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United States Government Fur Trade Factory System

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The United States Government Fur Trade Factory System was a system of government non-profit trading with Native Americans that existed between 1795 and 1822.

The factory system was set up on the initiative of George Washington who thought it would neutralize the influence of British traders doing business on United States territory. As an honest alternative to private trade it would also further the prestige of the United States among Native Americans. Thomas Jefferson shared Washington's expectations, but was also hoping that leading men of the Indian Nations would go into debt and be forced to cede land to pay it off.

Private interests generally criticized the factory system.[1] American Fur Company was hurt by competition from the government's trading houses and began a campaign to have them closed down. In 1821, Senator Benton of Missouri, who stood in a close relationship with that company's owner, John Jacob Astor, started hearings with the aim to abolish the factory system and open the fur trade for uninhibited private enterprise and profit-making. Among the system's defenders were the future Vice President Richard Mentor Johnson and the future President Martin Van Buren. Nevertheless, Congress abolished the government fur trade factories in 1821, giving the government one year to liquidate the system.

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Transcription

Episode 23: The Rise of the Industrial Economy Hi I’m John Green this is Crash Course U.S. History and today we’re going to discuss economics and how a generation of- Mr. Green, Mr. Green, is this going to be one of those boring ones no wars or generals who had cool last words or anything? Alright, Me From The Past, I will give you a smidge of Great Man history. But only a smidge. So today we’re gonna discuss American industrialization in the decades after the Civil War, during which time the U.S. went from having per capita about a third of Great Britain’s industrial output to becoming the richest and most industrialized nation on earth. Libertage Meh, you might want to hold off on that Libertage, Stan because this happened mostly thanks to the Not Particularly Awesome Civil War, which improved the finance system by forcing the introduction of a national currency and spurred industrialization by giving massive contracts to arms and clothing manufacturers. The Civil War also boosted the telegraph, which improved communication, and gave birth to the transcontinental railway via the Pacific Railway Act of 1862, all of which increased efficiency and productivity. So thanks, Civil War! Intro If you want to explain America’s economic growth in a nutshell chalk it up to G, D, and L: Gerard, Depardieu, and Lohan. No, Geography, Demography and Law. However, while we’re on the topic, when will Gerard, Depardieu, and Lindsay Lohan have a baby? Stan, can I see it? Yes. Yes. Geographically, the U.S. was a huge country with all the resources necessary for an industrial boom. Like, we had coal, and iron and, later, oil. Initially we had water to power our factories, later replaced by coal. And we had amber waves of grain to feed our growing population which leads to the Demography. America’s population grew from 40 million in 1870 to 76 million in 1900 and 1/3 of that growth was due to immigration. Which is good for economies. Many of these immigrants flooded the burgeoning cities, as America shifted from being an agrarian rural nation to being an industrial, urban one. Like, New York City became the center of commerce and finance and by 1898 it had a population of 3.4 million people. And the industrial heartland was in the Great Lakes region. Chicago became the second largest city by 1900, Cleveland became a leader in oil refining, and Pittsburgh was a center of iron and steel production. And even today, the great city of Pittsburgh still employs 53 Steelers. Last but not least was the Law. The Constitution and its commerce clause made the U.S. a single area of commerce – like a giant customs union. And, as we’ll see in a bit the Supreme Court interpreted the laws in a very business friendly way. Also, the American constitution protects patents, which encourag4B-es invention and innovation, or at least it used to. And despite what Ayn Rand would tell you, the American government played a role in American economic growth by putting up high tariffs, especially on steel, giving massive land grants to railroads and by putting Native Americans on reservations. Also, foreigners played an important role. They invested their capital and involved Americans in their economic scandals like the one that led to a depression in 1893. The U.S. was at the time was seen by Europeans as a developing economy; and investments in America offered much higher returns than those available in Europe. And the changes we’re talking about here were massive. In 1880, for the first time, a majority of the workforce worked in non-farming jobs. By 1890 2/3 of Americans worked for wages, rather than farming or owning their own businesses. And, by 1913 the United States produced 1/3 of the world’s total industrial output. NOW bring out the Libertage, Stan. Libertage Awesome. And even better, we now get to talk about the perennially underrated railroads. Let’s go to the Thought Bubble. Although we tend to forget about them here in the U.S., because our passenger rail system sucks, railroads were one of the keys to America’s 19th century industrial success. Railroads increased commerce and integrated the American market, which allowed national brands to emerge, like Ivory Soap and A&P Grocery Stores. But railroads changed and improved our economy in less obvious ways, too: For instance, they gave us time zones, which were created by the major railroad companies to make shipping and passenger transport more standard. Also because he recognized the importance of telling time, a railroad agent named Richard Warren Sears turned a $50 dollar investment in watches into an enormous mail order empire, and railroads made it possible for him--and his eventual partner Roebuck--to ship watches, and then jewelry, and then pretty much everything, including unconstructed freaking houses throughout the country. Railroads were also the first modern corporations. These companies were large, they had many employees, they spanned the country. And that meant they needed to invent organizational methods, including the middle manager--supervisors to supervise supervisors. And for the first time, the owners of a company were not always day-to-day managers, because railroads were among the first publicly traded corporations. They needed a lot of capital to build tracks and stations, so they sold shares in the company in order to raise that money, which shares could then be bought and sold by the public. And that is how railroads created the first captains of industry, like Cornelius “They Named a University after Me” Vanderbilt and Andrew “Me Too” Carnegie (Mellon) and Leland “I Named a University After My Son” Stanford. The Railroad business was also emblematic of the partnership between the national government and industry. The Transcontinental Railroad, after all, wouldn’t have existed without Congressional legislation, federal land grants, and government sponsored bond issues. Thanks, Thought Bubble. Apparently it’s time for the Mystery Document. The rules here are simple. I guess the author of the Mystery Document and if I’m wrong, which I usually am, I get shocked. Alright. “The belief is common in America that the day is at hand when corporations far greater than the Erie – swaying such power as has never in the world’s history been trusted in the hands of mere private citizens, controlled by single men like Vanderbilt...– will ultimately succeed in directing government itself. Under the American form of society, there is now no authority capable of effective resistance.” Corporations directing government? That’s ridiculous. So grateful for federal ethanol subsidies brought to you by delicious Diet Dr. Pepper. Mmm I can taste all 23 of the chemicals. Anyway, Stan, I’m pretty sure that is noted muckraker Ida Tarbell. No! Henry Adams? HOW ARE THERE STILL ADAMSES IN AMERICAN HISTORY? That makes me worry we’ll never escape the Clintons. Anyway, it should’ve been Ida Tarbell. She has a great name. She was a great opponent of capitalism. Whatever. AH! Indeed industrial capitalists are considered both the greatest heroes and the greatest villains of the era, which is why they are known both as “captains of industry” and as “robber barons,” depending on whether we are mad at them. While they often came from humble origins, took risks and became very wealthy, their methods were frequently unscrupulous. I mean, they often drove competitors out of business, and generally cared very little for their workers. The first of the great robber barons and/or captains of industry was the aforementioned Cornelius Vanderbilt who rose from humble beginnings in Staten Island to make a fortune in transportation, through ferries and shipping, and then eventually through railroads, although he once referred to trains as “them things that go on land.” But the poster boy of the era was John D. Rockefeller who started out as a clerk for a Cleveland merchant and eventually became the richest man in the world. Ever. Yes, including Bill Gates. The key to Rockefeller’s success was ruthlessly buying up so many rivals that by the late 1880s Standard Oil controlled 90% of the U.S. oil industry. Which lack of competition drove the price of gasoline up to like 12 cents a gallon, so if you had one of the 20 cars in the world then, you were mad. The period also saw innovation in terms of the way industries were organized. Many of the robber barons formed pools and trusts to control prices and limit the negative effects of competition. The problem with competition is that over time it reduces both prices and profit margins, which makes it difficult to become super rich. Vertical integration was another innovation – firms bought up all aspects of the production process – from raw materials to production to transport and distribution. Like, Philip Armour’s meat company bought its own rail cars to ship meat, for instance. It also bought things like conveyor belts and when he found out that animal parts could be used to make glue, he got into the glue-making business. It was Armour who once proclaimed to use “everything but the squeal.” Horizontal integration was when big firms bought up small ones. The best example of this was Rockefeller’s Standard Oil, which eventually became so big incidentally that the Supreme Court forced Standard Oil to be broken up into more than a dozen smaller oil companies. Which, by the way, overtime have slowly reunited to become the company known as Exxon-Mobil, so that worked out. U.S. Steel was put together by the era’s giant of finance, J.P. Morgan, who at his death left a fortune of only $68 million – not counting the art that became the backbone of the Metropolitan Museum of Art – leading Andrew Carnegie to remark in surprise, “And to think he was not a rich man.”[1] Speaking of people who weren’t rich, let us now praise the unsung heroes of industrialization: workers. Well, I guess you can’t really call them unsung because Woody Guthrie. Oh! Your guitar! And my computer! I never made that connection before. Anyway, then as now, the benefits of economic growth were shared...mmm shall we say...a smidge unevenly. Prices did drop due to industrial competition, which raised the standard of living for the average American worker. In fact, it was among the highest in the world. But due to a growing population, particularly of immigrant workers, there was job insecurity. And also booms and busts meant depressions in the 1870s and 1890s, which hit the working poor the hardest. Also, laborers commonly worked 60 hours per week with no pensions or injury compensation, and the U.S. had the highest rate of industrial injuries in the world: an average of over 35,000 people per year died on the job. These conditions and the uncertainty of labor markets led to unions, which were mostly local but occasionally national. The first national union was the Knights of Labor, headed by Terence V. Powderly which grew from 9 members in 1870 to 728,000 by 1884. The Knights of Labor admitted unskilled workers, black workers, and women, but it was irreparably damaged by the Haymarket riot in 1886. During a strike against McCormick Harvesting Company, a policeman killed one of the strikers and in response there was a rally in Chicago’s Haymarket Square at which a bomb killed seven police officers. Then, firing upon the crowd, the police killed four people. Seven anarchists were eventually convicted of the bombing, and although Powderly denounced anarchism, the public still associated the Knights of Labor with violence. And by 1902, its membership had shrunk considerably--to 0. The banner of organized labor however was picked up by the American Federation of Labor under Samuel L. Gompers. Do all of these guys have great last names? They were more moderate than the anarchists and the socialist International Workers of the World, and focused on bread and butter issues like pay, hours, and safety. Founded in 1886, the same year as the Haymarket Riot, the AFL had about 250,000 members by 1892, almost 10% of whom were iron and steel workers. And now we have to pause to briefly mention one of the most pernicious innovations of the era: Social Darwinism: a perversion of Darwin’s theory that would have made him throw up. Although to be fair, almost everything made him throw up. Social Darwinists argued that the theory of survival of the fittest should be applied to people and also that corporations were people. Ergo, big companies were big because they were fitter and we had nothing to fear from monopolies. This pseudoscience was used to argue that government shouldn’t regulate business or pass laws to help poor people. It assured the rich that the poor were poor because of some inherent evolutionary flaw, thus enabling tycoons to sleep at night. You know, on a big pile of money, surrounded by beautiful women. But, despite the apparent inborn unfitness of workers, unions continued to grow and fight for better conditions, sometimes violently. There was violence at the Homestead Steel Strike of 1892 and the Pullman Rail strike of 1894 when strikers were killed and a great deal of property was destroyed. To quote the historian Michael Lind: “In the late 1870s and early 1880s, the United States had five times as many unionized workers as Germany, at a time when the two nations had similar populations.”[2] Unions wanted the United States and its citizens to imagine freedom more broadly, arguing that without a more equal economic system, America was becoming less, not more, free, even as it became more prosperous. If you’re thinking that this free-wheeling age of fast growth, uneven gains in prosperity, and corporate heroes/villains resembles the early 21st century, you aren’t alone. And it’s worth remembering that it was only 150 years ago that modern corporations began to form and that American industry became the leading driver in the global economy. That’s a blink of an eye in world history terms, and the ideas and technologies of post Civil War America gave us the ideas that still define how we--all of us, not just Americans--think about opposites like success and failure, or wealth and poverty. It’s also when we people began to discuss the ways in which inequality could be the opposite of freedom. Thanks for watching. I’ll see you next week. Crash Course is produced and directed by Stan Muller. Our script supervisor is Meredith Danko. The associate producer is Danica Johnson. The show is written by my high school history teacher, Raoul Meyer, Rosianna Halse Rojas, and myself. And our graphics team is Thought Café. Each week there’s a new caption for the Libertage. You can suggest captions in comments where you can also ask questions about today’s video that will be answered by our team of historians. Thanks for watching Crash Course. Make sure you’re subscribed. And as we say in my hometown, don’t forget to be awesome. Industrial Economy - ________________ [1] Brands, American Colossus p 6. [2] Lind, Land of Promise 171

Background

The United States had inherited the concept of government regulation of Indian trade from Britain. Continental Congress outlawed unlicensed trade with the Indian Nations in 1776 and the Confederation Congress added stricter regulations in 1786. Indian agents were only to issue licenses to citizens whose moral characters were vouched for by the appropriate governors. The licenses were issued for one year periods only and cost $500 per period. A bond of $5,000 had to be given to ensure compliance with alcohol and firearms rules. Subsequent Nonintercourse Acts of 1790, 1793, 1796 and 1802 modified these laws. Licence fees were eliminated, lighter penalties were introduced for non-observance of regulations and the moral character clause was removed.

Jay Treaty of 1794 gave British subjects the right to acquire licenses for trading on United States territory.[2] Treaty of Ghent 1815 did not renew the right of the British to follow the trade across the international border and the guaranteed access to the Mississippi River that was granted them in the Jay Treaty.[3] Through the lobbying of John Jacob Astor, Congress in 1816 outright banned foreigners from the fur trade other than in a subordinate capacity.[4]

Legislative history

In his 1793 State of the Union Address, President Washington suggested that a scheme of trading without profit with the Indian Nations would gain their friendship and fealty. The president repeated his idea in the next annual message to Congress and in 1795 a bill was passed for a limited test of the plan in the form of a $50,000 appropriation for trade goods to be sold at locations decided by the president. The following year a definite system was established by law. The president was to appoint factors residing at government trading posts and selling goods in the Indian country. They were prohibited from trading on their own behalf and had to give account of all money, goods and furs received and sold. An additional funding of $150,000 gave a total capital of $200,000 to the factory system. The trade goods were to be sold at prices that maintained the principal sum but gave no profit. An annual amount of $8,000 was allotted for maintenance of the physical assets. The law was limited to two years plus the duration of Congress.[5]

When the law of 1796 expired on March 4, 1799, the factories continued in operation anyway. In 1802, President Jefferson pointed out that the enabling act had become invalid and Congress subsequently renewed it until March 4, 1803. In 1803, the law was extended for another two years plus the duration of Congress. In 1805 the act again expired, regardless of which Congress appropriated an additional $100,000 for setting up several new fur trade posts. The law was again renewed in 1806, now also authorizing the President to establish factories on both side of the Mississippi River. The capital was set to $260,000 and an annual allocation of $13,000 for staffing was given. In 1809, the capital was increased to $300,000 with further appropriations for clerks and factors. In 1811, a year before the formal expiration of the 1809 act, the law was renewed. Renewals of the act then took place in 1815, 1817, 1818, 1819, 1820 and 1821.[6]

Objectives

Washington recommended the factory system to Congress because he believed it would undercut the influence of British traders in the Indian country. As it would protect Native Americans from fraud and deceit it would enhance the prestige of the United States among them. The Department of the Treasury optimistically reported in 1800 that the Indian Nations were pleased with the government trading houses because through them they were sure to find a buyer for their furs as well as a fair treatment. Sale of alcohol was prevented and the business of the North West Company, the largest Montreal trading firm, was cut short.[2]

In a message to Congress in 1802, Jefferson claimed that the government factories undersold private and foreign interest, driving them away and thereby ridding the Indian country of a class of men that undermined the United States in the eyes of the Native Americans. Recommending an expansion of the factory system, he portrayed it as a means of making the Native Americans adopt a sedentary lifestyle. Once settled as agriculturalists they would be willing to sell surplus land not needed for hunting.[7] On several occasions, Jefferson wrote to various officials that the job of the trading posts was to encourage indebtedness beyond the leading men's personal ability to pay thereby goading them into surrender land to get rid of the debt. Several treaties ceding land to the United States also clearly state that the Indian Nations were selling in order to get rid of debts run up at a federal factory.[8]

Organization

Office of Indian Trade
Agency overview
Formed1806
Dissolved1821
TypeGovernment procurement and distribution agency
JurisdictionUnited States Government
HeadquartersGeorgetown, Washington D.C.
Agency executives
Parent departmentUnited States Department of the Treasury 1806-1811
United States Department of War 1811-1821

At the very beginning, the Purveyor of Public Supplies was in charge of buying the merchandise to be sold at the government factories and also for selling the furs and other items received in trade. Military agents of the War Department usually handled transportation of the goods. In 1796, John Harris, the Keeper of Military Stores in Philadelphia, took over the reception and selling of goods obtained in trade. The Purveyor of Public Supplies continued to buy merchandise for the factories. In 1801, William Irvine, Superintendent of Military Stores, was appointed Agent for the fur trading factories in addition to the office he already held. He was to receive and sell goods received and give the Secretary of War estimates of merchandise needed by the factories. When he died in 1804, George Ingels, Military Storekeeper at Philadelphia was appointed Acting Superintendent of Military Stores and Acting Agent for the Indian Factories. In 1805, William Davy was appointed Principal Agent for Indian Factories. He was to handle both the purchase of merchandise for the factories and the disposal of goods received from them, thereby also assuming the job previously done by the Purveyor of Public Supplies.[9]

In 1806, John Shee was appointed Superintendent of Indian Trade, in charge of both the purchase of merchandise for the factories and the disposal of goods received from them. At first his office was called "Office of the Superintendent of Indian Trade" but from 1808 "Office of Indian Trade" or "Indian Trade Office". The office was first established in Philadelphia, but was required by law to move to the District of Columbia. Shee were not willing to move with it and John Mason was appointed Superintendent and the Office was moved to Georgetown. In 1816, Mason was replaced by Thomas L. McKenney.[9] The Office of Superintendent of Indian Trade was under the supervision of the Secretary of the Treasury until 1811 when it was moved from the Treasury to the War Department.[10]

Factors were in immediate charge of the several factories. They received merchandise which they traded in exchange for Native American goods, mostly furs and skins. Other employees of the factory system, many on a part-time-basis, handled purchasing and transportation in Philadelphia, New York, New Orleans, Savannah, Albany and St. Louis.[11] The furs received in trade at the factories were from 1806 to 1809 sold at public auction. This ended because the market became oversupplied and the prices low.[12]

Operations

President Washington insisted that government trade with the Indian Nations be free of fraud and extortion, supply merchandise plentifully and without delay and provide a market for Native American goods at fair and stable prices.[13] The merchandise was limited to products of the domestic market and hence not always of the highest quality. They were often inferior to products imported from England by private merchants.[14] The Embargo Act of 1807 and the Non-Intercourse Act of 1809 made it more difficult for private traders to acquire foreign goods. British traders avoided that problem as their import from England went to Montreal and from there to Pittsburgh, down the Ohio and up the Mississippi.[15]

The merchandise included blankets, strouds, siamoise cotton, mammoodies cotton, calamanco, Bocking bay, pullicats, rumals, shalloons, guns, gunpowder, lead, axes, knives, gorgets, kettles, tin cups, cowbells, maul rings, hoes, frying pans, arm bands, shirts, earbobs, silk stock, tinsel hatbands, Jew's harps, side-saddles, wampum, trinkets, coffee, and food items. Transportation of merchandise to the factories was a costly, laborious and many times inefficient procedure, often requiring several transshipments. Merchandise bought at Philadelphia, and later Georgetown, was received by forwarding agents in New Orleans, St. Louis or Detroit who distributed them to the factories by boats, wagons or pack horses.[16]

The merchandise was primarily sold at the factories, but the factors also sent out traders to reach Native Americans who lived far away. In trade, the factories received furs, skins, beeswax, tallow, bear oil, feathers and other products. Soldiers, private traders, travelers and others paid in cash. The trade goods were shipped to New Orleans, St. Louis and Detroit. Some items were sold there, but most of it was shipped to Philadelphia and later Georgetown. Merchandise was sold at a 68% markup over market costs. Non-Native Americans were charged 10% more. Business at the factories reflected the general economic situation in the country. After the War of 1812 there was a steady rise in the volume of business until the Panic of 1819. The factory at Green Bay, Wisconsin showed a decline in business already in 1818, as a result of the establishment of the American Fur Company in the area.[17]

Criticism and support

The factory system was routinely denounced by its rivals in the private sector. It happened that private traders told Native Americans that the goods sold at the factories were intended to be gifts from the government, but that the factors sold them for their own personal gain. The frontier press regularly censured the factory system and prominent businessmen added their political influence to its detractors. The American Fur Company was hurt by competition from the government trading houses and began a campaign to have them closed down.[18] In 1815, Governor Edwards of the Illinois Territory presented criticism that originated with the fur trader Auguste Chouteau of St. Louis. The gist of it was that the factor's lack of profit interest made them lax businessmen. In addition, the federal appointees were ignorant of Native American ways and languages.[19]

Supporters of the government's involvement in the fur trade were usually found among philanthropists, government officials and among most of the factors themselves. Its existence was upheld by several Congress committees and of Congress itself.[20] The Superintendent of Indian Trade, Thomas McKenney, was the most vigorous defender of the factory system. He regarded private traders as the root of most evil in the Indian country and wanted the factory system to be a means for "civilizing" Native Americans.[21] George C. Sibley, a vehement critic of fur traders and fur trading companies agreed with the Superintendent in his assessment of the negative effects of the private fur trade.[22]

Madison's administration did not share the trust in private business expressed by many critics of the factory system. In 1816, Secretary of the Treasury, William H. Crawford proposed more stringent regulations for private fur traders. Nor did the Monroe administration trust the unselfishness of private interests. Secretary of War, John C. Calhoun urged stricter licence requirements for private fur traders in 1818. According to him, aliens and other dishonest fortune hunters were debauching the Native Americans through illegal whiskey.[19]

Abolishment

Broadside advertising the sale at auction of merchandise remaining from the government factories at Chicago and Green Bay.

In 1821, Thomas Hart Benton of Missouri, chairman of the Committee on Indian Affairs, started hearings with the aim to abolish the factory system and open the fur trade for uninhibited private enterprise.[23] Benton claimed that as a citizen of a frontier state he had a better understanding than most of the systems supporters of how it worked. However, other motives can also be found. Among his constituents were several powerful fur traders.[22] Benton was on a retainer from the American Fur Company as their lawyer and acted as John Jacob Astor's spokesperson in the Senate, while that role in the House was filled by John Floyd of Virginia. At this point in time he was also in considerable pecuniary difficulties due to a bank failure in Missouri.[24]

Benton argued that the factory system had been established to contest the influence of the British fur traders that made business on United States territory under the Jay Treaty.[23] But now, when that treaty was superseded and the law kept alien fur traders away there was nothing that motivated government factories. Instead, the system proved the inherent unfitnes of the federal government to conduct commercial business. It was full of undetected abuse. Trade goods provided by the government did not meet the needs of its Native American customers. The merchandise was purchased at excessive costs at inconvenient locations from eastern businessmen, when suitable articles could have been found at lower prices in Pittsburgh or St. Louis thereby also saving on transportation costs. The sale of furs at Georgetown meant that the government received lower prices than if they had been sold in St Louis. The matter was referred to the Indian Affairs Committee which heard testimony from interested parties, fur traders, Indian agents, factors and the Superintendent of Indian Trade.[25]

Some of the witnesses that faulted the factory system and its employees were individual traders and Indian agents that were eager to remove competition, while others were employees of John Jacob Astor.[26] Ramsay Crooks was the general manager of the American Fur Company, while Indian Agent Benjamin O'Fallon had been appointed on the recommendation of Astor. Antagonism existed between Indian agents and the Office of Indian Trade, while the agents were in tender harmony with the fur traders they licensed. The newly appointed Indian Agent John Biddle affirmed "the uselessness" of the factory system.[27]

Superintendent McKenney argued for the factory system while admitting some of the claims made by Benton. Congress required his office to procure trade goods on the home market, thereby putting a severe handicap on the factory system. Much merchandise had been bought during or just after the War of 1812, when the prices were two-fold or threefold the current. The prices charged Native Americans were not outrageous when considering freight and haulage. McKenney claimed that intrigues of the American Fur Company harmed the official trade to the extent that the posts at Chicago and Green Bay was about to be closed down. Indian Agents were intimidated by threats of removal through the political influence of Mr. Astor. As proof of this, he claimed that John Kinzie, an agent of the American Fur Company, had been found selling alcohol to Native Americans in Milwaukee, but no actions against him had been taken.[28]

Finally, the Committee on Indian Affairs reported a bill abolishing the factory system.[29] In the debate in the Senate, the existing system was defended by Henry Johnson, Richard Mentor Johnson, Martin Van Buren and Walter Lowrie.[30] But the bill became law on March 31, 1821. A year was allowed to liquidate the operations. Benton managed to pass a supplementary bill that prevented the current officeholders from taking part in the closing down process.[29] George Gorham was subsequently placed in charge of the liquidation of the Office of Indian Trade and the government factories. It was not fully completed until 1830.[31]

List of factories

Government factories were usually situated at military posts. The army aided the factories by ordering soldiers to assist with transporting goods, beating and packing furs and erecting buildings. The Army protected the factories from violence and theft.[32] The military presence enhanced the prestige of the factories in the eyes of the Native Americans.[33]

References

Citations

  1. ^ Jenkins, Jeffery A. (2024). "Investigating the Rise and Fall of Indian Trading Houses, 1795–1822". Journal of Historical Political Economy. 4 (1): 117–151. doi:10.1561/115.00000069. ISSN 2693-9290.
  2. ^ a b Coman 1911, p. 368.
  3. ^ Nesbit 1989, p. 77.
  4. ^ Way 1919, p. 226.
  5. ^ Wesley 1935, pp. 33-35.
  6. ^ Wesley 1935, pp. 36-37.
  7. ^ Coman 1911, p. 370.
  8. ^ Miller 2009.
  9. ^ a b Hill 1965, p. 15.
  10. ^ Wesley 1935, pp. 25-36.
  11. ^ Hill 1965, pp. 15-16.
  12. ^ Wesley 1935, p. 36.
  13. ^ Prucha 1986, p. 35.
  14. ^ Coman 1911, p. 373.
  15. ^ Way 1919, p. 225.
  16. ^ Wesley 1935, pp. 41-42.
  17. ^ Wesley 1935, pp. 42-45.
  18. ^ Wesley 1935, pp. 47-48.
  19. ^ a b Coman 1911, p. 374.
  20. ^ Wesley 1935, pp. 49.
  21. ^ Prucha 1986, p. 38.
  22. ^ a b Wesley 1935, p. 50.
  23. ^ a b Way 1919, p. 231.
  24. ^ Mueller 2014, pp. 99, 103.
  25. ^ Coman 1911, pp. 379-380.
  26. ^ Way 1919, p. 232.
  27. ^ Coman 1911, p. 381.
  28. ^ Coman 1911, pp. 381-382.
  29. ^ a b Coman 1911, p. 383.
  30. ^ Way 1919, p. 234.
  31. ^ Hill 1965, p. 16.
  32. ^ Westley 1935, p. 46.
  33. ^ Prucha 1986, p. 36.
  34. ^ a b Wesley 1935, pp. 35, 38.
  35. ^ a b Wesley 1935, p. 38.
  36. ^ a b Wesley 1935, pp. 38, 40.
  37. ^ Wesley 1935, pp. 40, 41.
  38. ^ a b c d e f g h i Wesley 1935, p. 40.
  39. ^ Wesley 1935, p. 41.

Cited literature

This page was last edited on 21 May 2024, at 16:19
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