Ideal language philosophy

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Wittgenstein (second from right), summer 1920
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Works Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus "Some Remarks on Logical Form" Blue and Brown Books Philosophical Remarks Philosophical Investigations On Certainty Culture and Value Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics Zettel Remarks on Colour Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief
People Bertrand Russell G. E. Moore John Maynard Keynes Paul Engelmann Friedrich Waismann Moritz Schlick Rudolf Carnap Francis Skinner Frank Ramsey Vienna Circle G. E. M. Anscombe Norman Malcolm Rush Rhees Peter Winch Peter Geach G. H. von Wright
Interpreters G. E. M. Anscombe Gordon Baker Stanley Cavell James F. Conant Alice Crary Cora Diamond Terry Eagleton Juliet Floyd A. C. Grayling Peter Hacker Oswald Hanfling Cressida Heyes Jaakko Hintikka Anthony Kenny Saul Kripke Warren Goldfarb Sandra Laugier Sabina Lovibond Norman Malcolm John McDowell Stephen Mulhall Colin McGinn Marie McGinn D. Z. Phillips Rupert Read Constantine Sandis Barry Stroud Stephen Toulmin Michael Williams Peter Winch John Wisdom Crispin Wright Hans Sluga
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Ideal language philosophy is contrasted with ordinary language philosophy. From about 1910 to 1930, analytic philosophers like Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein emphasized creating an ideal language for philosophical analysis, which would be free from the ambiguities of natural language that, in their opinion, often made for philosophical error. During this phase, Russell and Wittgenstein sought to understand language (and hence philosophical problems) by using formal logic to formalize the way in which philosophical statements are made. Wittgenstein developed a comprehensive system of logical atomism in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (German: Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung, 1921). He thereby argued that the universe is the totality of facts and not things: actual states of affairs and that these states of affairs can be expressed by the language of first-order predicate logic. Thus a picture of the universe can be construed by means of expressing atomic facts in the form of atomic propositions, and linking them using logical operators.

See also

• Formal language theory

References

• Barber, Alex; Stainton, Robert, eds. (2010). Concise Encyclopedia of Philosophy of Language and Linguistics. Oxford: Elsevier. p. 47. ISBN 978-0-08-096500-0. OCLC 377840723.
• Moore, A. W. (2012). The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics: Making Sense of Things. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 230, 242, 224–54. ISBN 978-1-139-02922-3. OCLC 778278812.

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This page was last edited on 2 January 2024, at 15:55