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1517 Hebron attacks

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1517 Hebron attacks occurred in the final phases of the 1513–17 Ottoman–Mamluk War, when Turkish Ottomans had ousted the Mamluks and taken Palestine. The massacre targeted the Jewish population of the city and is also referred to as a pogrom.[1]

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  • ✪ The Roots of the Israeli-Palestinian Dispute with James L. Gelvin
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Good evening, and welcome to the lecture. The first lecture in the 2018-19 season, of the Alworth center for the study of piece and justice. I'm Roy, Martha's oldest and smartest son. I'm here to say a little bit about Martha. Following her death in 2012 one lecture in the series is chosen that best reflects her interest in the subject examined by the series. Mom was connected to the Saint Scholastica campus as a student, trustee, and as a generous supporter. During her life, she worked to find ways to support the causes of justice, and give thoughtful consideration to peaceful, and sustainable solutions to conflict. Her desire to explore and learn developed over a lifetime. It took her all over the United States and every continent in the world except Antarctica. She believes it is imperative that learning about peaceful conflict resolution begin as early as possible. And her support of the idea lead to the establishment of this program. Everywhere she went, she wanted to meet people. Hear about their lives, their histories, their joys, and their challenges. Her travels helps her take a broad view of nearly any issue. Thus the subject of this year's series, unraveling the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. She would approach from the numerous travels to Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Israel, and Jordan. Thank you for being here it evening. Now I would like to introduce the director of the program and my friend, Tom Morgan. (applause). >> Thank you for that Royal. I have to say I was one of the fortunate people who did know Martha going back before my association with the college of St. Scholastica. She was always a great supporter morally and financially with all kinds of peace-making causes that I was a part of and so were others. She is missed. Anyway on behalf of the Center for the Study of Peace and Justice, I welcome you all to the first on a series of lectures on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. They are studied by the center here at the college. We're very grateful to the Alworth family for their generous and continued generous support. They are also funded in part by the Warner series of the foundations. Additional support has been received from the global awareness fund of the Duluth superior area administration, the state at the University of Minnesota of Duluth, UMD world languages of cultures, reader weekly from Duluth, and numerous other private donors. I am so grateful for their support. I say this every time. I really mean it. It wouldn't happen without you. The college doesn't have that big of a budget. It really helps. If you are interested in following what we do here and want to be on the mailing list, e-mail or, you know, snail mail. We do both. We have sign up sheets in the lobby. Please fill one of those out, and we'll put you on the mailing list. Please write very legibly and print. Sometimes we have trouble figuring out what your e-mail address is. We're happy to include you. In fact we want to include you. There are two other organizations out in the lobby that are supportive of this whole project. They have tables out there and information about what they are all about. So at the very least, I want to bring them to your attention. One is Veterans for Peace. There's a table for that organization. And the other one is the Twins for Peace not Walls group. It is a small group but a vocal group here in the Twin Ports that is particularly interested in the Palestine-Israeli problem. They have a table. You can hear more about them or hear more about what they are doing if you go there. And after the lecture that is next week we invite you to come together again. And talk about what we've heard, critique, find what we like, and what we didn't like about it. This session will be moderated or conducted by my colleague, Neil Fly. Here's the flier and there's his credentials. He's qualified to lead a lecture of this topic. He said you got to get James Gelvin. We did. After Professor Gelvin's lecture, we'll have Q & A. When that time comes, we invite you to come to the two microphones and ask your question in an orderly fashion and our speaker will recognize you in return. We like to give special attention to the students. Students go first. They get to ask the questions first. Because without them our enterprise wouldn't exist. Please defer to the students if they have a question. Sometimes I have found students have very good questions. Yes, one more thing to promote. And this should -- this material should be out there too. This is a program that's operated by another colleague of mine whom wasn't able to be here, but it is the program run under the interreligious form, sacred religious about immigration. This program is about it and the information is on the flier. It will be held Thursday, October 11th, Peace United Church of Christ. In front of you on either side of me we're displaying the text on tonight's lecture to technology called realtime captioning. Although we anticipate a high-qualify format, there will inevitably be errors that are inherit to the technology. A special thank you to the Edwin H.Eddie foundation whose support makes this service possible. Another benefactor to the program. I'm grateful for that. One last thing about technology, if you have any in your pocket or purse, please turn it off. We give our attention to our speaker. He came a long way to do this. By the way, I was just chatting with him earlier. He's got a whole bunch of other gigs this year. He was telling me Switzerland and London, and I don't remember. This will be the high point, right, Duluth, for you. So we're lucky to have him. Our speaker is a scholar of Middle Eastern history and has been a faculty member in the Department of History at the University of California, Los Angeles since 1995. He's written extensively on the history of the modern Middle East, with particular focus on nationalism and the social and cultural history of the area. In addition to his position with the History Department, he has been a co-director of UCLA's Center for Near Eastern Studies. Prof. Gelvin has a master's degree from the School of International and Public Affairs of Columbia University and a Ph.D. from Harvard. Before joining the faculty at UCLA, he taught at MIT, Boston College and at Harvard. He's been a fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, a recipient of a U.C. President's Fellowship in the Humanities and, in 2002-3, he was a visiting professor of history at the American University in Beirut. Three years ago, the Middle East Studies Association honored Prof. Gelvin with its Undergraduate Teaching Award, citing his "outstanding commitment to the practice and substance of undergraduate teaching." His book on the Israel-Palestine conflict was named an Outstanding Academic Title by the American Library Association. And the UCLA chapter of Mortar Board National Senior Honor Society presented him with a Faculty Excellence Award. And so on. Many more grants and honors too numerous to mention. He's also the author of many, many articles and books on the Middle East. Two of those books will be available after the program: THE NEW MIDDLE EAST and THE ISRAEL-PALESTINE CONFLICT. Prof. Gelvin lives inSanta Monica with his partner Lynn who works for Los Angeles County and their Pomeranian, Jekyll. Besides writeing and thinking about the Middle East, -- Ladies and gentlemen, please welcome Prof. James L. Gelvin. Professor: I want to thank Professor Morgan. He wasn't kidding about this being one of the high points of my travels this year. Lake Superior has always been on my bucket list. Now I can just cross that one off. What I want to do today is I want to talk about the Israeli-Palestine conflict. Many of you probably were glueed to your television sets or listening to the raid quo today at the Kavanagh hearings. I think after listening to democrats and republicans today, we'll listen and talk about something common which is the hundred and thirty year struggle between the Palestinians and Israelis. I was asked to give a historical background for the conflict. I want to say the title is actually true. 130 years within less than an hour. Forgive me if I forget about your favorite war or your favorite situation, war it might be in the Middle East. There's only so much you can do within this period of time. What I want to do is lay out the broad contours and set up the other two speakers and the comedy troupe that's going to be here over the course of this year. First though, before I start laying out the history, what I want to do is to make several points -- six points to be precise about the nature of the conflict itself. The conflict, in my opinion, is both trivial and mundane. I think you are going to see some aspects of that as I go on. First of all, what I want to do is to put the conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians within some broader framework. First of all, Israel's population, here's Israel. Israel's population is approximately eight million. Which is less than 10% of the population of Turkey or Iran or Egypt. As a matter of fact, it is approximately the size of the population of London or New York. The size of the Palestinian population in the territoryies -- here are the territoryies. That's the west bank. That's the Baza strip or Gazap. The population is about 11.5 million. It is slightly more than the population of Belgium. What we're dealing with here is very, very small populations on both sides. There's a famous story about the President of Egypt in the 1950s. And he went to a conference in Indonesia, a conference of non-allying powers. And the shower has it that he goes up to the premier of China. You look pretty town. -- down. What's your problem? >> It is the Israelis. They are mean and awful. Wait a minute. How many are there? He says there's two million of them. He said what hotel are they staying at? Here's a map of relative sizes of countryies around the world if measures by population. See if you can find Israel-Palestine on the map. Israel is 80% of the rivers -- Israel within its recognized borders is slightly around the size of New Jersey. Here's a map of Israel-Palestine overlayid in the Middle East. Here it is. You can see the size of the territory. It is not very large. Not very large population. What about the tragedy of the various wars that have taken place between Israel and its neighbors and between Israel and the Palestinians? It's been estimated that between 1948 and today there have been approximately 150,000 casualtyies in the wars that have taken place between Israels and the neighbors and the Palestinians. Of course that's a tragedy. Look at it this way: the Bosnian War of 1992-1995 left approximately 250,000 dead. Much shorter period of time. Much higher casualtyies. The Rwandan Genocide this in 1994 left 500,000 to 850,000 people dead. The worst of it all is the Iran-Iraq War. The second point that I want to make is the dispute has gone on for such a long time and has been the subject of so many debate that it is easy to lose sight of exactly what the dispute is all about. The dispute simply put is about land. Frequently on the lecture I get eye rolling. Of course, somebody from L.A. is going to say it is about Real Estate. It is about Real Estate. It is about land. It is about basically the ownership of land. Specifically Jewish immigrants who are uniteed by their allegiance to a nationalist ideology called Zionist, and Palestinians amongst whom the Zionist settleed both claim an exclusive right to control all or at least part of the territory that stretches from the Mediterranean to the Jordan River east to west and from the Sinai Peninsula in the south to Lebanon in the north. immigrants who are uniteed byDespite the claims from both sides this isn't a struggle about religion. This is a quintessential, nationalist struggle. Which, of course, is the model struggle that we see across the 19th and 20th century. Nationalist began to emerge in Europe in the 18th century. And then spread throughout the rest of the world in the 19th century. So at best we can say that the roots of the struggle go back, oh, approximately a century and a half or so. A distinct Jewish nationalist called Zionism, began to emerge in the mid to late 19th century in eastern Europe. It emergeed in response to European anti-Semitism. A distinct Palestinian nationalism emergeed much later. Palestinians were otherred by the Zionist who moved into the area. Let me say a couple of things about this. Number one, just because Palestinian emergeed later than Zionism and just because it emerged in response to Zionism doesn't mean it is less valid than Zionism. Zionism emergeed in response to European anti-Semitism. It would be perverse to say Jewish nationalism is less genuine than the European anti-Semitism that spawned it. Zionism is no less valid. Palestinian nationalism is no less valid. All nationalisms are true. All nationalisms are false. Every time I say that I should end up saying, oh, grasshopper. Nationalisms are are true in as many as they create fashions where nations had not existed before. There was no Jewish nation before Zionism. Judaism is a religious Zionism community. Zionism createed a Jewish nation. Therefore they are valid. But in the same sense of makeing things up. Both of them createed a nation where nations had not existed before. Point number four as in the case of all nationalisms, every side claims it has a historic right to a specific territory that it has inhabited. That territory was either the site of the nation's greatest triumphs on the birth of that nation. But a right derived from decent is a fabrication of nationalism. It is something that nationalists make up. There's no right to a specific territory that any people has. Whether or not it is the Jewish nation or the Palestinian nation, the American nation, or the French nation. Whether or not modern Jews are descended for the ancient Hebrews and therefore they have a right to establish a state where the Kingdom of David once was. Whether or not they are descendants of the Hebrews or Canaanites. One of the reasons it is so hard to solve is it was submerged in other conflicts as well. From 1948 to 1993, most of the world refused to look at the conflict as an Israel-Palestinian conflict. Instead they viewed it as a conflict between Israel Israelis and generic Arabs. Between at the State of Israel and Arabs nations. This is not what the conflict was all about. Beginning in 1993, the conflict once again become between the two principles that are resolve -- that are involved this it. Therefore I choose to talk about in my writeing an Israeli-Palestine conflict not Arab-Israeli conflict. I talk about it as a phase of the conflict that took place between 1948 and 1993. Finally while the struggle between Zionist and their descendants on the other hand and the Palestinians at the other and is at the core and has never changeed from being at core of the conflict -- the conflict if that part of the Middle East. We can say the conflict itself has gone through significant changes over time. And today what I want to do for the remainder of this lecture is to talk about four turning points in that conflict. Those turning points are 1917, 1948, 1967, and 1993. Let's start off with 1917. The territory which is now Palestine was part of the Ottoman Empire from 1517 to 1918. They made some mistakes if their 400 years of rule in the Middle East andball can --ball kins and north Africa. At the end of the war, Britain got control of Palestine. During the war, the British had made a commitment to the Zionist movement, Jewish nationalist, to support their aspirations in Palestine. Their aspirations were to establish a national home in Palestine. This was made in the famous Balfour Declaration. Two sentences that causeed a hell of a lot of trouble ever since. It was published in the "Times of London" and it read in part his majesty's government view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people. Why did the British of all people promise the establishment of a national home? This has been a bone of contention ever since. Some think that the Jews thought they control the war and in order to win, we'll do something nice for the Jews or to keep the United States and Russia in World War I. Many of the Balkan leaders were of Russian descent. Lloyd George, who was the prime minister of Britain during the time himself in his memoir say it gets nine reasons for the prom migration. He said the British Empire has always been on the side of the people who yearn to be free. Except Ireland and India, maybe. The most recent of the Balfour Declaration goes like this. A guy drops dead in the streets of New York. A crowd forms. Cops there. He says break it up. Nothing is happening. A little old lady pushes her way in to the crowd. Give him some chicken soup. Give him some chicken soup. The cop says lady, the guy is dead. It is not going to help him. It can't hurt him either. In other words, the Balfour Declaration was probably promulgateed because it couldn't hurt but certainly didn't help in World War I. It through the Britains support behind a national movement. Think of all of the national movements that have failed in history. Think of confederate nationalism. The fact that a great power would give their support to the nationalist gave the Jewish nationalism a leg up. It made it possible for that Jewish nationalism to weather storms. Okay? During the interwar period, the British enableed the immigration of Jews in to Palestine and by the end of the interwar period, Jews made up approximately one third of the population of Palestine. Now Jewish organizations brought up a huge amount of land from both large land owners, Palestinian land owners ab absentee. They were bound to get in to conflict, which is exactly what began to happen in the 1920's and into the 1930's. A conflict between the Zionist population, the settler population, and the indigenous Palestinian population. The stage was set for disaster. That disaster occurred in 1948 when the British after being broke in World War II and trying to get out of many of its commitments found out it could not station the necessary 100,000 troops in Palestine that would have been necessary to keep the peace and dump the Palestine question on the United Nations. The United Nations then voteed for -- on Palestine and decideed to divide the territory between the Zionist and Pall stippians -- Palestinians, createing the basis for the first Palestine War. The first Palestine War was two in one. It began between a war between the Palestinians and the Zionism. The Zionism community prevailed over the Palestinian community. This lead to two things. Number one, the declaration of statehood for Israel, the State of Israel in 1948 and number two, 720,000 Palestinians were forced to flee. A large number of Palestinians were forceed to flee. Some did so because they were exspelled. Others did so because of acts of terrorism that made them fear for their lives. Others did so because it is a reasonable thing for Palestinians or anybody else to leave a war zone. Which is exactly what happened. Most fled to the west bank of the Jordan River. Others to the Gaza Strip in the south. The west bank of the Jordan River after 1948 was occupyied by the Jordanians, the Gaza Strip was occupyied by the Egyptians. Others fled to Arab states surrounding Palestine -- Israel-Palestine. And others, of course, made it further abroad. Those with, for example, skills with education, money, for example, made it to Europe and North America. There's probably some people in the audience whose an senator -- ancestors come from the area. Those fled to refugee camps where 34 -- many of them and their descendents live for today. This is important for a contemporary reason. About two weeks ago Donald Trump announced that the United States was going to stop funding the United Nations efforts refugee centers throughout the Middle East and stop funding the United Nations Works and Relief citeing that the Palestinians should not become a culture of dependency. This was Jared Kushner who said that. It is a bit ironic he would talk about cultures of dependency. Anyway. To the very day the Palestinians demand the right to return and go back to their ancestral homes in Palestine. It was after the beginning of the flight of Palestinians that the Arab States surrounding Palestine declared war on the newly formed state of Israel and invaded. The boundaryies that are nationally recognized are the lines from the 1948 war. The international community saw the problem in the region as being a problem between Israel and its sovereign neighbors. Those who invade it. This was a problem between Israel and Syria, Israel and Jordan, Israel and Egypt. This was not a problem as far as the international community saw between Israel and the Zionist movement and the Palestinian population. Looking at the totality of the struggle as one between Israel and the -- its neighbors has the sole problem in the region therefore is mistaken. Because it ignores probably the most important actor on the other side which is the Palestinians. To recap why is 1948 important? It saw the establishment of the state of Israel. Number two, it was the beginning of the Palestinian refugee problem. A refugee problem that remains unresolveed to the present day. Number three it made it appear that a conflict between two peoples, Zionist and Palestinians was actually a conflict between states. Israel and its Arab neighbors. 1967. Nobody was happy with the results of the 1948 war. The Arab states wanted to reverse the consequences of the war. And Israel was unhappy with the borders that came out of the war. Tensions built over the course of the 1950's and the 1960's. And in 1967, war broke out between Israel and its neighbors. Israel struck first. But most historians credit the -- or give the blame to the Arab states and their Russian backers and Soviet backers were egging them on. The war was over in a mere six days. Yet it had changeed the map of the region. At the end of the war, Israel occupyied the west bank which had been under Jordanian control, Gaza which was under Egyptian control, Sinai which was Egyptian territory, the Golan Heights which belonged to Syria, and Jerusalem, which wasdy -- was divided between Israel and Jordan after the 1948 war. The Arab states reverseed the war to reverse the consequence of the 1948 war. They shifted their goals. Now it was to reverse the consequences of the second war and to regain the territory they had lost before. They wanted their land back. The Israelis wanted diplomatic recognition from the surrounding Arab states. So what developed out of the 1967 war was a perfect bargaining position. The Arabs would give Israel recognition, and Israel would give the Arabs their land back. This was embodyied in U.N. resolution 242 which is also called the land for peace formula. The land for peace formula has been the basis for every peace treaty signed between Israel and its neighbors ever since. For example, in 1979, the Israelis signed a peace treaty with the Egyptians. In exchange for diplomatic relations with the Egyptians, the Israelis gave the Sinai back to the Egyptians. In 1994, the Israelis seened a peace treaty with Jordan. In exchange for peace with Jordan, they gave Jordanian territory that they had occupyied back as well. Not all of the land was easy to dispense with. This was id -- logical reasons. After the war the Israelis annexed Jere Jere Jerusalem. It was not up for negotiation. It would be the undie viedd capitol of Israel. Ever since then Jerusalem has recognized Israel as the capitol as well as other Palestines have recognized Israel as the capitol as well. The United States claimed that this was a situation that had to be figureed out between the two partyies. The fun was put on the scale when the United States moved it embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem and recognizeing Jerusalem as the capitol of Israel. Jerusalem was one territory that the Israelis did not want to give back. Another territory that the Israelis had difficulty parting with was the west bank and Gaza Strip. Okay. Territory of where the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip. Gaza and Israel -- Israel claimed that Gaza and the West Bank would not be returned to anybody simply because Jordan that controlled the West Bank and Gaza that -- and Egypt that controlled Gaza were not the real owners of the territories. There was no place they could return them too. Therefore what the Israelis began to do was not only maintain control over Gaza and the West Bank, but began to colonize Gaza and the Best -- West Bank as well. They built settlements in the territories. As you can see, the settlements are not trailers or even double wides or tents that are pitched in the desert. They are communityies that would look like any bedroom community in Minnesota or any other state in the United States. Over time the settlements expanded makeing it more and more difficult for the Israelis to abandon them on the one hand. And makeing it more and more difficult for the Palestinians to create a state in the West Bank if they were granted the privilege of doing so. As of now there are about 400,000 Israeli settleers on the West Bank. There's $200,000 in Jerusalem. That brings us to 600,000 settlers which is 13% of the Israeli population. The settlements by the way according to most international law are illegal. The United States has gradually backed away. At first they were illegal, then an impediment to peace, now simply a bargaining chip. So these were the effects of the 1967 war. There was one further effect of the 1967 war. During the war the Arabs blew it. They wanted to liberate Palestine. But they were unable to do so. Not only were unable to do so, but six days, the Arab armies were splashed. They reasonably understood after the six-day war if they wanted the territory, they would have to take it upon themselves to liberate their territory. During the 1970's and the 1980's, the Palestine liberation organization was recognized by first the Palestinians and then the Arab States then the world community as a sole, legitimate, representative of the Palestine community. During the 1970's and the 1980's, the Palestinian liberation organization committed acts of terrorism to keep the Palestine question on the international agenda. They were very effective. We are talking today about the Israel-Palestine conflict. We are not talking about the Moroccan-Sauwis at all. The reason for that is the PLO is very effective in keeping its -- keeping the Palestine question alive during this period. The ethics of what they did is questionable. But the fact that they accomplished what they accomplished was something that you might have to say is admiralable. This brings us to 1993. They met with unofficial dellation of Israelis in Oslo, Norway. I was told all I have to do is mention Norway, and I would get cheers from the audience. These two unofficial delegations hammered out an agreement which they took to their representative governments. The agreement has been called ever after, the Oslo Accord. Now the Oslo Accord consists of two sets of agreements. The first set of agreement was between the -- it was mutual recognitions between the Israelis and the Palestinians. The Palestinians who spokesman was a PLO recognized the state of Israel. The Israelis recognized a Palestinian nation. Not a state, a Palestinian nation. Whose representative in negotiations would be the Palestine liberation organization. This was probably the most important part of the Oslo Asord, because this is the accord that people go back to when they talk about a two-state solution. The Palestinians recognize a state of Israel. So the best the Palestinians could have would be a state on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. This was also problematic for the Palestinians since the Israeli state could only get larger and the Palestinian State could only get smaller in negotiations, particularly as settlements expanded over the course of the years. So the first accord was about mutual recognitions. The second accord was a step by step process whereby the Israelis would begin a withdrawal from the Palestinian territories and continue negotiations with the Palestinians resulting in -- that was never clearly laid out. Most Palestinians, of course, fell that it would lead to the creation of a Palestinian state. At the time the Israeli government thought that this would lead to a confederation between the West Bank and the State of Jordan. Currently the Israelis are talking about something called state minus. In other words, the Palestinians would have a state, in name, but the Israelis would control borders and airspace and security and the water table and a whole variety of other things. State minus. Anyway. The whole idea was that the Israelis would begin their withdrawal from Palestinian territories, and that a Palestinian authority would take its place. Elections were held. A Palestinian authority that was made up of the largest constituent of the Palestine organization took control of the Urban areas of the West Bank. The problem was is that after the first withdrawal and the second withdrawal, the withdrawals got smaller and smaller and then nonexistent. But before we get in to that, why did the Israelis do this? Well, there are multiple reasons why the Israelis went to the bargaining table. They got to be difficult to control. In 1987, an upriseing broke out in the Gaza Strip and in the West Bank in which Palestinians took on directly the occupation. The Israelis who had longed for normalcy had the confronted and armed upriseing that was not only debilitateing economically but morally as well. If you look at the picture, it shows a child with rocks throwing that at an Israeli tank. That was the quintessential picture of the first intifada, of the first uprising. Israel certainly lost the war of international opinion. The other thing was that Israel -- this was the end of the Cold War. And Israel now longed for the sort of normal existence of any other state. Which would be impossible as long as Israel remained in occupation of the West Bank preventing the Palestinians from their right of self-determination. Between independence and 2016, for example, there have been 2019 security council resolutions condemning Israel. The vast majority of them condemning Israeli settlement policy or policyies in the territory. So as I said, the Israelis began to pull back and over time that pull back stalled. Now there's a number of reasons why the pullback began to stall. First of all, there were just minor issues on the table. That had to be resolveed. Like Jerusalem. The writer returned for Palestinian refugees, borders, security, water, small issues like that. Of course they are not easyily reconcilable. They might have been reconcilable through compromise. There's one that's been on the table since 2000. It was known as the Clinton Parameters. It was very simple. Taker Jerusalem, Israel said it should be divided. Fine. It is going to be shared. It is going to be Cher -- shared between Israel and the Palestinians. They will have their own state. It will be demilitarized. These are the way the things can be worked out. The problem is the political will is not there. The compromise has not been reached since 1993 that would being necessary to end the conflict. Why is this so? First of all, the Israelis blame Palestinian violence. This is a picture from the second intifada. A much more violent rebellion by Palestinians in the territories. It was bloody. 1,000 Israelis died, civilians, in various forms of terrorist activityies, includeing bus bombings. 4,000 Palestinians also died during the first -- the second intifata. The Palestinian violence is just one explanation and not the only explanation for why come promise hasn't been reached. The Israeli and Palestinian dispute is the longest running dispute in history. Thank you, Northern Ireland. If you look at it, the good Friday accords were signed and immediately thereafter the worst terrorists activityies took place of something called the Irish Republican Army did a major bombing in the town of Ohma. It would have been easy for both sides to walk away. They were too heavyily committed to the peace process themselves. We are not going to let a few bunch of thugs to do this to us. We're going to continue the process. In the case of the Israel-Palestine conflict there were two other reasons why the Israelis are not particularly interested at the present time in reaching compromise. Number one over the last ten years or 15 years or so, Israel has become increasely nationalist and right wing. First of all, it is not the only country in the world as we well know that's becomeing increaseingly nationalist and right wing. But on the other hand it has -- this has prevented the Israeli population from supporting the compromises that would be necessary to bring about peace. And in part the violence of the second intifada is to blame for this. Israelis were badly shaken by the short of violence that would take place in their cities. But there's something else as well. Which is the settlements. The settlements make a single, config -- contiguous state in the Palestinian West Bank impossible. It is supported by the Israeli government. It would be just as difficult for the Israeli government today to say to turn its back on the settler movement in Israel as it would be for -- let's say the American administration today to turn its back on the NRA. These things just don't happen. The settler movement provides a pillar. Over time the Americans have tryied to stop the settlement of the West Bank. George W. Bush came out with a proposal and Barack Obama and along comes Donald Trump. Donald Trump abandoned America -- that was a Freudian slip, by the way. It happened. Donald Trump abandoned America's position as a so-called honest broker. The United States never really was an honest broker. But presented itself as such. Because what's happened in the last year or so? The current administration has moved the American embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, backing Israeli claims to Jerusalem, it has expelled diplomats, and it cut off aid to joint Palestinian groups advocates co-existence. Rather than trying to bring the two sides together, what the current administration is attempting to do is to humiliate and weaken the Palestinian cause so they would have to accept some form of peace settlement. It is not going to work. It is probably a fruitless pursuit. But on its 25th anniversary which it is this year, it appears that the Oslo process itself is hopelessly dead rocked, maybe never to restart again. Thank you. (applause). >> It is the beginning. Certainly not the end. Please come forward and ask questions. Especially students. >> Yes. Thank you for coming. Thank you for improveing the Bible in your first comments. Because Israel and specifically Jerusalem is mentioned in the Bible as a troublesome stone before the Lord returns. That's the prophesy that we see happening today. Back in the 1880's when Mark Twain went through the land, it was a nondisscript land. Then you mention the title of the book by "Time" that was published in 1984. She went to tell a story that was very much different than what she wrote after she did research, Censuses, and so forth. This book -- did you read it or -- >> Yes. As a matter of fact what we used to do is to read it to each other and laugh. >> It is worth reading. It is well documented. It tells a totally different story. And then the third thing I brought a book called "The eye of the Storm." And God gave Israel or Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, a title deed of the land that's prescribeed in the Bible which includes Israel today and beyond that. So when we have tried to divide Jerusalem, we've had bad effects. When Gaza was forceed to be given back to the Palestinians, the Israelis -- well, the Israelis gave them factties with the -- for the flowers and all of that. Going things they were destroyed. And at the same time that happened, we had controlled it. And we destroyed the southern part -- of this nation. So there's tie-ins. I'm just wondering -- yes -- yeah? I'm just wondering, these things in to consideration, is it possible that your premise of this being 130 years and not something that goes back such as a book "In time and memorial" could be true? >> There are certain things people have to agree to disagree on. Let me just say a couple of things about some of the things you brought up. Jerusalem is mentioned in the Bible. It is also mentioned in the Koran. And it is the cite of where theoretically Mohamad took his night journey to heaven. I am not a Muslim. I'm hardly a Christian. I'm certainly not Jewish. So these storyies mean nothing to me. What means something to me is the reality that we have now. And what we can do about it. It is not a religious conflict is what I've been trying to say. It is a conflict that is very, very modern in what it is all about. It is a conflict that is between two people, two peoples who have modeled themselves in the same way that every other people has modeled themselves in the modern world, witch is in terms ofeth no nationalism or so form of nationalism. They didn't exist in the ancient world and certain parts of eastern Europe before the 19th century and certainly in Palestine not physical the late 19th century as well. I like the Mark Twain story. It is one of my favorites. I talk about it in the book. "Innocence abroad" takes his trip to Palestine. He sees these ram shackled buildings. These shacks. He comes to the conclusion that Palestine is under inhabited and the people are very, very poor, and that basically what's necessary is something from the west to come in and to pick up this poor clan of people and help them. What he saw was something called Horab which is Arabic for ruins. In times in which the Ottoman state was not particularly strong, Bedwan used to attack the coastal state. Nobody liveed down there. At time that Mark Twain liveed there, the Ottoman state was strong. What you saw there rather than an abandoned areaing you saw shacks that were built by people expanding in the industrial production. They would go down to the coastal area, build these shacks, and for twice a year. Once to sew and once to reap the crops. There was really no need for more heavy input on this thing. Instead of seeing a failure of the Ottoman State, he saw an expansion of the territory -- of the territory that could be cultivateed. And in the late 19th century, the Arab population of Palestine doubled as a result of the Ottoman's getting a second wind. I was facetious -- I wasn't really facetious, we did do this with John Peters book. The book -- if you read any of the scholarly reviews of the book. It is a joke. Ellen Dirshwitz in his case for Israel it has been demonstrateed he cribs most of the book out of from time and memorial. It is not something that people take, you know, seriously, you know, who are trying to figure out exactly what the history of the region is all about. >> You have pointed out this country has failed in centuries working in Israel and Palestine. If you ran the zoo, what would you do? >> Now or over the course? >> I mean how to solve it. >> How to solve it. Sure. Why not. We are locked within a have still bill conflict. During the Cold War the United States depended on certain satellites in the region to do the heavy lifting for us. The United States would have their backs. The United States depended on Israel as a check on Syria. The United States depended on Iran and Saudi Arabia as a check on Iraq. The Cold War ended. The United States is still locked in. By the way, the Iran thing ended in 1979, before the end of the Cold War. The United States is still locked in to the idea that we have to somehow work with these allyies of ours. Saudi Arabia on the one hand and Israel on the other. Now when Donald Trump took his first trip to the -- first trip he went to the Middle East. He went to Riyadh and Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. He basically underscored the relationships there that Obama was distanceing the United States from. And for good reason. For example, Saudi Arabia has tryied to convince the bigger problem in the Middle East is terrorism. The biggest purvey purveyor of terrorism is Iran. It's been estimated over the course of the existence, the Soviet Union spent $7 million on communist propaganda. It's been estimated since 1973, Saudi Arabia has spent $100 billion on the doctrine of Wahabism. You can see it every time you look at pictures of what Saudi Aye rain request is all about. The biggest purveyor of terrorism is not Iran in the Middle East. We had the same problem in the Cold War. That's problematic. Israel has not been serveing American interest in a way you would expect an ally to receiver the American interest. Truman had the says when I buy a client, I want it to say bought. You know? But, for example, the United States determined that probably one of the biggest problems in the Middle East was nuclear proliferation. What the United States determined to do was to prevent Iran from getting a bomb. It spearheaded the nuclear treaty with Iran. While the United States was spearheading the nuclear treaty with Iran, Israel was doing everything possible to undercut the United States, includeing coming to the American Congress and attempting to get the American Congress to move against an American President. Okay? Why are we allowing this to take place? Why do we still think in terms of the Cold War? At the present time, Israel gets $4 billion in military aid. That's great for American arms manufacturers. Now they have to buy that in the United States, but Israel has got the third largest per capita army in the world. After North Korea and -- do we really have to finance the military actions and the occupation? Do we really have to do what we are doing now in terms of the Palestinians which is cutting off u UNROF or trying to humiliate Palestinians by kicking their delegates out. The same thing for Saudi Arabia. The United States has implicateed in war crimes that with being complimented this very day by the Saudis in Yemen. The United States is replying war planes, refueling war planes, supplying intelligence that that, and the weapons being dropped on civilians. If you remember the bus load of children several weeks ago. That's supplyied by the United States to the ally in Saudi Arabia. This is some of the stuff I would do. I would tend to rethink those very alliances. (applause). >> My question is around the time of the Arab states and Israeli War, who funded Israel during the war that it was powerful enough to win against all of the Arab states and to consider them to be a nation and consideringing the fact it was a newly formed nation, how did the funding for the war to get to win against the Arab states? >> I assume you mean 1967. >> Let me give you two wars. 1967 and 1973. Who was responsible for the Israel military up until that point? The French. We had other fish to fry in 1957. The United States. We were in Vietnam at the time. The United States fundamentally had sold defensive weapons to Israeli pilots for flying mirages against the Arabs in the 1967 war. It was only after the 1967 war that the United States began to look at Israel as a strategic partner as somebody who will do the dirty work for us. That's when we began to supply it. If you are talking about 1973 -- I didn't talk about 1973. '73 was the worst of the Arab-Israeli wars. More casualtyies than any other Arab-Israeli war. It didn't mean very much in terms of what the conflict was all about. You had the war. The conquest of the Sinai by the Israelis. The peace process or the attempt the land for peace process had broken down. There was no way the Arab states were going to be able to get their land back, short of war. The Arab states went to war in 1973. Not to destroy Israel. Not to get rid of the Palestinian refugee crisis by having Palestinians move back to Israel, but to restart the process again. To restart the peace process. We see a direct link between 1973 and 1979 with the Egyptians and the peace process that started there. Now the United States was instrumental in re-supplying Israel and supplying Israel before the war, resupplying Israel after the war. American -- the United States had begun to shift in terms of its perspective on the Middle East. They began to view -- adopted this view of all that was necessary in order to bring about an Israel-Palestine peace was to fore close the war option. How do you fore close the war option? You make Israel stronger than the sum total of the Arab states. That's the American policy in the 1970's or so. Because the war option was fore closeed, it left only one option, for the Arabs to go to war. The American and Israeli policy is we're going to sit and wait for the Arabs to come to us. They don't come to us, fine. We'll keep the land. In order to get the American Americans attention again was the Arabs attacked Israel again. It is interesting after the Egyptians broke through the Israeli line, they didn't know what to do. The road to Tel Aviv was open at that point. And you have the general staff calling back saying we've broken through. Now what? The whole idea was to breakthrough and have the confrontation. The Americans went on the highest nuclear alert since the Cuban missile crisis. This is the beginning of the Arab oil embargo as a result of the war. All because the United States read signals that was coming out of the Middle East wrong in terms of what we have to do in order to encourage a peace process. What he meant was anybody under 40. >> So you just mentioned the kind of ideology of the Israelis and the Americans of waiting it out because they had the hand and they wanted to hold on to the land. Earlier you mentioned the PLO with their terrorism trying to keep the global stage and keep the debate going on. Would you say that this is a direct reaction to kind of that wait-it-out ideology. Personally I would never find terrorism and these grievous acts as a way towards a conflict resolution and peaceful resolution between states. I guess my question is would you say this -- this waiting it out kind of created the PLO terrorism? >> No. It is a good question. I don't want people to leave here with the idea that Gelvin thinks the terrorism kept the Palestinian dispute alive and therefore it was a great thing. I find it disgusting and organizations should not participate in et cetera. I think if any people knows what the horrors of terrorism is all about besides the Israelis, of course, it is the Americans. Because of 9/11. What I was trying to say is something different. We have a couple of tracks. We have an Arab-Israeli track on the one hand. It is peace between the Arab states and Israel. Then we have the Palestinians. They say, hey, wait. Resolution 242. Land for peace. Where does it say anything or mention the Palestinians? It mentioned refugees. It never mentioned the word Palestinian or even says anything about the Palestinian issue of substance. It says land for peace. Return of land. Recognition and so on and so forth. This cut the Palestinians out. You know? Palestinians politically were not a factor in 1967. They were beginning to be a factor in 1969 when Yasser Arafat was elected. Originally it was the first President and PLO to throw the Jews in the sea. He was committed to liberation of Palestine. Starting in the 1970's, the PLO began to talk about a creation in the mini state in the West Bank as the first step. Then what they did is they began to look at a mini state in Palestine as a permanent thing that would take place. Mini state meaning the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Then they signed on to the Oslo Accord which meant that they recognized that Israel was going to control the 80% of the territory between the Mediterranean and the Jordan River. The best they could hope for was the remaining West Bank and Gaza Strip. As I said before, Israel could only get larger. The Palestines larger. Hamas is Hamas. But actually they hit the nail on the head. They said, okay, reject Oslo. We'll negotiate with the Israelis if they want to. You want Jerusalem. Okay. You want Hebron. Okay. We want Tel Aviv. Now when you put it that way, that sort of throws in stark relief exactly what's taking place as a result of Oslo. It is not a fair sort of let's sit down and negotiate these things. It is sort of like we've got Tel Aviv. We have Jerusalem. We have Hebron. The state keeps on expanding and getting bigger. It was like they useed to say about the doctrine. What's mine is mine and what's your is mine too. That's the way the Oslo Accord views were. To summarize your question the thing about the Palestine organization historically is the way that you have to look at it is that it did keep the question alive when so much of the world was either committed to ignoreing it or to destroyinging the Palestinian national movement. I'm not talking just about the Israelis, I'm talking about the Syrian and Egyptians well. Both of whom would like to have seen the Palestinian national movement disappear. >> Thanks for your talk. Perhaps even more so your books, which I know some of my students here continue to learn from. My question does have to do again with the legacy of the Oslo Accords which the late Palestinian scholar eWard -- Edward Siid said it offered nothing. Long before Trump we've been seeing a convergence of the policy vis-a-vis the Palestinians and the thoughts on that? >> I would degree. I don't think it's been a direct line. George W. Bush said we can't expect Israel to go back to the 1967 lines. Why not? Expect them to go back. Throw it back. You go back to 1967 lines. No. Okay. What are you going to give us? Something along those lines. We gave up that negotiateing posture. Okay? Now under Obama there was something else going on which is very interesting. Obama's idea was that -- and I would agree with the policy, but I think the excuse was really poor -- some of it he couldn't help such as the Arab uprisings in 2010 and 2011. He should have been able to it work something and make sure it wasn't going to happen. He should have been able to explain his policy better. His policy was the following -- basically the Israel policy was underneath the middle eastern policy. The Middle East is worthless. We're going into a post-oil world. We don't need the oil. The Middle East is the second least globalized region in the world behind sub-Saharan Africa. It is faces numerous crises that can't be resolveed the way the United States like to resolve them, at the point of the gun. For example, health care, demography, water supply. All of tease things are affecting the Middle East. There's going to be more wars in the Middle East. Things are going to get worse. This is what the United States should do. Disentangle itself. The United States has bigger fish to fry. They are in the far east. The world of the 21st century is going to be create in the far east. It is going to be China and southeast Asia and the Pacific Rim. That's where the United States should focus and why the hell are we destroying so much in terms of blood and treasure in Afghanistan and Iraq? Let's get out of Afghanistan and Iraq. That was a policy. Let's resolve the Israel Palestine conflict. The first step would be a settlement freeze. Okay. Let's, for example, bring Iran in to the Middle East balance of power, you know? Because of the whole Saudi thing. It is better to have a come -- camel inside your tent pissing out, than a camel outside of tent pissing in. In other words, bring the Iranians into the tent. We have to compromise with Iran, but why not bring it in? That's what Obama wanted to do. Once we've done that, all we have to do is solve Israel and Palestine and began to face east Asia and the real problems there. As a policy, that's sound. The Middle East is nothing but a big sink hole to the United States. You know? And everything that we have the reverse Midas touch. Everything that we touch -- you know. It does not turn to gold. Let's put it that way. Get out of the Middle East. And move some place else. So this was the American policy before the election Donald Trump. What does Donald Trump do? Donald Trump sets the Middle East policy by being the unObama. He looks to see what Barack Obama did and does the opposite. Probably for no other reason than Barack Obama did it and he wants to do the opposite. So Barack Obama said to Israel and said to Saudi Arabia, look, we're not going to pick your coals out of the fire. We're going to give you support. If you don't want the support, we're not going to get involved. We're not going to get another Desert Storm and another invasion of Iraq. We're not going to make war on Iraq. This is what made American relations so bad. What happens? All of the sudden we get the idea that Saudi Arabia is going to be the strong ally and Israel is the wonderful ally. We have to get rid of the Palestinian issue and put pressure on Iran, et cetera, et cetera. This is all of the stuff that has been taking place recently. It is a fundamentally irrational policy and it goes against everything that we've attempted to do in American history. Put it one more way, America was incredibly successful in the Middle East policy during the Cold War. Aisle not -- I'm not going to say it was moral. I'm going to say it was successful in as much as it accomplished practically everything that itmented to accomplish. Yeah, there were problems with the Iranian revolution, Lebanon. We sold out the Kurds twice and the Palestinians on multiple occasions. Fundamentally, we accomplished everything that we want. Oil, Israel, the state system, locking the Soviet Union out. We won. Think of -- you know, how many -- we lost 5,000 people during the Cold War in the Middle East. 5,000. You know? 500. Excuse me. 500. In the Middle East. Almost half of that took place in one terrorist incident in Beirut in 1983. 500 people. 55,000 in ten years in Vietnam. Obviously our policy in the Middle East was far more successful if viewed in American terms than the policy -- one of the ways we accomplished what we accomplished was we got people to do all of the heavy lifting for us. You know? When the e Egyptians were screwing around in Yemen, we got the Saudis to finance an opposition to that. The Syrians do that Syrians tended to do, the Israelis would do something about it. On and on and on. You know? This is what American policy was. After the Cold War, we turn knew briskic. Nobody can come close to us. What are we going to do? We're going to do everything otherwises. The Israelis don't have to lift a finger. Nobody lifts a finger. We are going to put together the international coalition to liberate Kuwait. We're going to be the ones that fundamentally take on, you know, Iran and Iraq at the same time. The dual containment strategy. We're the ones who are going to take care of the Iraq problem by invadeing Iraq. Okay? That was reversal. They were attempting to go back to what gave America success in the Cold War. We'll have your backs. But you do the heavy lifting for us. Unfortunately this is not the way they likeed it. Obama called the Saudis free loaders at a certain point. This is not what they wanted. So therefore their push back was the one that determineed the way things went. That's unfortunate. That was a long-winded answer. >> Thank you. >> Hi. Thank you for being here. I happen to be Jewish. Personally and politically, I am very concerned about this sort of effort to equate Israel and the nation of Israel and the people of Israel and all Jews in the entire world. And in the same vain, I'm enraged by all of the -- my interpretation is newly reenergyized efforts to limit free speech by saying any speech against Israel is anti-semitic. I was hopeing you could speak more about that. Also if you have any thoughts or ideas on how to resist that. >> It is a good question. It goes to the heart -- I think your question as well. Which is the problem of equateing Jews -- particularly American Jews with what goes on in Israel and Israeli policy. You know? The Israeli policy -- if you read the liberal paper from Israel, it's got an English language aation. They basically talk about the big problems in the Gulf that's developing between American Jews and Israeli Jews. Not all Israeli Jews. Those of the orthodox and ultra orthodox persuasion. These problems consistent of many problems, for example, having a place where liberal Jews and Jewish women can pray at the Welling wall or having rabbis being able to perform marriage ceremonyies. Americans say, of course. The Israelis say absolutely not. There's a bigger issue at the present time which is American Jews who are either pro BDS or have said things that offend the Israeli government are not allowed in to Israel. They boycott, divest, and sanction Israel. Non-vie plenty it is not like BDS is saying anything. That's sort of like violent -- it is non-vie leapt. It is calling for a boycott. They say it is delegitimizeing Israel. It is anti-semitic because it is delegitimateizing the Jewish state. There are people who don't like Israeli policy and support BDS or who, you know, are major proponents of BDS. I, for example, have just become a BDS supporter. I think it is a stupid tactic. It is never going to happen. There's not going to be a sanction. I tryied to get my university to divest. They chose not to. The thing about it is you don't go along into a Texas town that's been Raff ravageed by floods and have people sign a pledge they are not going to support BDS in order to get flood relief. You don't do that. You don't disallow people like me from going into in Israel for the support. I have friends that have been turned away. I haven't tryied recently. You don't do that sort of stuff. This is the sort of stuff that's going on now in the name of preventing antisemitism. There's plenty out there. Particularly now. The stuff that's going on with Israel and those people who are saying that this occupation, which has lasted since 1967, the occupation has got to end. You know? And this impression of the Palestinian people have to end. Those two things are not equitable. To get -- to be very, very political about it. Okay? We have an administration right now in power that supports Israel and is supported by Israel inspite of the fact this is the first administration I can remember that relyies for its vote on absolute anti- anti- anti-Semites. I think that alone should alert people to the difference of Jews and anti-Semites and the whole question of Israel on the other hand. (applause). >> Thank you. Professor Gelvin and I are going to walk out of here now and go over to the table with he has some of his books for sale. He will sign them, if you will buy them. You are welcome to stay for a while and chat more about this. We have a little reception in the lobby. Thank you all very much for coming. Another program in October. Thank 621 01:31:12,489 --> 01:31:14,489 you. (applause).


An account of the event, recorded by Japheth ben Manasseh in 1518, mentions how the onslaught was initiated by Turkish troops led by Murad Bey, the deputy of the Sultan from Jerusalem.[2][3] Jews were attacked, beaten and raped, and many were killed as their homes and businesses were looted and pillaged.[4] It has been suggested that the stable financial position of the Hebronite Jews at the time was what attracted the Turkish soldiers to engage in the mass plunder.[2] Others suggest the pogrom could have in fact taken place in the midst of a localised conflict, an uprising by the Arabs against the new Ottoman rulers.[5] Those who survived the calamity fled to Beirut and Jews only returned to Hebron 16 years later in 1533.[4]

See also


  1. ^ Spencer C. Tucker, ed. (2008). "Hebron". The Encyclopedia of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO. p. 436. Retrieved May 21, 2012.
  2. ^ a b Fred Skolnik; Michael Berenbaum (2007). Encyclopaedia Judaica. Macmillan Reference USA in association with the Keter Pub. House. p. 746. ISBN 978-0-02-865936-7.
  3. ^ Jerold S. Auerbach (30 July 2009). Hebron Jews: memory and conflict in the land of Israel. Rowman & Littlefield. p. 40. ISBN 978-0-7425-6615-6.
  4. ^ a b The Solomon Goldman lectures. Spertus College of Judaica Press. 1999. p. 56. ISBN 978-0-935982-57-2. The Turks' conquest of the city in 1517, was marked by a violent pogrom of murder, rape, and plunder of Jewish homes. The surviving Jews fled to the "land of Beirut", not to return until 1533.
  5. ^ Alan David Crown (1989). The Samaritans. Mohr Siebeck. p. 114. ISBN 978-3-16-145237-6.
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