To install click the Add extension button. That's it.

The source code for the WIKI 2 extension is being checked by specialists of the Mozilla Foundation, Google, and Apple. You could also do it yourself at any point in time.

4,5
Kelly Slayton
Congratulations on this excellent venture… what a great idea!
Alexander Grigorievskiy
I use WIKI 2 every day and almost forgot how the original Wikipedia looks like.
What we do. Every page goes through several hundred of perfecting techniques; in live mode. Quite the same Wikipedia. Just better.
.
Leo
Newton
Brights
Milds

Islamist uprising in Syria

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Islamist uprising in Syria
Part of the Arab Cold War

A destroyed section of Hama's old town, after the 1982 Hama massacre
Date31 May 1976 – 28 February 1982[10]
(5 years, 11 months and 4 weeks)
Location
Result

Syrian government victory

Belligerents
Fighting Vanguard[1][2]
Muslim Brotherhood (after mid-1979)[3][4]
Supported by:
Iraq (1980–1982)
 Jordan[5][6]
 West Germany[7]

Syria Syrian government

Supported by:
 Soviet Union[8][9]
Commanders and leaders


Strength

Thousands "hardline" Islamists

Tens of thousands loosely armed supporters and sympathizers
Varies per combat zone (~30,000 in Hama).
Casualties and losses
Reports vary (lowest; 3,000, highest; 25,000) 1,000+
Total death toll unknown estimates vary from 10,000 - 40,000 killed[11]

The Islamist uprising in Syria comprised a series of protests, assassinations, bombings, and armed revolts led by Sunni Islamists, mainly members of the Fighting Vanguard and, after 1979, the Muslim Brotherhood, from 1976 until 1982. The uprising aimed to establish an Islamic Republic in Syria by overthrowing the Ba'athist government, in what has been described by Ba'ath Party as a "long campaign of terror".[12]

After 1980, the popular resistance to Ba'athist rule expanded; with a coalition of Islamist opposition groups coordinating nation-wide strikes, protests and revolts throughout Syria.[13] During the violent events; resistance militias attacked Syrian Arab Army bases and carried out political assassinations of Ba'ath party cadres, army officials, Soviet military advisors, and bureaucrats linked to Assad family.[14][15][9] Civilians were also killed in retaliatory strikes conducted by security forces.[16] The uprising reached its climax in the 1982 Hama massacre, during which the Syrian government killed over 40,000 civilians.[17][18]

YouTube Encyclopedic

  • 1/4
    Views:
    4 096 831
    1 037 699
    593 053
    468 515
  • Iran's Revolutions: Crash Course World History 226
  • Rise of the Abbasids: Islam's Mightiest Dynasty
  • Why IS remains a threat | DW Documentary
  • The Syrian Civil War: A Downward Spiral to Madness

Transcription

Hi, I’m John Green and this is Crash Course World History and today we’re talking about Iran. Oh, Mr. Green? Mr. Green? I know that country. It’s in the Middle East. It’s with Egypt. No, Me from the Past, we’re going to talk about Iran. Now, I used to be you so I remember when you would look at this part of the world and you would be like, “oh yeah, that’s a thing.” And in your case that “thing” extended more or less from I guess, like, western China to, like, uh, Poland. Then you’d make a bunch of broad generalizations about that area and no doubt use the terms Arab and Muslim interchangeably. But as usual Me From the Past the truth resists simplicity. So today we are going to talk about Iran and just Iran. Specifically, the 1979 Iranian Revolution. So the 1979 Iranian Revolution and its aftermath are often seen by detractors as the first step in the creation of an isolated, fundamentalist state that supports terrorism, and, you might be surprised to hear me say, that there is some truth to that interpretation. That said, the way you think about the Iranian Revolution depends a lot of which part of it you are looking at. And regardless, it’s very important because it represents a different kind of revolution from the ones that we usually talk about. So the 1979 uprisings were aimed at getting rid of the Pahlavi Dynasty, which sounds, like, impressive, but this dynasty had only had two kings, Reza Shah and Mohammed Reza Shah. Before the Pahlavis, Iran was ruled by the Qajar dynasty, and before that the Safavids. The Safavids and Qajars were responsible for two of the most important aspects of Iran: The Safavids made Shia Islam the official state religion in Iran, starting with Ismail I in 1501, and the Qajars gave the Muslim clergy – the ulema – political power. So most of the world’s Muslims are Sunnis but the Shia, or Shiites are an important sect that began very early on – around 680 CE and today form the majority of Muslims in Iran and Iraq. Now within both Sunni and Shia there are further divisions and many sects, but we’re just going to talk about, like, the historical difference between the two. Shia Muslims believe that Ali should’ve been the first Caliph, Sunni Muslims think that Abu Bakr, who was the first Caliph, was rightly chosen. Since that disagreement, there have been many others, many doctrinal differences but what’s more important is that from the very beginning, Shia Muslims saw themselves as the party of the oppressed standing up against the wealthy and powerful and harkening back to the social justice standard that was set by the prophet. And this connection between religious faith and social justice was extremely important to the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and also to previous revolutions in Iran. This is really crucial to understand because many historians argue that the Iranian revolution represents what the journalist Christian Caryl called an “odd fusion of Islam and late-twentieth century revolutionary politics.” But actually, in the scheme of Iranian history, its not so odd. Because 1979 was not Iran’s first revolution. The first major one was in 1906. It forced the ruling Qajars to accept a constitution. It created a parliament and supposedly some limits on the king, and made Shia Islam the official state religion, but it also protected the rights of minorities in Iran. It ultimately failed partly because the clergy withdrew their support, partly because the shah worked very actively against it, and maybe most importantly, because the Russians and the British worked to keep Persia weak so they could continue to try to dominate the region. Which reminds me that most people in Iran are not Arabs, they are Persian. And most people in Iran don’t speak Arabic, they speak Farsi, or as we often call it in English, Persian. So after WWI European rivalries really heated up because of the discovery of oil in the Middle East. The British established the Anglo Iranian Oil Company – which would later come to be known as BP. They also extracted a bunch of concessions from the Iranian government in addition to extracting lots of oil. And they helped to engineer a change in dynasty by supporting military commander Reza Khan in his coup in February 1921. Reza Khan became Reza Shah and then he attempted to turn Persia, which he re-named Iran in 1935, into a modern, secular, western-style state kind of like Turkey was under Ataturk. But Reza Shah is perhaps best remembered for his over the top dictatorial repression, which turned the clergy against him. Okay, so during World War II Reza Shah abdicated and his young son Mohammad Reza Shah became the leader of Iran. Which he remained, mostly, until 1979 when he definitely stopped being the leader of Iran. So after World War II, the British allowed greater popular participation in Iran’s government. The main party to benefit from this openness was Tudeh, the Iranian communist party. Mohammed Mosaddegh was elected prime minister in 1951 and led the parliament to nationalize Iran’s oil industry, and that was the end of the democratic experiment. Now most history books say that in 1953 the British and the CIA engineered a coup to remove Mosaddegh from office. And that is quite possibly true. It is definitely true that we tried to engineer a coup. It’s also true that Mosaddegh quit and fled Iran following demonstrations against him. But we also know that the Shia clergy encouraged those demonstrations. That’s a bit of a weird decision for the Clergy, considering that Shia Islam traditionally takes a radical stance against oppression. But it’s important to remember that Mosaddegh was supported by the Tudeh party and they were communists. Nationalization of the oil industry was one thing, but a further shift toward communism might mean appropriation of the land that supported the clergy, maybe even a rejection of religion altogether. So now we’ve seen two occasions where the Shia clergy support helped facilitate change. Right, in 1906 and again in 1953. So, let’s flash ahead to 1979. The Shah was definitely an autocrat, and he employed a ruthless secret police called the SAVAK to stifle dissent. In 1975, the Shah abolished Iran’s two political parties and replaced them with one party the Resurgence party. You’ll never guess who was resurging - the Shah. There was a huge round of censorship and arrests and torture of political prisoners signaling that autocracy was in Iran to stay. But before those events in 1975, say between 1962 and 1975, by most economic and social measures Iran saw huge improvements. In 1963, the Shah had tried to institute what he called a White Revolution – top-down modernization led by the monarchy, and in many ways he was successful, especially in improving industry and education. Oil revenues rose from $555 million in 1964 to $20 billion in 1976. And the Shah’s government invested a lot of that money in infrastructure and education. The population grew and infant mortality fell. A new professional middle class arose. But the White Revolution wasn’t universally popular. For instance, it was opposed by one particular Shia cleric - the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Khomeini spoke out against the White Revolution from the religious center of Iran, Qom. One of his main complaints was that the reforms would grant more rights to women, including the right to vote, but he also attacked the government for, quote: “the rigging of elections and other constitutional abuses, neglect of the poor and the sale of oil to Israel.” And in general, Khomeini felt that a king’s power was inherently un-Islamic and that Shia tradition was to fight that power. That noted about Khomeini, the 1979 revolution didn’t start out to create an Islamic state. At first it was a pretty typical uprising by dissatisfied Iranians to overthrow a government that they perceived as corrupt and unresponsive to their needs. In spite of, or arguably because of, oil-fueled economic growth, many Iranians weren’t enjoying economic success. The universities were turning out more graduates than there were jobs and the mechanization of agriculture had the predictable result of displacing farmers who moved to cities. Especially the capital city of Tehran where there weren’t nearly enough jobs for the number of people. So, I think it’s unfair to say that a majority of the demonstrators who took to the streets in late 1978 were motivated by a fundamentalist vision of Islam. They were dissatisfied with economic inequality and political repression and a corrupt regime. So why do we generally remember the 1979 revolution as having been motivated by Shia Islam. Well, Let’s go to the Thought Bubble. So the initial demonstrations did begin after an Iranian newspaper on January 7, 1978 published an article that was critical of Khomeini. By the way, at the time he was living in Paris. These initial demonstrations were pretty small, but when the government police and army forces starting firing on demonstrators, killing some of them, the protests grew. Each time marchers protested against the violent treatment of demonstrators, the government would crack down, and their violent reaction would spur more demonstrations. There was also a lot of criticism of the west tied up in the revolution. According to one woman who participated: “American lifestyles had come to be imposed as an ideal, the ultimate goal. Americanism was the model. American popular culture – books, magazines, film – had swept over our country like a flood...We found ourselves wondering ‘Is there any room for our own culture?’” The Shah never understood why so many people were protesting against him; he thought that they were communists, or being supported by the British. He also thought that merely bringing prosperity would be enough to keep him in power. It wasn’t. On January 16, 1979 he left Iran. He eventually ended up in the U.S., which had unfortunate consequences for diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Iran. But the point here is that the first part of the Iranian revolution was relatively peaceful protests followed by a government crackdown, more protests that eventually led to the collapse of the monarchy, and that looks kind of familiar, especially if you’ve studied, like, the French or Russian or even the American Revolutions. And most historians argue these protests weren’t about Islam, but rather, “The discontent over living conditions, pay cuts, and the threat of unemployment fused with the general disillusionment and anger with the regime.” The government that eventually replaced the monarchy was the second, and in many ways much more revolutionary revolution. Thanks Thought Bubble. So the new Islamic Republic of Iran was based on Khomeini’s idea about what an Islamic government should be, a principle he called velayat-e faqih. Mainly it was that a sharia law scholar, would have ultimate authority, because he was more knowledgeable than anyone about law and justice. There would be a legislature and a president and a prime minister, but any of their decisions could be overturned by the supreme ruler who from 1979 until his death was Khomeini. Now, if democracy is only about holding elections, then the new Iran was a democracy. I mean, Iran has elections, both for president and for the parliament. And for the record, despite what Khomeini might have thought in the ‘60s, women can vote in Iran and they do. They also serve in the parliament and the president’s cabinet. And in the referendum on whether to create an Islamic Republic of Iran, the vast majority of Iranians in a free and open vote, voted “yes.” Now governance in Iran is extremely complicated, too complicated for one Crash Course video. But in once sense at least, Iran is definitely not a democracy. The ultimate authority, written into the constitution, is not the will of the people but god, who is represented by the supreme religious leader. And the actions of the Islamic Republic, especially in the early chaotic days of 1979 but also many times since, don’t conform to most ideas of effective democracy. Like one of the first things that Khomeini did to shore up his support was to create the Islamic Revolutionary Guards and Hezbollah to defend the revolution against coup attempts. Although initially there were opposition parties, their activities were curtailed by the new “revolutionary courts” that applied sharia law in a particularly harsh fashion. Like it’s estimated that by October 1979, several hundred people had been executed. And under the new constitution, Khomeini was given extensive power. I mean, he could appoint the heads of the armed services, and the Revolutionary Guard and the national TV and radio stations. He also approved the candidates for presidential elections and appointed six of the twelve members of the Guardian Council that approved legislation from the parliament before it became law. So structurally Iran’s government looked kind of like other governments, but as Michael Axworthy points out it was different because, quote, “above and beyond stood the faqih, with the power and the responsibility to intervene directly in the name of Islam; indeed with powers greater than those given to most monarchs in constitutional monarchies.” By 1979, Iran already had a long history of clerical involvement in protest and dynamic change, but it also had a long history of pushing for constitutions and liberty. The current end result is the Islamic Republic of Iran, but it’s worth remembering that both those threads of history are still part of Iranian life. Like we saw that in 2009 and 2010 with the so-called Green Revolution where there were huge protests after an Iranian election. Those protests involved young people arguing for more rights and liberties.. But they were also led by, and encouraged by, reformist Shia clerics. In the U.S. we mostly remember the 1979 Iranian Revolution for its burning of American flags and taking of hostages in the American Embassy. That belonged more to the second phase of the revolution, the chaotic period when the Islamic republic was being born. Life in the Islamic Republic of Iran remains highly repressive. I mean, for instance, Iran still executes a very high percentage of criminals. But it’s inaccurate to say that Iran is merely a dictatorship, or that it’s merely repressive. And one of the challenges for people in the West trying to understand Iran is that we have to disentangle the various aspects of the revolution rather than simply relying on the images that have defined it for us. I hope this episode can help a little. You can find more resources in the links below. Thanks for watching. Crash Course is filmed here in the Chad and Stacey Emigholz studio in Indianapolis and it’s made possible because of the hard worth of all of these people. Thank you for watching and as we say in my hometown, “don’t forget to be awesome.”

Background

1963 Coup and 1964 Hama Riots

In context, the insurgency traces its origins to multiple factors. Historical ideological friction is a result of the Ba'ath Party's ultra-secularist foundation versus the Muslim Brotherhood's religious foundation. Muslim Brotherhood believed that Islamic religion had the central role in directing the laws of the state.[19] On the other hand, secular Ba'athist ideology emphasized Arab nationalism and advocated the replacement of religion with socialism.[20]

This friction became heated following the 1963 Ba'ath Party coup which saw the Party claiming sole power in the country and subsequently outlawing all other organised opposition. In response, the Muslim Brotherhood encouraged general protests across the country. These protests were most acute in the city of Hama, long considered "a stronghold of landed conservatism".[21] During the 1964 Hama uprising, Ba'ath Party responded violently, crushing the revolt with brutal force.[22]

Muslim Brotherhood was forced to continue its activities clandestinely. In the party, the ideological dispute began widening towards a sectarian one; as dominance of Alawite elites in the Ba'athist military, bureaucracy and politics became visible after the Old Guard was overthrown by the neo-Ba'athist military wing of Alawite General Salah Jadid in the 1966 coup.[19] The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood fractured over disputes of the best course of action. Much of the party leadership was afraid to directly oppose the Syrian government, fearing that a violent confrontation could cause more harm than good. In contrast, several of the most radical members of the party split off to form the "Fighting Vanguard", led by Marwan Hadid. The Fighting Vanguard was willing to challenge the government by conducting assassinations and sabotage actions.[1][2]

1970 Coup and 1973 Constitutional Amendment

On 13 November 1970, Hafez Al Assad launched a coup which saw him gain sole power. To cement his power, on 31 January 1973, Assad implemented a new constitution which led to a national crisis. Unlike previous constitutions, this one did not require that the president of Syria must be a Muslim, leading to fierce demonstrations in Hama, Homs and Aleppo organized by the Muslim Brotherhood and the ulama. They labelled Assad as the "enemy of Allah" and called for a jihad against his rule.[23] Under pressure, Assad returned the requirement and convinced Lebanese cleric Musa al-Sadr to issue a fatwa proclaiming the Alawite minority to be part of Shia Islam.[24] The 1973 constitution greatly increased the support for Hadid's Fighting Vanguard, and many Muslim Brotherhood members defected to his faction or at least began to support it. He subsequently reorganized his group to increase the number of attacks, hoping to provoke the Syrian government into a crackdown that would force the Muslim Brotherhood into open rebellion.[25][26]

Robert D. Kaplan has compared Assad's coming to power to

"an untouchable becoming maharajah in India or a Jew becoming tsar in Russia—an unprecedented development shocking to the Sunni majority population which had monopolized power for so many centuries."[27]

Economic downturn

According to historian Patrick Seale, the "economic boom following the October War had run out of steam, and new inequalities were created".[28] Raphael Lefevre adds that the emergence of secular ideology had led to the "overturning of traditional structures of political and socioeconomic power".[29] Additionally, a decrease in Gulf countries' economic support, the cost of Syria's military campaign in Lebanon, and the take-in of several refugees from the conflict all further exacerbated Syria's economic livelihood.[30]

Economic impact of state socialism adopted by the Ba'athist government as well as rising assertiveness of Alawites in the new socio-political system resulted in the alienation of the traditional elites, landowners, industrialists and the bourgeoisie. Their support shifted in favour of the Islamic opposition which positioned itself as ideological defenders of private property and free trade.[19]

Phases of the Insurgency

Phase One: Clandestine Terrorist Operations 1976–1979

1976 marked the Syrian army's intervention in the Lebanese Civil War, initially against the Palestinian guerrillas (PLO). This was received with surprise across the Arab world and contributed to pre-existing reasons for discontent with the Syrian government. Historian Patrick Seale described this attack as "slaughtering Arabism's sacred cow".[31]

In the same year, Syria experienced sporadic terror attacks, mostly explosions and assassinations.[32] The killings were largely aimed at prominent military officers, bureaucrats and government officials, including doctors and teachers. Most of the victims were Alawites, which led some to suggest "that the assassins had targeted the community" but "no one could be sure who was behind" the killings.[33]

The Iraqi government of Saddam Hussein had supported the insurgents with a steady flow of arms and supplies.[34] General Rifa'at al-Assad, younger brother of Hafez al-Assad, became a powerful figure in the Ba'ath party and Syrian politics, as a result of his activities in the Lebanese Civil War. Rifa'at's corruption as well as the sectarian excesses of his increasingly autonomous Alawite loyalist private militias provoked widespread resentment across the Syrian population. As a result, internal situation in Syria became further destabilized and protests spread further across the cities.[35]

Phase Two: Large-scale Campaign June 1979 – January 1982

16 June 1979 marked the day of the Aleppo artillery school massacre. Member of school staff, Captain Ibrahim Yusuf, called cadets to an urgent meeting at the dining hall. Once assembled, gunmen fired indiscriminately at the cadets with automatic weapons and grenades.[32] The massacre was masterminded by 'Adnan 'Uqla, a Fighting Vanguard commander.[36][37] 'Uqla committed the mass murder without the permission of the Fighting Vanguard's formal leader, Hisham Jumbaz, or its field commando in Aleppo.[38][39][3]

This massacre signalled a turn in the insurgency as it was now more than just a series of sporadic attacks, but a campaign of "large-scale urban warfare".[40] By August, the Brotherhood had declared a jihad against the Syrian government, effectively claiming responsibility for the insurgency.[41]

In the days leading up to 8 March 1980 (the 17th anniversary of the 1963 Ba'athist coup), nearly all Syrian cities were paralysed by strikes and protests, which sometimes developed into pitched battles with security forces.[42] The events escalated into a widescale crackdown in Aleppo, where the government responded with overwhelming military force, sending in tens of thousands of troops, supported by tanks and helicopters. In and around Aleppo, hundreds of demonstrators were killed, and eight thousand were arrested. By April, the uprising in the area had been crushed.[43]

Between 1979 and 1981, Brotherhood insurgents continued to target Ba'ath party officials, party offices, police stations, military vehicles, barracks, factories, and even Russian officials.[40] Insurgents would form 'hit teams' to kill Ba'ath party members in their sleep, such as 'Abd al 'Aziz al 'Adi, who was murdered in front of his wife and children and had his body thrown into the street.[44] On occasion, individuals who had denounced the killings were also targeted, including Sheikh al-Shami, Imam of the Suleymania mosque of Aleppo.[45]

Other instances of terrorism include attacks in August, September and November 1981, where the Brotherhood carried out three car-bomb attacks against government and military targets in Damascus, killing hundreds of people, according to the official press.[46] Among the victims were Soviet officials, experts, and their families serving with the United Nations as part of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force.[47]

Phase Three: Government Response 1979-1981

Losing control over the streets, the government decided on a policy of all-out-war on the insurgents after a Ba'ath party congress concluded in January 1980.[48] The Party's first step was to arm Party loyalists and sympathizers, effectively creating a 'citizen militia'.[48] By March and April, the cities of Jisr al-Shughur and Aleppo were brought into line with thousands of troops in garrison and tanks on the streets. Hundreds were rounded up in search-and-destroy operations.

In another case, in retaliation to a failed terror attack on an Alawite village near Hama, the army executed about 400 of Hama's Sunni inhabitants, chosen randomly among the male population of over the age of 14.[49]

On 27 June 1980, Hafez Al Assad himself narrowly escaped death after a failed assassination attempt. The assailant fired a burst of rounds and threw two grenades, the first being kicked away by Assad and the second being covered by his personal bodyguard, Khalid al-Husayn, who died instantly. In retaliation, the very next day, Rifaat Al Assad's defence company flew into the infamous Palmyra prison in helicopters and killed hundreds of prisoners who had been Brotherhood-affiliates. By July 8, membership of the Muslim Brotherhood became a capital offence altogether,[50] with a month-long grace period for those who wished to turn themselves in and avoid a death sentence. Some couple thousand individuals turned themselves in, hoping to escape the death penalty; mostly urban, educated, young men.[51]

Rifaat Al Assad (Left) next to his brother Hafez Al Assad (Right). Rifaat Al Assad commanded the military divisions that entered Hama to crush the insurgency.

Phase Four: Crushing of the Insurgency 1982

The insurgency is generally considered to have been crushed by the bloody Hama massacre of 1982, in which thousands of insurgents, soldiers and residents were killed, according to anti-Syrian Government claims "the vast majority innocent civilians".[52][53] On 2 February 1982, the Brotherhood led a major insurrection in Hama, rapidly taking control of the city; the military responded by bombing Hama (whose population was about 250,000) throughout the rest of the month, killing between 2,000 and 25,000 people. The Hama events marked the defeat of the Brotherhood, and the militant Islamic movement in general, as a political force in Syria.[54]

US Intelligence conducted an intelligence analysis with regards to possible outcomes of the conflict.[55]

Aftermath

Having suppressed all opposition, Hafez al-Assad released some imprisoned members of the Brotherhood in the mid-1990s.

The Muslim Brotherhood would have no physical presence in Syria again.

Although its leadership is in exile, the Brotherhood continues to enjoy considerable sympathy among Syrians. Riyad al-Turk, a secular opposition leader, considers it "the most credible" Syrian opposition group[citation needed]. The Brotherhood has continued to advocate a democratic political system; it has abandoned its calls for violent resistance and for the application of shari'a law. The Brotherhood also maintains that it condemns sectarianism against Alawites and is only against the Baathist dictatorship. Al-Turk and others in the secular opposition are inclined to take this evolution seriously, as a sign of the Brotherhood's greater political maturity, and believe that the Brotherhood would now be willing to participate in a democratic system of government.[citation needed]

In a January 2006 interview, the Brotherhood's leader, Ali Sadreddine Bayanouni, "said the Muslim Brotherhood wants a peaceful change of government in Damascus and the establishment of a 'civil, democratic state', not an Islamic republic."[56] According to Bayanouni, the Syrian government admits having detained 30,000 people, giving a fair representation of the Brotherhood's strength.[52]

List of assassinations during the uprising

Individuals assassinated between 1976 and 1979

  • the commander of the Hama garrison, Colonel Ali Haydar, killed in October 1976
  • the rector of Damascus University, Muhammad al-Fadl, killed in February 1977
  • the commander of the missile corps, Brigadier 'Abd al Hamid Ruzzug, killed in June 1977
  • the doyen of Syrian dentists, Ibrahim Na'ama, killed in March 1978
  • the director of police affairs at the Ministry of the Interior, Colonel Ahmad Khalil, killed in August 1978
  • Public Prosecutor 'Adil Mini of the Supreme State Security Court, killed in April 1979.
  • President Hafez Asad's own doctor, the neurologist Muhammad Shahada Khalil, who was killed in August 1979.

Individuals assassinated between 1980 and 1982

While the involvement of the Syrian government "was not proved" in these killings, it "was widely suspected."

See also

References

  1. ^ a b Lefèvre 2013, pp. 100–101.
  2. ^ a b Conduit 2019, p. 34.
  3. ^ a b Conduit 2019, p. 35.
  4. ^ Lefèvre 2013, p. 110.
  5. ^ Milton Edwards, Beverly; Hinchcliffe, Peter (2001). "4: International Relations". Jordan: A Hashemite Legacy. New York, USA: Routledge. p. 97. ISBN 0-415-26726-9.
  6. ^ Conduit 2019, pp. 138–141.
  7. ^ Nina Wiedl, Kathrin (2006). The Hama Massacre – reasons, supporters of the rebellion, consequences. GRIN Verlag. pp. 26–31. ISBN 978-3-638-56770-1. Another reason for West Germany to oppose Asad was his involvement in international terrorism, such as the RAF (Baader Meinhof Gang) clique and the "Movement 2nd of June – Tupamaros West Berlin"... West Germany, as an ally in the anti-Soviet camp, had a reason to support the Brotherhood in Syria and to provide them a safe exile in Germany as a place from where they could continue their attempts to overthrow Asad, in order to weaken the Soviet bloc... Three ways how West Germany supported the Syrian Brotherhood.. It provided asylum and a save haven from where the exile-brotherhood could organise its struggle against Asad, it protected them against attacks of Syrian intelligence, and West German newspapers reported about the Hama incident in a way that supported the aims of the Brotherhood.
  8. ^ Nina Wiedl, Kathrin (2006). The Hama Massacre – reasons, supporters of the rebellion, consequences. GRIN Verlag. pp. 3–34. ISBN 978-3-638-56770-1.
  9. ^ a b "Like Father, Like Son — Tyranny in Syria, A Massacre in Hama". Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training. 11 June 2015. Archived from the original on 16 May 2016.
  10. ^ "Timeline: The Syrian revolt". Al Jazeera.
  11. ^ "Hamah (Hama), Syria, 1982". Global Security.
  12. ^ Seale (1989), pp. 336–337.
  13. ^ "Key events in Syria 1946–2010". Britannica. Archived from the original on 4 August 2016.
  14. ^ Ismael, Quiades (22 December 2009). "The Hama Massacre - February 1982". SciencesPo. Archived from the original on 3 November 2020.
  15. ^ Nina Wiedl, Kathrin (2006). The Hama Massacre – reasons, supporters of the rebellion, consequences. GRIN Verlag. p. 23. ISBN 978-3-638-56770-1.
  16. ^ Lefèvre (2013), p. 59.
  17. ^ Lefèvre (2013), p. [page needed].
  18. ^ "Sufism and Sufi Brotherhoods in Syria and Palestine". ou.edu.
  19. ^ a b c Alzaben, Eias (2022). The Implications of Social Theory of Fear on the Alawi Section in the Syrian civil conflict (Bachelors). Linnaeus University. p. 27. Archived from the original on 26 February 2023 – via Linneuniversitet.
  20. ^ D. Kaplan, Robert (February 1993). "Syria: Identity Crisis". The Atlantic. Archived from the original on 2 June 2022.
  21. ^ Seale (1989), pp. 92–93.
  22. ^ Seale (1989), p. 93.
  23. ^ Alianak, Sonia (2007). Middle Eastern Leaders and Islam: A Precarious Equilibrium. Peter Lang. p. 55. ISBN 978-0-8204-6924-9.
  24. ^ Glassé, Cyril (2001). The new encyclopedia of Islam (Rev. ed.). Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press. pp. 36–37. ISBN 0-7591-0189-2. OCLC 48553252.
  25. ^ Lefèvre 2013, pp. 102–103.
  26. ^ Conduit 2019, p. 99.
  27. ^ Kaplan, Robert (February 1993). "Syria: Identity Crisis". The Atlantic.
  28. ^ Seale (1989), p. 317.
  29. ^ Lefèvre (2013), p. 49.
  30. ^ Seale (1989), pp. 320–321.
  31. ^ Seale (1989), p. 285.
  32. ^ a b Seale (1989), p. 316.
  33. ^ Seale (1989), pp. 316–317.
  34. ^ Seale (1989), pp. 336.
  35. ^ Roberts, David (2015). "12: Hafiz al-Asad - II". The Ba'ath and the creation of modern Syria (Routledge Library Editions: Syria ed.). Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge. pp. 120, 121. ISBN 978-0-415-83882-5.
  36. ^ Lia, Brynjar (1 October 2016). "The Islamist Uprising in Syria, 1976–82: The History and Legacy of a Failed Revolt". British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies. 43 (4): 546. doi:10.1080/13530194.2016.1139442. ISSN 1353-0194. S2CID 146869114.
  37. ^ Conduit 2019, p. 101.
  38. ^ Lefèvre 2015, p. 128.
  39. ^ Lefèvre 2013, p. 105.
  40. ^ a b Seale (1989), p. 324.
  41. ^ Lia, Brynjar (1 October 2016). "The Islamist Uprising in Syria, 1976–82: The History and Legacy of a Failed Revolt". British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies. 43 (4): 542. doi:10.1080/13530194.2016.1139442. ISSN 1353-0194. S2CID 146869114.
  42. ^ Lia, Brynjar (1 October 2016). "The Islamist Uprising in Syria, 1976–82: The History and Legacy of a Failed Revolt". British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies. 43 (4): 548. doi:10.1080/13530194.2016.1139442. ISSN 1353-0194. S2CID 146869114.
  43. ^ Carré & Michaud (1983), pp. 141–146.
  44. ^ Seale (1989), pp. 324–325.
  45. ^ Seale (1989), p. 325.
  46. ^ Tashijan, Yeghia (December 2011). "The Other Face of the Islamists".
  47. ^ Allan, James H. (1996). Peacekeeping: outspoken observations by a field officer. Praeger. p. 59. OCLC 1132130545.
  48. ^ a b Seale (1989), p. 327.
  49. ^ Carré & Michaud (1983), pp. 148–151.
  50. ^ "جماعة الإخوان المسلمين في سورية". Carnegie Middle East Center (in Arabic). Retrieved 26 May 2022.
  51. ^ Carré, Olivier (1983). Les Frères Musulmans: Egypte et Syrie (1928-1982). Gallimard. pp. 148–151. OCLC 1203497428.[clarification needed]
  52. ^ a b Wright, Robin (2008). Dreams and Shadows: the Future of the Middle East. Penguin Press. pp. 243–248.
  53. ^ Seale (1989), p. 334.
  54. ^ Carré & Michaud (1983), p. 159.
  55. ^ "ملف:CIA-RDP86T01017R000100770001-5.pdf" (PDF). المعرفة (in Arabic). Retrieved 26 May 2022.
  56. ^ McCarthy, Rory (26 January 2006). "We would share power, says exiled leader of Syrian Islamist group". The Guardian.
  • Conduit, Dara (2019). The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1-108-49977-4.
  • Carré, Olivier; Michaud, Gérard (1983). Les Frères musulmans: Egypte et Syrie (1928–1982). Paris: Gallimard.
  • Lefèvre, Raphaël (2013). Ashes of Hama: the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria. New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-936545-6. OCLC 867049938.
  • Lefèvre, Raphaël (2015). "The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood's Alawi Conundrum". The Alawis of Syria: War, Faith and Politics in the Levant. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-045811-9.
  • Seale, Patrick (1989). Asad of Syria: the struggle for the Middle East (1st ed.). Berkeley: University of California Press. ISBN 0-520-06667-7. OCLC 19130614.

External links

This page was last edited on 25 May 2024, at 23:21
Basis of this page is in Wikipedia. Text is available under the CC BY-SA 3.0 Unported License. Non-text media are available under their specified licenses. Wikipedia® is a registered trademark of the Wikimedia Foundation, Inc. WIKI 2 is an independent company and has no affiliation with Wikimedia Foundation.