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Islamic Movement in Israel

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Raed Salah, the leader of the northern branch of the Islamic Movement in Israel
Hamed Abu Daabas, the leader of the southern branch of the Islamic Movement in Israel

The Islamic Movement in Israel (also known as the Islamic Movement in '48 Palestine)[1] is an Islamist movement that advocates for Islam in Israel, particularly among Arabs and Circassians.

The movement was established and led by Abdullah Nimar Darwish from 1971 to 1991, when he was replaced by Ibrahim Sarsur. In 1996 the movement decided to participate in the Israeli parliamentary elections for the first time in history. The decision was controversial. Opponents of the participation, based in Umm el-Fahm, branched off and were named the "Northern Branch" while the supporters, based in Kfar Qasim, were named the "Southern Branch".[2] The Southern Branch is considered more moderate, and the Northern Branch more radical.[3][4] The Northern Branch was banned by the Israeli government in November 2015 due to close ties with Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood, although it has been speculated that it may resurface as an underground organization.[by whom?]

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  • Islam and Politics: Crash Course World History 216

Transcription

Hi, I’m John Green, this is Crashcourse World History and today we’re going to talk about the Islamic state. A story ripped from the headlines! JFTP: Mr. Green? Wait. No, no, no, no this is not history this is news and also for me it’s not even news - it’s the future. Yeah, Me from the Past, it turns out that history is a continuous process, and that even current events have a history. INTRO Alright, let’s begin with the headlines. In 2014 ISIS – the Islamic State In Iraq and Syria, also known as ISIL and Islamic State, and many other things. Anyway, they declared a caliphate in the territory that the group controls, prompting many Americans to wonder what a Caliphate is. Well, if you’ve seen our episode on the emergence of Islam, the caliphate is an Islamic state, modeled on the original Islamic community that was founded by the prophet Muhammad in the 7th century. Now Muhammad was not a caliph, because the word means successor and they were the successors to Muhammad. But the first four political leaders who led the community and turned it into an empire have come to be known as the Four Rightly Guided caliphs. And when groups like ISIS that are trying to reestablish this kind of government look back on it they see it as being kind of the golden age. That this was a time of not just of growth for the Islamic empire but also of political stability and unity. Which as it happens it really wasn’t. Like even under the Four Rightly Guided caliphs the Islamic world was tremendously diverse and had huge disagreements. I mean of the Four Rightly Guided caliphs, three were assassinated. But anyway, the ideal version of that type of state is what ISIS and some other Islamists mean when they talk about reconstructing a caliphate although what the boundaries of a modern-day Caliphate might be are far from clear. I mean are you going to try to include Indonesia, but anyway, according to historian Michael Cook, “the restoration of the caliphate is a political ideal for many Islamists – and for some a political project,” But I want to be clear, that is not the case for the vast majority of Muslims. So when I use the term Islamism I mean something very specific. For me, Islamism is the idea that Islam can be the basis of government; it’s not the same as fundamentalism, although it’s often related to it. And it’s certainly not the same thing as Islam - which is a diverse and complicated and world wide religious tradition. Now, Islamism is a potent political force, but it’s a relatively recent one, and in many ways it developed as a response to our old friend, Western-style nationalism. That said, the idea that Islam can guide nation states or new kinds of states is much older than, you know, 2001. But it became much more relevant to Americans with the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington. Since then there has been more and more attention paid to the argument that Islam and Western civilization were at-best incompatible and at-worst locked in a mortal clash of civilizations. That clash of civilizations idea has become so ingrained that even though I don’t really agree with it i think we need to at least acknowledge what we’re talking about when we talk about us and them. Us, usually refers to European style nation states such as those which became dominant in the 19th century. These states tend to value democracy or at least pluralism, and, to varying degrees, they espouse political values such as egalitarianism and individualism. National identity in these states has at least traditionally been in a sense ethnic – based on some sense of shared language and culture if not exactly kinship – and it’s secular rather than religious. And then the arguments goes that the Islamic world is the opposite of this, but I am not convinced that that’s accurate. For instance, there are lots of religious connections in European nation states and there are lots of conversations about strengthening those religious connections or even making laws according to religious dictates. And in the Islamic world there are lots and lots of nation states. But let’s start with the idea that the Islamists are out of step with the modern political reality of the nation state. Let’s go to the thoughtbubble. So Islam is a universal religion that is supposed to transcend ethnic identity. According to the Quran, “The believers indeed are brothers.” (Q49:10) The universal nature of Islam didn’t mean that ethnicity didn’t matter at all of course; it did. Early on and for a long time Arab ethnicity was privileged in the Islamic world and this was especially true during the period of conquest. This was despite Muhammad saying “Truly the Arab has no superiority over the non-Arab, nor the non-Arab over the Arab, nor the black over the white, nor the white over the black, except in piety.” But their amazingly rapid and far reaching conquest granted the Arabs huge prestige that lasted until the 18th century. Now, from the beginning being a Muslim meant being part of a political community, because unlike Jesus or the Buddha, Muhammad was also a political leader in addition being a religious one. But at least to an extent the tight connection between political and religious identity really ended with the assassination of the Fourth Rightly Guided Caliph Ali. According to the writer Tamim Ansary, “After Ali’s death, the khalifate was just an empire.” But as the empire grew and became more diverse, it became impossible to hold it together as a political unit. So, even though the idea of a caliphate doesn’t square so well with western notions of ethnically homogenous nation states, ethnicity has always mattered in the Islamic world, as we can see if we go to Turkey, or Egypt, or Pakistan. In each of those places, the experience of being a Muslim is affected by the experience of one’s ethnicity. Thanks, Thoughtbubble. So this idea that the Islamic empire wasn’t always a caliphate for much of its history, was just an empire is really important. Because it gets to how not-different ways of organizing people are when it comes to like us and them. Now I’m not trying to make a false equivalence or say that all people are the same or whatever But like let’s look at a defining western political value - egalitarianism. In its earliest incarnations, Islam was unusually egalitarian, especially for its time. The religion structurally avoids hierarchy except perhaps based on piety. The Quran (49:13) states: “the noblest among you in the sight of God is the most godfearing of you,” and there’s a quote from Muhammad that “people are equals like the teeth of a comb.” To which I say. What’s a comb? Also, Islamic law, unlike, say Hammurabi’s code, doesn’t make class distinctions among Muslims, only between Muslims and non-Muslims, and Muhammad is quoted as saying that the blood of believers is always of equal value. In fact, that Islam lacks caste or formal aristocracy was noted by many Europeans, who thought it was weird. Now this canonical idea egalitarianism is not the same thing as equality - at least the equality that we’ve come to think about in the present day. Like in the Quran, and in the sayings of Muhammad called Hadiths, Women and men are alike in the performance of prayer and their obligation to pay the alms tax and their expectations of eternal life in paradise And women did have some inheritance rights in the early Islamic community that they did not enjoy in pre-Islamic Arabic communities. And that they also wouldn’t have had in Byzantium or, god forbid, Rome. And then there’s the inequality between Muslims and ‘unbelievers’ which is pretty well known; like other “peoples of the book” Christians and Jews, could live and work in Muslim empires provided they paid a special tax called the jizya. Which was far better than the life of a Muslim under Ferdinand and Isabella in Spain. And then there’s the issue of slavery, which the Quran accepts. In general Muslims have avoided enslaving other Muslims, showing that there is a sense of brotherhood and solidarity among believers, but overall to quote a historian “Islamic egalitarianism was … limited to free Muslim males.” Of course, if you’ve watched our US History series you may remember that early American egalitarianism was limited to like land-owning Christian males. My point here, is that if you look for historical precedence, you can generally find them. That’s true in the Islamic world, it’s also true in the rest of the world. Now today, in Europe and the United States, most citizens expect their states to be, in at least some degree, democratic, and republican, and constitutional. So when people in the west look at the early Islamic empire we have a way of imaging Caliphs as kings because, like, you know, we had kings. But Caliphs were important in different ways, for starters, they were the successor to the prophet. Now, maybe that’s similar to what the Roman Catholic papacy became over time but it’s not like a king - except for the king of England. King Henry VIII, founder of my church, who was like “I need to be the head of the church so I can get divorced.” But this combination of religious and political authority is important as is, at least initially, there was no hereditary succession of caliphs. And then there’s the concept of bay’a which is a kind of political allegiance, like according to Michael Cook, “an agreement is made between the future caliph and the future subject whereby each party is to have specified rights and duties.” A closely related theme is shura, “the duty of the caliph to consult with others before making his decision.” Like, according to tradition, when Abu Bakr accepted the role of the first Caliph he claimed that Muslims had no duty to obey him if he disobeyed God and the Prophet. Now that’s not democracy, but it is limited rule and it gives people some participation in the government. And then there’s another Western value that is often bandied about as something that isn’t part of the Islamic world - freedom. Islam, as you may know, means “submission.” And a Muslim is a person who submits to God. And to some Westerns that seems like the opposite of freedom. But the tradition within Islam, is that by releasing people from domination by other people, and making them servants of God - there is freedom. Freedom is a famously abstract concept, but if we think of it as the opposite of slavery, then being free from having to serve other people is freedom. That said, in contemporary Islamism, political freedom is not particularly held in high esteem. Which is one of the reasons why Islamists were less relevant in the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011 than people tend to think. But in at least one way, the caliphate can be thought of as enshrining republican (with a little “r”) values; Islamism emphasizes the rule of law and that even the caliph is subject to it. Since ultimate sovereignty belongs only to God, men to quote Michael Cook, “are not entitled to exercise lordship over each other.” And the much talked about Shari’a law, coming from a source outside the political process (whether that’s God or scholars) acts as a huge check on rulers becoming dictators. Right. like Iran’s government has many problems, but its president is not a dictator. But that same complete sovereignty of God over the people makes it difficult for Islamists to embrace democracy, because it’s based on the idea that the people themselves are sovereign. And the most radical Islamists, like Ayman al Zawahiri of Al-Qaeda really do hate democracy. He called democracy, “a new religion that deifies the masses.” And the completely extreme and absolutely horrifying Boko Haram in Nigeria have exclaimed that they, “will never accept any system of government apart from on stipulated by Islam,” and will, “keep on fighting against democracy, capitalism, socialism and whatever.” Yes, the “and whatever” is a quote. If you belong to a group that is fighting blank, blank, blank, and whatever - you need to leave that group. So it’s easy and relatively common for people in the West to say that Islam is inimical to political values like freedom, equality and democracy. And when we talk about certain groups of radical Islamists, that’s true. But in the West we also really, really struggle to see the other complexely, and to understand the incredible diversity in response to the revelation of the Quran. In my opinion, the clash of civilization model oversimplifies the world into this group and that group, and imagines that this group sees the world only that way and that group sees the world only this way. In fact, it’s complicated. For one thing, modern Islamism itself, is a very recent phenomenon, and in large part it’s a reaction to western imperialism and nationalism, and it doesn’t always reflect the ideas of Islam OR Islamic history. Humans have a storied tradition of calling upon certain facets of our history to inspire us toward what we already kind of want. And those seeking to recreate the caliphate want a more powerful and unified Arab world, if not, an Islamic world. And so they look toward history for inspiration, taking parts and leaving many others. What really happened, is that for the most part European style nationalism took hold in the Islamic world at the same time it rose in Europe, as the creation of Turkey shows quite clearly. But in trying to understand the allure of the caliphate it’s important to understand that Islam is not just a religion. From the beginning, it was a civilization. As the historian Tamim Ansary wrote: “Islam might just as validly be considered as one item in a class whose other items include communism, parliamentary democracy, fascism, and the like, because Islam is a social project like those others, an idea for how politics and the economy ought to be managed, a complete system of civil and criminal law.” But it’s also a very diverse system shaped by everything around it and everything inside of it - like any civilization. So when we try to discuss a topic as complex and charged as contemporary Islamic thought and practice and political worldviews, we don’t just need to be sure that we have some sense of history. We also need to be sure that we’re all talking about the same thing. There is nothing bright about the lines between politics and religion and history and nation. Thank you for watching. I’ll see you next week. Crash Course is filmed in the Chad and Stacey Emigholz studio here in Indianapolis. It’s made possible thanks to the hard work of all of these people. And also your subscriptions on Subbable. Subbable is a voluntary subscription service that allows you to support Crash Course directly so we can keep it free for everyone forever. You can also support Crash Course by buying some of our awesome merch like t-shirts or posters. Thank you for watching. And as we say in my hometown, “don’t forget to be awesome.”

History

Before the establishment of the Movement

The origins of the Islamic Movement can be traced back to the late years of Mandatory Palestine. Early organization began in the days of the 1936–39 Arab revolt in Palestine, however, it only began gaining momentum after World War II as a result of cooperation between the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem Haj Amin al-Husseini and the Muslim Brotherhood, which is the parent movement of the Islamic Movement in Israel.[5]

During the 1948 Palestine war, the movement cooperated with the Arab Higher Committee, much like the Egyptian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, which cooperated with the Egyptian military. As a result, it suffered a major setback following the war as all of its institutions in the newly formed Jewish state were shut down. During the period of martial law on Israeli Arabs between 1949 and 1966, the movement was suppressed. The institutions that remained in the West Bank were put under the control of Jordanian authorities, who controlled the West Bank. Though a mild recovery took place in the Gaza Strip during the 1950s under Egyptian rule, there too its influence steadily declined until 1967.[6]

The Six-Day War in 1967 caused renewed Palestinian support, both for the Palestine Liberation Organization, which had transformed from a puppet organization to a militant movement, and for Islamic Palestinian movements, among them the Islamic Movement in Israel. The newly created contact between Israeli Arabs and Palestinian Arabs in the territories occupied in 1967, in which the movement had managed to remain somewhat organized, also contributed to this resurgence. As part of the new contracts, members of the Islamic Movement in Israel were sent to study in religious institutions in the occupied territories.[7] At the same time, the government of Saudi Arabia began to allow Muslim citizens of Israel to perform the Hajj to Mecca (all other holders of Israeli passports are barred from entry into that country).

Establishment to split

In 1971, the Islamic Movement in Israel was founded by Abdullah Nimar Darwish after he had completed his religious studies in Nablus.[8] During the 1970s the movement largely focused on establishing welfare services for the Muslim community parallel to those of the state.[9] Among its activities were provision of computers to schools, the establishment of an Islamic football league, marriage arrangement, charity and more.

Parallel to this charity work, several of the heads of the movement, led by Darwish, established an organization called Osrat al-Jihad ("The Families of Jihad"), with the goal of establishing "an Arab Islamic state in Palestine". The heads of the organization were arrested in 1979 following an attempted minor attack on a kibbutz in central Israel, which didn't pose a threat to any lives. Dozens of members served sentences of between a few months to three years in prison.[10] In prison, the members decided to continue their work under Israeli law.[11]

During the 1980s, the movement experienced a rapid increase in support.[7]

With the outbreak of the First Intifada, the movement established the 'Islamic Relief Committee', whose purpose was to assist the needy in the occupied territories, particularly those harmed by Israel Defense Forces (IDF) operations.

In 1989, the movement decided to participate in elections for several Arab localities, in which it won control of six city councils and made substantial gains in others. The most significant victory was achieved by Sheikh Raed Salah in Umm al-Fahm, which subsequently became the center of the movement.

The Oslo I Accord caused a split in the movement whereby the northern branch opposed the agreement (similarly to the position of Hamas), and the southern branch supported the agreement. In 1994, the activity of the movement was felt in the Jewish public when Salah attempted to mediate between Israel and Hamas on the issue of the captured Israeli soldier Nakhshon Waxman.

In 1995, the Israeli Shin Bet closed down the 'Islamic Relief Committee' after it was found that the body had been granting financial assistance to the families of Hamas members. It was quickly reopened under the name 'The Humanitarian Rescue Committee', whose objectives were almost identical. In 1997, the committee was closed a second time (though only for a short period), and subsequently restrictions were placed upon it.

Two separated branches

In 1996, the movement decided to run for the Knesset, following three previous rejections of the idea. The decision cemented the divisions between the northern and southern branches of the movement, the former, led by Raed Salah, arguing that elections should be boycotted. The southern branch, led by Sheikh Ibrahim Sarsur, ran for elections sometimes together with the Arab Democratic Party or in an Arab Joint List, and sometimes independently under the name United Arab List; in 2021 it joined the Israeli government coalition.

Ahead of Ariel Sharon's visit at the Temple Mount, the movement stirred agitation among Israeli Arabs. After the visit, both branches of the movement continued to incite their followers to violence in order to "protect the mountain." According to the Or Commission, these calls for violence contributed significantly to the heated spirits of the Arab public and caused a severe worsening in the October 2000 events.

In 2002, the 'Humanitarian Rescue Committee' was shut down, and after a short period 'The Organization of the Humanitarian Rescue Committee' was established in its stead. In the same year Eli Yishai, then Interior Minister, decided to close the newspaper of the northern branch, though the decision was never implemented.

In 2003, the heads of the northern branch of the movement were arrested under suspicion of aiding Hamas, but two-thirds were released almost immediately. The remaining suspects were detained, but most were released during 2005 after signing a plea bargain. Both the arrests and the plea bargain stirred opposition from both the left wing and right wing camps of Israeli politics. The main offenses of which those detained were accused were financial offenses such as tax evasion, but also contact with a foreign agent and contact with a terrorist group. Ultimately, only the economic offenses were proved true.

These two events, as well as the history of incitement by the movement, have been defining factors in the group's image among the Jewish public, most of which views it as a terrorist organization, and there have been many calls to ban the movement.

In 2007, in response to Mahmoud Ahmedinejad's comments on the Holocaust, the Islamic Movement (southern branch) leader Abdullah Nimr Darwish "slammed" the Holocaust denial. He also said that antisemitic texts in the Muslim world were contrary to the true spirit of Islam. At the same time, he criticized Israel for not supporting a Saudi peace initiative involving Hamas and Fatah.[8]

In 2012, the Murabitat and Mourabitoun were founded by the Northern Branch after fear arose that the status quo at the Temple Mount would be changed by Israel.

Banning of the Northern Branch

On September 9, 2015, Israel banned both the Murabitat and the Mourabitoun stating they were a source of incitement and violence. Defense Minister Moshe Yaalon said in a statement that they were the "main cause in the creation of tension and violence on the Temple Mount (al Aqsa compound) specifically and Jerusalem in general."[12][13]

In November 2015, the Israeli Security Cabinet, led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, outlawed the Northern Branch, based on evidence gathered by the Israel Police and the Israeli secret police, Shin Bet, which allegedly showed that the movement had close connections with Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood. The organization's suspected ties with Hamas were a major catalyst for the decision; the northern branch received funding from Hamas-affiliated groups, and collaborated with Hamas in its institutional activities.

The chief of Shin Bet, Yoram Cohen, objected to the Cabinet's decision to outlaw the Northern Branch. According to him, there was no evidence linking it to terror attacks and the decision would be seen as a declaration of war on Israel's Muslim community and an assault on the political rights of its Palestinian minority. Banning the movement would, according to Cohen, do "more harm than good".[14]

As a consequence of the decision to outlaw the Northern Branch, police raided more than a dozen of its offices, seized computers, files, and funds, and questioned several members, including Salah and his deputy. The Israeli government also froze the northern branch's bank accounts and ordered 17 organizations affiliated with the branch to close.[15]

Israeli law professor Aeyal Gross, writing for the left-wing newspaper Haaretz, claimed that the outlawing criminalized thousands of citizens. Anyone who acted on the Northern Branch's behalf, held a job in it, attended one of its meetings or possessed one of its books, periodicals or fliers or any other publication could be prosecuted and sentenced up to ten years in prison.[14]

Foiled bombing attack

On December 27, 2016, Shin Bet revealed that it had indicted two men suspected for planning a bombing attack in retribution for the outlawing of the Northern Branch. A third man was indicted in 2017. Shin Bet claimed that they were plotting to attack Israeli soldiers at three possible locations in the Negev, Dimona, Arad, or the Nevatim Airbase.[16][17][18][19][20]

See also

References

  1. ^ "On the Banning of the Islamic Movement in 48 Palestine". Palestine Chronicle. 18 November 2015. Retrieved 13 February 2024.
  2. ^ Deskel, Shlomi (9 February 2013). "המדיניות המעשית" [The practical policy]. HaAyin HaShevi'it. Retrieved 13 November 2016.
  3. ^ Ettinger, Yair (2004-10-25). "בת ברית מפתיעה לשרון - התנועה האיסלמית" [A Surprising Ally for Sharon - the Islamic Movement] (in Hebrew). Walla! News. Archived from the original on 2005-05-03. Retrieved 2008-05-03.
  4. ^ Bard, Mitchell G.: Death to the Infidels: Radical Islam's War Against the Jews, p. 205
  5. ^ Danny Rabinowitz. "התעוררות דתית, פונדמנטליזם ורדיקליזם דתי אצל המוסלמים אזרחי ישראל" [Religious Awakening, Radicalism and Religious Fundamentalism among Muslim Citizens of Israel] (in Hebrew). Matach: The Center for Educational Technology. Retrieved 2008-05-03.
  6. ^ Yisraeli, Rafi (1993). Muslim Fundamentalism in Israel. London: Brassey's. p. 18. ISBN 978-0080417936. as cited at: http://lib.cet.ac.il/Pages/item.asp?item=7192
  7. ^ a b Raphael Israeli (1999-10-15). "The Islamic Movement in Israel". Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs. Retrieved 2008-05-03.
  8. ^ a b Barkat, Amiram (2007-02-12). "Founder of Islamic Movement in Israel slams Holocaust denial". Haaretz. Retrieved 15 June 2015.
  9. ^ Abu Raia, Isam (1991). "Umnal-Fakhim – Leadership and Organization (MA Thesis)" (Document). Johns Hopkins University. as cited at: http://lib.cet.ac.il/Pages/item.asp?item=7192
  10. ^ Nachman Tal (February 2000). "The Islamic Movement in Israel". Strategic Assessment. Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel-Aviv University. 2 (4). Archived from the original on 24 October 2007. Retrieved 2008-05-03.
  11. ^ Dr. Dan Rabinowitz, Religious Revival, Fundamentalism and Religious Radicalism amongst the Muslim Citizens of Israel
  12. ^ Hadid, Diaa (9 September 2015). "Israel Bans 2 Muslim Groups That Protest at Jerusalem Holy Site". New York Times. Retrieved 10 September 2015.
  13. ^ "Israel bans Palestinian activists behind Jerusalem shrine protests".
  14. ^ a b Jonathan Cook (12 January 2016). "Behind the Ban on the Islamic Movement in Israel".
  15. ^ Eichner, Itamar; Shaalan, Hassan; Zitun, Yoav (17 November 2015). "Israel bans northern branch of Islamic Movement". Ynetnews.
  16. ^ "נשק ומטענים בשלט רחוק: נחשפה חוליה שתכננה פיגועים נגד חיילים - וואלה! חדשות". 27 December 2016.
  17. ^ "נחשפה חוליית טרור של ישראלים שתכננו פיגוע נגד חיילים בנגב". Ynet. 27 December 2016.
  18. ^ "חשד: סגן מנהל ב"קינג-סטור" עמד בראש חוליית טרור".
  19. ^ "Shin Bet busts Islamic Movement cell suspected of planning shooting attack".
  20. ^ "Shin Bet foils plan by Arab Israelis to attack soldiers".
This page was last edited on 13 February 2024, at 20:33
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