Vietnamese Army... ...would take control of the war for themselves. The American plan was to help the South Vietnamese government... ...regain control over vast areas of the countryside. The populated areas were swamped with patrols... ...trying to find an increasingly elusive enemy. Often the aim was to draw the Vietcong into attacking a small unit... ...and then hit back with massive air strikes... ...and attacks by helicopter gunships. The new kind of war being fought in and around the villages... ...was enormously destructive. American firepower caused heavy civilian casualties and widespread damage. For the NLF guerrillas, the second half of 1969 was a nightmarish ordeal. In less than two years their casualties had been more than 70% in many areas. Food was desperately short as support from the villages faded away... ...and American patrols interfered with supplies. Meanwhile, the Phoenix program, a campaign run by the Central Intelligence Agency... and staffed by American and South Vietnamese soldiers, ...killed up to 40,000 people suspected of being NLF sympathizers. Thousands more were tortured and imprisoned. In that year, desertions from the NLF and NVA were over 28,000 However, morale in the South Vietnamese Army was no better... with the number of desertions reaching almost a 100 in 10,000. While South Vietnamese government forces fought... ...to rest control of the villages from the NLF, American planners turned their attention to Cambodia. Already the secret bombing campaign ordered by the American president... Richard Nixon, was well underway. Up to now, American ground forces had been banned... ...from mounting operations into Cambodia. The country was legally neutral and its leader since the 1950's... ...the flamboyant prince Sihanouk, had played both sides. Sometimes an ally of the Americans, he also allowed the NVA... ...to route the Southern part of the Ho Chi Minh trail through his kingdom... ...and maintain their base areas along the heavily jungled... ...Eastern border with Vietnam. Then, in March 1970, there was a CIA backed coup to oust Sihanouk. The new government, led by Lon Nol immediately moved... to eject all Vietcong and North Vietnamese troops from Cambodian soil. Operations by the Americans and the South Vietnamese would follow. The Vietcong base areas inside Cambodia were attacked from the west... ...by the Royal Cambodian Army. North Vietnam quickly diverted army units to defend them, and with the help of the Cambodian guerrillas, the Khmer Rouge, they halted the Cambodian government advance. Meanwhile the Americans and the South Vietnamese had deployed... ...powerful forces on their side of the border. On April 29th 1970, South Vietnamese troops attacked into Cambodia, pushing towards the Vietcong bases. Two days later, the U.S. force of 30,000... ...including elements of three U.S. divisions, mounted a second attack. The next target was a base area in the Se Sam Valley. Soon after, more assaults were mounted further South. Operations in Cambodia lasted for 60 days. American and South Vietnamese troops uncovered vast jungle supply depots... they captured 28,500 weapons as well as over 16 million rounds... of small arms ammunition, and 14 million pounds of rice. Although most Vietcong troops had managed to escape across the Mekong, ...there were over 10,000 NVA and NLF casualties. However, when the South Vietnamese commander was killed in a helicopter crash, ...his forces withdrew. When news of the Cambodian incursion broke in the United States... ...there was public outcry. Many believed that in spite of President Nixon's promises to get out of Vietnam, ...he meant to expand the war. Protests erupted in universities all over the country. On May 4th 1970, at Kent State University in Ohio, ...National Guardsmen shot four students dead. The deep divisions about the U.S. role in Southeast Asia... ...were having a powerful effect on American troops in Vietnam. Opinions about the war were divided, sometimes bitterly, as they were at home. Added to the conflict were growing tensions between the races... ...and between social classes. It was a volatile and sometimes dangerous mix. By now, there were few career sergeants and officers... ...still to serve their tours in Vietnam. Much of the burden of maintaining discipline was falling on newly promoted... ...and often inexperienced leaders. Between 1969 and 1971, the U.S. army would record... ...more than 700 attacks by troops on their officers. 83 officers were killed and almost 650 were injured. Many attacks were by fragmentation grenades rolled into the victim's tent, ...a practice known as 'fragging'. The whole discipline problem was aggravated by widespread drug abuse. In 1971 fewer than 5,000 soldiers needed hospital treatment for combat wounds... ...but more than 20,500 were treated for serious drug abuse. By this time it was plain to most soldiers... ...that the United States would pull out of Vietnam. 100,000 troops had been withdrawn and Nixon had promised... ...another 150,000 would leave within a year. No one wanted to be the last American soldier to die in Southeast Asia. By the end of 1970, North Vietnam had replaced many of the losses... ...suffered in the fighting of the previous year. Their leaders were intent on launching a new campaign... ...and floods of men and supplies were being sent down the Ho Chi Minh trail... ...through Laos and Cambodia to South Vietnam. The build up was soon detected by the Americans. U.S. commanders begged for permission to attack into Laos... and once and for all destroy the supply lines down the Ho Chi Minh trail. Their hopes were quickly dashed. The U.S. congress banned any American ground operations... ...beyond the borders of South Vietnam. This time, Saigon's forces would have to go it alone. If successful, the administration argued, they would gain two years... ...in which to build the South Vietnamese Army. The South Vietnamese attack into Laos was codenamed Operation Lam Son 719. The offensive opened with the U.S. Army 24th corps... ...clearing route 9 to Khe Sanh. On February 8th 1971, three South Vietnamese Army divisions, about 17,000 men, supported by armor and a Ranger group... ...attacked across the border. However they were advancing into an NVA trap, ...carefully planned and with well coordinated defenses. The targets were two major North Vietnamese Army bases, known as 611 and 604. They were defended by over 40,000 combat troops. The South Vietnamese had established a series of fire bases... ...to protect their flanks. The NVA launched fierce counterattacks against these bases... ...and the main advance with T-54 tanks, employed for the first time, ...and 130mm guns. Other NVA units moved to cut route 9 trying to encircle the invading column. Two South Vietnamese battalions were eventually airlifted in to Tchepone. President Thieu assumed command of what became a disastrous operation, ...and on March 8th he ordered a retreat. It became a rout. More than 9,000 Southern troops were killed or wounded. They lost 2/3 of their armored vehicles and large numbers of helicopters and planes were destroyed or damaged. A crucial test of the South Vietnamese Army's ability to fight... ...without American support had ended in humiliation. Although the North Vietnamese had crushed the Southern offensive, ...they too had suffered casualties. Defending their bases in Laos and in Cambodia the year before... ...had cost thousands of dead and many vehicles and guns destroyed. Vietcong units were now ordered to avoid major actions... ...while they rebuilt their strength. THE LEADERS – North Vietnam Since the death of Ho Chi Minh in September 1969, Prime Minister Pham Van Dong... Le Duan, the communist party leader... ...and General Giap, the defense minister... ...were determined not to abandon Ho's legacy. The struggle to reunite North and South Vietnam would go on whatever the cost. Since the Americans had begun to withdraw troops from the South, Northern leaders had been faced with a dilemma: Should the North wait to mount another major offensive... ...until after the Americans had gone or should it keep up the momentum? In May 1971 the politburo instructed General Giap to prepare a new campaign. For some time, the North's strategy had been to fight... ...and negotiate at the same time. Talks with the Americans and the South Vietnamese had been going on in Paris... ...but there was no progress. Northern leaders now believed that a victory on the battlefield... ...might break the stalemate. At the very least it could prove to the Americans... ...that their policy of Vietnamisation was not going to save the South. THE LEADERS – United States / South Vietnam Although the U.S. President, Richard Nixon, believed... ...that Vietnam was damaging the United States at home and abroad... ...he was not prepared to make peace at any price. Nixon feared a climb down would dangerously weaken... ...America's credibility as an ally in the eyes of the world. South Vietnam had to survive. As well as the formal peace negotiations in Paris... there were also secret meetings between Henry Kissinger... ...Nixon's national security advisor, and the North Vietnamese. Those talks too had stalled... ...mainly over the future of the South Vietnamese government. The North was insisting that president Nguyen Van Thieu be replaced... ...and that the new government include the NLF. As for Thieu himself, his great fear was that to end the war... ...Nixon meant to do a separate deal with Hanoi. In fact, Nixon and his advisor Henry Kissinger were looking... ...not to North Vietnam, but to Moscow and Beiging. Nixon's hope was that the Chinese or the Russians... ...would put pressure on the North Vietnamese to compromise. In February 1972, he embarked on the first visit... ...by an American president to communist China. Now that U.S. troops were withdrawing from Vietnam, ...Chinese leader Mao Tse Tung increasingly favored an end to the war. He had already pressed Hanoi to step up the search for a solution. Neither Nixon nor his advisors were aware of it, but because of centuries of mistrust, North Vietnam had no intention of listening to the Chinese. STRATEGY – North Vietnam As they planned their most ambitious offensive yet, North Vietnam's leaders knew they were taking a big gamble. There would still be U.S. troops in South Vietnam... ...which could easily be reinforced. The question was Would the Americans send major combat units... ...to save their South Vietnamese allies? Northern planners decided that, in an American election year, they would not. The success of the coming campaign would depend... ...on assembling huge quantities of weapons and supplies. That meant more aid from both the Soviet Union and China. Although by now both superpowers were reluctant supporters of the war, neither was prepared to lose influence to the other. As a result, the North succeeded in getting increased arms deliveries... ...from both Moscow and Beijing. More than any offensive they had launched before, ...this one would depend on speed and mobility. For the North it would be a new kind of battle using tanks and artillery... ...to smash through enemy lines. The plan foresaw three major armored thrusts... ...slicing deep into South Vietnam. The first North Vietnamese attack would cross the Demilitarized Zone... ...separating North and South and push East from Laos. Two whole provinces and the cities of Quang Tri, Hue, and Da Nang would be captured. The second Thrust would attack through the Central Highlands... ...to the coast of Qui Nhon. The third assault would strike from Cambodia and capture An Loc. There, a provisional revolutionary government would be established for the South. If resistance was still light, units would press on... ...and capture the capital, Saigon. North Vietnamese Commanders knew that attacking the South... ...in three different places was a risky plan. In none of the attacks would they have... ...an overwhelming superiority of troops over the enemy. However, General Giap believed that multiple thrusts... ...would keep the South guessing about what might come next. Southern units would be forced to stay on the defensive, isolated and scattered. Giap could then defeat them division by division. Northern leaders calculated that even limited success... ...would leave the NVA in control of large areas of South Vietnam. The NLF would then be able to reestablish political control over the countryside. Such gains would be a serious challenge to the Saigon government. At the same time, the North's bargaining position... ...in future negotiations would be improved dramatically. STRATEGY – United States / South Vietnam By January 1st 1972 only 133,000 U.S. servicemen... ...remained in South Vietnam. 2/3 of American troops had gone in two years. Australian and New Zealand contingents were also about to leave... ...and South Korean forces had already begun to return home. The ground war now almost exclusively... ...the province of the South Vietnamese Army. As Vietnamisation had gone on, U.S. field commanders... had been under orders from Washington to keep American casualties down. Most operations were now defensive, designed to protect... ...U.S. bases from mortar and rocket attacks. American air power was also being used in a different way. Fighter bombers were still mounting vigorous attacks on the Ho Chi Minh trail in Laos. More than 70,000 sorties in 1971. But American air activity in South Vietnam had fallen dramatically. There, the South Vietnamese Air Force was expected to look after... ...most ground support operations. South Vietnam's strategy for defending against attack... ...had been devised by President Thieu himself. Thieu believed that any foothold won by the Vietcong... would seriously threaten his bargaining position in the Paris peace talks. As a result he was determined to defend all of South Vietnam. The only orders he issued to the South Vietnamese Army... ...were to hold on to every scrap of territory. The front line of the South Vietnamese Army's defense... ...was a string of forts and outposts along the borders. Behind the forts were the Army divisions, but each was responsible only... ...for the defense of territory around its own base. The South's Joint General Staff also had a reserve of airborne and Marine troops... ...to act as a fire brigade in the event of an attack. The defense would be backed up by American strike aircraft, U.S. carriers in the Gulf of Tonkin, ...and B-52 bombers. For years, the United States had pressed president Thieu... to improve the lot of the South Vietnamese people. Only then, the argument went, ...could support for the NLF in the countryside be undermined. By early 1972, Thieu had begun to introduce... ...some of the reforms the Americans had wanted. Thieu introduced a program to give peasants ownership of the land they tilled. A school was established to train local headmen... ...to administer their villages. Recruitment to local self defense militias was stepped up. Thieu's hollow boast was that 97% of all hamlets and villages... ...in the South were under government control. THE OPPOSING FORCES – North Vietnam / Vietcong By the eve of the planned offensive, named operation Nguyen Hue... ...after a eighteenth century national hero, the North Vietnamese Army had been transformed. It now had fully equipped armored regiments. Artillery forces had been strengthened. From weapons to radios, all the front line divisions... ...were better equipped than ever before. The port of Haiphong was still jammed with Soviet shipping... ...delivering military supplies. With the American bombing of North Vietnam long over... trains loaded with troops, tanks and field guns could move with no risk from attack. The North Vietnamese Air Force had more than 200 jet fighters... which patrolled energetically over Southern North Vietnam, but they rarely flew over the supply trails in Laos... ...where American aircraft were most active, ...nor would they play any direct part in the planned offensive. Instead, very large numbers of anti aircraft guns had been deployed... ...to cover the supply lines and assembly areas. Above the Demilitarized Zone, General Giap deployed two divisions, including the elite 308th and three independent infantry regiments. The infantry were backed by tank, artillery and sapper regiments. Another division was poised in Laos opposite the former U.S. base at Khe Sanh. In the early months of 1972 the North Vietnamese infiltrated a division, supported by independent infantry regiments, into South Vietnam. Another two divisions were already on the coastal plain. More divisions were deployed on the western border. Further South, another formation threatened the Mekong delta. Until now, North Vietnam had been fighting an infantry war. Its army in the field could maintain its operations... ...as long as food and ammunition lasted. The coming offensive would be very different. A modern, conventional battle of firepower and maneuver... ...would pose a full range of completely new problems. 125,000 men now massing on South Vietnam's borders would be going into battle... ...alongside over 600 tanks, ...a bigger army than General Patton had commanded in WWII. The tanks would consume huge quantities of fuel and ammunition. The infantry would have to keep up with the armor... and that meant large numbers of trucks. The battle would move fast, putting strains on the communication and command systems... ...unlike anything the army had met before. WEAPONS – North Vietnam / Vietcong The main North Vietnamese Army tanks were the Soviet designed... ...T-54 and T-72 and their Chinese copies. They were armed with a powerful 100mm gun and were highly robust vehicles, ...easy to maintain on the battlefield. Some units were also equipped with the WWII vintage T-34 tank. The T-34 was armed with an 85mm gun... ...and was even simpler to operate and look after. Like the T-55 it could fire either armor piercing or high explosive shells. The NVA also deployed a light tank, the PT-76. It was armed with a 76 mm gun and it was amphibious. The ability to cross rivers and canals would make it... ...a specially valuable weapon in the lowlands of South Vietnam. North Vietnamese artillery ranged from the superb Soviet made 130mm field gun... ...to rockets and mortars of every size. All infantry units had their own air defense artillery and machine guns. There were also specialist air defense units. THE TROOPS – North Vietnam / Vietcong In 12 years of war in South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, Vietcong forces had suffered appalling losses. By early 1972, over 600,000 North Vietnamese Army troops and NLF had died. As well as those killed in battle, many thousand had perished from disease... ...and American air attacks on the long journey on the Ho Chi Minh trail. In North Vietnam a severe manpower shortage meant... ...the gaps in the NVA's ranks were not being filled. In the three months before the spring offensive, every male between the ages of 14 to 45 was called up. For the first time the ranks of draftees even included... ...the relatives of senior party officials. The NLF in South Vietnam was also suffering a manpower crisis. Saigon government troops and officials seemed to be everywhere... making it difficult for NLF recruiting teams to operate. Even the ranks of local guerrilla units were being boosted... ...by North Vietnamese regular troops. The Northerners faced a host of problems, not least the lack of friends and relatives ...to provide information, food and a hiding place. The ever increasing dominance of the North Vietnamese over the NLF... ...was causing real tensions in Vietcong units. Many NLF members believed the North no longer saw them as equal partners. There was a growing fear that once Victory was achieved... ...Northerners would simply take over the South. In every unit political officers worked hard to ease friction... ...between NVA troops and their Southern comrades. THE OPPOSING FORCES – United States / South Vietnam By January 1972, the armed forces of South Vietnam had grown... ...to over a million men. The American's Vietnamisation program was in full swing... ...with a massive equipment and training effort. The army's supply and logistics system was also being built up... ...to cope with a whole new scale of operations. Where once the South Vietnamese had been expected to get by on WWII surplus... ...the Americans were now providing advanced weaponry. The infantry got nearly a million M-16 rifles... ...and 20,000 machine guns. Heavy weapons included 400 new tanks and 200 Howitzers, while the Air Force was built up to 2,000 planes. It would soon be the fourth largest air force in the world. Transforming the South Vietnamese Army... ...into a modern fighting military machine was not proving easy. American tanks, helicopters and aircraft... ...arrived with their maintenance manuals in English. South Vietnamese personnel training to be technical specialists... ...had first to go through Language School. Most American advisors agreed... ...that building up the South Vietnamese armed forces... ...into a credible defense was going to take more time than anyone had realized. South Vietnam was divided into four military regions, ...each the responsibility of an army Corp. Altogether the South fielded 11 infantry divisions and an airborne division... three Marine brigades, ...ten Ranger groups, ...and four brigades of tanks. The Air Force deployed nine squadrons of combat aircraft, fourteen of helicopters... ...and three air transport squadrons. U.S. Army combat forces were now down to a handful of units at Da Nang, ...around Saigon, ...and at Can Tho, in the delta. The Air Force also had two tactical fighter wings, ...a reconnaissance wing, ...and a B-52 wing in Thailand. The Navy carriers Hancock and Coral Sea... ...were still in Yankee Station on the gulf of Tonkin. By early 1972, many of the 133,000 U.S. ground troops in South Vietnam... ...were occupied closing up bases and preparing to withdraw, but aviation units of the Army, Navy and Air Force were still operating, ...as were logistics and communications specialists. So were 1,400 Army and Marine advisors attached to South Vietnamese units. In spite of American protests most of the South Vietnamese Army's Infantry divisions ...were static defense forces. Their orders to hold territory at all costs, meant that they had little incentive to use their new armored vehicles and helicopters. Nor were they developing the skills to fight fast moving offensive battles. Because the Army's Infantry divisions had their own territory to defend, ...they had grown increasingly settled. The divisional bases were soon surrounded by shanty towns... ...as soldiers' families set up home close by. Bribery could secure a permanent posting... ...and soldiers ordered to move sometimes refused. In 1971 alone over a 140,000 government soldiers deserted. WEAPONS – United States / South Vietnam In the battles ahead, Southern forces would be faced... ...with large North Vietnamese armored formations for the first time in the war. For the infantry the main defense was the LAW or the Light Anti-tank Weapon. It was a one shot disposable launcher... ...which fired a shaped charged rocket. It was already highly valued by the troops... ...for destroying bunkers and fortified positions. It was the Americans who still had the most mobile and powerful anti tank defense. The TOW was a wire guided anti tank missile... ...often mounted on a helicopter gunship. It had a range of more than 3,000 meters and it was highly accurate. As long as the gunner kept its sight on the target, the weapon's computer system would insure a hit. The most effective helicopter gunship in American service was the Huey Cobra. It was a revolutionary design. The gunner sat in front with the pilot above and behind. The Cobra was fast, able to fly at over 200 miles per hour and highly maneuverable. It could carry a devastating array of weapons, many guns, automatic grenade launchers, a multi barrel 20mm cannon, and 76 rockets. American gunships and the South Vietnamese Air Forces attack planes... ...would provide most of the support for ground troops. However, vastly more destructive American air power... ...was always present in the background. B-52 bombers, some able to carry over 31 tons of bombs, were still attacking targets in Laos and Cambodia. The Americans also had the most advanced supersonic strike aircraft in the world. he F-111 had a unique swing wing design. With the wings extended, it could make low speed landings. In swept back configuration it could fly at 1,600 miles an hour. The F-111 had advanced computer navigation... ...and could bomb targets at night and in the worst weather. THE TROOPS – United States / South Vietnam Most major South Vietnamese Army units still had American military advisors. They were usually career soldiers, ...many on their second or even third tour of duty in Vietnam. The main role of advisors to infantry units was to coordinate... ...the vast array of American fire power still on call. They also offered encouragement and tactical advice. In some units, the advisor's presence had an unforeseen drawback. Many South Vietnamese field commanders came to rely heavily... ...on the American's military skills. As the months went on and advisors were gradually withdrawn, large numbers of South Vietnamese officers would find themselves... ...unable to command on their own. For years, one of the biggest American complaints about their allies... ...was the way promotions were awarded in the South Vietnamese Army. Political patronage was rife. The social connections of senior officers were far more important... ...than their professional competence. There was one unexpected plus... ...in the way the South Vietnamese Army promotions worked. Officers lacking political influence could stay in combat units for years, as a result, by 1972 many of the South Vietnamese Army's front line formations... ...were led by highly experienced and battle hardened men. Amongst the many problems besetting the South Vietnamese armed forces, poor training was one of the worst. Army culture held training in contempt. When the military schools requested combat experienced instructors... ...most front line units unloaded their worst men. As a result, some training units failed to produce soldiers... ...with even the most basic military skills. EVE OF BATTLE President Nixon meant to follow his triumphant visit to China... ...by next going to Moscow. Hopes were high that relations between the world's great powers... ...were entering a new era. In fact, events in Vietnam were about to threaten the whole plan. Since the American bombing of North Vietnam had ended in late 1968, U.S. reconnaissance activity had been intense. As well as conventional reconnaissance planes, the Americans deployed the Top Secret Blackbird. The SR-71 could fly at 2,000 miles an hour and operated 70,000 feet, ...well above anti aircraft defenses. By the opening weeks of 1972 reconnaissance pictures of Southern North Vietnam... ...as well as the border areas of Laos and Cambodia... ...had shown a dramatic communist buildup. They photographed 7 to 8,000 trucks waiting in supply depots ready to go. The American response was to launch heavy air strikes... ...against the troop concentrations. U.S. intelligence believed the North Vietnamese blow... ...would fall before the end of January 1972. when the month passed without incidents, Saigon relaxed its vigilance. Senior South Vietnamese officers hoped that the preemptive air strikes... ...and the increasing strength of the Army had forced the North to think twice. So confident were the Americans that the U.S. defense secretary, Melvin Laird, told congress that a major communist offensive... ...was not a serious possibility. Only five weeks later he would be proved shockingly wrong. By late March 1972, in hundreds of North Vietnamese Army command posts and dugouts, ...the countdown had already begun. Subtitling: DeStrangis

History

First Indochina War

Victorious Việt Minh soldiers at Điện Biên Phủ

As early as January 1946, the first regiment of the PAVN, the 102 'Capital' Regiment, was created for operations around Hanoi.[2] It consisted of Regiments 88, 102, and 36, and soon became the 308 'Vanguard' Division. By late 1950 the 308 Division had a full three infantry regiments, one heavy weapons regiment, and support units.

The 308th initiated the Battle of Vĩnh Yên with an attack on Groupe Mobile 3 on the evening of 13 January 1951, surrounding and half-destroying the unit. The 308th and 312th then surrounded Vĩnh Yên. The French counterattacked and began to airlift reinforcements into Vĩnh Yên. On 16 August the 308th and 312th launched human wave attacks against the French positions which were largely repulsed by French ground fire and airstrikes. At dawn on 17 January the Việt Minh renewed their attacks but were once again devastated by French airstrikes and by midday General Giáp ordered a withdrawal. The two Divisions had lost at least 5000 killed and 500 taken prisoner.[1]: 113 

In March 1951, General Giáp again tried a conventional assault on the French forces in the Red River Delta when units of the 308th, 312th and 316th Division threatened the approaches to Haiphong. In this Battle of Mạo Khê the Việt Minh were beaten back by determined resistance from the French garrisons, airstrikes and naval gunfire. Total Việt Minh losses exceeded 1500 killed.[1]: 114 

The battered 308th played a minor role in the Battle of the Day River in May/June 1951, making diversionary attacks on Ninh Bình and Phủ Lý.[1]: 114 

On 17 October 1952 two regiments of the 308th attacked Nghĩa Lộ overrunning the post in one hour.[3]: 322  This attack triggered the French Operation Lorraine launched on 29 October, the largest operation attempted to date by the French Union forces.[4]: 78  Giáp planned to wait until the French supply lines were overextended at which point they could be harassed and eventually forced to withdraw. Giáp detached Regiment 36 of the 308th and Regiment 176 of the 316th to defend the important supply bases at Yên Bái and Thái Nguyên.[4]: 78  The only major fighting during the operation came during the withdrawal, when the Regiment 36 ambushed Groupe Mobiles 1 and 4 on Route 2 in a narrow valley near Chan Muong on morning of November 17. The Viet Minh managed to blow up one of the leading tanks, completely blocking the road and then, covered by heavy weapons fire from the surrounding hills, proceeded to methodically destroy the convoy. French air support eased the pressure on the forces caught in the valley and then in the afternoon the 2nd Battalion, 2nd Foreign Infantry Regiment and the Battalion de Marche Indochinois (BMI) inside the valley and the lead elements of Groupe Mobile 1 outside the ambush area counterattacked against the Việt Minh, culminating with a bayonet charge by the BMI. At this point the Việt Minh disengaged and the withdrawal could continue with the column arriving at Ngoc Tap at 22:30. The French had lost 56 dead, 125 wounded and 133 missing and 12 vehicles including 1 tank and 6 half-tracks destroyed.[4]: 97–103 

By early 1953 three Việt Minh Divisions were operating in T'ai Highlands and threatening the approaches to Laos. On 23 April 1953 the 308th and 316th had surrounded a French air-land base on the Plain of Jars blocking the approach to Vientiane.[1]: 126 

By the end of December 1953, the 308th had arrived in the hills to the north of Điện Biên Phủ[1]: 260  and Regiment 88 was soon at work helping improve Route Provinciale 41 which would form the main Việt Minh supply line to Điện Biên Phủ.[1]: 265 

In January 1954, the 308th, accompanied by a Battalion from Regiment 176, 316th Division launched a probe towards Luang Prabang, capturing Muong Khoua on 1 February. Hampered by French airpower, the airdrop of the 1st Colonial Parachute Battalion on Muong Sai and the deployment of Groupe Mobile 7 to Luang Prabang, the Việt Minh force withdrew towards Điện Biên Phủ on 20/21 February.[1]: 288  By the end of February the 308th was in positions to the west of Điện Biên Phủ.[1]: 297 

During the Battle of Điện Biên Phủ, the 308th's first action was on 14 March 1954 attacking the isolated French strongpoint Gabrielle at the north of the valley.[1]: 396  After having prepared approach trenches the assault would be launched by Regiment 88 from the north and Regiment 165 from the 312th Division from the east, while Regiment 102 would invest the position from the west and south. The attack started with an artillery barrage at 6pm that continued for more than 2 hours before the ground assault began. By 2:30am on 15 March the Việt Minh assault stalled, but at 3:30am a new artillery barrage commenced and then Regiments 88 and 165 renewed their attacks penetrating the French lines. By 7am the Việt Minh captured the Battalion command post, but French forces continued fighting from their positions in the south of Gabrielle.[1]: 397–403  At dawn on the 15th the French launched a counterattack with the 1 BEP and the newly arrived 5 BPVN supported by M24 tanks. By 6:30am the 1BEP and tanks were halted at a river ford south of Gabrielle by Regiment 102 of the 308th. The 5 BPVN was delayed in joining the 1 BEP and so the 1 BEP and tanks pressed on without them through the choke point. Ar 7:45am after confusion in the French command as to whether Gabrielle was to be relieved or abandoned, the remaining defenders abandoned their positions and by 9am the Việt Minh controlled Gabrielle.[1]: 403–7 

On 28 March Regiment 36 was engaged in the defense against a French attack against Việt Minh anti-aircraft machine guns to the west of the airfield.[1]: 447–8  On the night of 30 March Regiment 36 attacked the 5 BPVN at Strongpoint Huguette 7, while the main Việt Minh attack took place against the 5 Hills to the east of the base. By dawn on 31 March the attack had been repulsed.[1]: 470–1  Regiment 36 renewed their attack on Huguette 7 on the night of 31 March and in a ruse the 5 BPVN withdrew from their positions allowing Regiment 36 to take them over, but at 11pm a French artillery strike on Huguette 7 devastated Regiment 36 and by 10am the 5 BPVN had reoccupied the entire position.[1]: 481 

For the battle of the 5 Hills, Regiment 102 was moved to the east of the base to be held in reserve.[1]: 454  On 31 March following their failure to capture Eliane 2 the depleted Regiment 98 of the 316th was relieved by Regiment 102.[1]: 473  On the night of 31 March Regiment 102 again attempted to take Eliane 2 but was beaten back and then replaced by Regiment 98 on 3 April.[1]: 479–80 

Following the battle of the 5 Hills, Giáp ordered his forces to invest the remaining French positions with trenches and the 308th surrounded Huguette 1 with trenches and gun positions choking off supplies from Huguette 2. On the night of 22 April the Việt Minh burst out of their trenches and tunnel to overrun Huguette 1. The loss of Huguette 1 meant that the Việt Minh controlled most of the airfield further reducing the French parachute drop zone.[1]: 526–7  A French counterattack was attempted on the afternoon of 23 April but was repulsed.[1]: 527–33  On the night of 30 April a Battalion from the 308th attacked Huguette 5 but were forced out by a French counterattack.[1]: 576–7 

On the night of 1 May, Regiment 36 was tasked with taking Lili 3 while Regiment 88 would make another attempt to take Huguette 5.[1]: 579  The Regiment 36 attack commenced at 8:30pm, but had been repulsed by daybreak on 7 May.[1]: 583  Regiment 88's attack commenced at 2:30am and within an hour they had overrun Huguette 5.[1]: 583  For the final assault on the French positions on the night of 6/7 May, Regiment 102 was tasked with taking Claudine 5 while Regiments 36 and 88 would be held in reserve for a final assault.[1]: 601  The attack on Claudine 5 began at 10pm and by dawn on 7 May Regiment 102 held the position.[1]: 607 

On 7 May after the French ceased firing at 5pm, the 308th moved into the central position from the west and captured the command post of General de Castries.[1]: 616  Three Battalions from the 308th were quickly moved south of the base to block any French breakout from the southern strongpoint Isabelle.[1]: 617  Total estimated losses among the 308th Division at the Battle of Điện Biên Phủ are 2650 killed.[5]

On 9 October 1954, the 308th was the first Viet Minh Division to enter Hanoi at the same time as the last French troops departed for Haiphong across the Paul Doumer Bridge.[1]: 651 

Vietnam War

During the Tet Offensive the Division was working on flood protection dikes in North Vietnam.[6] Later in 1968 the Division's 36th Regiment was sent to reinforce the Quảng Nam Province-Da Nang Front while the 88th and 102nd Regiments were sent to reinforce the Route 9 Front fighting in the Battle of Khe Sanh.[7][8]: 227 

In October 1970, the PAVN command formed the PAVN B-70 Corps comprising the Division, together with the 304th and 320th Divisions based in southern Laos.[9]: 248 [8]: 272 

In 1971 the B-70 Corps and ancillary units participated in repulsing Operation Lam Son 719. On 18 February while conducting a B-52 bomb damage assessment north of Route 9 the ARVN 1st Airborne Battalion captured the Division's command post.[10]: 76  That afternoon the Division's 102nd Regiment attacked the ARVN 39th Ranger Battalion on Landing Zone Ranger North (16°44′38″N 106°29′35″E / 16.744°N 106.493°E / 16.744; 106.493) and the fighting continued throughout the night.[10]: 76  On the night of 19 February the 102nd Regiment continued to attack Ranger North but were kept in check by airstrikes. By the afternoon of 20 February Ranger North was surrounded and radio contact was lost. The 211 survivors of the 39th Rangers fought their way to LZ Ranger South (16°44′10″N 106°28′19″E / 16.736°N 106.472°E / 16.736; 106.472) leaving 178 dead and missing while PAVN losses were estimated at 639 killed with 423 AK-47s and 15 B-40/B-41 launchers destroyed.[10]: 79  By 19 March the Division was attacking ARVN positions north of Route 9 and harassing their withdrawal.[10]: 111 

In 1972 the division was commanded by Nguyễn Hữu An.

From late March to mid-September 1972 during the Easter Offensive the Division and the 304th Division fought in the First and Second Battles of Quảng Trị.[9]: 321 

On 24 October 1973 the PAVN command formed 1st Corps, composed of the Division, the 312th and 338th Divisions, 367th Air Defense Division, 202nd Tank Brigade, 45th Artillery Brigade, 299th Engineer Brigade and the 204th Signal Regiment under the command of Major General Lê Trọng Tấn.[8]: 342 

During the initial phases of the 1975 Spring Offensive, the 1st Corps was held in reserve, however following the Vietnamese Politburo decision to capitalise on the opportunity presented by the collapsing Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), in on 25 March it was ordered to join a general offensive against the South.[11] However the Division remained in North Vietnam to serve as the strategic reserve and defend the north and so did not participate in the offensive.[8]: 394 

Post-Vietnam War

On August 28, 1979, the division was reorganized into the first mechanized infantry division of PAVN and became the rapid response force of the 1st Corps since then.

Present day

Today the division remains part of the 1st Corps located in the Red River Delta.

References

  1. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z aa ab ac Windrow, Martin (2004). The Last Valley: Dien Bien Phu and the French Defeat in Vietnam. Orion Publishing Group. ISBN 0-297-84671-X.
  2. ^ Conboy, Kenneth (2012). The NVA and Viet Cong. Osprey Publishing. p. 5. ISBN 9781780967660.
  3. ^ Logevall, Fredrik (2012). Embers of War: The Fall of an Empire and the making of America's Vietnam. Random House. ISBN 978-0-375-75647-4.
  4. ^ a b c Fall, Bernard (1989). Street Without Joy. Schocken Books. ISBN 0-8052-0330-3.
  5. ^ Fall, Bernard (1985). Hell in a Very Small Place: The Siege of Dien Bien Phu. Da Capo Group. p. 487. ISBN 0-306-80231-7.
  6. ^ Harrison, Benjamin (2004). Hell on a Hill Top: America's Last Major Battle In Vietnam. iUniverse. p. 208. ISBN 978-0595327300.
  7. ^ Rottman, Gordon (2005). Khe Sanh 1967–68: Marines Battle for Vietnam's Vital Hilltop Base. Osprey Publishing. ISBN 978-1-84176-863-2.
  8. ^ a b c d Military History Institute of Vietnam (2002). Victory in Vietnam: A History of the People's Army of Vietnam, 1954–1975. trans. Pribbenow, Merle. University of Kansas Press. ISBN 0-7006-1175-4.
  9. ^ a b Sorley, Lewis (2000). A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnam. Harvest Books. ISBN 0-15-601309-6.
  10. ^ a b c d Nguyen, Duy Hinh (1979). Operation Lam Sơn 719. United States Army Center of Military History. ISBN 978-1984054463.Public Domain This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.
  11. ^ Dougan, Clark; Fulgham, David (1985). The Vietnam Experience: The Fall of the South. Boston Publishing Company. p. 94. ISBN 0-939526-16-6.
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