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Spheres of exchange

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Spheres of exchange is a heuristic tool for analyzing trading restrictions within societies that are communally governed and where resources are communally available.[1] Goods and services of specific types are relegated to distinct value categories, and moral sanctions are invoked to prevent exchange between spheres. It is a classic topic in economic anthropology.[1]

Paul Bohannan developed the concept in relation to the Tiv of Nigeria, who he argued had three spheres of exchange. He argued that only certain kinds of goods could be exchanged in each sphere; each sphere had its own different form of money.[2] The term is also used in reference to gift economies. Similarly, Clifford Geertz's model of "dual economy" in Indonesia[3] and James C. Scott's model of "moral economy"[4] hypothesized different exchange spheres emerging in societies newly integrated into the market; both hypothesized a continuing culturally ordered "traditional" exchange sphere resistant to the market. Geertz used the sphere to explain peasant complacency in the face of exploitation, and Scott to explain peasant rebellion. This idea was taken up lastly by Jonathan Parry and Maurice Bloch, who argued in "Money and the Morality of Exchange" (1989), that the "transactional order" through which long-term social reproduction of the family takes place has to be preserved as separate from short-term market relations.[5]

The introduction of money into communal societies where these sphere-of-exchange restrictions exist can disrupt resource allocation, by creating a pathway for exchange that is not accounted for in the existing restrictions.[6] However, in some societies money has been more or less successfully integrated into spheres of exchange.[7]

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  • Imperialism: Crash Course World History #35
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Transcription

Hi, I’m John Green, this is Crash Course World History and today we’re going to discuss 19th century Imperialism. So, the 19th century certainly didn’t invent the Empire, but it did take it to new heights. By which we means lows. Or possibly heights. I don’t know. I can’t decide. Roll the intro while I think about it... [Intro music] [intro music] [intro music] [intro music] [intro music] [intro music] [intro music] Yeah, I don’t know. I’m still undecided. Let’s begin with China. When last we checked in, China was a thriving manufacturing power about to be overtaken by Europe but still heavily involved in world trade, especially as an importer of silver from the Spanish Empire. Europeans had to use silver because they didn’t really produce anything else the Chinese wanted. And that state of affairs continued through the 18th century. For example, in 1793, the McCartney mission tried to get better trade conditions with China and was a total failure. Here’s the Qianlong emperor’s well-known response to the British: Hitherto, all European nations, including your own country's barbarian merchants, [yowser] have carried on their trade with our Celestial Empire at Canton. Such has been the procedure for many years, although our Celestial Empire possesses all things in prolific abundance and lacks no product within its own borders. But then Europeans, especially the British, found something that the Chinese would buy: opium. By the 1830s British free trade policy unleashed a flood of opium in China, which threatened China’s favorable balance of trade. It also created a lot of drug addicts. [you think?] And then, in 1839, the Chinese responded to what they saw as these unfair trade practices with a stern letter that they never actually sent. [opium: not a productivity aid] Commissioner Lin Zexu drafted a response that contained a memorable threat to cut off trade in “Rhubarb, tea and silk… all valuable products of ours, without which foreigners could not live.” But even if the British had received this terrifying threat to their precious rhubarb supply, they probably wouldn’t have responded, because selling drugs is super lucrative. [newsflash in any era] So the Chinese made like tea partiers, [tri-corn hats and all?] confiscating a bunch of British opium and chucking it into the sea. [This is sounding like a Hunter S. Thompson hallucination…] And then, the British responded to this by demanding compensation and access to Chinese territory where they could carry out their trade. And then, the Chinese were like, “Man, that seems a little bit harsh,” whereupon the British sent in gunships, opening trade with Canton by force. [response: "Yeuup."] Chinese General Yijing made a counterattack in 1842 that included a detailed plan to catapult flaming monkeys onto British ships— STAN, IS THAT TRUE? Alright apparently the plans involved strapping fireworks to monkeys’ backs and were never carried out. But, still... Slightly off-topic, obviously I don’t want anyone to light monkeys on fire. I’m just saying that flaming monkeys lend themselves to a lot of great band names, like the Sizzling Simians, Burning Bonobos, Immolated Marmoset. [Imolated Marmoset???] Stan, sometimes I feel like I should give up teaching World History and just become a band name generator. That’s my real gift. [Seriously, don't quit your day job.] Anyway, due to lack of monkey fireworks, the Chinese counterattacks were unsuccessful. And they eventually signed the Treaty of Nanjing, which stated that Britain got Hong Kong and five other treaty ports, as well as the equivalent of $2 billion in cash. Also, the Chinese basically gave up all sovereignty to European “spheres of influence,” wherein Europeans were subject to their laws, not Chinese laws. In exchange for all of this, China got a hot slice of nothing. You might think the result of this war would be a shift in the balance of trade in Britain’s favor, but that wasn’t immediately the case. In fact, the British were importing so much tea from China that the trade deficit actually rose more than $30 billion. But eventually, after another war (and one of the most destructive civil rebellions in Chinese and possibly world history, the Taiping Rebellion) the situation was reversed and Europeans, especially the British became the dominant economic power in China. Okay, so, but when we think about 19th century imperialism, we usually think about the way that Europe turned Africa from this into this, the so-called Scramble for Africa. Speaking of scrambles and the European colonization of Africa, you know what they say, sometimes to make an omelet, you’ve gotta break a few eggs. And then sometimes, you break a lot of eggs and you don’t get an omelet. [that's a downer of a saying] Europeans had been involved in Africa since the 16th century when the Portuguese used their cannons to take control of cities on coasts to set up their trading post empire. But in the second half of the 19th century, Europe suddenly and spectacularly succeeded at colonizing basically all of Africa. Why? Well, the biggest reason that Europeans were able to extend their grasp over so much of the world was the same reason they wanted to do so in the first place: industrialization. Nationalism played its part, of course: European states saw it as a real bonus to be able to say that they had colonies, so much so that a children’s rhyme in An ABC for Baby Patriots went: “C is for Colonies, Rightly we boast that of all the great countries, Great Britain has the most.” But it was mostly— not to get all Marxist on you or anything— about controlling the means of production. Europeans wanted colonies to secure sources of raw materials, especially cotton, copper, iron, and rubber, that were used to fuel their growing industrial economies. And in addition to providing the motive for imperialism, European industrialization also provided the means. Europeans didn’t fail to take over territory in Africa until the late 19th century because they didn’t want to; they failed because they couldn’t. This was mostly due to disease. [Disease: History's Frenemy] Unlike in the Americas, Africans weren’t devastated by diseases like smallpox, because they’d had smallpox for centuries and were just as immune to it as Europeans were. Not only that, but Africa had diseases of its own, including yellow fever, malaria, and sleeping sickness, all of which killed Europeans in staggering numbers. Also, nagana was a disease endemic to Africa that killed horses, which made it difficult for Europeans to take advantage of African grasslands, and also difficult for them to get inland because their horses would die as they tried to carry stuff. Also, while in the 16th century, Europeans did have guns, they were pretty useless, especially without horses, so most fighting was done the old fashioned way, with swords. That worked pretty well in the Americas, unless you were the Incas or the Aztecs, but it didn’t work in Africa because the Africans also had swords and spears and axes. So, as much as they might have wanted to colonize Africa in the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries, Africa’s mosquitoes, microbes, and people were too much for them. So what made the difference? Technology. First, steam ships made it possible for Europeans to travel inland bringing supplies and personnel via Africa’s navigable rivers. No horses? No problem. Even more important was quinine medicine, sometimes in the form of tonic water mixed into refreshing, quintessentially British gin and tonics. Quinine isn’t as effective as modern anti-malarial medication, and it doesn’t cure the disease, but it does help moderate its effects. But, of course, the most important technology that enabled Europeans to dominate Africa was guns. By the 19th century, European gun technology had improved dramatically, especially with the introduction of the Maxim machine gun, which allowed Europeans to wipe out Africans in battle after battle. Of course, machine guns were effective when wielded by Africans, too— but Africans had fewer of them. Oh, it’s time for the Open Letter? [king triumphantly re-throned] And my chair is back! [must've been in shock last week, eh?] An Open Letter to Hiram Maxim. But first, let’s see what’s in the secret compartment today. Oh, it’s Darth Vader. What a great reminder of imperialism. Dear Hiram Maxim, I hate you. [Best Wishes, John Green?] It’s not so much that you invented the Maxim Machine Gun although obviously that’s a little bit problematic, or even that you look like the poor man’s Colonel Sanders. [sick burn] First off, you’re a possible bigamist. I have a longstanding opposition to bigamy. [quite a bold proclamation there, pal] Secondly, you were born an American but then became a Brit thereby metaphorically machine gunning our founding fathers. But most importantly, among your many inventions was the successful amusement park ride, the Captive Flying Machine. Mr. Maxim, I hate the Captive Flying Machine. The Captive Flying Machine has resulted in many a girlfriend telling me that I’m a coward. I’m not a coward! I just don’t want to die up there. It’s all your fault, Hiram Maxim. And nobody believes your story about the light bulb. Best Wishes, John Green Alright so, here is something that often gets overlooked: European imperialism involved a lot of fighting and a lot of dying. And when we say that Europe came to dominate Africa, for the most part that domination came through wars, which killed lots of Africans (and also lots of Europeans, although most of them died from disease). It’s very, very important to remember that Africans did not meekly acquiesce to European hegemony: they resisted, often violently, but ultimately they were defeated by a technologically superior enemy. In this respect, they were a lot like the Chinese, and also the Indians, and the Vietnamese and, you get the picture. So, by the end of the 19th century, most of Africa, and much of Asia, had been colonized by European powers. I mean, even Belgium got in on it and they weren’t even a country at the beginning of the 19th century. I mean, Belgium has enjoyed, like, 12 years of sovereignty in the last three millenia. Notable exceptions include Japan -- which was happily pursuing its own imperialism— Thailand, Iran, and of course Afghanistan. Because no one can conquer Afghanistan. Unless you are— wait for it— the Mongols. [we missed you, Mongoltage] [Triumphant return #2: best week ever!] Mongoltage It is tempting to imagine Europe ruling their colonies with the proverbial topaz fist, [ouch?] and while there was always the threat of violence, the truth is a lot more complicated. Let’s go to the Thought Bubble. In most cases Europeans ruled their colonies with the help of, and sometimes completely through, intermediaries and collaborators. For example, in the 1890s in India, there were fewer than 1000 British administrators supposedly “ruling” over 300 million Indians. The vast majority of British troops at any given time in India— more than two thirds— were in fact Indians under the command of British officers. Because of their small numbers relative to local populations, most European colonizers resorted to indirect rule, relying on the governments that were already there but exerting control over their leaders. Frederick Lugard, who was Britain’s head honcho in Nigeria for a time, called this “rule through and by the natives.” This worked particularly well with British administrators, who were primarily middle class men but had aristocratic pretensions and were often pleased to associate with the highest echelons of Indian or African society. Now, this isn’t to say that indigenous rulers were simply puppets; often they retained real power. This was certainly true in India, where more than a third of the territory was ruled by Indian princes. The French protectorates of Morocco and Tunisia were ruled by Arab monarchs, and the French also ruled through native kings in Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam. For the most part Europeans could almost always rely on their superior military technology to coerce local rulers into doing what the Europeans wanted and they could replace native officials with Europeans if they had to, but in general they preferred to rule indirectly. It was easier and cheaper. Also, less malaria. Thanks, Thought Bubble. So, while we can’t know why all native princes who ruled in the context of European imperialism put up with it, we can make some pretty good guesses. First of all, they were still rulers: They got to keep their prestige and their fancy hats and to some extent their power. Many were also able to gain advantages through their service, like access to European education for themselves and for their children. Mahatma Gandhi, for instance, was the son of an Indian high official, which made it possible for him to study law in England. And we can’t overlook the sheer practicality of it – the alternative was to resist and that usually didn’t work out well. I’m reminded of the famous couplet: “Whatever happens, we have got / the Maxim gun and they have not.” But even with this enormous technological advantage, it wasn’t always easy. For example, it took 25 years, from 1845 to 1870, for the British to fully defeat the Maori on New Zealand, [No John! Think Sister, Sister twins!] because the Maori were kick-ass fighters [and tattooists] who had mastered musketry and defensive warfare. And I will remind you, it is not cursing if you’re talking about donkeys. In fact, it took them being outnumbered three to one with the arrival of 750,000 settlers for the Maori to finally capitulate. And I will remind you that the rule against splitting infinitives is not an actual rule. Those of you more familiar with U.S. history might notice a parallel between the Maori and some of the Native American tribes like the Apaches and the Lakota, a good reminder that the United States did some imperial expansion of its own as part of its nationalizing project in the 19th century. But, back to Africa. Sometimes African rulers were so good at adapting European technology that they were able to successfully resist imperialism. Ethiopia’s Menelik II defeated the Italians in battle, securing not just independence, but an empire of his own. But embracing European style modernization could also be problematic, as Khedive Ismail of Egypt found out during his rule in the late 19th century. The European-style ruler celebrated his imperial success by commissioning an opera, Giuseppe Verdi’s Aida, for the opening of the Cairo opera house in 1871. Giuseppe Verdi, by the way, no relation to John Green. [get it? huh, do you?] And Ismail had ambitions of extending Egypt’s control up the Nile west toward Lake Chad, but to do that, he needed money, and that’s where he got into trouble. His borrowing bankrupted Egypt and led to Britain’s taking control over the country’s finances and its shares in the Suez Canal that Ismail had built (with French engineers and French capital) in 1869. The British sent in 1,300 bureaucrats to fix Egypt’s finances, an invasion of red tape that led to a nationalist uprising. Which brought on full scale British intervention after 1881, in order to protect British interests. This “business imperialism,” as it is sometimes known, is really at the heart of the imperialistic impulse: Industrialized nations push economic integration upon developing nations, and then extract value from those developing nations, just as you would from a mine or a field you owned. And here we see political history and economic history coming together again. As western corporations grew in the latter part of the 19th century, their influence grew as well, both in their home countries and in the lands where they were investing. But ultimately, whether the colonizer is a business enterprise or a political one, the complicated legacy of Imperialism survives. It’s why your bananas are cheap, why your call centers are Indian, why your chocolate comes from Africa, and why everything else comes from China. These imperialistic adventures may have only lasted a century, but it was the century in which the world, as we know it today, began to take shape. Thanks for watching. I’ll see you next week. Crash Course is produced and directed by Stan Muller. Our script supervisor is Danica Johnson. The show is written by my high school history teacher, Raoul Meyer, and myself. And our graphics team is Thought Bubble. Oh, our intern! I’m sorry, Meredith the Intern. [vengeance is imminent] Our intern is Meredith Danko. Last week’s phrase of the week was “homogeneous mythologized unitary polity.” Thank you for that suggestion. If you want to guess this week’s phrase of the week or suggest future ones, you can do so in comments where you can also ask questions about today’s video that will be answered by our team of historians. Thanks for watching Crash Course. Remember, you can get this shirt, the Mongols shirt, or our poster at DFTBA.com. [back to the capitalism episode, eh?] Speaking of which, as we say in my hometown, don’t forget All Persons, Living and Dead, are Purely Coincidental.

Tiv spheres of exchange

The concept of spheres of exchange was introduced by Paul Bohannan and Laura Bohannan in analyzing their field work with the Tiv in Nigeria.[8] The Bohannan's discuss three types of ranked exchange objects, each restricted to its own separate exchange sphere; ideally, objects do not flow between spheres. The subsistence sphere included food such as yams, grains, vegetables, and small livestock, as well as eating utensils, farming tools and tools for food-preparation. The second sphere of wealth included brass rods, cattle, white cloth, and slaves. A third and most prestigious sphere was marriageable female relatives.[9] "In calling these different areas of exchange spheres, we imply that each includes commodities that are not regarded as equivalent to those commodities in other spheres and hence in ordinary situations are not exchangeable. Each sphere is a different universe of objects. A different set of moral values and different behavior are to be found in each sphere."[9] As a result, it is considered immoral to use prestige objects to purchase goods from a lower sphere.

Similar examples of exchange spheres have been noted by Frederik Barth among the Fur of Sudan; by Raymond Firth among the Tikopia in the south Pacific; by Bronisław Malinowski in the Trobriand Islands off New Guinea amongst others.[10]

Why spheres of exchange?

A number of writers have emphasized that spheres of exchange are set up in order to protect subsistence goods from being monopolized by a few group members who have control of wealth objects.[11] Bloch and Parry alternately phrase this for market based societies; where universal money has been introduced, moral injunctions are introduced to prevent its use within the family. The family, which is responsible for long term social reproduction of individuals and the group, has to be preserved from the short-term morality of market exchange.[5]

Bohannan and Dalton argue that these societal restrictions exist in traditional egalitarian societies in order to inhibit the accumulation of wealth by a few individuals, to the detriment of the community. Trading restrictions that prevent the exchange of wealth objects in the hands of only a few for other kinds of goods ensures the availability of subsistence goods for all of the group's members.[12] Sillitoe adds that the highly valued "wealth" items (such as the brass rods in the Tiv example) are not locally produced, hence politically ambitious leaders cannot step up their production of these goods thereby maintaining an egalitarian social order.[6]

David Graeber provides a historical explanation for the development of Tiv exchange spheres which places less emphasis on the preservation of a communal subsistence sphere and more on the development of west African slavery by Dutch and Portuguese merchants. In the same vein, Jane Guyer argues that the refusal to convert items between spheres of exchange in the local area makes sense in terms of the regional economy of trade between ethnic groups. For example, the Tiv refused to convert brass rods for subsistence goods in the local area because they were saving up their supply for conversion upwards to rights in people with groups to the North. Viewed this way, the Tiv did not refuse to convert between spheres, but simply engaged in long term trade where the conversion would bring the most profit.[13]

The effect of money on spheres of exchange

The Bohannans note that, within some spheres, particular kinds of objects (such as brass rods) may serve one of the classical functions of money, a standard of value for the objects within that sphere of exchange. The introduction of (colonially produced) general-purpose money resulted, they argued, in a universal standard of value across all exchange spheres that broke down the barriers between them. Most subsequent debate has focused on the impact of money on distinct spheres of exchange.

While money did serve to break down Tiv exchange spheres, other cases have been cited where money has been socialized; that is, where money's characteristic as a universal unit of exchange has been subverted and prevented from allowing exchanges across spheres.

Related concepts

Moral economy

English historian E. P. Thompson wrote of the moral economy of the poor in the context of widespread food riots in the English countryside in the late eighteenth century. According to Thompson these riots were generally peaceable acts that demonstrated a common political culture rooted in feudal rights to “set the price” of essential goods in the market. These peasants held that a traditional “fair price” was more important to the community than a “free” market price and they punished large farmers who sold their surpluses at higher prices outside the village while there were still those in need within the village. A moral economy is thus an attempt to preserve an alternate exchange sphere of subsistence goods from market penetration.[14][15] The notion of a non-capitalist cultural mentalité using the market for its own ends has been linked to subsistence agriculture and the need for subsistence insurance in hard times.[4]

Dual economy

The "Dual Economy" model was developed by Dutch colonial economist J.H. Boeke, and extended and popularized by the anthropologist Clifford Geertz in "Agricultural Involution: The Process of Ecological Change in Indonesia."[16] Boeke's “dual economy” thesis maintained that Dutch capitalism never penetrated the "native" economy of Indonesia (the Netherlands East Indies); the native economy was shaped and moulded by a pre-capitalist culture and thus remained embedded in “social” rather than “economic” needs.[17] In an early debate with liberal economists (a debate later recapitulated by substantivist and formalist economic anthropologists in the 1960s), he argued for the creation of a new sub-discipline, colonial economics, which was not predicated upon universalizing models of economic man. However, Boeke's model served colonial interests by underscoring western economic rationality and placing Indonesians in a subordinated evolutionary position: the yet to be civilized. Geertz argued that colonialism “stabilized and accentuated the dual economy pattern of a capital-intensive Western sector and a labor-intensive Eastern one by rapidly developing the first and rigorously stereotyping the second.”[18] Geertz's interpretation of Javanese peasant economic rationality as static, coddled within a closed corporate community and isolated from a capital-intensive colonial economy has increasingly been challenged. Critics argue that Geertz ignores the manner in which the "traditional" Javanese economy was incorporated in and exploited by the colonial capitalist regime.[19]

Social, cultural and economic capital

Capital can either be economic wealth in the form of money or property, or something that is valued in social or cultural context. Capital can be used to influence other people.

Notes

  1. ^ a b Sillitoe, Paul (2006) "Why spheres of exchange?" Ethnology 45(1): pp. 1-23, page 1
  2. ^ Bohannan, Paul (1959). "The Impact of money on an African subsistence economy". The Journal of Economic History. 19 (4): 491–503. doi:10.1017/S0022050700085946. S2CID 154892567.
  3. ^ Geertz, Clifford (1963). Agricultural involution; the process of ecological change in Indonesia. Berkeley: Published for the Association of Asian Studies by University of California Press. ISBN 978-0-520-00459-7.
  4. ^ a b Scott, James C. (1976). The moral economy of the peasant: rebellion and subsistence in Southeast Asia. New Haven, MA: Yale University Press.
  5. ^ a b Parry, Jonathan; Maurice Bloch (1989). Money and the Morality of Exchange. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 28–30.
  6. ^ a b Sillitoe, Paul (2006) "Why spheres of exchange?" Ethnology 45(1): pp. 1-23, page 2
  7. ^ Barth, Fredrik (1967) "Economic Spheres in Darfur" pages 156-157 and 164-165 In Firth, Raymond (editor) Themes in Economic Anthropology (ASA Monograph 6), Tavistock, London, pp. 149–74, OCLC 293389; reprinted with different pagination as "Chapter 9: Economic Spheres in Darfur" pages 163-164 and 170-171 In Barth, Fredrik (1981) Process and form in social life: selected essays of Fredrik Barth: Volume I Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, pp. 157-178, ISBN 0-7100-0720-5
  8. ^ Sillitoe, Paul (2006) "Why spheres of exchange?" Ethnology 45(1): pp. 1-23, page 3
  9. ^ a b Bohannan, Paul and Bohannan, Laura (1968) Tiv Economy Northwestern University Press, Evanston, IL, pages 227-228, OCLC 7394758
  10. ^ Sillitoe, Paul (2006) "Why spheres of exchange?" Ethnology 45(1): pp. 1-23, page 5-6
  11. ^ Sillitoe, Paul (2006) "Why spheres of exchange?" Ethnology 45(1): pp. 1-23, page 7
  12. ^ Bohannan, Paul and Dalton, George (1965) "Introduction" pages 3-7 In Bohannan, Paul and Dalton, George (editors) (1965) Markets in Africa: Eight subsistence economies in transition Doubleday, Garden City, New Jersey, pp. 1–26, OCLC 64841839
  13. ^ Guyer, Jane I. (2004). Marginal Gains: Monetary Transactions in Atlantic Africa. Chicago: Chicago University Press. pp. 27–31.
  14. ^ Thompson, Edward P. (1991). Customs in Common. New York: New Press. pp. 341. ISBN 978-1-56584-003-4.
  15. ^ Thompson, Edward P. (1991). Customs in Common. New York: New Press. ISBN 978-1-56584-003-4.
  16. ^ Geertz, Clifford (1963). Agricultural Involution: The Process of Ecological Change in Indonesia. Berkeley: University of California Press. ISBN 978-0-520-00459-7.
  17. ^ Boeke, J.H. (1961). Indonesian Economics: The Concept of Dualism in Theory and Policy. The Hague: Royal Tropical Institute.
  18. ^ Geertz, Clifford (1963). Agricultural Involution: The Process of Ecological Change in Indonesia. Berkeley: University of California Press. p. 53. ISBN 978-0-520-00459-7.
  19. ^ Schrauwers, Albert (2000). Colonial "Reformation" in the Highlands of Central Sulawesi, Indonesia, 1892-1995. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. ISBN 978-0-8020-8303-6.
This page was last edited on 9 March 2024, at 13:09
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