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Campaign to Suppress Bandits in Southwestern China

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Campaign to suppress bandits in southwestern China
Part of Chinese Civil War
DateFebruary 1950 – December 1953
Location
Result Communist victory
Belligerents

 Republic of China

China People's Republic of China
Commanders and leaders
Taiwan unknown China Deng Xiaoping
Strength
Taiwan 1,160,000+ China 350,000+
Casualties and losses
1,160,000+ Several thousand

The campaign to suppress bandits in southwestern China was a counterinsurgency campaign waged by the forces of the Chinese Communist Party against the Chinese Nationalist guerrillas, mostly consisting of bandits and regular nationalist forces not withdrawn from mainland China during the transfer of the nationalist government to Taiwan. The campaign occurred after the conclusion of World War II during the Chinese Civil War in Southwest China. The Communist counterinsurgency campaign was ultimately successful.

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  • Progressive Presidents: Crash Course US History #29
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Transcription

Episode 29: Progressive Presidents Hi, I’m John Green, this is CrashCourse U.S. History and today we’re going to finish our discussion of Progressivism, and indulge in a bit of “great man” history. Mr. Green, Mr. Green! Great man history, huh? Well I was born on a sunny, summer morning in 197-- Yeah you’re not great, Me from the Past. Also, you’re a boy not a man, and the only historically significant thing you ever participated in was a brilliant senior prank that wasn’t even your idea. However, 39 of our 43 presidents were, at least arguably, great men and today we’ll be talking about three of them. It will be kind of like a Jefferson vs. Hamilton for the 20th century, except not like that at all. But there will be a canal, and TWO people get shot. Intro So, as we saw in CrashCourse World History, national governments were on the rise from the middle of the 19th century until basically now. And in the U.S., Corporations became national and then, by the twentieth century, international. Like, the British East India Company was kind of an international corporation, but it wasn’t the same as Coca-Cola, although they did both deal in narcotics. And this mania for nationalization even affected sports. Like, in baseball, the National league and the American league were formed and in 1903 they played the first inaccurately named World Series. I’m sorry, was Botswana invited? Then it’s not a World Series. Anyway, the rise of a strong, national government was seen as an alternative to people’s lives being controlled by provincial city and state governments or by ever-growing corporations. Like, Herbert Croly, editor of the New Republic, thought that to achieve the Jeffersonian democratic self-determination ideal of individual freedom, the country needed to employ Hamiltonian government intervention in the economy. And he wasn’t the only one who believed that. Okay, so in 1901, 42-year-old Theodore Roosevelt became the youngest American president ever after William McKinley was assassinated by Leon Czolgosz. Czol--? Czolg--? Czol--? Hold on. “Czolgosz. Polish.” Czolgosz? Czolgosz? His name was Leon Chuckles? Man, Leon Chuckles was a real barrel of laughs for an anarchist. Usually they’re very serious. Right, so Leon Chuckles paved the way for Teddy Roosevelt, who in many ways the model of the 20th century president. He was very engaged in both domestic and foreign policy and he set the political agenda for the whole country. His political program, the Square Deal, aimed to distinguish good corporations that provided useful products and services at fair prices from evil corporations that existed just to make money. That is hilarious. A corporation that doesn’t exist just to make money. That’s fantastic, Teddy. Everybody knows that corporations are just inherently greedy people, but they are people. Roosevelt felt it was the federal government’s responsibility to regulate the economy directly and to break up power of wealthy corporations, and he used the Sherman Act to prosecute bad trusts such as the Northern Securities Company, which was a holding company created by J.P. Morgan that directed three major railroads and monopolized transport. And that did not make J.P. Morgan a happy bunny. Thank you for that, Stan. That’s, that’s wonderful. Shockingly, the legislative and executive branches managed to work together and Congress passed some actual legislation, including the Hepburn Act of 1906, which gave the Interstate Commerce Commission the power to regulate railroad rates and examine their company books. And Roosevelt was also a conservationist. He wanted to preserve the environment from economic exploitation, probably so that there would be plenty of animals for him to hunt with his big stick while he walked softly. Having appointed noted progressive Gifford Pinchot head of the forest service, millions of acres were set aside for new, highly managed national parks reflecting the progressive idea that experts could manage the world. But then in 1908, Teddy Roosevelt decided to go elephant hunting instead of running for re-election and he picked William Howard Taft to be his successor, but the man who became our largest president massively disappointed Roosevelt. When I say “our largest,” by the way, I don’t mean our greatest. I mean our largest. Taft was a pretty hard-core trust-buster who ordered the prosecution that broke up Standard Oil in 1911, but he didn’t see big business as bad unless the corporations stifled competition. He also supported the 16th amendment, allowing Congress to pass an income tax, and that paved the way for the 18th amendment, Prohibition, because with an income tax, the federal government didn’t have to rely on liquor excise taxes. So, why didn’t Roosevelt like Taft? Well, not only was Taft more conservative than most progressives, he also fired Pinchot in 1910. And Roosevelt was so frustrated with Taft that he actually challenged the incumbent president for the Republican nomination in 1912. Which Roosevelt lost, but he didn’t let it drop. He founded his own Progressive Party, called the Bull Moose Party so that he could run again. So, the election of 1912 featured four candidates: Taft; Teddy Roosevelt for the Bull Moose Party; Eugene Debs, for the Socialist Party; and Democrat Woodrow Wilson. It’s worth noting that in contemporary American political discourse, all four of these people would have been seen as somewhere between crazy liberals and actual communists. So Eugene Debs, from right here in my home state of Indiana, did not support the Socialist Party’s goal of abolishing capitalism, but he ran on a platform that included public ownership of railroads and banks, and laws limiting work hours. And running on the socialist ticket, Debs won 6% of the vote, which was, to quote another president, “not bad.” But the election of 1912 turned out to be a contest between Wilson and Roosevelt’s competing views over the dangers of increasing government power and economic concentration. Wilson claimed, “Freedom today is something more than being let alone. The program of government must in these days be positive, not negative merely.” That’s just not good grammar, sir. His program, called New Freedom, was supposed to reinvigorate democracy by restoring market competition and preventing big business from dominating government. It included stronger anti-trust laws and policies to encourage small businesses. Roosevelt’s answer to New Freedom was a program he called New Nationalism, because, of course, in election years all things are new. Roosevelt recognized the inevitability of big business and hoped to use government intervention to stop its abuses. New Nationalism included heavy taxes on personal and corporate fortunes and greater federal regulation of industries. So, the Bull Moose Party platform was in some ways a vision of a modern welfare state, it called for: Women’s suffrage Federal regulation National labor and health legislation for women and children Eight hour days and living wage for all workers National systems of social insurance for health, unemployment, and old age What are we, Canada? God, I wish we were Canada...You weren’t recording that, were you, Stan? Roosevelt thought his party’s platform was one of the most important documents in the history of mankind, and Americans agreed, they supported him and elected him in a landslide. Oh wait, no they didn’t. Instead, he lost. And also, a guy shot him at one of his campaign stops, that’s shooting #2. Roosevelt however survived and even went on to make the speech after being shot. What happened in the election is that Taft and Roosevelt split the Republican vote, leaving Woodrow Wilson president with a mere 42% of the popular vote, giving us our only democratic president between 1896 and 1932. Oh, it’s time for the mystery document? The rules here are simple. I guess the author of the mystery document. If I’m wrong, I get shocked by the shock pen, which many of you insist is fictional, but I promise, it’s not. “The two things we are fighting against, namely, excessive tariffs and almost universal monopoly, are the very things that these two branches of the Republican party both decline to combat. (...) They intend to accept these evils and stagger along under the burden of excessive tariffs and intolerable monopolies as best they can through administrative commissions. I say, therefore, that it is inconceivable that the people of the United States, whose instinct is against special privilege and whose deepest convictions are against monopoly, should turn to either of these parties for relief when these parties do not so much as pretend to offer them relief.” Alright, it’s definitely about the 1912 election. It talks about the Republican party being split into two parts, so it’s by a democrat. Or a socialist, but probably a democrat judging from the Mystery Document itself. You always make it hard, Stan. So it’s not going to be Woodrow Wilson because that would be obvious, but I do not know the names of any other prominent democrats, so I am going to guess Woodrow Wilson. YES? Get in! So, with its stirring anti-tariff, anti-monopoly, do not pass GO, do not collect $200 stance, New Freedom won out, and because the Democrats also controlled Congress, Wilson was able to implement this program. The Underwood Tariff reduced import duties and after the ratification of the 16th amendment, Congress imposed a graduated income tax on the richest 5% of Americans. Other legislation included the Clayton Act of 1914, which exempted unions from antitrust laws and made it easier for them to strike; the Keating-Owen Act, which outlawed child labor in manufacturing; and the Adamson Act which mandated an eight hour workday for railroad workers. If Wilson’s New Freedom sounds a lot like Roosevelt’s New Nationalism, that’s because they ended up being pretty similar. Wilson engaged in less trust busting than expected, and more regulation of the economy. Wilson didn’t institute a national system of health and unemployment insurance, but he did expand the powers of the Federal Trade Commission to investigate and prohibit unfair monopolistic practices. He also supported the founding of the Federal Reserve System in 1913, which gave the government much more control over banks in response to the Panic of 1907 where the U.S. had to be bailed out by J.P. Morgan. Fear not, big banks, the government will bail you out in due time. So, under Roosevelt, and Wilson, and to a lesser extent Taft, Progressivism flourished domestically, but it also became an international phenomenon as presidents expanded national government power outside the country’s border, mostly in the Western Hemisphere. Like, between 1901 and 1920, U.S. marines landed in Caribbean countries over 20 times, usually to create a more friendly environment for American businesses, but sometimes just to hang out on the beach. And this points to an interesting contradiction, Progressive presidents were very concerned about big business as a threat to freedom in the United States, but in Latin America and the Caribbean, they weren’t that concerned about freedom at all. Teddy Roosevelt especially was much more active in international diplomacy than his predecessors. He was the first president to win the Nobel Peace prize, for instance, for helping to negotiate the Treaty of Portsmouth that ended the Russo Japanese War in 1905. You may be familiar with his motto, “Speak Softly and Carry a Big Stick” – which essentially meant “the U.S. will intervene in Latin America whenever we want.” And probably the most famous such intervention was the building of the Panama Canal. It featured feats of engineering and succeeding where the French had failed...Stan, these are my favourite things! Let’s go to the Thought Bubble. The way we got the 10 mile wide canal zone wasn’t so awesome. In 1903, Panama was part of Colombia but the U.S. encouraged Philippe Bunau-Varilla to lead an uprising. Bunau-Varilla, a representative of the Panama Canal Company, was so grateful after the U.S. sent a gunboat to ensure that the Colombian army couldn’t stop him that he signed a treaty giving the U.S. the right to build and operate the canal and sovereignty over newly independent Panama’s Canal Zone, which we gave up in 2000 after enjoying nearly 100 Years of sovereignty thanks to Carter’s stupid altruism. Roosevelt also added the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, the 1823 statement that the U.S. would defend independent Latin American states from European intervention. Now, according to Roosevelt, we would wield our big stick like a policeman waving around a nightstick exercising an “international police power” over the western hemisphere. In practice, this meant using American troops to ensure that Latin American countries were stable enough for Americans to invest there. Like, in 1904 we seized the customs house in the Dominican Republic to make sure that they paid their debts to investors, then by “executive agreement” American banks got control of the DR’s finances. Roosevelt also encouraged investment by the United Fruit Company in Honduras and Costa Rica, helping to turn those nations into Banana Republics. No, not the store, Thought Bubble. Yes. Taft, on the other hand, maybe because of his experiences as governor of the Philippines, was less eager to wave America’s Big Stick. He emphasized loans and economic investment as the best way to spread American influence in a policy that came to be known as Dollar Diplomacy. Ultimately, Dollar Diplomacy was probably more effective, but it seemed weak to many people in contrast to Roosevelt’s strategy of SEND ALL THE TROOPS RIGHT NOW. Thanks, Thought Bubble. I wore my Banana Republic shirt just for this occasion. So, we’ve discussed Roosevelt and Taft’s foreign policy. Let’s move on to Wilson, who was, of course, an isolationist. No. Woodrow Wilson. Okay. Woodrow Wilson was not a volleyball. He was the son of a Presbyterian Minister, a former American history professor and once had been governor of New Jersey, so he understood moral indecency. Wilson thought the best way to teach other countries about the greatness of America was to export colossal amounts of American products. Like, in 1916, he instructed a group of businessmen, “Sell goods that will make the world more comfortable and happy, and convert them to the principles of America.” In short, Woodrow Wilson believed correctly that the the essence of democracy is the freedom to choose among hundreds of brightly coloured breakfast cereals. Still, Wilson intervened in Latin America more than any other U.S. President and his greatest moral triumph was in Mexico, where he wanted to teach the Mexicans “to elect good men”. To do this, Wilson sent troops to stop weapons from flowing to the military dictator Victoriano Huerta but the Americans, who landed at Veracruz were not welcomed with open arms, and 100 Mexicans and 19 Americans were killed. And then in 1916, having learned his lesson (just kidding), Wilson sent 10,000 troops into northern Mexico to chase after revolutionary bandit Pancho Villa. Villa had killed 17 Americans in New Mexico. And everyone knows that the proper response to such a criminal act is to send 10,000 troops into a foreign country. Pershing’s expedition was a smashing success fortunately…except that he actually did not capture Pancho Villa. But all of that was a prelude to Wilson’s leading America to our first international moral crusade, our involvement in the Great War. So, this period of American history is important because Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson oversaw the expansion of the power of the federal government both at home and abroad, and in doing so they became the first modern American presidents. I mean, these days, we may talk about small government and large government, but really, we’re always talking about large government. Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson recognized that the national government was going to have to deal with big business, and that it would have to get big to do that. And also that it had a role to play in ensuring that Americans would retain some freedom in this new industrial era. And they also built neo-imperialistic foreign policies around the idea that the safer the world was for American business, the better it was for Americans. As our old friend Eric Foner wrote: “The presidents who spoke the most about freedom were likely to intervene most frequently in the affairs of other countries.” Sometimes for good and sometimes for ill, we’ll see an extreme and ambiguous case of that next week when we look at America in World War I. Thanks for watching. I’ll see you then. Crash Course is produced and directed by Stan Muller. Our script supervisor is Meredith Danko. The associate producer is Danica Johnson. Our show is written by my high school history teacher, Raoul Meyer, Rosianna Rojas, and myself. And our graphics team is Thought Café. Every week, there’s a new caption for the libertage. If you’d like to suggest one, you can do so in comments where you can also ask questions about today’s video that will be answered by our team of historians. Thanks for watching Crash Course and as we say in my hometown, don’t forget to be awesome.

Strategies

The Nationalists forces found themselves in a precarious dilemma while conducting this campaign against the Communist forces stemming from complex politico-military situation in the region. Consequently, several actions proved to be grave miscalculations, contributing to their eventual defeat.

Nationalist miscalculations

Like other futile Nationalist attempts to wage guerrilla and insurgency warfare against the Communist forces after evacuation of the Nationalist government to Taipei, the first Nationalist strategic miscalculation made was at least an equal if not larger factor than the enemy's political and military pressure in the Nationalist defeat in this campaign. Immediately after World War II, the Nationalists had neither sufficient forces nor adequate logistical capabilities to secure the Japanese-occupied regions of China; the Nationalist government, unwilling to allow these regions to fall into Communist control, ordered the Japanese and their Chinese puppet government not to surrender to the Communists and allowed them to retain their fighting capabilities to 'maintain order' in occupied regions which entailed resisting Communist forces. This decision incurred resentment from the populace in Japanese occupied territory. This further eroded local support of the Nationalist government which was already blamed for the allowing the successful Japanese invasion in the first place. Half a decade later as the National Revolutionary Army was driven from mainland China, the Nationalists made another miscalculation in their desperation by enlisting the support of local bandits in the fight the Communists and ordered those Nationalist forces remaining in mainland China to join the bandits in combat against the communism. This decision proved unwise as the bandits were deeply feared and hated by the local populace which they preyed upon, and the sight of Nationalist forces joining the bandits further diminished the support for the Nationalist forces and solidified support for the People's Republic of China.

Another strategic miscalculation made by the Nationalists was similar to the one the nationalist government had made immediately after World War II, when it attempted to simultaneously address the warlord problem that had plagued China alongside its efforts to combat the growing Communist threat together. The warlords who were allied with Chiang Kai-shek's nationalist government were only interested in retaining their power and defected to the Japanese side when Japanese invaders offered to let them keep their power in exchange for their collaborations. After the World War II, the forces of the Japanese puppet government realigned with the Nationalist faction, once more with the intention of retain their power as they had when collaborating with the Japanese. It was difficult for Chiang to effectively dispose of these warlords immediately upon their surrender to the Nationalists as such an action would have caused discontent among other Nationalist factions. Furthermore, the former Japanese–aligned warlords could aid the Nationalist cause by retaining control of their territory and combating Communist insurgents. This would have the added benefit of weakening both the Communists and the collaborators. Half a decade later, these bandits the Nationalist government had failed to exterminate were deemed undesirable candidates for evacuation to Taiwan, consequently their use as a force to combat the Communists appeared to be a logical alternative. If the bandits were able to undermine the Communist governance of mainland China, the Nationalist forces would have an advantage in their anticipated counterattack to retake China. On the other hand, if the bandits were subdued by the Communists then the Nationalists would have been spared the task of eradicating the bandit forces after retaking China. However the bandit forces were more interested in keeping their own power than suppressing the Chinese Communist Revolution, and thus did not devote any substantial effort to fighting the Communists. Furthermore, the eventual eradication of bandits by the Communist government only served to strengthen its popular support as the Communists had succeeded where previous governments as far back from Qing Dynasty had failed.

Yet another strategic error by the Nationalist government involved the Nationalist forces left behind in mainland China. The Nationalist government required high quality and disciplined forces to defend Taiwan, the last Nationalist sanctuary. The forces which mainly comprised the forces of the Nationalist warlord allies were not the most suited to effect the last stand defense the Nationalist were preparing, and as such these forces were not given a high priority for evacuation. Instead, these forces were to remain on the mainland and continue to fight the Communists with guerrilla tactics. However this decision angered many of the troops left behind, and it was unlikely that they would fight the Communists with the same vigor as Nationalist forces with political motivation. Compounding this problem, due to the need of bandits' knowledge of the local area, leaders among the bandits were often granted higher ranks than the Nationalist troops left behind. As a result, the Nationalist regulars–turned–guerrillas often were unwilling to work in conjunction to the bandits they were once tasked to exterminate, especially as many of these forces had earlier engaged each other in combat during pacification campaigns. Similarly, the bandits were similarly willing to cooperate and attempted to expend those Nationalist troops when possible in order to spare their comrades.

The retreating Nationalist government made another significant error which was financial in nature. Due to the lack of money, those bandits turned guerrillas were mostly provided with arms, but not sufficient supplies and money. The bandits turned guerrilla had no problem of looting the local population to get what they need, as they had done for decades, which inevitably drove the general popular support further into the communist side. The little financial support provided by the nationalist government was simply not enough to support such guerrilla and insurgency warfare on such a large scale. Another unexpected but disastrous result of the insufficient financial support was that it had greatly eroded the support of the nationalist government within its own ranks. The wealthy landowners and businessmen were the strong supporters of nationalist government and as their properties were confiscated by the communists and redistributed to the poor, their hatred toward the communist government was enough to cause many of them to stay behind voluntarily to fight behind the enemy line. However, the landowners and businessmen were also longtime victims of bandits due to their wealth, and many of them had suffered even more than the general populace who had far less wealth. As these former landowners and businessmen turned guerrilla fighters were ordered to join their former bandits who once threatened, looted, kidnapped and even killed them and their relatives, it was obvious that such cooperation was mostly in name only and could not produce any actual benefits, and the alienation and discontent toward the nationalist government harbored by these once ardent nationalists would only grow greater.

Another problem for the nationalists was the strong disagreement among themselves over how to fight the war against their communist enemy. Military professionals preferred to fight a total war, incapacitate the enemy's ability to fight, but this inevitably conflicted with the interest of another faction of strong supporters of the nationalist government: the landowners and businessmen, who joined bandits to oppose such tactic. The reason was that landowners and businessmen supporting and joining the nationalist guerrilla firmly believed that the nationalists would be able to retake mainland China within several years and they would be able to regain their lost lands, businesses, and other properties that were confiscated and redistributed to the poor by the communists. As the nationalist military professionals in the guerrilla suggested and destroyed the production facilities and businesses as part of the total war, the landowners and businessmen would not be able to regain any valuable properties after the return of the nationalist government because those properties had been destroyed. The bandits agreed with the businessmen and landowners to oppose the idea of total war for a different reason: when the properties were destroyed and productivity dropped, they would not be able to loot enough supply to survive. As a result, despite the animosities between the bandits and landowners and businessmen, they were united together in the opposition to the military professional faction of the nationalists.

Communist strategies

In contrast to the nationalists, the Communists had much simpler and more effective strategy aided by their lack of the same order of problems as the Nationalists: the Communist forces simply needed to eradicate bandits. The Communist forces exploited Nationalist error to their advantage. As with all other bandit eradication campaigns, the Communist strategy sought to mobilize the victim populations to against the bandits. Furthermore, the Communists were in position to custom tailor specific strategies to combat bandits in specific localities.

Campaign

Southwestern China had been long plagued by bandits that had continuously existed for centuries. By the time the Nationalist government had lost control in the region in the face of the advancing Communist army, there were over half a million bandits active in the region. In Sichuan alone, there were over three hundred bands of bandits. In Yunnan, there were a hundred forty–eight bands of bandits. In Guizhou, there were five hundred forty–one bands of bandits. In addition large numbers of bandits were also active in Xikang. The number of bandits soon would more than double to more than a million, encouraged by the Nationalist government, which previously had attempted to eradicate them. After the Chengdu campaign concluded in December 1949, many retreating Nationalist military units joined forces with local bandits to continue their struggle against the Communists, but the alliance was a fragile one, and still allowed the Communists to defeat them separately.

In February 1950, the Communists made it a top priority to eradicate the bandits. The Communists decided to first eradicate bandits in wealthy areas and regions adjacent to the communication/transportation lines, gradually expanding their efforts into more remote regions. The Communist 3rd Corps, IV Corps, V Corps, XVIII Corps and the 7th Army of the I Corps, totaling to seventeen armies, were deployed for the bandit suppression campaign. From March 1953 onward, the Communists first targeted large bands of bandits with each military formation responsible of pacification of its designated area. Due to the heavy bandit activity in Sichuan, the planned deployment of Communist troops in Tibet was postponed to eradicate bandits first. The 11th Army and the 12th Army, totaling six divisions of the Communist III Corps, were responsible for eradicating bandits in eastern Sichuan. Eight divisions from the 10th Army, 18th Army and 15th Army of the Communist southern Sichuan Military Region were tasked to eradicating bandits in southern Sichuan. Seven divisions of the 60th Army, 62nd Army, and 7th Army of the Western Sichuan Military Region were tasked to eradicate bandits in western Sichuan. The 61st Army was tasked to eradicate bandits in northern Sichuan, and the 62nd Army was tasked to eradicate bandits in Xikang. The 13th Army, 14th Army and units of the 15th Army of the Communist IV Corps were tasked to eradicate bandits in Yunnan. The 16th Army of III Corps was tasked to eradicate bandits in Guizhou. After ten months of fighting, large organized bands of bandits were wiped out by the end of 1950, with over nine hundred thousand bandits annihilated.

From 1951 onward, the People's Liberation Army switched their focus to bandits who went into hiding in the remote regions while they continued strengthening the security of warehouses, transportation infrastructure, and communication lines. Large numbers of Communist cadres were sent to strengthen the local garrison and security forces. The main targeted area included the border regions of provinces and border region of counties, remote mountain ranges, and the area near YunnanBurmese border. From February 1951 to March 1951, the Western Sichuan Military Region successfully eradicated bandits active in Maogong (懋功), and secured the region by stepping up political pressure and mobilizing the local population. The success was approved by Mao Zedong and became an example for the rest to follow. Additionally to better coordinate bandit suppression efforts between different provinces and counties, bandit suppression operations headquarters for joint command were established at the border regions between provinces and counties. In 1951, over two hundred seven thousand bandits were annihilated in Sichuan, Xikang, Yunnan and Guizhou. Towns that had been occupied by bandits for more than a year were successfully taken back, including Ceheng (册亨), Wango (望谟), Libo (荔波) and Luodian County. Meanwhile, fourteen Communist regiments were deployed to annihilate bandits fled from southwestern China to northwestern China.

By the end of 1953, all bandits in southwestern China has been successfully eradicated, with a total of more than one million and a hundred sixty thousands bandits annihilated, over seven hundred artillery pieces and over six hundred thousands rifles captured. The internal conflicts between the bandits and the former Nationalist regulars contributed greatly to the Communist victory, and some female nationalists totaling over thirty thousands had suffered grave personal tragedies in the campaign: refusing to surrender to the Communists after that nationalist governments collapsed in the unstoppable Communist advance, many Nationalists opted to continue their fight by joining bandits in the hope of forming a united front to wage the guerrilla war against the war, as the retreating Nationalist government had directed. However many bandits took the opportunity to settle old scores with the Nationalist government they once fought. Over thirty thousand female Nationalists who attempted to join bandits were treated as enemies. These female nationalists were brutally raped and tortured by the bandits, afterward, they were sold to minorities in the remote regions as sex slaves. It was not until 1956 that the last of these unfortunate women were finally rescued from slavery and finally returned home.

Outcome

Although they shared a common anticommunist goal, the Nationalist guerrilla warfare campaign was largely handicapped by the enlistment of bandits, many of whom had fought Nationalist troops in the earlier pacification campaigns, and looted, kidnapped and even killed landlords and business owners, an important faction that supported the Nationalist government. But their union against their common enemy was half-hearted at the best. Compounding the problem further were additional differences within the ranks of the Nationalist guerrillas themselves. The futile Nationalist guerrilla campaign failed in the face of the expanding Communist state.

See also

References

  • Zhu, Zongzhen and Wang, Chaoguang, Liberation War History, 1st Edition, Social Scientific Literary Publishing House in Beijing, 2000, ISBN 7-80149-207-2 (set)
  • Zhang, Ping, History of the Liberation War, 1st Edition, Chinese Youth Publishing House in Beijing, 1987, ISBN 7-5006-0081-X (pbk.)
  • Jie, Lifu, Records of the Liberation War: The Decisive Battle of Two Kinds of Fates, 1st Edition, Hebei People's Publishing House in Shijiazhuang, 1990, ISBN 7-202-00733-9 (set)
  • Literary and Historical Research Committee of the Anhui Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, Liberation War, 1st Edition, Anhui People's Publishing House in Hefei, 1987, ISBN 7-212-00007-8
  • Li, Zuomin, Heroic Division and Iron Horse: Records of the Liberation War, 1st Edition, Chinese Communist Party History Publishing House in Beijing, 2004, ISBN 7-80199-029-3
  • Wang, Xingsheng, and Zhang, Jingshan, Chinese Liberation War, 1st Edition, People's Liberation Army Literature and Art Publishing House in Beijing, 2001, ISBN 7-5033-1351-X (set)
  • Huang, Youlan, History of the Chinese People's Liberation War, 1st Edition, Archives Publishing House in Beijing, 1992, ISBN 7-80019-338-1
  • Liu Wusheng, From Yan'an to Beijing: A Collection of Military Records and Research Publications of Important Campaigns in the Liberation War, 1st Edition, Central Literary Publishing House in Beijing, 1993, ISBN 7-5073-0074-9
  • Tang, Yilu and Bi, Jianzhong, History of Chinese People's Liberation Army in Chinese Liberation War, 1st Edition, Military Scientific Publishing House in Beijing, 1993 – 1997, ISBN 7-80021-719-1 (Volume 1), 7800219615 (Volume 2), 7800219631 (Volume 3), 7801370937 (Volume 4), and 7801370953 (Volume 5)
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