The 13 steps are identified in a paragraph of the Final Document (agreed by consensus) of the 2000 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, providing a set of 'practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons'. Article VI is the part of the Treaty that provides for disarmament, including nuclear disarmament.
It was adopted mainly on the initiative of the New Agenda Coalition, a group of countries favouring early nuclear disarmament, including Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa, and Sweden.
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What Keeps Nuclear Weapons from Proliferating: The hardest step in making a nuclear bomb I have here a scale-model of the first atomic bomb ever used. This bomb, which destroyed Hiroshima contains about sixty kilograms of uranium-235 of which only about six-hundred grams underwent fission. Enough though to generate an explosion equal to more than thirteen kilotons of TNT. The bomb’s designers divided the amount needed into two piece. At the tip they placed about 40% of the necessary uranium. They loaded the remaining 60% at the other end. A conventional explosion drove the projectile into the target initiating the nuclear explosion. Now the exact details of this bomb remain classified because they could still be used. Although this design involved some brilliant innovation by engineers in the twentith century the really difficult part is preparing the uranium. This lies at the heart of all efforts to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. The key problem. Separating two nearly identical variants of the element uranium. Natural uranium occurs as a metal ore and it contains primarily two isotopes. Most uranium is U-238. U-235 however, can easily sustain a chain reaction that releases tremendous energy, whereas the more common U-238 will not. Most elements are stable so that when bombarded with neutrons they simply absorb them and decay later, or they require very high energy neutrons but bombarding U235 with low energy neutrons causes its nucleus to split. The emission of these extra neutrons allows the initial fission to generate a chain reaction. So how do we go about enriching the U-235 in natural uranium. When we separate two items we make use of their differences. The two major uranium isotopes have identical magnetic and chemical properties no magnets will tug on one more than the other no solvent will wash away only one isotope and neither will boil before the other. So, to separate them engineers exploit the one small difference between them U235 weighs slightly less than U238. Less than a two percent difference just enough to make separation possible, but it’s not easy. That tiny weight difference means that the two isotopes will move at slightly different speeds when exposed to an equal force. To enrich uranium for the first atomic bomb engineers built immense gaseous diffusion plants that capitalized on the differing speeds. A gas containing uranium flows through miles of piping in a kind of race, where the lighter U-235 wins out. The gas flows through a tube encased in a chamber. A pressure difference between the chamber and the tube causes more of the U-235 to pass through perforations in the tube’s wall. To increase the separation the slightly enriched stream in the chamber is passed through many more stages like this. To enrich 3% U-235 to 90% takes nearly 4,000 stages. Enriching uranium for the first atomic bomb required a diffusion plant that covered over 40 acres. It housed a maze of 100 miles of piping. These diffusion plants use great amounts of energy to run Compressors generating the pressures needed and the energy to heat gas flowing throughout the miles of tubing. Another method of separation exploits the small mass difference by using a centrifuge. A typical device consists of a stationary outer cylinder and an inner rotor that spins. A gaseous mixture of the two isotopes flows up a tube along the central axis, filling the rotor. As it spins rapidly more of the U238 is thrown out to the edge than the lighter U235, which stays closer to the middle. The enriched stream can be removed from the rotor and sent to another centrifuge to be separated even more. The amount of separation is exaggerated here In an actual centrifuge the amount of enrichment is a fraction of a percent so a typical plant might have 60,000 centrifuges to enrich natural uranium to 30% U235. Such a plant uses four percent the energy of a gaseous diffusion plant. Even though this is a much more efficient process the precision that the rotors need to be manufactured with makes them very difficult to engineer. The smallest defect and the rotor spins itself to pieces. That’s lucky for us otherwise we might have nuclear devices right next to our microwave ovens. I’m Bill Hammack, the Engineerguy. This video is based on a chapter in the book Eight Amazing Engineering Stories. The chapters features more information about this subject. Learn more about the book at the address below.
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Article VI of the Treaty itself says:
Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.
The paragraph containing the 13 steps may be found in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference in the section 15. It says:
The Conference agrees on the following practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and paragraphs 3 and 4(c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament":
1. The importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications, without delay and without conditions and in accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.
2. A moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending entry into force of that Treaty.
3. The necessity of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator in 1995 and the mandate contained therein, taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years.
4. The necessity of establishing in the Conference on Disarmament an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate establishment of such a body.
5. The principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures.
6. An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all States parties are committed under Article VI.
7. The early entry into force and full implementation of START II and the conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons, in accordance with its provisions.
8. The completion and implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the United States of America, Russian Federation and the International Atomic Energy Agency.
9. Steps by all the nuclear-weapon States leading to nuclear disarmament in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all:
- Further efforts by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally
- Increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to the nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to Article VI and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress on nuclear disarmament
- The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process
- Concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems
- A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination
- The engagement as soon as appropriate of all the nuclear-weapon States in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons
10. Arrangements by all nuclear-weapon States to place, as soon as practicable, fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside of military programmes.
11. Reaffirmation that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control.
12. Regular reports, within the framework of the NPT strengthened review process, by all States parties on the implementation of Article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament", and recalling the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996.
13. The further development of the verification capabilities that will be required to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world.
See also
External links
- Peace and Security through Disarmament (UN)
- Disarmament Agreements (UN)
- Department for Disarmament Affairs (UN)
- NPT Review Conferences and Preparatory Committees
- Text of the Final Document of REVCON 2000, (PDF - 200KB)
This page was last edited on 8 July 2023, at 10:57