2010 Nigerien coup d'état

A coup d'état occurred in Niger on 18 February 2010. Soldiers attacked the presidential palace in Niamey under weapons fire at midday and captured President Mamadou Tandja, who was chairing a government meeting at the time.^[2] Later in the day, the rebels announced on television the formation of the Supreme Council for the Restoration of Democracy (CSRD),^[3]^[4] headed by chef d'escadron Salou Djibo.^[5]

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Hi, I’m John Green and this is Crash Course World History and today we’re talking about Iran. Oh, Mr. Green? Mr. Green? I know that country. It’s in the Middle East. It’s with Egypt. No, Me from the Past, we’re going to talk about Iran. Now, I used to be you so I remember when you would look at this part of the world and you would be like, “oh yeah, that’s a thing.” And in your case that “thing” extended more or less from I guess, like, western China to, like, uh, Poland. Then you’d make a bunch of broad generalizations about that area and no doubt use the terms Arab and Muslim interchangeably. But as usual Me From the Past the truth resists simplicity. So today we are going to talk about Iran and just Iran. Specifically, the 1979 Iranian Revolution. So the 1979 Iranian Revolution and its aftermath are often seen by detractors as the first step in the creation of an isolated, fundamentalist state that supports terrorism, and, you might be surprised to hear me say, that there is some truth to that interpretation. That said, the way you think about the Iranian Revolution depends a lot of which part of it you are looking at. And regardless, it’s very important because it represents a different kind of revolution from the ones that we usually talk about. So the 1979 uprisings were aimed at getting rid of the Pahlavi Dynasty, which sounds, like, impressive, but this dynasty had only had two kings, Reza Shah and Mohammed Reza Shah. Before the Pahlavis, Iran was ruled by the Qajar dynasty, and before that the Safavids. The Safavids and Qajars were responsible for two of the most important aspects of Iran: The Safavids made Shia Islam the official state religion in Iran, starting with Ismail I in 1501, and the Qajars gave the Muslim clergy – the ulema – political power. So most of the world’s Muslims are Sunnis but the Shia, or Shiites are an important sect that began very early on – around 680 CE and today form the majority of Muslims in Iran and Iraq. Now within both Sunni and Shia there are further divisions and many sects, but we’re just going to talk about, like, the historical difference between the two. Shia Muslims believe that Ali should’ve been the first Caliph, Sunni Muslims think that Abu Bakr, who was the first Caliph, was rightly chosen. Since that disagreement, there have been many others, many doctrinal differences but what’s more important is that from the very beginning, Shia Muslims saw themselves as the party of the oppressed standing up against the wealthy and powerful and harkening back to the social justice standard that was set by the prophet. And this connection between religious faith and social justice was extremely important to the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and also to previous revolutions in Iran. This is really crucial to understand because many historians argue that the Iranian revolution represents what the journalist Christian Caryl called an “odd fusion of Islam and late-twentieth century revolutionary politics.” But actually, in the scheme of Iranian history, its not so odd. Because 1979 was not Iran’s first revolution. The first major one was in 1906. It forced the ruling Qajars to accept a constitution. It created a parliament and supposedly some limits on the king, and made Shia Islam the official state religion, but it also protected the rights of minorities in Iran. It ultimately failed partly because the clergy withdrew their support, partly because the shah worked very actively against it, and maybe most importantly, because the Russians and the British worked to keep Persia weak so they could continue to try to dominate the region. Which reminds me that most people in Iran are not Arabs, they are Persian. And most people in Iran don’t speak Arabic, they speak Farsi, or as we often call it in English, Persian. So after WWI European rivalries really heated up because of the discovery of oil in the Middle East. The British established the Anglo Iranian Oil Company – which would later come to be known as BP. They also extracted a bunch of concessions from the Iranian government in addition to extracting lots of oil. And they helped to engineer a change in dynasty by supporting military commander Reza Khan in his coup in February 1921. Reza Khan became Reza Shah and then he attempted to turn Persia, which he re-named Iran in 1935, into a modern, secular, western-style state kind of like Turkey was under Ataturk. But Reza Shah is perhaps best remembered for his over the top dictatorial repression, which turned the clergy against him. Okay, so during World War II Reza Shah abdicated and his young son Mohammad Reza Shah became the leader of Iran. Which he remained, mostly, until 1979 when he definitely stopped being the leader of Iran. So after World War II, the British allowed greater popular participation in Iran’s government. The main party to benefit from this openness was Tudeh, the Iranian communist party. Mohammed Mosaddegh was elected prime minister in 1951 and led the parliament to nationalize Iran’s oil industry, and that was the end of the democratic experiment. Now most history books say that in 1953 the British and the CIA engineered a coup to remove Mosaddegh from office. And that is quite possibly true. It is definitely true that we tried to engineer a coup. It’s also true that Mosaddegh quit and fled Iran following demonstrations against him. But we also know that the Shia clergy encouraged those demonstrations. That’s a bit of a weird decision for the Clergy, considering that Shia Islam traditionally takes a radical stance against oppression. But it’s important to remember that Mosaddegh was supported by the Tudeh party and they were communists. Nationalization of the oil industry was one thing, but a further shift toward communism might mean appropriation of the land that supported the clergy, maybe even a rejection of religion altogether. So now we’ve seen two occasions where the Shia clergy support helped facilitate change. Right, in 1906 and again in 1953. So, let’s flash ahead to 1979. The Shah was definitely an autocrat, and he employed a ruthless secret police called the SAVAK to stifle dissent. In 1975, the Shah abolished Iran’s two political parties and replaced them with one party the Resurgence party. You’ll never guess who was resurging - the Shah. There was a huge round of censorship and arrests and torture of political prisoners signaling that autocracy was in Iran to stay. But before those events in 1975, say between 1962 and 1975, by most economic and social measures Iran saw huge improvements. In 1963, the Shah had tried to institute what he called a White Revolution – top-down modernization led by the monarchy, and in many ways he was successful, especially in improving industry and education. Oil revenues rose from $555 million in 1964 to $20 billion in 1976. And the Shah’s government invested a lot of that money in infrastructure and education. The population grew and infant mortality fell. A new professional middle class arose. But the White Revolution wasn’t universally popular. For instance, it was opposed by one particular Shia cleric - the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Khomeini spoke out against the White Revolution from the religious center of Iran, Qom. One of his main complaints was that the reforms would grant more rights to women, including the right to vote, but he also attacked the government for, quote: “the rigging of elections and other constitutional abuses, neglect of the poor and the sale of oil to Israel.” And in general, Khomeini felt that a king’s power was inherently un-Islamic and that Shia tradition was to fight that power. That noted about Khomeini, the 1979 revolution didn’t start out to create an Islamic state. At first it was a pretty typical uprising by dissatisfied Iranians to overthrow a government that they perceived as corrupt and unresponsive to their needs. In spite of, or arguably because of, oil-fueled economic growth, many Iranians weren’t enjoying economic success. The universities were turning out more graduates than there were jobs and the mechanization of agriculture had the predictable result of displacing farmers who moved to cities. Especially the capital city of Tehran where there weren’t nearly enough jobs for the number of people. So, I think it’s unfair to say that a majority of the demonstrators who took to the streets in late 1978 were motivated by a fundamentalist vision of Islam. They were dissatisfied with economic inequality and political repression and a corrupt regime. So why do we generally remember the 1979 revolution as having been motivated by Shia Islam. Well, Let’s go to the Thought Bubble. So the initial demonstrations did begin after an Iranian newspaper on January 7, 1978 published an article that was critical of Khomeini. By the way, at the time he was living in Paris. These initial demonstrations were pretty small, but when the government police and army forces starting firing on demonstrators, killing some of them, the protests grew. Each time marchers protested against the violent treatment of demonstrators, the government would crack down, and their violent reaction would spur more demonstrations. There was also a lot of criticism of the west tied up in the revolution. According to one woman who participated: “American lifestyles had come to be imposed as an ideal, the ultimate goal. Americanism was the model. American popular culture – books, magazines, film – had swept over our country like a flood...We found ourselves wondering ‘Is there any room for our own culture?’” The Shah never understood why so many people were protesting against him; he thought that they were communists, or being supported by the British. He also thought that merely bringing prosperity would be enough to keep him in power. It wasn’t. On January 16, 1979 he left Iran. He eventually ended up in the U.S., which had unfortunate consequences for diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Iran. But the point here is that the first part of the Iranian revolution was relatively peaceful protests followed by a government crackdown, more protests that eventually led to the collapse of the monarchy, and that looks kind of familiar, especially if you’ve studied, like, the French or Russian or even the American Revolutions. And most historians argue these protests weren’t about Islam, but rather, “The discontent over living conditions, pay cuts, and the threat of unemployment fused with the general disillusionment and anger with the regime.” The government that eventually replaced the monarchy was the second, and in many ways much more revolutionary revolution. Thanks Thought Bubble. So the new Islamic Republic of Iran was based on Khomeini’s idea about what an Islamic government should be, a principle he called velayat-e faqih. Mainly it was that a sharia law scholar, would have ultimate authority, because he was more knowledgeable than anyone about law and justice. There would be a legislature and a president and a prime minister, but any of their decisions could be overturned by the supreme ruler who from 1979 until his death was Khomeini. Now, if democracy is only about holding elections, then the new Iran was a democracy. I mean, Iran has elections, both for president and for the parliament. And for the record, despite what Khomeini might have thought in the ‘60s, women can vote in Iran and they do. They also serve in the parliament and the president’s cabinet. And in the referendum on whether to create an Islamic Republic of Iran, the vast majority of Iranians in a free and open vote, voted “yes.” Now governance in Iran is extremely complicated, too complicated for one Crash Course video. But in once sense at least, Iran is definitely not a democracy. The ultimate authority, written into the constitution, is not the will of the people but god, who is represented by the supreme religious leader. And the actions of the Islamic Republic, especially in the early chaotic days of 1979 but also many times since, don’t conform to most ideas of effective democracy. Like one of the first things that Khomeini did to shore up his support was to create the Islamic Revolutionary Guards and Hezbollah to defend the revolution against coup attempts. Although initially there were opposition parties, their activities were curtailed by the new “revolutionary courts” that applied sharia law in a particularly harsh fashion. Like it’s estimated that by October 1979, several hundred people had been executed. And under the new constitution, Khomeini was given extensive power. I mean, he could appoint the heads of the armed services, and the Revolutionary Guard and the national TV and radio stations. He also approved the candidates for presidential elections and appointed six of the twelve members of the Guardian Council that approved legislation from the parliament before it became law. So structurally Iran’s government looked kind of like other governments, but as Michael Axworthy points out it was different because, quote, “above and beyond stood the faqih, with the power and the responsibility to intervene directly in the name of Islam; indeed with powers greater than those given to most monarchs in constitutional monarchies.” By 1979, Iran already had a long history of clerical involvement in protest and dynamic change, but it also had a long history of pushing for constitutions and liberty. The current end result is the Islamic Republic of Iran, but it’s worth remembering that both those threads of history are still part of Iranian life. Like we saw that in 2009 and 2010 with the so-called Green Revolution where there were huge protests after an Iranian election. Those protests involved young people arguing for more rights and liberties.. But they were also led by, and encouraged by, reformist Shia clerics. In the U.S. we mostly remember the 1979 Iranian Revolution for its burning of American flags and taking of hostages in the American Embassy. That belonged more to the second phase of the revolution, the chaotic period when the Islamic republic was being born. Life in the Islamic Republic of Iran remains highly repressive. I mean, for instance, Iran still executes a very high percentage of criminals. But it’s inaccurate to say that Iran is merely a dictatorship, or that it’s merely repressive. And one of the challenges for people in the West trying to understand Iran is that we have to disentangle the various aspects of the revolution rather than simply relying on the images that have defined it for us. I hope this episode can help a little. You can find more resources in the links below. Thanks for watching. Crash Course is filmed here in the Chad and Stacey Emigholz studio in Indianapolis and it’s made possible because of the hard worth of all of these people. Thank you for watching and as we say in my hometown, “don’t forget to be awesome.”

Background

The coup followed a year-long political crisis in Niger related to President Tandja's efforts to extend his mandate beyond December 2009, when his second term was originally scheduled to end. Arguing that the people wanted him to remain in office, Tandja dissolved the National Assembly in May 2009 and subsequently appointed a new Constitutional Court, enabling him to push forward with a constitutional referendum in August 2009 that extended his mandate for an additional three years. The new constitution also enhanced Tandja's power by scrapping the semi-presidential system of government in favor of a presidential system.^[2]

The opposition reacted furiously to Tandja's efforts to remain in office and denounced him as a dictator.^[2] Tandja also faced strong international and regional criticism as a result of the events of 2009; Niger was suspended from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and some aid from western countries was halted.^[2]^[6] While Tandja said that he needed to remain in office to oversee various projects of tremendous economic value,^[2] others felt that Niger, as one of the poorest nations in the world, was in a poor position to cope with any degree of isolation. The former minister Mariama Gamatié pointed to a serious and ongoing hunger problem and argued that "we cannot afford [Tandja's] ego."^[7]

Although Tandja negotiated with the opposition in talks that were mediated by ECOWAS, the talks were thought to have reached a stalemate by February 2010. The opposition blamed Tandja for the lack of progress and continued to protest his rule; a large protest, over 10,000-strong, was held in Niamey on 14 February 2010.^[8]

Tandja is one of Niger's most enduring politicians, first entering politics through his participation in the 1974 coup d'état that brought Seyni Kountché to power. He held various high-level posts under the Kountché regime and then headed the National Movement for the Society of Development (MNSD) as an opposition leader during the 1990s. A 1999 coup d'état paved the way for a free and fair election in which Tandja was elected president.^[9]

Initial violence

A group of soldiers from a barracks at Tondibia, near Niamey, reportedly entered the city with armored vehicles at noon on 18 February 2010 and opened fire on the presidential palace. They did so while a meeting of the government, chaired by Tandja, was beginning.^[2] Gunfire and explosions near the presidential palace were heard "non-stop" for about 30 minutes, followed by "sporadic shooting". A "senior French official" told the news agency Agence France-Presse that a coup attempt was underway and that "it would appear that Tandja is not in a good position".^[10] As a result of the attack, Tandja was captured by the rebel soldiers.^[2]

At least 10 people, including four soldiers, were killed.^[11] The French government asked French nationals in Niamey to remain indoors for safety.^[12]

After the violence began, streets in the city center were quickly deserted as civilians sought shelter from the events. The national radio station Voix du Sahel continued to broadcast,^[13] although it was interrupted for 15 minutes. Subsequently it failed to mention the violence during a normal news report for the afternoon^[2] and played traditional music.^[14]

Subsequent events

A few hours after the initial violence, reports emerged indicating that the coup attempt, said to be led by Major Adamou Harouna, had succeeded. Tandja and government ministers were said to be held in detention at a point near the palace. Military music was broadcast on the national radio.^[15]

Later in the day, the formation of a ruling junta, the Supreme Council for the Restoration of Democracy (CSRD), was announced on television. Speaking for the CSRD, Colonel Abdul Karim Goukoye, who was surrounded by other soldiers, announced that the constitution was suspended and state institutions, such as the National Assembly, were dissolved. He called for calm and unity among the people and urged "national and international opinions to support us in our patriotic action to save Niger and its population from poverty, deception and corruption".^[16] According to Goukoye, the military had acted because it felt the need to resolve Niger's "tense political situation". The announcement did not mention Tandja, and it also failed to clarify how long the CSRD planned to remain in power. It did, however, say that the national borders were closed and an overnight curfew was being imposed.^[17] The border closure and curfew were lifted the next day.^[18]

Although the coup action was reportedly led by Adamou Harouna,^[19] the CSRD was headed by Colonel Salou Djibo.^[11] At the time of the coup he was considered an obscure figure, little known by the general public.^[11]^[20] The presence in the junta of some officers who had previously participated in the 1999 coup, which led to free and fair elections within a relatively short timeframe, raised hopes in some quarters that the CSRD would pursue a similar course.^[19]

According to Reuters, life in Niamey had largely returned to normal by 19 February and there was "a sense of relief and hope for change" after an extended political crisis and semi-isolation. The work of government continued, with ministries being managed by their secretaries-general.^[19] Speaking on 19 February, Djibo was reticent about the CSRD's intentions, saying only that "we are at a starting point, and we will create a consultative body".^[21] Speaking to the BBC, Goukoye gave assurances about Tandja's health and safety: "We are taking care of him—remember he is one of our elder soldiers". He also said that most of Tandja's ministers had been released; although three remained in detention, Goukoye said that they too would be released within days.^[22]

In the immediate aftermath of the coup, the opposition Coordination of Democratic Forces for the Republic (CFDR) coalition notified the junta of its willingness "to make its contribution for the creation of a new constitution and the organization of free, honest and transparent elections." The CFDR also held a rally in Niamey on 20 February, in which over 10,000 people participated. On that occasion, the CFDR thanked the junta for ousting Tandja and expressed solidarity with the army, viewing the coup as an opportunity to restore democracy.^[23]

At a summit of West African leaders in Bamako on 20 February, Colonel Djibrilla Hima, a member of the junta, said that elections would be held at some point, when the situation was stabilized and the appropriate conditions existed.^[24] Mohamed Ibn Chambas, the President of the ECOWAS Commission, met with the junta on 21 February and said afterward that it wanted "a short transition"; the transitional process would include a political dialogue, and the timetable of the transition would be determined through that dialogue. Hima, meanwhile, pointed to the successful transition initiated by the 1999 coup and gave an assurance that "we are going to do the same thing". He also argued that the army had seized power only as a last resort after the politicians had failed to resolve the situation. As for Tandja, Hima said that he was being held under house arrest at a Niamey villa.^[25]

According to Hima, the three ministers "still under surveillance"—Prime Minister Ali Badjo Gamatié, Interior Minister Albadé Abouba, and Finance Minister Ali Lamine Zeine—had held "very sensitive portfolios" under Tandja and therefore it was necessary "to ensure their security". Tandja's party, the MNSD, called for the three ministers, as well as Tandja, to be released.^[26]

Djibo was officially designated as head of state and head of government by a decree on 22 February. He then appointed Mahamadou Danda, who had been Minister of Communication during the transition that followed the 1999 coup, as Prime Minister on 23 February.^[27]^[28]

Mohamed Bazoum, one of the leading members of the CFDR, said on 23 February that his coalition wanted Tandja to be put on trial for high treason because he had abrogated the 1999 constitution in his efforts to remain in power. According to Bazoum, such a trial was necessary to deter future leaders from pursuing a similar course. He said that the junta should hold Tandja until "democratic institutions" were in place, and then Tandja should be tried, although he also said that he felt the death penalty would be unnecessary.^[29]

General Moumouni Boureima, who was Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces under Tandja, opposed the coup, and it was reported in the aftermath of the coup that his home was surrounded by tanks.^[28]

Speaking for the CSRD, Goukoye stated on 24 February that members of the CSRD and "any other transitional body" would not run in the planned election. He remained unwilling to specify a timetable for the election, saying that the dates would be determined through a consultative process. Goukoye also disclosed that six of Tandja's ministers, rather than three, were in detention, and that Morocco had offered asylum to Tandja.^[30]

On 1 March 2010, an interim government of 20 ministers was appointed. Five portfolios were assigned to officers, three of whom (including the Minister of Defense) were generals associated with Tandja.^[31] Former Prime Minister Gamatié was released along with five other former ministers on 4 March, but Tandja and Albadé Abouba remained in detention.^[32]

While Tandja's government consistently sought to downplay the problem of famine and hunger—to the point that it was considered "an almost taboo subject"—the CSRD quickly demonstrated a different approach. On 10 March, Prime Minister Danda issued "an emergency appeal" to the international community for aid. According to Danda, 58% of the population could be affected by lack of food; under Tandja, the number had been placed much lower, at about 20%. Danda discussed the government's plans for emergency relief, and the UN and EU both promised assistance.^[33]

Moctar Kassoum, who had served as Minister of Communications and Government Spokesman before the coup, was arrested on 15 March after "he urged people to fast and to organise prayers to call on God" in order to seek the release of Tandja and Abouba. He had also accused the CSRD of hypocrisy in continuing to hold Tandja and Abouba in detention while talking about reconciliation.^[34] Kassoum was reportedly arrested for "breaching public order" through his comments, but the junta released him on 18 March.^[35]

During its last months in power, Tandja's government had initiated legal charges against the main opposition leaders, forcing them to live in exile. Under the CSRD, the charges were abandoned and the opposition leaders were encouraged to return home. The key opposition leader Mahamane Ousmane—who was President of Niger from 1993 to 1996 and President of the National Assembly from 1999 to 2009—returned to Niger "discreetly" on a flight from Abuja on 24 March 2010.^[36]

On 29 March 2010, the CSRD arrested numerous high-ranking associates and loyalists of Tandja. According to Ousmane Cissé, the Minister of the Interior, they were arrested because they were involved in "subversive activities and undermining of the government and the transition process". Those arrested included Seyni Oumarou, the President of the MNSD; under Tandja, he had been Prime Minister from 2007 to 2009 and then briefly served as President of the National Assembly prior to the coup. Others who were arrested included Garba Lompo (Justice Minister), Lamido Moumouni (Equipment Minister), and the previously released Ali Lamine Zeine (Finance Minister). Kassoum, who had been released 11 days beforehand, was arrested again. Several heads of state-run companies were also arrested. Cissé stressed that any activity aimed at undermining the government or stirring unrest would be punished: "The state now cannot tolerate these practices to undermine the CSRD's efforts to reconcile Nigeriens."^[37]

On 1 April, 20 Tandja-appointed state company officials—including the heads of the state mining company, SOPAMIN, and the state petroleum import company, SONIDEP—were replaced in their posts.^[38] The CSRD released the 14 arrested Tandja loyalists the next day.^[38]^[39] Cissé, the Interior Minister, said that their "destabilisation operation" had been "neutralised" and that the suspects were being released "to calm things down".^[39]

Djibo appointed a committee to draw up a draft constitution on 21 April 2010. It was to complete its work within 45 days. The Consultative Council, another body established by the CSRD, then announced a proposed timetable for the transitional process on 23 April 2010. According to the timetable, a series of votes would begin on 24 October 2010, when the referendum on a new constitution would be held; the constitution, if approved by the referendum, would be promulgated on 11 November. The first round of the presidential and parliamentary elections would be held on 26 December 2010, and the results would be proclaimed on 12 January 2011. The second round of the presidential election, along with local elections, would follow on 26 January 2011; results for the presidential second round would be announced on 12 February 2011, the National Assembly would begin sitting for its parliamentary term on 14 February 2011, and results for the local elections would be announced on 27 February 2011. The process would then conclude with the swearing in of the newly elected President on 1 March 2011.^[40]

The CSRD announced on 5 May 2010 that it accepted the Consultative Council's proposal to set the length of the transition as one year, although it said that the electoral processes would be held in a different sequence (referendum, local elections, parliamentary election, presidential election).^[41] January 3 and 14 were set for presidential elections, while January 3 would be a legislative election.^{[citation needed]}

International reaction

United Nations: In New York, U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon condemned the coup, reiterating "his disapproval of unconstitutional changes of government as well as attempts to remain in power through unconstitutional means," U.N. deputy spokeswoman Marie Okabe said.^[42]
African Union: An AU official, Mull Sebujja Katende, stated that: "As of today, Niger will not participate in our activities. We have condemned the coup and imposed sanctions on Niger: Niger is suspended from all activities of the A.U."^[43] African Union chief Jean Ping condemned the coup and expressed concern.^[11]
Senegal: Senegal's Foreign Affairs Minister Madicke Niang told reporters in Niamey that ECOWAS was "hoping for a peaceful transition after the events of the last few days."^[44]
Libya: Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi sent an envoy asking for guarantees that Tandja and his family would not be harmed.^[45]
United States: State Department spokesman Philip Crowley said "This is a difficult situation […] President Tandja has been trying to extend his mandate in office. And obviously, that may well have been […] an act on his behalf that precipitated this act today." Crowley emphasized that the U.S. had little information about the exact nature of the coup, and that Niger needs to hold elections to form a new government. The United States called for a "speedy return to democracy".^[44]
France: Foreign ministry spokesman Bernard Valero stated, "France condemns the taking of power by non-constitutional means". France, of which Niger is a former colony, also demanded fresh elections "in the coming months."^[11]

Referendum and elections in 2010–2011

In late 2010 the Supreme Council for the Restoration of Democracy organized a constitutional referendum. In early 2011 general election was held. Former opposition leader Mahamadou Issoufou was elected as president.

2011 coup attempt

In July 2011, ten military officers were arrested for plotting a coup and assassination of President Issoufou. The assassination attempt was alleged to be planned for 16 July at an event marking the first 100 days of Issofou in office.^[46] It is often believed that the coup attempt was rooted in dissatisfaction with efforts by Issoufou to root out corruption in the military.^[1]

References

^ ^a ^b "Freedom in the World 2012: Niger". Freedom House. 2012. Retrieved 8 April 2013.
^ ^a ^b ^c ^d ^e ^f ^g ^h Todd Pitman, "Armed soldiers storm Niger presidential palace", Associated Press, 18 February 2010.
^ "Military coup ousts Niger president", BBC News, 18 February 2010.
^ "Un Conseil militaire prend le pouvoir au Niger" Archived 2010-02-21 at the Wayback Machine, Radio France Internationale, 19 February 2010 (in French).
^ "Niger : le chef d'escadron Salou Djibo, "président" du CSRD", Agence France-Presse, 19 February 2010 (in French),
^ "Niger President Reported Held in Coup Attempt", VOA News, 18 February 2010.
^ "NIGER: Constitution crisis turned coup", IRIN, 18 February 2010.
^ "Thousands protest Niger president's grip on power", Reuters, 14 February 2010.
^ "Tandja wins second term as president in historic first for country", IRIN, 8 December 2004.
^ Boureima Hama, "Soldiers launch coup against Niger president: sources", AFP, 18 February 2010.
^ ^a ^b ^c ^d ^e "Niger's military coup is condemned by France and Africa", BBC News, 19 February 2010.
^ "Attempted coup under way against President Tandja" Archived February 21, 2010, at the Wayback Machine, France24, 18 February 2010.
^ Djibril Saidou, "Niger Capital's Streets Empty After Palace Shooting" Archived February 24, 2010, at the Wayback Machine, Bloomberg, 18 February 2010.
^ Scott Stearns, "Reports: Soldiers Have Taken Niger President"^{[permanent dead link]}, VOA News, 18 February 2010.
^ Abdoulaye Massalatchi, "Niger president held by troops: military sources", Reuters, 18 February 2010.
^ "Niger soldiers say coup 'patriotic'", Al Jazeera, 18 February 2010.
^ "Niger president seized in military coup", Reuters, 18 February 2010.
^ "Niger's junta lifts curfew, reopens borders". African Press Agency. February 19, 2010. Retrieved 19 February 2010.^{[permanent dead link]}
^ ^a ^b ^c Abdoulaye Massalatchi, "Niger's capital calm one day after coup", Reuters, 19 February 2010.
^ "Factbox: Key players in Niger's military junta", Reuters, 19 February 2010.
^ Abdoulaye Massalatchi, "Niger coup leader silent on election timetable", Reuters, 19 February 2010.
^ "African Union suspends Niger after military coup", BBC News, 19 February 2010.
^ Abdoulaye Massalatchi, "Niger opposition urges junta to hold elections", Reuters, 20 February 2010.
^ "Niger junta says to hold elections after situation stabilized", Xinhua, 20 February 2010.
^ David Lewis and Abdoulaye Massalatchi, "Army to run Niger until election - ECOWAS", Reuters, 21 February 2010.
^ Fiacre Vidjingninou, "Niger junta pledges new constitution", AFP, 21 February 2010.
^ Boureima Hama, "Niger junta leader appoints premier", AFP, 23 February 2010.
^ ^a ^b "Niger junta names civilian as caretaker prime minister", BBC News, 23 February 2010.
^ Peter Clottey, "Niger Opposition Leader Says Ex-President Tandja Should Face Treason Charges" Archived 2010-02-27 at the Wayback Machine, VOA News, 23 February 2010.
^ David Lewis and Abdoulaye Massalatchi, "Niger junta says no members to run in vote", Reuters, 25 February 2010.
^ "Niger junta names five officers in new cabinet", AFP, 1 March 2010.
^ "Niger junta releases former prime minister, five former ministers"^{[permanent dead link]}, African Press Agency, 5 March 2010.
^ "Niger appeals for emergency food aid", AFP, 10 March 2010.
^ "Niger's former govt spokesman arrested: aide", AFP, 16 March 2010.
^ "Niger's ex-government spokesman freed: aide", AFP, 18 March 2010.
^ "Niger ex-parliamentary speaker returns from exile", AFP, 25 March 2010.
^ Boureima Hama, "Niger junta arrests ex-ministers for alleged plot", AFP, 29 March 2010.
^ ^a ^b "Niger junta sacks heads of state companies", Reuters, 4 April 2010.
^ ^a ^b "Niger junta frees allies of ex-president: ministry source", AFP, 2 April 2010.
^ "Présidentielle au Niger: le 26 décembre proposé pour la tenue du 1er tour", AFP, 23 April 2010 (in French).
^ "Niger: la junte militaire fixe à un an la durée de la transition", AFP, 5 May 2010 (in French).
^ "Niger opposition urges junta to hold elections". News.yahoo.com. Archived from the original on 21 February 2010. Retrieved 2010-02-21.
^ "African Union suspends Niger after military coup". 2010-02-19. Archived from the original on 2010-08-21. Retrieved 2010-02-23.
^ ^a ^b "US official says Tandja can blame himself for Niger coup". News.yahoo.com. 2010-02-18. Archived from the original on 23 February 2010. Retrieved 2010-02-23.
^ Hama, Boureima. "UN, AU envoys head to Niger for talks with junta". News.yahoo.com. Archived from the original on 23 February 2010. Retrieved 2010-02-21.
^ "Niger's new leader faced coup attempt for pursuing corruption investigation". Christian Science Monitor. 27 July 2011. Retrieved 8 April 2013.

v t e Coups d'état in Africa since 1960
1960s	Republic of the Congo (1960)^c Ethiopia (1960) Rwanda (1961) French Algeria (1961) Somalia (1961) Senegal (1962) Algeria (1962)^c Dahomey (1963)^c Togo (1963)^c Gabon (1964)^c Algeria (1965)^c Dahomey (1965) Burundi (1965) Democratic Republic of the Congo (1965) Central African Republic (1965–66)^c Burundi (July 1966)^c Burundi (November 1966)^c Ghana (1966)^c Upper Volta (1966)^c Nigeria (January 1966)^c Nigeria (July 1966)^c Republic of the Congo (1966) Dahomey (1967) Ghana (1967) Togo (1967)^c Algeria (1967) Sierra Leone (1968)^c Mali (1968)^c Republic of the Congo (1968)^c Dahomey (1969) Sudan (1969)^c Libya (September 1969)^c Somalia (1969)^c Libya (December 1969)
1970s	Lesotho (1970)^‡c Uganda (1971)^c Morocco (1971) Sudan (1971)^c Dahomey (1972)^c Ghana (1972)^c Morocco (1972) Republic of the Congo (1972) Rwanda (1973)^c Upper Volta (1974)^‡ Uganda (1974) Niger (1974)^c Ethiopia (1974)^c Comoros (1975)^c Sudan (1975) Libya (1975) Nigeria (1975)^c Chad (1975)^c Comoros (1976)^c Burundi (1976)^c Nigeria (1976) Sudan (1976) Benin (1977) Seychelles (1977)^c Sudan (1977) Uganda (June 1977) Angola (1977) Somalia (1978) Comoros (1978)^c Ghana (1978)^‡c Mauritania (1978)^c Mauritania (1979)^c Ghana (1979)^c Equatorial Guinea (1979)^c Central African Republic (1979)^c
1980s	Mauritania (1980)^c Liberia (1980)^c Guinea-Bissau (1980)^c Upper Volta (1980)^c Mauritania (1981) Gambia (1981) Central African Republic (1981)^c Ghana (1981)^c Seychelles (1981) Central African Republic (1982) Kenya (1982) Upper Volta (1982)^c Upper Volta (February 1983) Upper Volta (August 1983)^c Nigeria (1983)^c Mauritania (1984)^c Cameroon (1984) Guinea (1984)^c Uganda (1985)^c Nigeria (1985)^c Sudan (1985)^c Guinea (1985) Liberia (1985) Lesotho (1986)^c Togo (1986) Burkina Faso (1987)^c Burundi (1987)^c Republic of the Congo (1987) Tunisia (1987)^c Transkei (1987)^c Benin (1988) São Tomé and Príncipe (1988) Burkina Faso (1989) Ethiopia (1989) Chad (1989) Sudan (1989)^c
1990s	Sudan (1990) Nigeria (1990) Zambia (1990) Chad (1990)^c Ciskei (1990)^c Venda (1990)^c Mali (1991)^c Lesotho (1991)^c Suadn (1992) Sierra Leone (1992)^c Algeria (1992)^c Sierra Leone (December 1992) Burundi (1993) Libya (1993) Nigeria (1993)^c Bophuthatswana (1994)^c Gambia (1994)^c Comoros (1995) São Tomé and Príncipe (1995) Sierra Leone (1996)^c Guinea (1996) Burundi (1996)^c Niger (1996)^c Sierra Leone (August 1996) Zambia (1997) Sierra Leone (1997)^c Republic of the Congo (1998) Niger (1999)^c Côte d'Ivoire (1999)^c
2000s	Burundi (2001) Central African Republic (2001) Central African Republic (2003)^c Mauritania (2003) Guinea-Bissau (2003)^c São Tomé and Príncipe (2003) Burkina Faso (2003) Chad (2004) Sudan (2004) Equatorial Guinea (2004) Democratic Republic of the Congo (2004) Mauritania (2005)^c Chad (2006) Madagascar (2006) Guinea (2008)^c Mauritania (2008)^c Sudan (2008) Madagascar (2009)^c
2010s	Madagascar (2010) Niger (2010)^c Niger (2011) Mali (March 2012)^c Guinea-Bissau (2012)^c Mali (April 2012) Sudan (2012) Eritrea (2013) Chad (2013) Egypt (2013)^c Libya (October 2013) Central African Republic (2013)^c Libya (2014) Lesotho (2014) The Gambia (2014) Burundi (2015) Burkina Faso (2015) Burkina Faso (2016) Libya (2016) Zimbabwe (2017)^c Gabon (2019) Sudan (2019)^c Ethiopia (2019)
2020s	Mali (2020)^c Central African Republic (2021) Niger (2021) Mali (2021)^c Tunisia (2021)^‡^c Guinea (2021)^c Sudan (September 2021) Sudan (October 2021)^c Burkina Faso (January 2022)^c Guinea-Bissau (2022) Burkina Faso (September 2022)^c São Tomé and Príncipe (2022) Gambia (2022) Sudan (2023) Niger (2023)^c Gabon (2023)^c Burkina Faso (2023) Sierra Leone (2023) Guinea-Bissau (2023)
^c: successful coup ^‡ self-coup no sign for attempted coup

v t e Coups, self-coups, and attempted coups since 1991
List of coups and coup attempts by country since 2010
1990s	Mali (1991)^c Lesotho (1991)^c Thailand (1991)^c Soviet Union (1991) Haiti (1991)^c Georgia (1991–1992)^c Venezuela (1992) February November Peru (1992) April^‡^c November [es] Sierra Leone (1992)^c Algeria (1992)^c Sudan (1992) Guatemala (1993)^‡ Azerbaijan (1993)^c Russia (1993)^‡^c Libya (1993) Burundi (1993) Lithuania (1993) Nigeria (1993)^c Bophuthatswana (1994)^c Gambia (1994)^c Azerbaijan (1995) Qatar (1995)^c São Tomé and Príncipe (1995) Paraguay (1996) Iraq (1996) Burundi (1996)^c Niger (1996)^c Qatar (1996) Bangladesh (1996) Cambodia (1997)^c Turkey (1997)^c Zambia (1997) Niger (1999)^c Pakistan (1999)^c Côte d'Ivoire (1999)^c
2000s	Ecuador (2000)^c Paraguay (2000) Fiji (2000)^c Solomon Islands (2000) ^c Burundi (2001) Central African Republic (2001) Venezuela (2002) Burkina Faso (2003) Central African Republic (2003)^c Mauritania (2003) Philippines (2003) Guinea-Bissau (2003)^c São Tomé and Príncipe (2003) Chad (2004) Sudan (2004) Haiti (2004)^c Equatorial Guinea (2004) Democratic Republic of the Congo (2004) Peru (2005) Nepal (2005)^‡^c Mauritania (2005)^c Chad (2006) Thailand (2006)^c Madagascar (2006) Fiji (2006)^c Philippines (2007) Sudan (2008) Mauritania (2008)^c Guinea (2008)^c Madagascar (2009)^c Honduras (2009)^c
2010s	Niger (2010)^c Madagascar (2010) Niger (2011) Guinea-Bissau (2011) Bangladesh (2011) Mali (2012) March^c April Guinea-Bissau (2012)^c Sudan (2012) Eritrea (2013) Central African Republic (2013)^c Chad (2013) Egypt (2013)^c Libya (October 2013) Libya (2014) Thailand (2014)^c Gambia (2014) Yemen (2014–15)^c Burundi (2015) Burkina Faso (2015) Turkey (2016) Burkina Faso (2016) Libya (2016) Zimbabwe (2017)^c Yemen (2018)^c Gabon (2019) Sudan (2019)^c Ethiopia (2019)
2020s	Mali (2020)^c Central African Republic (2021) Myanmar (2021)^c Niger (2021) Mali (2021)^c Guinea (2021)^c Tunisia (2021)^‡^c Sudan (2021) September October^c Burkina Faso (2022) January^c September^c Guinea-Bissau (2022) São Tomé and Príncipe (2022) Peru (2022)^‡ Gambia (2022) Sudan (2023) Niger (2023)^c Gabon (2023)^c Burkina Faso (2023) Sierra Leone (2023) Guinea-Bissau (2023)
^‡ Self-coup or its attempt ^{[no symbol]} Coup attempt ^c Successful coup or self-coup See also: Plots and conspiracies